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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

PATCH New [email protected] 2 participants 3 messages Jul 21, 2025 – Jul 22, 2025

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author maintainer
#0 lore raw

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2025072141-jujitsu-ebay-6dbf@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2025 10:51:18 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using
async crypto

The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous. However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause use-after-free crashes:

crypt_message()

    // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
    creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);

    // Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
    rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);

    // Free creq while async operation is still in progress
    kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);

Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS, the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(), the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes when the driver later accesses the freed memory.

This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.

The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask, async implementations can be selected.

Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion

This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the CVE-2024-50047 fix.

fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +6 -1
index 1468c16ea9b8..cb659256d219 100644
@@ -4316,6 +4316,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE];
 	struct aead_request *req;
 	u8 *iv;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
 	void *creq;
 	size_t sensitive_size;
@@ -4366,7 +4367,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);
 	aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
 
-	rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
+				: crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
 
 	if (!rc && enc)
 		memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto

From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6 ]

The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous. However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause use-after-free crashes:

crypt_message()

    // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
    creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);

    // Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
    rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);

    // Free creq while async operation is still in progress
    kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);

Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS, the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(), the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes when the driver later accesses the freed memory.

This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.

The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask, async implementations can be selected.

Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion

This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the CVE-2024-50047 fix.

---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +6 -1
index aa1acc698caa2..1297acb5bf8e5 100644
@@ -4302,6 +4302,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE];
 	struct aead_request *req;
 	u8 *iv;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
 	void *creq;
 
@@ -4350,7 +4351,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);
 	aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
 
-	rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
+				: crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
 
 	if (!rc && enc)
 		memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto

In reply to [email protected]

From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6 ]

The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous. However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause use-after-free crashes:

crypt_message()

    // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
    creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);

    // Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
    rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);

    // Free creq while async operation is still in progress
    kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);

Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS, the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(), the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes when the driver later accesses the freed memory.

This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.

The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask, async implementations can be selected.

Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion

This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the CVE-2024-50047 fix.

---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +6 -1
index aa1acc698caa2..1297acb5bf8e5 100644
@@ -4302,6 +4302,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE];
 	struct aead_request *req;
 	u8 *iv;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
 	void *creq;
 
@@ -4350,7 +4351,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);
 	aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
 
-	rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
+				: crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
 
 	if (!rc && enc)
 		memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5