6.6.102-rc1 review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/262 rtc: hym8563: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d0a518eb0a692a2ab8357e844970660c5ea37720 ]
When hym8563_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c +1 -1
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static long hym8563_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int hym8563_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/262 rtc: nct3018y: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 437c59e4b222cd697b4cf95995d933e7d583c5f1 ]
When nct3018y_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-nct3018y.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-nct3018y.c +1 -1
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static long nct3018y_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int nct3018y_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/262 rtc: pcf85063: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 186ae1869880e58bb3f142d222abdb35ecb4df0f ]
When pcf85063_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c +1 -1
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static long pcf85063_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int pcf85063_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/262 rtc: pcf8563: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 906726a5efeefe0ef0103ccff5312a09080c04ae ]
When pcf8563_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf8563.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf8563.c +1 -1
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static long pcf8563_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int pcf8563_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/262 rtc: rv3028: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b574acb3cf7591d2513a9f29f8c2021ad55fb881 ]
When rv3028_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-rv3028.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-rv3028.c +1 -1
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static long rv3028_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int rv3028_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/262 f2fs: fix KMSAN uninit-value in extent_info usage
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Abinash Singh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 154467f4ad033473e5c903a03e7b9bca7df9a0fa ]
KMSAN reported a use of uninitialized value in __is_extent_mergeable()
and __is_back_mergeable() via the read extent tree path.
The root cause is that get_read_extent_info() only initializes three fields (fofs, blk, len) of struct extent_info, leaving the remaining fields uninitialized. This leads to undefined behavior when those fields are accessed later, especially during extent merging.
Fix it by zero-initializing the extent_info struct before population.
--- fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c +1 -1
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ void f2fs_init_read_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage)struct f2fs_extent *i_ext = &F2FS_INODE (ipage)->i_ext;struct extent_tree *et;struct extent_node *en; -struct extent_info ei; +struct extent_info ei = {0 };if (!__may_extent_tree (inode,EX_READ )) {/* drop largest read extent */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/262 f2fs: doc: fix wrong quota mount option description
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 81b6ecca2f15922e8d653dc037df5871e754be6e ]
We should use "{usr,grp,prj}jquota=" to disable journaled quota, rather than using off{usr,grp,prj}jquota.
--- Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst +3 -3
@@ -233,9 +233,9 @@ usrjquota=<file> Appoint specified file and type during mount, so that quota grpjquota=<file> information can be properly updated during recovery flow, prjjquota=<file> <quota file>: must be in root directory; jqfmt=<quota type> <quota type>: [vfsold,vfsv0,vfsv1]. -offusrjquota Turn off user journalled quota. -offgrpjquota Turn off group journalled quota. -offprjjquota Turn off project journalled quota. +usrjquota= Turn off user journalled quota. +grpjquota= Turn off group journalled quota. +prjjquota= Turn off project journalled quota. quota Enable plain user disk quota accounting. noquota Disable all plain disk quota option. alloc_mode=%s Adjust block allocation policy, which supports "reuse"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/262 f2fs: fix to avoid UAF in f2fs_sync_inode_meta()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7c30d79930132466f5be7d0b57add14d1a016bda ]
syzbot reported an UAF issue as below: [1] [2]
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashReport&x=16594c60580000
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100567dc8 by task kworker/u4:0/8 CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller-00017-g642656a36791 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x151/0x1b7 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:316 [inline] print_report+0x158/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x13c/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0x100/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1553 f2fs_update_inode+0x72/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:588 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x135/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:706 f2fs_write_inode+0x416/0x790 fs/f2fs/inode.c:734 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4cf/0xb80 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_sb_inodes+0xb32/0x1910 fs/fs-writeback.c:1903 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x118/0x3f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1974 wb_writeback+0x3da/0xa00 fs/fs-writeback.c:2081 wb_check_background_flush fs/fs-writeback.c:2151 [inline] wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2239 [inline] wb_workfn+0xbba/0x1030 fs/fs-writeback.c:2266 process_one_work+0x73d/0xcb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2299 worker_thread+0xa60/0x1260 kernel/workqueue.c:2446 kthread+0x26d/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:386 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 </TASK> Allocated by task 298: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:333 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:202 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3421 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3431 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3438 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x102/0x270 mm/slub.c:3454 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3255 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x350 fs/f2fs/super.c:1437 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x18c/0x7e0 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:486 f2fs_lookup+0x3c1/0xb50 fs/f2fs/namei.c:484 __lookup_slow+0x2b9/0x3e0 fs/namei.c:1689 lookup_slow+0x5a/0x80 fs/namei.c:1706 walk_component+0x2e7/0x410 fs/namei.c:1997 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2454 [inline] path_lookupat+0x16d/0x450 fs/namei.c:2478 filename_lookup+0x251/0x600 fs/namei.c:2507 vfs_statx+0x107/0x4b0 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3434 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xda/0x7c0 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x52/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x131/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:241 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:249 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:178 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1745 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1771 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3686 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x291/0x560 mm/slub.c:3711 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1584 i_callback+0x4b/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x552/0xbe0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x502/0xf40 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x1db/0x650 kernel/softirq.c:624 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:662 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:479 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x52/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:711 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x10 kernel/softirq.c:723 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1118 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1118 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:691 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb4/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2807 [inline] call_rcu+0xdc/0x10f0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2926 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x87d/0x930 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x616/0x690 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x4e1/0x920 fs/namei.c:4396 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4437 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4435 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4435 x64_sys_call+0x289/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100567a10 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1360
The buggy address is located 952 bytes inside of
1360-byte region [ffff888100567a10, ffff888100567f60)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004015800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x100560 head:ffffea0004015800 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff8881002c4d80 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080160016 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0xd2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 298, tgid 298 (syz-executor330), ts 26489303743, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:33 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x213/0x220 mm/page_alloc.c:2637 prep_new_page+0x1b/0x110 mm/page_alloc.c:2644 get_page_from_freelist+0x3a98/0x3b10 mm/page_alloc.c:4539 __alloc_pages+0x234/0x610 mm/page_alloc.c:5837 alloc_slab_page+0x6c/0xf0 include/linux/gfp.h:-1 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1962 [inline] new_slab+0x90/0x3e0 mm/slub.c:2015 ___slab_alloc+0x6f9/0xb80 mm/slub.c:3203 __slab_alloc+0x5d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3302 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3387 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3431 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3438 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x149/0x270 mm/slub.c:3454 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3255 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x350 fs/f2fs/super.c:1437 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x18c/0x7e0 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:486 f2fs_fill_super+0x5360/0x6dc0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4488 mount_bdev+0x282/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1445 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4743 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632
page_owner free stack trace missing
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888100567c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100567d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888100567d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888100567e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100567e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&x=13654c60580000
[ 24.675720][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="loop0" ino=3 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.705426][ T296] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 24.706608][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:73): avc: denied { remove_name } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="file0" dev="loop0" ino=4 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.711550][ T296] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 296 at fs/f2fs/inode.c:847 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1262/0x1540
[ 24.734141][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:74): avc: denied { rename } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="file0" dev="loop0" ino=4 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.742969][ T296] Modules linked in:
[ 24.765201][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:75): avc: denied { add_name } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="bus" scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.768847][ T296] CPU: 0 PID: 296 Comm: syz-executor399 Not tainted 6.1.129-syzkaller-00017-g642656a36791 #0
[ 24.799506][ T296] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
[ 24.809401][ T296] RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1262/0x1540
[ 24.815018][ T296] Code: 34 70 4a ff eb 0d e8 2d 70 4a ff 4d 89 e5 4c 8b 64 24 18 48 8b 5c 24 28 4c 89 e7 e8 78 38 03 00 e9 84 fc ff ff e8 0e 70 4a ff <0f> 0b 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 7f 21 92 ff f0 41 80 0e 04 e9 61
[ 24.834584][ T296] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000db7a40 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 24.840465][ T296] RAX: ffffffff822aca42 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888110948000
[ 24.848291][ T296] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 24.856064][ T296] RBP: ffffc90000db7bb0 R08: ffffffff822ac6a8 R09: ffffed10200b005d
[ 24.864073][ T296] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: ffff888100580000
[ 24.871812][ T296] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88810fef4078 R15: 1ffff920001b6f5cThe root cause is w/ a fuzzed image, f2fs may missed to clear FI_DIRTY_INODE flag for target inode, after f2fs_evict_inode(), the inode is still linked in sbi->inode_list[DIRTY_META] global list, once it triggers checkpoint, f2fs_sync_inode_meta() may access the released inode.
In f2fs_evict_inode(), let's always call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear FI_DIRTY_INODE flag and drop inode from global dirty list to avoid this UAF issue.
--- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +6 -2
@@ -921,8 +921,12 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)if (likely (!f2fs_cp_error (sbi) && !is_sbi_flag_set (sbi,SBI_CP_DISABLED )))f2fs_bug_on (sbi,is_inode_flag_set (inode,FI_DIRTY_INODE )); -else -f2fs_inode_synced (inode); + +/* +* anyway, it needs to remove the inode from sbi->inode_list[DIRTY_META] +* list to avoid UAF in f2fs_sync_inode_meta() during checkpoint. +*/ +f2fs_inode_synced (inode);/* for the case f2fs_new_inode() was failed, .i_ino is zero, skip it */ if (inode->i_ino)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/262 f2fs: fix to avoid panic in f2fs_evict_inode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a509a55f8eecc8970b3980c6f06886bbff0e2f68 ]
As syzbot [1] reported as below:
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450
R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520
</TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200
The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of
1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056
page_owner free stack trace missing
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000
This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed.
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857!
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected]
Tracepoints before panic:
f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05
f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2
The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped.
However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status.
Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode().
PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs:
F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink
--- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +13 -0
@@ -905,6 +905,19 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)f2fs_update_inode_page (inode);if (dquot_initialize_needed (inode))set_sbi_flag (sbi,SBI_QUOTA_NEED_REPAIR ); + +/* +* If both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() failed +* due to fuzzed corrupted inode, call f2fs_inode_synced() to +* avoid triggering later f2fs_bug_on(). +*/ +if (is_inode_flag_set (inode,FI_DIRTY_INODE )) { +f2fs_warn (sbi, +"f2fs_evict_inode: inode is dirty, ino:%lu" , + inode->i_ino); +f2fs_inode_synced (inode); +set_sbi_flag (sbi,SBI_NEED_FSCK ); + } }if (!is_sbi_flag_set (sbi,SBI_IS_FREEZING ))sb_end_intwrite (inode->i_sb);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/262 f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-boundary access in devs.path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5661998536af52848cc4d52a377e90368196edea ]
- touch /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123
- truncate -s $((1024*1024*1024)) \
/mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123
- touch /mnt/f2fs/file
- truncate -s $((1024*1024*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
- mkfs.f2fs /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 \
-c /mnt/f2fs/file
- mount /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 \
/mnt/f2fs/loop
[16937.192225] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mount Device [ 0]: /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123\xff\x01, 511, 0 - 3ffff [16937.192268] F2FS-fs (loop0): Failed to find devices
If device path length equals to MAX_PATH_LEN, sbi->devs.path[] may not end up w/ null character due to path array is fully filled, So accidently, fields locate after path[] may be treated as part of device path, result in parsing wrong device path.
struct f2fs_dev_info {
...
char path[MAX_PATH_LEN];
...
};
Let's add one byte space for sbi->devs.path[] to store null character of device path string.
--- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +1 -1
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ struct f2fs_bio_info {#define RDEV (i) (raw_super->devs[i])struct f2fs_dev_info {struct block_device *bdev; -char path[MAX_PATH_LEN ]; +char path[MAX_PATH_LEN +1 ];unsigned int total_segments;block_t start_blk;block_t end_blk;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/262 f2fs: vm_unmap_ram() may be called from an invalid context
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Prusakowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 08a7efc5b02a0620ae16aa9584060e980a69cb55 ]
When testing F2FS with xfstests using UFS backed virtual disks the kernel complains sometimes that f2fs_release_decomp_mem() calls vm_unmap_ram() from an invalid context. Example trace from f2fs/007 test:
f2fs/007 5s ... [12:59:38][ 8.902525] run fstests f2fs/007
[ 11.468026] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2978 [ 11.471849] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 68, name: irq/22-ufshcd [ 11.475357] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [ 11.476970] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 11.478531] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 68 Comm: irq/22-ufshcd Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc5-xfstests-ufs-g40f92e79b0aa #9 PREEMPT(none) [ 11.478535] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 11.478536] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 11.478537] Call Trace: [ 11.478543] <TASK> [ 11.478545] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 11.478554] __might_resched.cold+0xaf/0xbe [ 11.478557] vm_unmap_ram+0x21/0xb0 [ 11.478560] f2fs_release_decomp_mem+0x59/0x80 [ 11.478563] f2fs_free_dic+0x18/0x1a0 [ 11.478565] f2fs_finish_read_bio+0xd7/0x290 [ 11.478570] blk_update_request+0xec/0x3b0 [ 11.478574] ? sbitmap_queue_clear+0x3b/0x60 [ 11.478576] scsi_end_request+0x27/0x1a0 [ 11.478582] scsi_io_completion+0x40/0x300 [ 11.478583] ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xa3/0xe0 [ 11.478588] ufshcd_sl_intr+0x194/0x1f0 [ 11.478592] ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x68/0xb0 [ 11.478594] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478599] irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60 [ 11.478602] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478603] irq_thread+0xb9/0x180 [ 11.478605] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478607] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478609] kthread+0x10a/0x230 [ 11.478614] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478615] ret_from_fork+0x7e/0xd0 [ 11.478619] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478621] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 11.478623] </TASK>
This patch modifies in_task() check inside f2fs_read_end_io() to also check if interrupts are disabled. This ensures that pages are unmapped asynchronously in an interrupt handler.
--- fs/f2fs/data.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +1 -1
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static void f2fs_read_end_io(struct bio *bio) {struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_P_SB (bio_first_page_all (bio));struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx; -bool intask =in_task (); +bool intask =in_task () && !irqs_disabled ();iostat_update_and_unbind_ctx (bio); ctx = bio->bi_private;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/262 f2fs: fix to update upper_p in __get_secs_required() correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6840faddb65683b4e7bd8196f177b038a1e19faf ]
Commit 1acd73edbbfe ("f2fs: fix to account dirty data in __get_secs_required()") missed to calculate upper_p w/ data_secs, fix it.
--- fs/f2fs/segment.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.h +1 -1
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static inline void __get_secs_required(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,if (lower_p) *lower_p = node_secs + dent_secs + data_secs;if (upper_p) - *upper_p = node_secs + dent_secs + + *upper_p = node_secs + dent_secs + data_secs + (node_blocks ?1 :0 ) + (dent_blocks ?1 :0 ) + (data_blocks ?1 :0 );if (curseg_p)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/262 f2fs: fix to calculate dirty data during has_not_enough_free_secs()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e194e140ab7de2ce2782e64b9e086a43ca6ff4f2 ]
In lfs mode, dirty data needs OPU, we'd better calculate lower_p and upper_p w/ them during has_not_enough_free_secs(), otherwise we may encounter out-of-space issue due to we missed to reclaim enough free section w/ foreground gc.
--- fs/f2fs/segment.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.h +1 -2
@@ -606,8 +606,7 @@ static inline void __get_secs_required(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,unsigned int dent_blocks = total_dent_blocks %CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC (sbi);unsigned int data_blocks =0 ; -if (f2fs_lfs_mode (sbi) && -unlikely (is_sbi_flag_set (sbi,SBI_CP_DISABLED ))) { +if (f2fs_lfs_mode (sbi)) { total_data_blocks =get_pages (sbi,F2FS_DIRTY_DATA ); data_secs = total_data_blocks /CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC (sbi); data_blocks = total_data_blocks %CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC (sbi);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/262 f2fs: fix to trigger foreground gc during f2fs_map_blocks() in lfs mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1005a3ca28e90c7a64fa43023f866b960a60f791 ]
w/ "mode=lfs" mount option, generic/299 will cause system panic as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2835! Call Trace: <TASK> f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x6f4/0xc50 f2fs_map_blocks+0x970/0x1550 f2fs_iomap_begin+0xb2/0x1e0 iomap_iter+0x1d6/0x430 __iomap_dio_rw+0x208/0x9a0 f2fs_file_write_iter+0x6b3/0xfa0 aio_write+0x15d/0x2e0 io_submit_one+0x55e/0xab0 __x64_sys_io_submit+0xa5/0x230 do_syscall_64+0x84/0x2f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0010:new_curseg+0x70f/0x720
The root cause of we run out-of-space is: in f2fs_map_blocks(), f2fs may trigger foreground gc only if it allocates any physical block, it will be a little bit later when there is multiple threads writing data w/ aio/dio/bufio method in parallel, since we always use OPU in lfs mode, so f2fs_map_blocks() does block allocations aggressively.
In order to fix this issue, let's give a chance to trigger foreground gc in prior to block allocation in f2fs_map_blocks().
--- fs/f2fs/data.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +4 -1
@@ -1552,8 +1552,11 @@ int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_map_blocks *map, int flag) end = pgofs + maxblocks; next_dnode: -if (map->m_may_create) +if (map->m_may_create) { +if (f2fs_lfs_mode (sbi)) +f2fs_balance_fs (sbi, true);f2fs_map_lock (sbi, flag); + }/* When reading holes, we need its node page */ set_new_dnode (&dn, inode,NULL ,NULL ,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/262 vfio: Fix unbalanced vfio_df_close call in no-iommu mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b25e271b377999191b12f0afbe1861edcf57e3fe ]
For devices with no-iommu enabled in IOMMUFD VFIO compat mode, the group open path skips vfio_df_open(), leaving open_count at 0. This causes a warning in vfio_assert_device_open(device) when vfio_df_close() is called during group close.
The correct behavior is to skip only the IOMMUFD bind in the device open path for no-iommu devices. Commit 6086efe73498 omitted vfio_df_open(), which was too broad. This patch restores the previous behavior, ensuring the vfio_df_open is called in the group open path.
--- drivers/vfio/group.c | 7 +++---- drivers/vfio/iommufd.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/group.c +3 -4
@@ -194,11 +194,10 @@ static int vfio_df_group_open(struct vfio_device_file *df)* implies they expected translation to exist */ if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ) || -vfio_iommufd_device_has_compat_ioas (device, df->iommufd)) +vfio_iommufd_device_has_compat_ioas (device, df->iommufd)) { ret = -EPERM ; -else - ret =0 ; - goto out_put_kvm; + goto out_put_kvm; + } } ret =vfio_df_open (df);
drivers/vfio/iommufd.c +4 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ int vfio_df_iommufd_bind(struct vfio_device_file *df)lockdep_assert_held (&vdev->dev_set->lock); +/* Returns 0 to permit device opening under noiommu mode */ +if (vfio_device_is_noiommu (vdev)) +return 0 ; +return vdev->ops->bind_iommufd (vdev, ictx, &df->devid); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/262 vfio: Prevent open_count decrement to negative
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 982ddd59ed97dc7e63efd97ed50273ffb817bd41 ]
When vfio_df_close() is called with open_count=0, it triggers a warning in vfio_assert_device_open() but still decrements open_count to -1. This allows a subsequent open to incorrectly pass the open_count == 0 check, leading to unintended behavior, such as setting df->access_granted = true.
For example, running an IOMMUFD compat no-IOMMU device with VFIO tests
(https://github.com/awilliam/tests/blob/master/vfio-noiommu-pci-device-open.c)
results in a warning and a failed VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD ioctl on the first run, but the second run succeeds incorrectly.
Add checks to avoid decrementing open_count below zero.
--- drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c +2 -1
@@ -537,7 +537,8 @@ void vfio_df_close(struct vfio_device_file *df)lockdep_assert_held (&device->dev_set->lock); -vfio_assert_device_open (device); +if (!vfio_assert_device_open (device)) +return ;if (device->open_count ==1 )vfio_df_device_last_close (df); device->open_count--;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/262 vfio/pds: Fix missing detach_ioas op
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brett Creeley <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fe24d5bc635e103a517ec201c3cb571eeab8be2f ]
When CONFIG_IOMMUFD is enabled and a device is bound to the pds_vfio_pci driver, the following WARN_ON() trace is seen and probe fails:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5040 at drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c:317 __vfio_register_dev+0x130/0x140 [vfio]
<...>pds_vfio_pci 0000:08:00.1: probe with driver pds_vfio_pci failed with error -22
This is because the driver's vfio_device_ops.detach_ioas isn't set.
Fix this by using the generic vfio_iommufd_physical_detach_ioas function.
--- drivers/vfio/pci/pds/vfio_dev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/vfio/pci/pds/vfio_dev.c +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops pds_vfio_ops = { .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas, + .detach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_detach_ioas, };const struct vfio_device_ops *pds_vfio_ops_info (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/262 vfio/pci: Separate SR-IOV VF dev_set
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e908f58b6beb337cbe4481d52c3f5c78167b1aab ]
In the below noted Fixes commit we introduced a reflck mutex to allow better scaling between devices for open and close. The reflck was based on the hot reset granularity, device level for root bus devices which cannot support hot reset or bus/slot reset otherwise. Overlooked in this were SR-IOV VFs, where there's also no bus reset option, but the default for a non-root-bus, non-slot-based device is bus level reflck granularity.
The reflck mutex has since become the dev_set mutex (via commit 2cd8b14aaa66 ("vfio/pci: Move to the device set infrastructure")) and is our defacto serialization for various operations and ioctls. It still seems to be the case though that sets of vfio-pci devices really only need serialization relative to hot resets affecting the entire set, which is not relevant to SR-IOV VFs. As described in the Closes link below, this serialization contributes to startup latency when multiple VFs sharing the same "bus" are opened concurrently.
Mark the device itself as the basis of the dev_set for SR-IOV VFs.
--- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +1 -1
@@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev)return -EBUSY ; } -if (pci_is_root_bus (pdev->bus)) { +if (pci_is_root_bus (pdev->bus) || pdev->is_virtfn) { ret =vfio_assign_device_set (&vdev->vdev, vdev); }else if (!pci_probe_reset_slot (pdev->slot)) { ret =vfio_assign_device_set (&vdev->vdev, pdev->slot);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/262 scsi: mpt3sas: Fix a fw_event memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e90b38781e3bdd651edaf789585687611638862 ]
In _mpt3sas_fw_work() the fw_event reference is removed, it should also be freed in all cases.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c +1 -2
@@ -10818,8 +10818,7 @@ _mpt3sas_fw_work(struct MPT3SAS_ADAPTER *ioc, struct fw_event_work *fw_event)break ;case MPI2_EVENT_PCIE_TOPOLOGY_CHANGE_LIST :_scsih_pcie_topology_change_event (ioc, fw_event); - ioc->current_event =NULL ; -return ; +break ; } out:fw_event_work_put (fw_event);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/262 scsi: Revert "scsi: iscsi: Fix HW conn removal use after free"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7bdc68921481c19cd8c85ddf805a834211c19e61 ]
This reverts commit c577ab7ba5f3bf9062db8a58b6e89d4fe370447e.
