dm: set DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO feature for dm-thin
PATCH 1/1 dm: set DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO feature for dm-thin
dm-thin obviously can pass through inline crypto support.
--- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +2 -1
@@ -4111,7 +4111,7 @@ static void pool_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)static struct target_type pool_target = { .name ="thin-pool" , .features =DM_TARGET_SINGLETON |DM_TARGET_ALWAYS_WRITEABLE | -DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE , +DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE |DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO , .version = {1 ,23 ,0 }, .module =THIS_MODULE , .ctr = pool_ctr,
@@ -4509,6 +4509,7 @@ static struct target_type thin_target = { .status = thin_status, .iterate_devices = thin_iterate_devices, .io_hints = thin_io_hints, + .features = DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO, };/*----------------------------------------------------------------*/
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Mikulas Patocka
maintainerQuoted 1 line · LongPing Wei
dm-thin obviously can pass through inline crypto support.
Hi
I'm not sure about it. What if dm-thin performs copy-on-write? How would that interact with inline crypto?
Mikulas
Quoted 29 lines
Signed-off-by LongPing Wei <[email protected]>--- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/md/dm-thin.c +2
-1@@ -4111,7 +4111,7 @@ static void pool_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)static struct target_type pool_target = { .name ="thin-pool" , .features =DM_TARGET_SINGLETON |DM_TARGET_ALWAYS_WRITEABLE | -DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE , +DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE |DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO , .version = {1 ,23 ,0 }, .module =THIS_MODULE , .ctr = pool_ctr,@@ -4509,6 +4509,7 @@ static struct target_type thin_target = { .status = thin_status, .iterate_devices = thin_iterate_devices, .io_hints = thin_io_hints, + .features = DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO, };/*----------------------------------------------------------------*/ Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 4 lines · Mikulas Patocka
On Wed, 30 Jul 2025, LongPing Wei wrote:
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
dm-thin obviously can pass through inline crypto support.
Hi
I'm not sure about it. What if dm-thin performs copy-on-write? How would that interact with inline crypto?
Mikulas
Hi, Mikulas
dm-thin's encryption behavior is the same as dm-bow's when COW occurs, and DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO has already been set to dm-bow.
The key and iv of inline crypto are passed in by the upper layer, which is not affected by the specific location of data blocks in thin-pool.
LongPing Wei>> Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]>
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 28 lines
--- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/md/dm-thin.c +2
-1@@ -4111,7 +4111,7 @@ static void pool_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)static struct target_type pool_target = { .name ="thin-pool" , .features =DM_TARGET_SINGLETON |DM_TARGET_ALWAYS_WRITEABLE | -DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE , +DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE |DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO , .version = {1 ,23 ,0 }, .module =THIS_MODULE , .ctr = pool_ctr,@@ -4509,6 +4509,7 @@ static struct target_type thin_target = { .status = thin_status, .iterate_devices = thin_iterate_devices, .io_hints = thin_io_hints, + .features = DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO, };/*----------------------------------------------------------------*/ Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Mikulas Patocka
maintainerQuoted 16 lines · LongPing Wei
Quoted 4 lines · Mikulas Patocka
On Wed, 30 Jul 2025, LongPing Wei wrote:
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
dm-thin obviously can pass through inline crypto support.
Hi
I'm not sure about it. What if dm-thin performs copy-on-write? How would that interact with inline crypto?
Mikulas
Hi, Mikulas
Quoted 7 lines
dm-thin's encryption behavior is the same as dm-bow's when COW occurs, and
DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTOhas already been set to dm-bow.The key and iv of inline crypto are passed in by the upper layer, which is not affected by the specific location of data blocks in thin-pool.
LongPing Wei>> Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]>
How is it supposed to work during provisioning? Suppose that you have 64k chunk with no mapping. dm-thin returns zero for it. Then, you write 4k somewhere to this chunk. dm-thin allocates the chunk, writes zeroes to it and then writes 4k data into it (and only this 4k block will be encrypted). When you attempt to read this chunk, the 4k block will be deciphered correctly, but the zero data around it will be deciphered too and garbage will be returned to the application.
Mikulas
Quoted 36 lines · Mikulas Patocka
Quoted 16 lines · LongPing Wei
Quoted 4 lines · Mikulas Patocka
On Wed, 30 Jul 2025, LongPing Wei wrote:
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
dm-thin obviously can pass through inline crypto support.
Hi
I'm not sure about it. What if dm-thin performs copy-on-write? How would that interact with inline crypto?
Mikulas
Hi, Mikulas
Quoted 7 lines
dm-thin's encryption behavior is the same as dm-bow's when COW occurs, and
DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTOhas already been set to dm-bow.The key and iv of inline crypto are passed in by the upper layer, which is not affected by the specific location of data blocks in thin-pool.
