package/mbedtls: security bump to version 3.6.4
PATCH 1/1 package/mbedtls: security bump to version 3.6.4
This fixes the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2025-48965
Mbed TLS before 3.6.4 has a NULL pointer dereference because mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data can trigger conflicting data with val.p of NULL but val.len greater than zero.
For more information, see:
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tech-updates/security-advisories/
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2025-06-6.md
- CVE-2025-49087
In Mbed TLS 3.6.1 through 3.6.3 before 3.6.4, a timing discrepancy in block cipher padding removal allows an attacker to recover the plaintext when PKCS#7 padding mode is used.
For more information, see:
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tech-updates/security-advisories/
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2025-06-5.md
- CVE-2025-49601
In MbedTLS 3.3.0 before 3.6.4, mbedtls_lms_import_public_key does not check that the input buffer is at least 4 bytes before reading a 32-bit field, allowing a possible out-of-bounds read on truncated input. Specifically, an out-of-bounds read in mbedtls_lms_import_public_key allows context-dependent attackers to trigger a crash or limited adjacent-memory disclosure by supplying a truncated LMS (Leighton-Micali Signature) public-key buffer under four bytes. An LMS public key starts with a 4-byte type indicator. The function mbedtls_lms_import_public_key reads this type indicator before validating the size of its input.
For more information, see:
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2025-06-4.md
- CVE-2025-52496
Mbed TLS before 3.6.4 has a race condition in AESNI detection if certain compiler optimizations occur. An attacker may be able to extract an AES key from a multithreaded program, or perform a GCM forgery.
For more information, see:
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2025-06-1.md
- CVE-2025-52497
Mbed TLS before 3.6.4 has a PEM parsing one-byte heap-based buffer underflow, in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer and two mbedtls_pk_parse functions, via untrusted PEM input.
For more information, see:
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2025-06-2.md
For more information on the release, see:
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.4
--- package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash | 4 ++-- package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash +2 -2
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# From https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.6.3.1: -sha256 243ed496d5f88a5b3791021be2800aac821b9a4cc16e7134aa413c58b4c20e0c mbedtls-3.6.3.1.tar.bz2 +# From https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.4: +sha256 ec35b18a6c593cf98c3e30db8b98ff93e8940a8c4e690e66b41dfc011d678110 mbedtls-3.6.4.tar.bz2 # Locally calculated sha256 9b405ef4c89342f5eae1dd828882f931747f71001cfba7d114801039b52ad09b LICENSE
package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -MBEDTLS_VERSION = 3.6.3.1 +MBEDTLS_VERSION = 3.6.4 MBEDTLS_SITE = https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/download/v$(MBEDTLS_VERSION) MBEDTLS_SOURCE = mbedtls-$(MBEDTLS_VERSION).tar.bz2 MBEDTLS_CONF_OPTS = \
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