The invocation of iscsi_put_conn() in iscsi_iter_destory_conn_fn() is used to free the initial reference counter of iscsi_cls_conn. For non-qla4xxx cases, the ->destroy_conn() callback (e.g., iscsi_conn_teardown) will call iscsi_remove_conn() and iscsi_put_conn() to remove the connection from the children list of session and free the connection at last. However for qla4xxx, it is not the case. The ->destroy_conn() callback of qla4xxx will keep the connection in the session conn_list and doesn't use iscsi_put_conn() to free the initial reference counter. Therefore, it seems necessary to keep the iscsi_put_conn() in the iscsi_iter_destroy_conn_fn(), otherwise, there will be memory leak problem.
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c +2 -0
@@ -2169,6 +2169,8 @@ static int iscsi_iter_destroy_conn_fn(struct device *dev, void *data)return 0 ;iscsi_remove_conn (iscsi_dev_to_conn (dev)); +iscsi_put_conn (iscsi_dev_to_conn (dev)); +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/262 scsi: ufs: core: Use link recovery when h8 exit fails during runtime resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seunghui Lee <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35dabf4503b94a697bababe94678a8bc989c3223 ]
If the h8 exit fails during runtime resume process, the runtime thread enters runtime suspend immediately and the error handler operates at the same time. It becomes stuck and cannot be recovered through the error handler. To fix this, use link recovery instead of the error handler.
--- drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +9 -1
@@ -4274,7 +4274,7 @@ static int ufshcd_uic_pwr_ctrl(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct uic_command *cmd) hba->uic_async_done =NULL ;if (reenable_intr)ufshcd_enable_intr (hba,UIC_COMMAND_COMPL ); -if (ret) { +if (ret && !hba->pm_op_in_progress) {ufshcd_set_link_broken (hba);ufshcd_schedule_eh_work (hba); }
@@ -4282,6 +4282,14 @@ static int ufshcd_uic_pwr_ctrl(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct uic_command *cmd)spin_unlock_irqrestore (hba->host->host_lock, flags);mutex_unlock (&hba->uic_cmd_mutex); +/* +* If the h8 exit fails during the runtime resume process, it becomes +* stuck and cannot be recovered through the error handler. To fix +* this, use link recovery instead of the error handler. +*/ +if (ret && hba->pm_op_in_progress) + ret =ufshcd_link_recovery (hba); +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/262 scsi: sd: Make sd shutdown issue START STOP UNIT appropriately
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Salomon Dushimirimana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e48727c26c4d839ff9b4b73d1cae486bea7fe19 ]
Commit aa3998dbeb3a ("ata: libata-scsi: Disable scsi device manage_system_start_stop") enabled libata EH to manage device power mode trasitions for system suspend/resume and removed the flag from ata_scsi_dev_config. However, since the sd_shutdown() function still relies on the manage_system_start_stop flag, a spin-down command is not issued to the disk with command "echo 1 > /sys/block/sdb/device/delete"
sd_shutdown() can be called for both system/runtime start stop operations, so utilize the manage_run_time_start_stop flag set in the ata_scsi_dev_config and issue a spin-down command during disk removal when the system is running. This is in addition to when the system is powering off and manage_shutdown flag is set. The manage_system_start_stop flag will still be used for drivers that still set the flag.
--- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/sd.c +3 -1
@@ -3895,7 +3895,9 @@ static void sd_shutdown(struct device *dev)if ((system_state !=SYSTEM_RESTART && sdkp->device->manage_system_start_stop) || (system_state ==SYSTEM_POWER_OFF && - sdkp->device->manage_shutdown)) { + sdkp->device->manage_shutdown) || + (system_state ==SYSTEM_RUNNING && + sdkp->device->manage_runtime_start_stop)) {sd_printk (KERN_NOTICE , sdkp,"Stopping disk\n" );sd_start_stop_device (sdkp,0 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/262 kconfig: qconf: fix ConfigList::updateListAllforAll()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 721bfe583c52ba1ea74b3736a31a9dcfe6dd6d95 ]
ConfigList::updateListForAll() and ConfigList::updateListAllforAll() are identical.
Commit f9b918fae678 ("kconfig: qconf: move ConfigView::updateList(All) to ConfigList class") was a misconversion.
--- scripts/kconfig/qconf.cc | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/kconfig/qconf.cc +1 -1
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ void ConfigList::updateListAllForAll() while (it.hasNext()) { ConfigList *list = it.next(); - list->updateList(); + list->updateListAll(); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/262 sched/psi: Fix psi_seq initialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99b773d720aeea1ef2170dce5fcfa80649e26b78 ]
With the seqcount moved out of the group into a global psi_seq, re-initializing the seqcount on group creation is causing seqcount corruption.
--- kernel/sched/psi.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/psi.c +1 -5
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ struct psi_group psi_system = { .pcpu = &system_group_pcpu, }; -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(seqcount_t, psi_seq); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(seqcount_t, psi_seq) = SEQCNT_ZERO(psi_seq);static inline void psi_write_begin (int cpu) {
@@ -200,11 +200,7 @@ static void poll_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t);static void group_init (struct psi_group *group) { -int cpu; - group->enabled = true; -for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) -seqcount_init (per_cpu_ptr (&psi_seq, cpu)); group->avg_last_update =sched_clock (); group->avg_next_update = group->avg_last_update + psi_period;mutex_init (&group->avgs_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/262 PCI: pnv_php: Clean up allocated IRQs on unplug
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4668619092554e1b95c9a5ac2941ca47ba6d548a ]
When the root of a nested PCIe bridge configuration is unplugged, the pnv_php driver leaked the allocated IRQ resources for the child bridges' hotplug event notifications, resulting in a panic.
Fix this by walking all child buses and deallocating all its IRQ resources before calling pci_hp_remove_devices().
Also modify the lifetime of the workqueue at struct pnv_php_slot::wq so that it is only destroyed in pnv_php_free_slot(), instead of pnv_php_disable_irq(). This is required since pnv_php_disable_irq() will now be called by workers triggered by hot unplug interrupts, so the workqueue needs to stay allocated.
The abridged kernel panic that occurs without this patch is as follows:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 687 at kernel/irq/msi.c:292 msi_device_data_release+0x6c/0x9c CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 687 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2 Call Trace: msi_device_data_release+0x34/0x9c (unreliable) release_nodes+0x64/0x13c devres_release_all+0xc0/0x140 device_del+0x2d4/0x46c pci_destroy_dev+0x5c/0x194 pci_hp_remove_devices+0x90/0x128 pci_hp_remove_devices+0x44/0x128 pnv_php_disable_slot+0x54/0xd4 power_write_file+0xf8/0x18c pci_slot_attr_store+0x40/0x5c sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x78 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0x3bc/0x50c ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x124/0x230 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
--- drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +77 -19
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@* PCI Hotplug Driver for PowerPC PowerNV platform. * * Copyright Gavin Shan, IBM Corporation 2016. +* Copyright (C) 2025 Raptor Engineering, LLC */ #include <linux/libfdt.h>
@@ -35,8 +36,10 @@ static void pnv_php_register(struct device_node *dn);static void pnv_php_unregister_one (struct device_node *dn);static void pnv_php_unregister (struct device_node *dn); +static void pnv_php_enable_irq (struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot); +static void pnv_php_disable_irq (struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, -bool disable_device) +bool disable_device,bool disable_msi) {struct pci_dev *pdev = php_slot->pdev;u16 ctrl;
@@ -52,19 +55,15 @@ static void pnv_php_disable_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, php_slot->irq =0 ; } -if (php_slot->wq) { -destroy_workqueue (php_slot->wq); - php_slot->wq =NULL ; - } - -if (disable_device) { +if (disable_device || disable_msi) {if (pdev->msix_enabled)pci_disable_msix (pdev);else if (pdev->msi_enabled)pci_disable_msi (pdev); + } +if (disable_device)pci_disable_device (pdev); - } }static void pnv_php_free_slot (struct kref *kref)
@@ -73,7 +72,8 @@ static void pnv_php_free_slot(struct kref *kref) struct pnv_php_slot, kref);WARN_ON (!list_empty (&php_slot->children)); -pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, false); +pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, false, false); +destroy_workqueue (php_slot->wq);kfree (php_slot->name);kfree (php_slot); }
@@ -560,8 +560,58 @@ static int pnv_php_reset_slot(struct hotplug_slot *slot, bool probe)static int pnv_php_enable_slot (struct hotplug_slot *slot) {struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot =to_pnv_php_slot (slot); +u32 prop32; +int ret; + + ret =pnv_php_enable (php_slot, true); +if (ret) +return ret; + +/* (Re-)enable interrupt if the slot supports surprise hotplug */ + ret =of_property_read_u32 (php_slot->dn,"ibm,slot-surprise-pluggable" , + &prop32); +if (!ret && prop32) +pnv_php_enable_irq (php_slot); -return pnv_php_enable (php_slot, true); +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Disable any hotplug interrupts for all slots on the provided bus, as well as +* all downstream slots in preparation for a hot unplug. +*/ +static int pnv_php_disable_all_irqs (struct pci_bus *bus) +{ +struct pci_bus *child_bus; +struct pci_slot *slot; + +/* First go down child buses */ +list_for_each_entry (child_bus, &bus->children, node) +pnv_php_disable_all_irqs (child_bus); + +/* Disable IRQs for all pnv_php slots on this bus */ +list_for_each_entry (slot, &bus->slots, list) { +struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot =to_pnv_php_slot (slot->hotplug); + +pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, false, true); + } + +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Disable any hotplug interrupts for all downstream slots on the provided +* bus in preparation for a hot unplug. +*/ +static int pnv_php_disable_all_downstream_irqs (struct pci_bus *bus) +{ +struct pci_bus *child_bus; + +/* Go down child buses, recursively deactivating their IRQs */ +list_for_each_entry (child_bus, &bus->children, node) +pnv_php_disable_all_irqs (child_bus); + +return 0 ; }static int pnv_php_disable_slot (struct hotplug_slot *slot)
@@ -578,6 +628,13 @@ static int pnv_php_disable_slot(struct hotplug_slot *slot) php_slot->state != PNV_PHP_STATE_REGISTERED)return 0 ; +/* +* Free all IRQ resources from all child slots before remove. +* Note that we do not disable the root slot IRQ here as that +* would also deactivate the slot hot (re)plug interrupt! +*/ +pnv_php_disable_all_downstream_irqs (php_slot->bus); +/* Remove all devices behind the slot */ pci_lock_rescan_remove ();pci_hp_remove_devices (php_slot->bus);
@@ -646,6 +703,15 @@ static struct pnv_php_slot *pnv_php_alloc_slot(struct device_node *dn)return NULL ; } +/* Allocate workqueue for this slot's interrupt handling */ + php_slot->wq =alloc_workqueue ("pciehp-%s" ,0 ,0 , php_slot->name); +if (!php_slot->wq) { +SLOT_WARN (php_slot,"Cannot alloc workqueue\n" ); +kfree (php_slot->name); +kfree (php_slot); +return NULL ; + } +if (dn->child &&PCI_DN (dn->child)) php_slot->slot_no =PCI_SLOT (PCI_DN (dn->child)->devfn);else
@@ -842,14 +908,6 @@ static void pnv_php_init_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, int irq)u16 sts, ctrl;int ret; -/* Allocate workqueue */ - php_slot->wq =alloc_workqueue ("pciehp-%s" ,0 ,0 , php_slot->name); -if (!php_slot->wq) { -SLOT_WARN (php_slot,"Cannot alloc workqueue\n" ); -pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, true); -return ; - } -/* Check PDC (Presence Detection Change) is broken or not */ ret =of_property_read_u32 (php_slot->dn,"ibm,slot-broken-pdc" , &broken_pdc);
@@ -868,7 +926,7 @@ static void pnv_php_init_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, int irq) ret =request_irq (irq, pnv_php_interrupt,IRQF_SHARED , php_slot->name, php_slot);if (ret) { -pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, true); +pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, true, true);SLOT_WARN (php_slot,"Error %d enabling IRQ %d\n" , ret, irq);return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/262 PCI: pnv_php: Work around switches with broken presence detection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 80f9fc2362797538ebd4fd70a1dfa838cc2c2cdb ]
The Microsemi Switchtec PM8533 PFX 48xG3 [11f8:8533] PCIe switch system was observed to incorrectly assert the Presence Detect Set bit in its capabilities when tested on a Raptor Computing Systems Blackbird system, resulting in the hot insert path never attempting a rescan of the bus and any downstream devices not being re-detected.