LongPing Wei>> Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]>
How is it supposed to work during provisioning? Suppose that you have 64k chunk with no mapping. dm-thin returns zero for it. Then, you write 4k somewhere to this chunk. dm-thin allocates the chunk, writes zeroes to it and then writes 4k data into it (and only this 4k block will be encrypted). When you attempt to read this chunk, the 4k block will be deciphered correctly, but the zero data around it will be deciphered too and garbage will be returned to the application.
Quoted 2 lines
Mikulas
Hi, Mikulas
For example:
F2FS/EXT4
----
dm-thin
----
dm-thin-pool
----
pool data
1. There is a block of testfile in F2FS/EXT4.
2. The offset of this block is n.
3. The position in the dm-thin device is m.
4. The position in the pool data is x.
The IV is only be affectted by offset in file and the ino of this file.
Even if we change m by defrag or change x by COW, IV won't changed.
The upper layer will only read the decrypted blocks with the same key and continous IV in one bio.
If the upper layer read the full chunk with mixed blocks for GC purpose, key and IV won't be passed in. Then the upper layer just get the encrypted blocks.
LongPing Wei
Mikulas Patocka
maintainerQuoted 21 lines · LongPing Wei
Hi, Mikulas
For example:
F2FS/EXT4
----
dm-thin
----
dm-thin-pool
----
pool data1. There is a block of testfile in F2FS/EXT4.
2. The offset of this block is n.
3. The position in the dm-thin device is m.
4. The position in the pool data is x.The IV is only be affectted by offset in file and the ino of this file.
Even if we change m by defrag or change x by COW, IV won't changed.
Quoted 7 lines
The upper layer will only read the decrypted blocks with the same key and continous IV in one bio.
If the upper layer read the full chunk with mixed blocks for GC purpose, key and IV won't be passed in. Then the upper layer just get the encrypted blocks.
LongPing Wei
Yes - so if the IV is calculated from inode and offset, it seems safe to support it on dm-thin. So, I accepted the patch (and increased the target version).
BTW. what happens if someone uses FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE or FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE on a file with inline encryption? That changes file offsets of existing data, so it should be disallowed when using inline encryption - but I don't see a test for this in the functions ext4_collapse_range and ext4_insert_range.
Mikulas
Quoted 37 lines · Mikulas Patocka
Quoted 21 lines · LongPing Wei
Hi, Mikulas
For example:
F2FS/EXT4
----
dm-thin
----
dm-thin-pool
----
pool data1. There is a block of testfile in F2FS/EXT4.
2. The offset of this block is n.
3. The position in the dm-thin device is m.
4. The position in the pool data is x.The IV is only be affectted by offset in file and the ino of this file.
Even if we change m by defrag or change x by COW, IV won't changed.
Quoted 7 lines
The upper layer will only read the decrypted blocks with the same key and continous IV in one bio.
If the upper layer read the full chunk with mixed blocks for GC purpose, key and IV won't be passed in. Then the upper layer just get the encrypted blocks.
LongPing Wei
Yes - so if the IV is calculated from inode and offset, it seems safe to support it on dm-thin. So, I accepted the patch (and increased the target version).
Quoted 5 lines
BTW. what happens if someone uses
FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGEorFALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGEon a file with inline encryption? That changes file offsets of existing data, so it should be disallowed when using inline encryption - but I don't see a test for this in the functionsext4_collapse_rangeandext4_insert_range.
This seems to be a question about fscrypt, not about inline encryption per se. FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE and FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE fail with EOPNOTSUPP on encrypted files, as is documented in Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst. For ext4, the check happens at the beginning of ext4_fallocate().
- Eric
Quoted 44 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 37 lines · Mikulas Patocka
Quoted 21 lines · LongPing Wei
Hi, Mikulas
For example:
F2FS/EXT4
----
dm-thin
----
dm-thin-pool
----
pool data1. There is a block of testfile in F2FS/EXT4.
2. The offset of this block is n.
3. The position in the dm-thin device is m.
4. The position in the pool data is x.The IV is only be affectted by offset in file and the ino of this file.
Even if we change m by defrag or change x by COW, IV won't changed.
Quoted 7 lines
The upper layer will only read the decrypted blocks with the same key and continous IV in one bio.
If the upper layer read the full chunk with mixed blocks for GC purpose, key and IV won't be passed in. Then the upper layer just get the encrypted blocks.
LongPing Wei
Yes - so if the IV is calculated from inode and offset, it seems safe to support it on dm-thin. So, I accepted the patch (and increased the target version).
Quoted 5 lines
BTW. what happens if someone uses
FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGEorFALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGEon a file with inline encryption? That changes file offsets of existing data, so it should be disallowed when using inline encryption - but I don't see a test for this in the functionsext4_collapse_rangeandext4_insert_range.
Quoted 7 lines
This seems to be a question about fscrypt, not about inline encryption per se.
FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGEandFALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGEfail with EOPNOTSUPP on encrypted files, as is documented inDocumentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst. For ext4, the check happens at the beginning ofext4_fallocate().- Eric
Hi, Mikulas
For f2fs, the check happens at the beginning of f2fs_allocate() just like ext4.
LongPing Wei