Work around this by additionally checking whether the PCIe data link is active or not when performing presence detection on downstream switches' ports, similar to the pciehp_hpc.c driver.
--- drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +27 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,20 @@ static int pnv_php_get_power_state(struct hotplug_slot *slot, u8 *state)return 0 ; } +static int pcie_check_link_active (struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ +u16 lnk_status; +int ret; + + ret =pcie_capability_read_word (pdev,PCI_EXP_LNKSTA , &lnk_status); +if (ret ==PCIBIOS_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND ||PCI_POSSIBLE_ERROR (lnk_status)) +return -ENODEV ; + + ret = !!(lnk_status &PCI_EXP_LNKSTA_DLLLA ); + +return ret; +} +static int pnv_php_get_adapter_state (struct hotplug_slot *slot,u8 *state) {struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot =to_pnv_php_slot (slot);
@@ -402,6 +416,19 @@ static int pnv_php_get_adapter_state(struct hotplug_slot *slot, u8 *state)*/ ret =pnv_pci_get_presence_state (php_slot->id, &presence);if (ret >=0 ) { +if (pci_pcie_type (php_slot->pdev) ==PCI_EXP_TYPE_DOWNSTREAM && + presence ==OPAL_PCI_SLOT_EMPTY ) { +/* +* Similar to pciehp_hpc, check whether the Link Active +* bit is set to account for broken downstream bridges +* that don't properly assert Presence Detect State, as +* was observed on the Microsemi Switchtec PM8533 PFX +* [11f8:8533]. +*/ +if (pcie_check_link_active (php_slot->pdev) >0 ) + presence =OPAL_PCI_SLOT_PRESENT ; + } + *state = presence; ret =0 ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/262 powerpc/eeh: Export eeh_unfreeze_pe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e82b34eed04b0ddcff4548b62633467235672fd3 ]
The PowerNV hotplug driver needs to be able to clear any frozen PE(s) on the PHB after suprise removal of a downstream device.
Export the eeh_unfreeze_pe() symbol to allow implementation of this functionality in the php_nv module.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c +1 -0
@@ -1130,6 +1130,7 @@ int eeh_unfreeze_pe(struct eeh_pe *pe)return ret; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (eeh_unfreeze_pe);static struct pci_device_id eeh_reset_ids[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/262 powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device hotplug safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1010b4c012b0d78dfb9d3132b49aa2ef024a07a7 ]
Multiple race conditions existed between the PCIe hotplug driver and the EEH driver, leading to a variety of kernel oopses of the same general nature:
<pcie device unplug>
<eeh driver trigger>
<hotplug removal trigger>
<pcie tree reconfiguration>
<eeh recovery next step>
<oops in EEH driver bus iteration loop>
A second class of oops is also seen when the underlying bus disappears during device recovery.
Refactor the EEH module to be PCI rescan and remove safe. Also clean up a few minor formatting / readability issues.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c | 10 ++++--- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c +32 -16
@@ -257,13 +257,12 @@ static void eeh_pe_report_edev(struct eeh_dev *edev, eeh_report_fn fn,struct pci_driver *driver;enum pci_ers_result new_result; -pci_lock_rescan_remove (); pdev = edev->pdev;if (pdev)get_device (&pdev->dev); -pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();if (!pdev) {eeh_edev_info (edev,"no device" ); + *result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT ;return ; }device_lock (&pdev->dev);
@@ -304,8 +303,9 @@ static void eeh_pe_report(const char *name, struct eeh_pe *root,struct eeh_dev *edev, *tmp;pr_info ("EEH: Beginning: '%s'\n" , name); - eeh_for_each_pe(root, pe) eeh_pe_for_each_dev(pe, edev, tmp) -eeh_pe_report_edev (edev, fn, result); +eeh_for_each_pe (root, pe) +eeh_pe_for_each_dev (pe, edev, tmp) +eeh_pe_report_edev (edev, fn, result);if (result)pr_info ("EEH: Finished:'%s' with aggregate recovery state:'%s'\n" , name,pci_ers_result_name (*result));
@@ -383,6 +383,8 @@ static void eeh_dev_restore_state(struct eeh_dev *edev, void *userdata)if (!edev)return ; +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); +/* * The content in the config space isn't saved because * the blocked config space on some adapters. We have
@@ -393,14 +395,19 @@ static void eeh_dev_restore_state(struct eeh_dev *edev, void *userdata)if (list_is_last (&edev->entry, &edev->pe->edevs))eeh_pe_restore_bars (edev->pe); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; } pdev =eeh_dev_to_pci_dev (edev); -if (!pdev) +if (!pdev) { +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; + }pci_restore_state (pdev); + +pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/**
@@ -647,9 +654,7 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus,if (any_passed || driver_eeh_aware || (pe->type &EEH_PE_VF )) {eeh_pe_dev_traverse (pe, eeh_rmv_device, rmv_data); }else { -pci_lock_rescan_remove ();pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); -pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/*
@@ -665,8 +670,6 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus,if (rc)return rc; -pci_lock_rescan_remove (); -/* Restore PE */ eeh_ops->configure_bridge (pe);eeh_pe_restore_bars (pe);
@@ -674,7 +677,6 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus,/* Clear frozen state */ rc =eeh_clear_pe_frozen_state (pe, false);if (rc) { -pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return rc; }
@@ -709,7 +711,6 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus, pe->tstamp = tstamp; pe->freeze_count = cnt; -pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return 0 ; }
@@ -843,10 +844,13 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe) {LIST_HEAD_INIT(rmv_data.removed_vf_list), 0};int devices =0 ; +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); + bus =eeh_pe_bus_get (pe);if (!bus) {pr_err ("%s: Cannot find PCI bus for PHB#%x-PE#%x\n" , __func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; }
@@ -1085,10 +1089,15 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe)eeh_pe_state_clear (pe,EEH_PE_PRI_BUS , true);eeh_pe_dev_mode_mark (pe,EEH_DEV_REMOVED ); -pci_lock_rescan_remove (); -pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); -pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); + bus =eeh_pe_bus_get (pe); +if (bus) +pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); +else +pr_err ("%s: PCI bus for PHB#%x-PE#%x disappeared\n" , + __func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr); +/* The passed PE should no longer be used */ +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; }
@@ -1105,6 +1114,8 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe)eeh_clear_slot_attention (edev->pdev);eeh_pe_state_clear (pe,EEH_PE_RECOVERING , true); + +pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/**
@@ -1123,6 +1134,7 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)unsigned long flags;int rc; +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); do { rc = eeh_ops->next_error(&pe);
@@ -1162,10 +1174,12 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)break ;case EEH_NEXT_ERR_NONE : +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ;default :pr_warn ("%s: Invalid value %d from next_error()\n" , __func__, rc); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; }
@@ -1177,7 +1191,9 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)if (rc ==EEH_NEXT_ERR_FROZEN_PE || rc ==EEH_NEXT_ERR_FENCED_PHB ) {eeh_pe_state_mark (pe,EEH_PE_RECOVERING ); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();eeh_handle_normal_event (pe); +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); }else {eeh_for_each_pe (pe, tmp_pe)eeh_pe_for_each_dev (tmp_pe, edev, tmp_edev)
@@ -1190,7 +1206,6 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void) eeh_report_failure, NULL);eeh_set_channel_state (pe, pci_channel_io_perm_failure); -pci_lock_rescan_remove ();list_for_each_entry (hose, &hose_list, list_node) { phb_pe =eeh_phb_pe_get (hose); if (!phb_pe ||
@@ -1209,7 +1224,6 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void) }pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); } -pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/*
@@ -1219,4 +1233,6 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)if (rc ==EEH_NEXT_ERR_DEAD_IOC )break ; }while (rc !=EEH_NEXT_ERR_NONE ); + +pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c +6 -4
@@ -671,10 +671,12 @@ static void eeh_bridge_check_link(struct eeh_dev *edev) eeh_ops->write_config (edev, cap +PCI_EXP_LNKCTL ,2 , val);/* Check link */ -if (!edev->pdev->link_active_reporting) { -eeh_edev_dbg (edev,"No link reporting capability\n" ); -msleep (1000 ); -return ; +if (edev->pdev) { +if (!edev->pdev->link_active_reporting) { +eeh_edev_dbg (edev,"No link reporting capability\n" ); +msleep (1000 ); +return ; + } }/* Wait the link is up until timeout (5s) */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/262 PCI: pnv_php: Fix surprise plug detection and recovery
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a2a2a6fc2469524caa713036297c542746d148dc ]
The existing PowerNV hotplug code did not handle surprise plug events correctly, leading to a complete failure of the hotplug system after device removal and a required reboot to detect new devices.
This comes down to two issues:
1) When a device is surprise removed, often the bridge upstream port will cause a PE freeze on the PHB. If this freeze is not cleared, the MSI interrupts from the bridge hotplug notification logic will not be received by the kernel, stalling all plug events on all slots associated with the PE.
2) When a device is removed from a slot, regardless of surprise or programmatic removal, the associated PHB/PE ls left frozen. If this freeze is not cleared via a fundamental reset, skiboot is unable to clear the freeze and cannot retrain / rescan the slot. This also requires a reboot to clear the freeze and redetect the device in the slot.
Issue the appropriate unfreeze and rescan commands on hotplug events, and don't oops on hotplug if pci_bus_to_OF_node() returns NULL.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/pci-hotplug.c | 3 + drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/pci-hotplug.c +3 -0
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ void pci_hp_add_devices(struct pci_bus *bus)struct pci_controller *phb;struct device_node *dn =pci_bus_to_OF_node (bus); +if (!dn) +return ; + phb =pci_bus_to_host (bus); mode =PCI_PROBE_NORMAL ;
drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +107 -3
147 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/262 pNFS/flexfiles: dont attempt pnfs on fatal DS errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tigran Mkrtchyan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f06bedfa62d57f7b67d44aacd6badad2e13a803f ]
When an applications get killed (SIGTERM/SIGINT) while pNFS client performs a connection to DS, client ends in an infinite loop of connect-disconnect. This
source of the issue, it that flexfilelayoutdev#nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds gets an error on nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect with status ERESTARTSYS, which is set by rpc_signal_task, but the error is treated as transient, thus retried.
The issue is reproducible with Ctrl+C the following script(there should be ~1000 files in a directory, client should must not have any connections to DSes):
``` echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches for i in * do head -1 $i done ```
The change aims to propagate the nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds error state to the caller that can decide whatever this is a retryable error or not.
--- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 26 ++++++++++++++--------- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c +16 -10
@@ -745,14 +745,14 @@ ff_layout_choose_ds_for_read(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg, {struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment *fls =FF_LAYOUT_LSEG (lseg);struct nfs4_ff_layout_mirror *mirror; -struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds; +struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );u32 idx;/* mirrors are initially sorted by efficiency */ for (idx = start_idx; idx < fls->mirror_array_cnt; idx++) { mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, false); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds))continue ; if (check_device &&
@@ -760,10 +760,10 @@ ff_layout_choose_ds_for_read(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg,continue ; *best_idx = idx; -return ds; +break ; } -return NULL ; +return ds; } static struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ ff_layout_pg_init_write(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio,for (i =0 ; i < pgio->pg_mirror_count; i++) { mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (pgio->pg_lseg, i); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (pgio->pg_lseg, mirror, true); -if (!ds) { +if (IS_ERR (ds)) {if (!ff_layout_no_fallback_to_mds (pgio->pg_lseg)) goto out_mds;pnfs_generic_pg_cleanup (pgio);
@@ -1839,6 +1839,7 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)u32 idx = hdr->pgio_mirror_idx;int vers;struct nfs_fh *fh; +bool ds_fatal_error = false; dprintk("--> %s ino %lu pgbase %u req %zu@%llu\n", __func__, hdr->inode->i_ino,
@@ -1846,8 +1847,10 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr) mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, false); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds)) { + ds_fatal_error =nfs_error_is_fatal (PTR_ERR (ds)); goto out_failed; + } ds_clnt =nfs4_ff_find_or_create_ds_client (mirror, ds->ds_clp, hdr->inode);
@@ -1888,7 +1891,7 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)return PNFS_ATTEMPTED ; out_failed: -if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg)) +if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg) && !ds_fatal_error)return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; trace_pnfs_mds_fallback_read_pagelist(hdr->inode, hdr->args.offset, hdr->args.count,
@@ -1909,11 +1912,14 @@ ff_layout_write_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr, int sync)int vers;struct nfs_fh *fh;u32 idx = hdr->pgio_mirror_idx; +bool ds_fatal_error = false; mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, true); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds)) { + ds_fatal_error =nfs_error_is_fatal (PTR_ERR (ds)); goto out_failed; + } ds_clnt =nfs4_ff_find_or_create_ds_client (mirror, ds->ds_clp, hdr->inode);
@@ -1956,7 +1962,7 @@ ff_layout_write_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr, int sync)return PNFS_ATTEMPTED ; out_failed: -if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg)) +if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg) && !ds_fatal_error)return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; trace_pnfs_mds_fallback_write_pagelist(hdr->inode, hdr->args.offset, hdr->args.count,
@@ -1998,7 +2004,7 @@ static int ff_layout_initiate_commit(struct nfs_commit_data *data, int how) idx =calc_ds_index_from_commit (lseg, data->ds_commit_index); mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, true); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds)) goto out_err; ds_clnt = nfs4_ff_find_or_create_ds_client(mirror, ds->ds_clp,
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c +3 -3
@@ -370,11 +370,11 @@ nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg, struct nfs4_ff_layout_mirror *mirror, bool fail_return) { -struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds =NULL ; +struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds;struct inode *ino = lseg->pls_layout->plh_inode;struct nfs_server *s =NFS_SERVER (ino);unsigned int max_payload; -int status; +int status = -EAGAIN ;if (!ff_layout_init_mirror_ds (lseg->pls_layout, mirror)) goto noconnect;
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg,ff_layout_send_layouterror (lseg);if (fail_return || !ff_layout_has_available_ds (lseg))pnfs_error_mark_layout_for_return (ino, lseg); - ds =NULL ; + ds =ERR_PTR (status); out:return ds; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/262 sched: Add test_and_clear_wake_up_bit() and atomic_dec_and_wake_up()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 52d633def56c10fe3e82a2c5d88c3ecb3f4e4852 ]
There are common patterns in the kernel of using test_and_clear_bit() before wake_up_bit(), and atomic_dec_and_test() before wake_up_var().
These combinations don't need extra barriers but sometimes include them unnecessarily.
To help avoid the unnecessary barriers and to help discourage the general use of wake_up_bit/var (which is a fragile interface) introduce two combined functions which implement these patterns.
Also add store_release_wake_up() which supports the task of simply setting a non-atomic variable and sending a wakeup. This pattern requires barriers which are often omitted.
Stable-dep-of: 1db3a48e83bb ("NFS: Fix wakeup of __nfs_lookup_revalidate() in unblock_revalidate()")
--- include/linux/wait_bit.h | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+)
include/linux/wait_bit.h +60 -0
@@ -335,4 +335,64 @@ static inline void clear_and_wake_up_bit(int bit, void *word) wake_up_bit(word, bit); } +/** +* test_and_clear_wake_up_bit - clear a bit if it was set: wake up anyone waiting on that bit +* @bit: the bit of the word being waited on +* @word: the address of memory containing that bit +* +* If the bit is set and can be atomically cleared, any tasks waiting in +* wait_on_bit() or similar will be woken. This call has the same +* complete ordering semantics as test_and_clear_bit(). Any changes to +* memory made before this call are guaranteed to be visible after the +* corresponding wait_on_bit() completes. +* +* Returns %true if the bit was successfully set and the wake up was sent. +*/ +static inline bool test_and_clear_wake_up_bit (int bit,unsigned long *word) +{ +if (!test_and_clear_bit (bit, word)) +return false; +/* no extra barrier required */ +wake_up_bit (word, bit); +return true; +} + +/** +* atomic_dec_and_wake_up - decrement an atomic_t and if zero, wake up waiters +* @var: the variable to dec and test +* +* Decrements the atomic variable and if it reaches zero, send a wake_up to any +* processes waiting on the variable. +* +* This function has the same complete ordering semantics as atomic_dec_and_test. +* +* Returns %true is the variable reaches zero and the wake up was sent. +*/ + +static inline bool atomic_dec_and_wake_up (atomic_t *var) +{ +if (!atomic_dec_and_test (var)) +return false; +/* No extra barrier required */ +wake_up_var (var); +return true; +} + +/** +* store_release_wake_up - update a variable and send a wake_up +* @var: the address of the variable to be updated and woken +* @val: the value to store in the variable. +* +* Store the given value in the variable send a wake up to any tasks +* waiting on the variable. All necessary barriers are included to ensure +* the task calling wait_var_event() sees the new value and all values +* written to memory before this call. +*/ +#define store_release_wake_up (var, val) \ +do { \ + smp_store_release(var, val); \ + smp_mb(); \ + wake_up_var(var); \ +} while (0) +#endif /* _LINUX_WAIT_BIT_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/262 NFS: Fix wakeup of __nfs_lookup_revalidate() in unblock_revalidate()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1db3a48e83bb64a70bf27263b7002585574a9c2d ]
Use store_release_wake_up() to add the appropriate memory barrier before calling wake_up_var(&dentry->d_fsdata).
--- fs/nfs/dir.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/dir.c +1 -3
@@ -1835,9 +1835,7 @@ static void block_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry)static void unblock_revalidate (struct dentry *dentry) { -/* store_release ensures wait_var_event() sees the update */ -smp_store_release (&dentry->d_fsdata,NULL ); -wake_up_var (&dentry->d_fsdata); +store_release_wake_up (&dentry->d_fsdata,NULL ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/262 NFS: Fix filehandle bounds checking in nfs_fh_to_dentry()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ef93a685e01a281b5e2a25ce4e3428cf9371a205 ]
The function needs to check the minimal filehandle length before it can access the embedded filehandle.
--- fs/nfs/export.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/export.c +9 -2
@@ -66,14 +66,21 @@ nfs_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb, struct fid *fid, {struct nfs_fattr *fattr =NULL ;struct nfs_fh *server_fh =nfs_exp_embedfh (fid->raw); -size_t fh_size = offsetof(struct nfs_fh , data) + server_fh->size; +size_t fh_size = offsetof(struct nfs_fh , data);const struct nfs_rpc_ops *rpc_ops;struct dentry *dentry;struct inode *inode; -int len =EMBED_FH_OFF +XDR_QUADLEN (fh_size); +int len =EMBED_FH_OFF ;u32 *p = fid->raw;int ret; +/* Initial check of bounds */ +if (fh_len < len +XDR_QUADLEN (fh_size) || + fh_len >XDR_QUADLEN (NFS_MAXFHSIZE )) +return NULL ; +/* Calculate embedded filehandle size */ + fh_size += server_fh->size; + len +=XDR_QUADLEN (fh_size);/* NULL translates to ESTALE */ if (fh_len < len || fh_type != len)return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/262 NFSv4.2: another fix for listxattr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9acb237deff7667b0f6b10fe6b1b70c4429ea049 ]
Currently, when the server supports NFS4.1 security labels then security.selinux label in included twice. Instead, only add it when the server doesn't possess security label support.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -4
@@ -10630,7 +10630,7 @@ const struct nfs4_minor_version_ops *nfs_v4_minor_ops[] = {static ssize_t nfs4_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *list,size_t size) { -ssize_t error, error2, error3, error4; +ssize_t error, error2, error3, error4 =0 ;size_t left = size; error =generic_listxattr (dentry, list, left);
@@ -10658,9 +10658,11 @@ static ssize_t nfs4_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) left -= error3; } - error4 =security_inode_listsecurity (d_inode (dentry), list, left); -if (error4 <0 ) -return error4; +if (!nfs_server_capable (d_inode (dentry),NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL )) { + error4 =security_inode_listsecurity (d_inode (dentry), list, left); +if (error4 <0 ) +return error4; + } error += error2 + error3 + error4;if (size && error > size)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/262 NFS: Fixup allocation flags for nfsiods __GFP_NORETRY
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99765233ab42bf7a4950377ad7894dce8a5c0e60 ]
If the NFS client is doing writeback from a workqueue context, avoid using __GFP_NORETRY for allocations if the task has set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO or PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS. The combination of these flags makes memory allocation failures much more likely.
We've seen those allocation failures show up when the loopback driver is doing writeback from a workqueue to a file on NFS, where memory allocation failure results in errors or corruption within the loopback device's filesystem.
--- fs/nfs/internal.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/internal.h +6 -3
@@ -613,9 +613,12 @@ nfs_write_match_verf(const struct nfs_writeverf *verf,static inline gfp_t nfs_io_gfp_mask (void ) { -if (current->flags &PF_WQ_WORKER ) -return GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN; -return GFP_KERNEL ; +gfp_t ret =current_gfp_context (GFP_KERNEL ); + +/* For workers __GFP_NORETRY only with __GFP_IO or __GFP_FS */ +if ((current->flags &PF_WQ_WORKER ) && ret ==GFP_KERNEL ) + ret |= __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN; +return ret; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/262 md/md-cluster: handle REMOVE message earlier
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 948b1fe12005d39e2b49087b50e5ee55c9a8f76f ]
Commit a1fd37f97808 ("md: Don't wait for MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED for HOT_REMOVE_DISK ioctl") introduced a regression in the md_cluster module. (Failed cases 02r1_Manage_re-add & 02r10_Manage_re-add)
Consider a 2-node cluster:
- node1 set faulty & remove command on a disk.
- node2 must correctly update the array metadata.
Before a1fd37f97808, on node1, the delay between msg:METADATA_UPDATED (triggered by faulty) and msg:REMOVE was sufficient for node2 to reload the disk info (written by node1).
After a1fd37f97808, node1 no longer waits between faulty and remove, causing it to send msg:REMOVE while node2 is still reloading disk info. This often results in node2 failing to remove the faulty disk.
== how to trigger ==
set up a 2-node cluster (node1 & node2) with disks vdc & vdd.
on node1:
mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -b clustered -n2 /dev/vdc /dev/vdd --assume-clean ssh node2-ip mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/vdc /dev/vdd
mdadm --manage /dev/md0 --fail /dev/vdc --remove /dev/vdc
check array status on both nodes with "mdadm -D /dev/md0". node1 output:
Number Major Minor RaidDevice State
- 0 0 0 removed
1 254 48 1 active sync /dev/vdd
node2 output:
Number Major Minor RaidDevice State
- 0 0 0 removed
1 254 48 1 active sync /dev/vdd
0 254 32 - faulty /dev/vdc
--- drivers/md/md.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md.c +6 -3
@@ -9465,8 +9465,8 @@ void md_check_recovery(struct mddev *mddev)* remove disk. */ rdev_for_each_safe (rdev, tmp, mddev) { -if (test_and_clear_bit (ClusterRemove, &rdev->flags) && - rdev->raid_disk <0 ) +if (rdev->raid_disk <0 && +test_and_clear_bit (ClusterRemove, &rdev->flags))md_kick_rdev_from_array (rdev); } }
@@ -9813,8 +9813,11 @@ static void check_sb_changes(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)/* Check for change of roles in the active devices */ rdev_for_each_safe (rdev2, tmp, mddev) { -if (test_bit (Faulty, &rdev2->flags)) +if (test_bit (Faulty, &rdev2->flags)) { +if (test_bit (ClusterRemove, &rdev2->flags)) +set_bit (MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED , &mddev->recovery);continue ; + }/* Check if the roles changed */ role =le16_to_cpu (sb->dev_roles[rdev2->desc_nr]);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/262 netpoll: prevent hanging NAPI when netcons gets enabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2da4def0f487f24bbb0cece3bb2bcdcb918a0b72 ]
Paolo spotted hangs in NIPA running driver tests against virtio. The tests hang in virtnet_close() -> virtnet_napi_tx_disable().
The problem is only reproducible if running multiple of our tests in sequence (I used TEST_PROGS="xdp.py ping.py netcons_basic.sh \netpoll_basic.py stats.py"). Initial suspicion was that this is a simple case of double-disable of NAPI, but instrumenting the code reveals:
Deadlocked on NAPI ffff888007cd82c0 (virtnet_poll_tx):
state: 0x37, disabled: false, owner: 0, listed: false, weight: 64
The NAPI was not in fact disabled, owner is 0 (rather than -1), so the NAPI "thinks" it's scheduled for CPU 0 but it's not listed (!list_empty(&n->poll_list) => false). It seems odd that normal NAPI processing would wedge itself like this.
Better suspicion is that netpoll gets enabled while NAPI is polling, and also grabs the NAPI instance. This confuses napi_complete_done():
[netpoll] [normal NAPI]
napi_poll()
have = netpoll_poll_lock()
rcu_access_pointer(dev->npinfo)
return NULL # no netpoll
__napi_poll()
->poll(->weight)
poll_napi()
cmpxchg(->poll_owner, -1, cpu)
poll_one_napi()
set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, ->state)
napi_complete_done()
if (NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)
return false
# exit without clearing SCHEDThis feels very unlikely, but perhaps virtio has some interactions with the hypervisor in the NAPI ->poll that makes the race window larger?
Best I could to to prove the theory was to add and trigger this warning in napi_poll (just before netpoll_poll_unlock()):
WARN_ONCE(!have && rcu_access_pointer(n->dev->npinfo) &&
napi_is_scheduled(n) && list_empty(&n->poll_list),
"NAPI race with netpoll %px", n);If this warning hits the next virtio_close() will hang.
This patch survived 30 test iterations without a hang (without it the longest clean run was around 10). Credit for triggering this goes to Breno's recent netconsole tests.
--- net/core/netpoll.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/core/netpoll.c +7 -0
@@ -791,6 +791,13 @@ int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)if (err) goto put;rtnl_unlock (); + +/* Make sure all NAPI polls which started before dev->npinfo +* was visible have exited before we start calling NAPI poll. +* NAPI skips locking if dev->npinfo is NULL. +*/ +synchronize_rcu (); +return 0 ; put:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/262 phy: mscc: Fix parsing of unicast frames
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6fb5ff63b35b7e849cc8510957f25753f87f63d2 ]
According to the 1588 standard, it is possible to use both unicast and multicast frames to send the PTP information. It was noticed that if the frames were unicast they were not processed by the analyzer meaning that they were not timestamped. Therefore fix this to match also these unicast frames.
--- drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.c | 1 + drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.c +1 -0
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ static int vsc85xx_eth1_conf(struct phy_device *phydev, enum ts_blk blk, get_unaligned_be32(ptp_multicast)); }else { val |=ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_MULTICAST ; + val |=ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_UNICAST ;vsc85xx_ts_write_csr (phydev, blk,MSCC_ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2 (0 ), val); vsc85xx_ts_write_csr(phydev, blk,
drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.h +1 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define MSCC_ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2 (x) (MSCC_ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ENA(x) + 3)#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_MASK_MASK GENMASK(22, 20)#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_MULTICAST 0x400000 +#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_UNICAST 0x200000#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_FULL_ADDR 0x100000#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_SRC_DEST_MASK GENMASK(17, 16)#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_SRC_DEST 0x020000
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/262 net: ipa: add IPA v5.1 and v5.5 to ipa_version_string()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luca Weiss <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f2aa00e4f65efcf25ff6bc8198e21f031e7b9b1b ]
Handle the case for v5.1 and v5.5 instead of returning "0.0".
Also reword the comment below since I don't see any evidence of such a check happening, and - since 5.5 has been missing - can happen.
--- drivers/net/ipa/ipa_sysfs.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ipa/ipa_sysfs.c +5 -1
@@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ static const char *ipa_version_string(struct ipa *ipa)return "4.11" ;case IPA_VERSION_5_0 :return "5.0" ; +case IPA_VERSION_5_1 : +return "5.1" ; +case IPA_VERSION_5_5 : +return "5.5" ;default : -return "0.0" ;/* Won't happen (checked at probe time) */ +return "0.0" ;/* Should not happen */ } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/262 pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit de9c4861fb42f0cd72da844c3c34f692d5895b7b ]
Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge()
We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might read uninit data as reported by syzbot.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline] ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314 pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709
--- drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c +9 -6
@@ -159,9 +159,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)int len;unsigned char *data;__u32 seq_recv; - - -struct rtable *rt; +struct rtable *rt =NULL ;struct net_device *tdev;struct iphdr *iph;int max_headroom;
@@ -179,16 +177,20 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)if (skb_headroom (skb) < max_headroom ||skb_cloned (skb) ||skb_shared (skb)) {struct sk_buff *new_skb =skb_realloc_headroom (skb, max_headroom); -if (!new_skb) { -ip_rt_put (rt); + +if (!new_skb) goto tx_error; - } +if (skb->sk)skb_set_owner_w (new_skb, skb->sk);consume_skb (skb); skb = new_skb; } +/* Ensure we can safely access protocol field and LCP code */ +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,3 )) + goto tx_error; + data = skb->data; islcp = ((data[0 ] <<8 ) + data[1 ]) ==PPP_LCP &&1 <= data[2 ] && data[2 ] <=7 ;
@@ -262,6 +264,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)return 1 ; tx_error: +ip_rt_put (rt);kfree_skb (skb);return 1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/262 netlink: specs: ethtool: fix module EEPROM input/output arguments
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01051012887329ea78eaca19b1d2eac4c9f601b5 ]
Module (SFP) eeprom GET has a lot of input params, they are all mistakenly listed as output in the spec. Looks like kernel doesn't output them at all. Correct what are the inputs and what the outputs.
--- Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml +3 -3
@@ -1489,9 +1489,6 @@ operations: do: &module-eeprom-get-op request: - attributes: - - header - reply: attributes: - header - offset
@@ -1499,6 +1496,9 @@ operations: - page - bank - i2c-address + reply: + attributes: + - header - data dump: *module-eeprom-get-op -
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/262 net/mlx5: Correctly set gso_segs when LRO is used
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 77bf1c55b2acc7fa3734b14f4561e3d75aea1a90 ]
When gso_segs is left at 0, a number of assumptions will end up being incorrect throughout the stack.
For example, in the GRO-path, we set NAPI_GRO_CB()->count to gso_segs. So, if a non-LRO'ed packet followed by an LRO'ed packet is being processed in GRO, the first one will have NAPI_GRO_CB()->count set to 1 and the next one to 0 (in dev_gro_receive()).
Since commit 531d0d32de3e
("net/mlx5: Correctly set gso_size when LRO is used")
these packets will get merged (as their gso_size now matches). So, we end up in gro_complete() with NAPI_GRO_CB()->count == 1 and thus don't call inet_gro_complete(). Meaning, checksum-validation in tcp_checksum_complete() will fail with a "hw csum failure".
Even before the above mentioned commit, incorrect gso_segs means that other things like TCP's accounting of incoming packets (tp->segs_in, data_segs_in, rcv_ooopack) will be incorrect. Which means that if one does bytes_received/data_segs_in, the result will be bigger than the MTU.
Fix this by initializing gso_segs correctly when LRO is used.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c +1 -0
@@ -1573,6 +1573,7 @@ static inline void mlx5e_build_rx_skb(struct mlx5_cqe64 *cqe,unsigned int hdrlen =mlx5e_lro_update_hdr (skb, cqe, cqe_bcnt);skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_size =DIV_ROUND_UP (cqe_bcnt - hdrlen, lro_num_seg); +skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_segs = lro_num_seg;/* Subtract one since we already counted this as one * "regular" packet in mlx5e_complete_rx_cqe() */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/262 ipv6: reject malicious packets in ipv6_gso_segment()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d45cf1e7d7180256e17c9ce88e32e8061a7887fe ]
syzbot was able to craft a packet with very long IPv6 extension headers leading to an overflow of skb->transport_header.
This 16bit field has a limited range.
Add skb_reset_transport_header_careful() helper and use it from ipv6_gso_segment()
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5871 Comm: syz-executor211 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-g7abc678e3084 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline] RIP: 0010:ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x54a/0xe10 net/nsh/nsh.c:110 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x342/0x510 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x857/0x11b0 net/core/dev.c:3950 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x84/0x120 net/core/dev.c:4000 sch_direct_xmit+0xd3/0x4b0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:329 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4102 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x17b6/0x3a70 net/core/dev.c:4679
--- include/linux/skbuff.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/skbuff.h +23 -0
@@ -2877,6 +2877,29 @@ static inline void skb_reset_transport_header(struct sk_buff *skb) skb->transport_header = skb->data - skb->head; } +/** +* skb_reset_transport_header_careful - conditionally reset transport header +* @skb: buffer to alter +* +* Hardened version of skb_reset_transport_header(). +* +* Returns: true if the operation was a success. +*/ +static inline bool __must_check +skb_reset_transport_header_careful (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +long offset = skb->data - skb->head; + + if (unlikely(offset != (typeof(skb->transport_header))offset)) +return false; + + if (unlikely(offset == (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U)) +return false; + + skb->transport_header = offset; +return true; +} +static inline void skb_set_transport_header (struct sk_buff *skb,const int offset) {
net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c +3 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, ops =rcu_dereference (inet6_offloads[proto]);if (likely (ops && ops->callbacks.gso_segment)) { -skb_reset_transport_header (skb); +if (!skb_reset_transport_header_careful (skb)) + goto out; + segs = ops->callbacks.gso_segment (skb, features);if (!segs) skb->network_header =skb_mac_header (skb) + nhoff - skb->head;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/262 net: drop UFO packets in udp_rcv_segment()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d46e51f1c78b9ab9323610feb14238d06d46d519 ]
When sending a packet with virtio_net_hdr to tun device, if the gso_type in virtio_net_hdr is SKB_GSO_UDP and the gso_size is less than udphdr size, below crash may happen.
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4572! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 62 Comm: mytest Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #203 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_pull_rcsum+0x8e/0xa0 Code: 00 00 5b c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 93 88 00 00 00 f7 da e8 37 44 38 00 f7 d8 89 83 88 00 00 00 48 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 5b c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 0f 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 000 RSP: 0018:ffffc900001fba38 EFLAGS: 00000297 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffff8880040c1000 RCX: ffffc900001fb948 RDX: ffff888003e6d700 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800411a062 RBP: ffff8880040c1000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff888003606c00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888004060900 R14: ffff888004050000 R15: ffff888004060900 FS: 000000002406d3c0(0000) GS:ffff888084a19000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000040 CR3: 0000000004007000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x176/0x4b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2445 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x155/0x1f0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2475 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x71/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:2626 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x433/0xb00 net/ipv4/udp.c:2690 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xa6/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x72/0x90 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:579 ip_sublist_rcv+0x122/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:636 ip_list_rcv+0xf7/0x130 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:670 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x21d/0x240 net/core/dev.c:6067 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x186/0x2b0 net/core/dev.c:6210 napi_complete_done+0x78/0x180 net/core/dev.c:6580 tun_get_user+0xa63/0x1120 drivers/net/tun.c:1909 tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1984 vfs_write+0x300/0x420 fs/read_write.c:593 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:686 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 </TASK>
To trigger gso segment in udp_queue_rcv_skb(), we should also set option UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP to enable udp_sk(sk)->encap_rcv. When the encap_rcv hook return 1 in udp_queue_rcv_one_skb(), udp_csum_pull_header() will try to pull udphdr, but the skb size has been segmented to gso size, which leads to this crash.
Previous commit cf329aa42b66 ("udp: cope with UDP GRO packet misdirection") introduces segmentation in UDP receive path only for GRO, which was never intended to be used for UFO, so drop UFO packets in udp_rcv_segment().
--- include/net/udp.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/udp.h +18 -6
@@ -466,6 +466,16 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *udp_rcv_segment(struct sock *sk, {netdev_features_t features =NETIF_F_SG ;struct sk_buff *segs; +int drop_count; + +/* +* Segmentation in UDP receive path is only for UDP GRO, drop udp +* fragmentation offload (UFO) packets. +*/ +if (skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type &SKB_GSO_UDP ) { + drop_count =1 ; + goto drop; + }/* Avoid csum recalculation by skb_segment unless userspace explicitly * asks for the final checksum values
@@ -489,16 +499,18 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *udp_rcv_segment(struct sock *sk,*/ segs =__skb_gso_segment (skb, features, false);if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (segs)) { -int segs_nr =skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_segs; - -atomic_add (segs_nr, &sk->sk_drops); -SNMP_ADD_STATS (__UDPX_MIB (sk, ipv4),UDP_MIB_INERRORS , segs_nr); -kfree_skb (skb); -return NULL ; + drop_count =skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_segs; + goto drop; }consume_skb (skb);return segs; + +drop: +atomic_add (drop_count, &sk->sk_drops); +SNMP_ADD_STATS (__UDPX_MIB (sk, ipv4),UDP_MIB_INERRORS , drop_count); +kfree_skb (skb); +return NULL ; }static inline void udp_post_segment_fix_csum (struct sk_buff *skb)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/262 net/sched: taprio: enforce minimum value for picos_per_byte
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takamitsu Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae8508b25def57982493c48694ef135973bfabe0 ]
Syzbot reported a WARNING in taprio_get_start_time().
When link speed is 470,589 or greater, q->picos_per_byte becomes too small, causing length_to_duration(q, ETH_ZLEN) to return zero.
This zero value leads to validation failures in fill_sched_entry() and parse_taprio_schedule(), allowing arbitrary values to be assigned to entry->interval and cycle_time. As a result, sched->cycle can become zero.
Since SPEED_800000 is the largest defined speed in include/uapi/linux/ethtool.h, this issue can occur in realistic scenarios.
To ensure length_to_duration() returns a non-zero value for minimum-sized Ethernet frames (ETH_ZLEN = 60), picos_per_byte must be at least 17 (60 * 17 > PSEC_PER_NSEC which is 1000).
This patch enforces a minimum value of 17 for picos_per_byte when the calculated value would be lower, and adds a warning message to inform users that scheduling accuracy may be affected at very high link speeds.
--- net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_taprio.c +18 -3
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ static struct static_key_false taprio_have_working_mqprio;#define TXTIME_ASSIST_IS_ENABLED (flags) ((flags) & TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAG_TXTIME_ASSIST)#define FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED (flags) ((flags) & TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAG_FULL_OFFLOAD)#define TAPRIO_FLAGS_INVALID U32_MAX +/* Minimum value for picos_per_byte to ensure non-zero duration +* for minimum-sized Ethernet frames (ETH_ZLEN = 60). +* 60 * 17 > PSEC_PER_NSEC (1000) +*/ +#define TAPRIO_PICOS_PER_BYTE_MIN 17struct sched_entry {/* Durations between this GCL entry and the GCL entry where the
@@ -1294,7 +1299,8 @@ static void taprio_start_sched(struct Qdisc *sch, }static void taprio_set_picos_per_byte (struct net_device *dev, -struct taprio_sched *q) +struct taprio_sched *q, +struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) {struct ethtool_link_ksettings ecmd;int speed =SPEED_10 ;
@@ -1310,6 +1316,15 @@ static void taprio_set_picos_per_byte(struct net_device *dev, skip: picos_per_byte = (USEC_PER_SEC *8 ) / speed; +if (picos_per_byte <TAPRIO_PICOS_PER_BYTE_MIN ) { +if (!extack) +pr_warn ("Link speed %d is too high. Schedule may be inaccurate.\n" , + speed); +NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD (extack, +"Link speed %d is too high. Schedule may be inaccurate." , + speed); + picos_per_byte =TAPRIO_PICOS_PER_BYTE_MIN ; + }atomic64_set (&q->picos_per_byte, picos_per_byte); netdev_dbg(dev, "taprio: set %s's picos_per_byte to: %lld, linkspeed: %d\n",
@@ -1334,7 +1349,7 @@ static int taprio_dev_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,if (dev !=qdisc_dev (q->root))continue ; -taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q); +taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q,NULL ); stab =rtnl_dereference (q->root->stab);
@@ -1871,7 +1886,7 @@ static int taprio_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, q->flags = err;/* Needed for length_to_duration() during netlink attribute parsing */ -taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q); +taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q, extack); err =taprio_parse_mqprio_opt (dev, mqprio, extack, q->flags);if (err <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/262 sunrpc: fix client side handling of tls alerts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cc5d59081fa26506d02de2127ab822f40d88bc5a ]
A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's iterator's kvec.
Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Scott found that a msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv.
--- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +30 -10
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp)static int xs_sock_process_cmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg, -struct cmsghdr *cmsg,int ret) +unsigned int *msg_flags,struct cmsghdr *cmsg,int ret) {u8 content_type =tls_get_record_type (sock->sk, cmsg);u8 level, description;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,* record, even though there might be more frames * waiting to be decrypted. */ - msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR ; + *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR ;break ;case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT :tls_alert_recv (sock->sk, msg, &level, &description);
@@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, }static int -xs_sock_recv_cmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,int flags) +xs_sock_recv_cmsg (struct socket *sock,unsigned int *msg_flags,int flags) {union {struct cmsghdr cmsg;u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (u8))]; } u; +u8 alert[2 ]; +struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len =sizeof (alert), + }; +struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen =sizeof (u), + };int ret; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen =sizeof (u); - ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, msg, flags); -if (msg->msg_controllen !=sizeof (u)) - ret =xs_sock_process_cmsg (sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); +iov_iter_kvec (&msg.msg_iter,ITER_DEST , &alert_kvec,1 , + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, &msg, flags); +if (ret >0 && +tls_get_record_type (sock->sk, &u.cmsg) ==TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT ) { +iov_iter_revert (&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret =xs_sock_process_cmsg (sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg, + -EAGAIN ); + }return ret; }
@@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek)ssize_t ret;if (seek !=0 )iov_iter_advance (&msg->msg_iter, seek); - ret =xs_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, msg, flags); + ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, msg, flags); +/* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */ +if (msg->msg_flags &MSG_CTRUNC ) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC |MSG_EOR ); +if (ret ==0 || ret == -EIO ) + ret =xs_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags); + }return ret >0 ? ret + seek : ret; }
@@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t count) {iov_iter_discard (&msg->msg_iter,ITER_DEST , count); -return xs_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, msg, flags); +return xs_sock_recvmsg (sock, msg, flags,0 ); }#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/262 benet: fix BUG when creating VFs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a40f8af2ba1b9bdf46e2db10e8c9710538fbc63 ]
benet crashes as soon as SRIOV VFs are created:
kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:3457!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 7408 Comm: test.sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [...] RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x5f/0x70 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __iommu_dma_free+0xe8/0x1c0 be_cmd_set_mac_list+0x3fe/0x640 [be2net] be_cmd_set_mac+0xaf/0x110 [be2net] be_vf_eth_addr_config+0x19f/0x330 [be2net] be_vf_setup+0x4f7/0x990 [be2net] be_pci_sriov_configure+0x3a1/0x470 [be2net] sriov_numvfs_store+0x20b/0x380 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x354/0x530 vfs_write+0x9b9/0xf60 ksys_write+0xf3/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x3d0
be_cmd_set_mac_list() calls dma_free_coherent() under a spin_lock_bh. Fix it by freeing only after the lock has been released.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c +1 -1
@@ -3852,8 +3852,8 @@ int be_cmd_set_mac_list(struct be_adapter *adapter, u8 *mac_array, status =be_mcc_notify_wait (adapter); err: -dma_free_coherent (&adapter->pdev->dev, cmd.size, cmd.va, cmd.dma);spin_unlock_bh (&adapter->mcc_lock); +dma_free_coherent (&adapter->pdev->dev, cmd.size, cmd.va, cmd.dma);return status; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/262 net/sched: mqprio: fix stack out-of-bounds write in tc entry parsing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maher Azzouzi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ffd2dc4c6c49ff4f1e5d34e454a6a55608104c17 ]
TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX is validated using NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE), which allows the value TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE (16). This leads to a 4-byte out-of-bounds stack write in the fp[] array, which only has room for 16 elements (0–15).
Fix this by changing the policy to allow only up to TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE - 1.
--- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_mqprio.c +1 -1
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int mqprio_parse_opt(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_mqprio_qopt *qopt,static const struct nla_policy mqprio_tc_entry_policy[TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_MAX +1 ] = { [TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX ] =NLA_POLICY_MAX (NLA_U32 , -TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE ), +TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE -1 ), [TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_FP ] =NLA_POLICY_RANGE (NLA_U32 ,TC_FP_EXPRESS ,TC_FP_PREEMPTIBLE ),
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/262 irqchip: Build IMX_MU_MSI only on ARM
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3b6a18f0da8720d612d8a682ea5c55870da068e0 ]
Compile-testing IMX_MU_MSI on x86 without PCI_MSI support results in a build failure:
drivers/gpio/gpio-sprd.c:8:include/linux/gpio/driver.h:41:33: error: field 'msiinfo' has incomplete type drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c:4:include/linux/msi.h:528:33: error: field 'alloc_info' has incomplete type
Tighten the dependency further to only allow compile testing on Arm. This could be refined further to allow certain x86 configs.
This was submitted before to address a different build failure, which was fixed differently, but the problem has now returned in a different form.
--- drivers/irqchip/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/irqchip/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ config IMX_MU_MSI tristate "i.MX MU used as MSI controller" depends on OF && HAS_IOMEM depends on ARCH_MXC || COMPILE_TEST + depends on ARM || ARM64 default m if ARCH_MXC select IRQ_DOMAIN select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 216/262 ALSA: hda/ca0132: Fix missing error handling in ca0132_alt_select_out()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9f320dfb0ffc555aa2eac8331dee0c2c16f67633 ]
There are a couple of cases where the error is ignored or the error code isn't propagated in ca0132_alt_select_out(). Fix those.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +4 -1
@@ -4803,7 +4803,8 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_out(struct hda_codec *codec)if (err <0 ) goto exit; -if (ca0132_alt_select_out_quirk_set (codec) <0 ) + err =ca0132_alt_select_out_quirk_set (codec); +if (err <0 ) goto exit;switch (spec->cur_out_type) {
@@ -4893,6 +4894,8 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_out(struct hda_codec *codec) spec->bass_redirection_val); else err =ca0132_alt_surround_set_bass_redirection (codec,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto exit;/* Unmute DSP now that we're done with output selection. */ err = dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x96,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 217/262 smb: server: remove separate empty_recvmsg_queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01027a62b508c48c762096f347de925eedcbd008 ]
There's no need to maintain two lists, we can just have a single list of receive buffers, which are free to use.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 60 +++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +8 -52
@@ -128,9 +128,6 @@ struct smb_direct_transport {spinlock_t recvmsg_queue_lock;struct list_head recvmsg_queue; -spinlock_t empty_recvmsg_queue_lock; -struct list_head empty_recvmsg_queue; -int send_credit_target;atomic_t send_credits;spinlock_t lock_new_recv_credits;
@@ -275,32 +272,6 @@ static void put_recvmsg(struct smb_direct_transport *t,spin_unlock (&t->recvmsg_queue_lock); } -static struct -smb_direct_recvmsg *get_empty_recvmsg (struct smb_direct_transport *t) -{ -struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg =NULL ; - -spin_lock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -if (!list_empty (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue)) { - recvmsg =list_first_entry (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue, - struct smb_direct_recvmsg, list); -list_del (&recvmsg->list); - } -spin_unlock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -return recvmsg; -} - -static void put_empty_recvmsg (struct smb_direct_transport *t, -struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg) -{ -ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, recvmsg->sge.addr, - recvmsg->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); - -spin_lock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -list_add_tail (&recvmsg->list, &t->empty_recvmsg_queue); -spin_unlock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -} -static void enqueue_reassembly (struct smb_direct_transport *t,struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg,int data_length)
@@ -385,9 +356,6 @@ static struct smb_direct_transport *alloc_transport(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id)spin_lock_init (&t->recvmsg_queue_lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&t->recvmsg_queue); -spin_lock_init (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue); -init_waitqueue_head (&t->wait_send_pending);atomic_set (&t->send_pending,0 );
@@ -553,7 +521,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) wc->opcode);smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t); } -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -567,7 +535,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)switch (recvmsg->type) {case SMB_DIRECT_MSG_NEGOTIATE_REQ :if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_negotiate_req )) { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; } t->negotiation_requested = true;
@@ -584,7 +552,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->byte_len < offsetof(struct smb_direct_data_transfer , padding)) { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -592,7 +560,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (data_length) {if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_data_transfer ) + (u64 )data_length) { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -612,7 +580,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) avail_recvmsg_count = t->count_avail_recvmsg;spin_unlock (&t->receive_credit_lock); }else { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = --(t->recv_credits);
@@ -810,7 +778,6 @@ static void smb_direct_post_recv_credits(struct work_struct *work)struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg;int receive_credits, credits =0 ;int ret; -int use_free =1 ;spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = t->recv_credits;
@@ -818,18 +785,9 @@ static void smb_direct_post_recv_credits(struct work_struct *work)if (receive_credits < t->recv_credit_target) {while (true) { -if (use_free) - recvmsg =get_free_recvmsg (t); -else - recvmsg =get_empty_recvmsg (t); -if (!recvmsg) { -if (use_free) { - use_free =0 ; -continue ; - }else { -break ; - } - } + recvmsg =get_free_recvmsg (t); +if (!recvmsg) +break ; recvmsg->type =SMB_DIRECT_MSG_DATA_TRANSFER ; recvmsg->first_segment = false;
@@ -1805,8 +1763,6 @@ static void smb_direct_destroy_pools(struct smb_direct_transport *t)while ((recvmsg =get_free_recvmsg (t)))mempool_free (recvmsg, t->recvmsg_mempool); -while ((recvmsg =get_empty_recvmsg (t))) -mempool_free (recvmsg, t->recvmsg_mempool);mempool_destroy (t->recvmsg_mempool); t->recvmsg_mempool =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 218/262 smb: server: make sure we call ib_dma_unmap_single() only if we called ib_dma_map_single already
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit afb4108c92898350e66b9a009692230bcdd2ac73 ]
In case of failures either ib_dma_map_single() might not be called yet or ib_dma_unmap_single() was already called.
We should make sure put_recvmsg() only calls ib_dma_unmap_single() if needed.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +9 -2
@@ -264,8 +264,13 @@ smb_direct_recvmsg *get_free_recvmsg(struct smb_direct_transport *t)static void put_recvmsg (struct smb_direct_transport *t,struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg) { -ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, recvmsg->sge.addr, - recvmsg->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (likely (recvmsg->sge.length !=0 )) { +ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, + recvmsg->sge.addr, + recvmsg->sge.length, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + recvmsg->sge.length =0 ; + }spin_lock (&t->recvmsg_queue_lock);list_add (&recvmsg->list, &t->recvmsg_queue);
@@ -637,6 +642,7 @@ static int smb_direct_post_recv(struct smb_direct_transport *t,ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, recvmsg->sge.addr, recvmsg->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + recvmsg->sge.length =0 ;smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ret; }
@@ -1818,6 +1824,7 @@ static int smb_direct_create_pools(struct smb_direct_transport *t)if (!recvmsg) goto err; recvmsg->transport = t; + recvmsg->sge.length =0 ;list_add (&recvmsg->list, &t->recvmsg_queue); } t->count_avail_recvmsg = t->recv_credit_max;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 219/262 smb: server: let recv_done() consistently call put_recvmsg/smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfe76fdbb9729c650f3505d9cfb2f70ddda2dbdc ]
We should call put_recvmsg() before smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection() in order to call it before waking up the callers.
In all error cases we should call smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection() in order to avoid stale connections.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +13 -5
@@ -520,13 +520,13 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) t = recvmsg->transport;if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_RECV ) { +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);if (wc->status !=IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR ) {pr_err ("Recv error. status='%s (%d)' opcode=%d\n" ,ib_wc_status_msg (wc->status), wc->status, wc->opcode);smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t); } -put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)case SMB_DIRECT_MSG_NEGOTIATE_REQ :if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_negotiate_req )) {put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ; } t->negotiation_requested = true;
@@ -548,7 +549,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) t->status =SMB_DIRECT_CS_CONNECTED ;enqueue_reassembly (t, recvmsg,0 );wake_up_interruptible (&t->wait_status); -break ; +return ;case SMB_DIRECT_MSG_DATA_TRANSFER : {struct smb_direct_data_transfer *data_transfer = (struct smb_direct_data_transfer *)recvmsg->packet;
@@ -558,6 +559,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->byte_len < offsetof(struct smb_direct_data_transfer , padding)) {put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ; }
@@ -566,6 +568,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_data_transfer ) + (u64 )data_length) {put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ; }
@@ -608,11 +611,16 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (is_receive_credit_post_required (receive_credits, avail_recvmsg_count))mod_delayed_work (smb_direct_wq, &t->post_recv_credits_work,0 ); -break ; +return ; } -default : -break ; } + +/* +* This is an internal error! +*/ +WARN_ON_ONCE (recvmsg->type !=SMB_DIRECT_MSG_DATA_TRANSFER ); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t); } static int smb_direct_post_recv(struct smb_direct_transport *t,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 220/262 smb: server: let recv_done() avoid touching data_transfer after cleanup/move
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a6c015b7ac2d8c5233337e5793f50d04fac17669 ]
Calling enqueue_reassembly() and wake_up_interruptible(&t->wait_reassembly_queue) or put_receive_buffer() means the recvmsg/data_transfer pointer might get re-used by another thread, which means these should be
the last operations before calling return.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +7 -5
@@ -580,16 +580,11 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)else t->full_packet_received = true; -enqueue_reassembly (t, recvmsg, (int )data_length); -wake_up_interruptible (&t->wait_reassembly_queue); -spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = --(t->recv_credits); avail_recvmsg_count = t->count_avail_recvmsg;spin_unlock (&t->receive_credit_lock); }else { -put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); -spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = --(t->recv_credits); avail_recvmsg_count = ++(t->count_avail_recvmsg);
@@ -611,6 +606,13 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (is_receive_credit_post_required (receive_credits, avail_recvmsg_count))mod_delayed_work (smb_direct_wq, &t->post_recv_credits_work,0 ); + +if (data_length) { +enqueue_reassembly (t, recvmsg, (int )data_length); +wake_up_interruptible (&t->wait_reassembly_queue); + }else +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +return ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 221/262 smb: client: Use min() macro
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shen Lichuan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 25e68c37caf2b87c7dbcd99c54ec3102db7e4296 ]
Use the min() macro to simplify the function and improve its readability.
Stable-dep-of: 5349ae5e05fa ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
--- fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +1 -1
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ compare_sids(const struct smb_sid *ctsid, const struct smb_sid *cwsid)/* compare all of the subauth values if any */ num_sat = ctsid->num_subauth; num_saw = cwsid->num_subauth; - num_subauth = num_sat < num_saw ? num_sat : num_saw; + num_subauth =min (num_sat, num_saw);if (num_subauth) {for (i =0 ; i < num_subauth; ++i) {if (ctsid->sub_auth[i] != cwsid->sub_auth[i]) {
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +2 -4
@@ -1585,10 +1585,8 @@ static struct smbd_connection *_smbd_get_connection( conn_param.initiator_depth =0 ; conn_param.responder_resources = - info->id->device->attrs.max_qp_rd_atom - <SMBD_CM_RESPONDER_RESOURCES ? - info->id->device->attrs.max_qp_rd_atom : -SMBD_CM_RESPONDER_RESOURCES ; +min (info->id->device->attrs.max_qp_rd_atom, +SMBD_CM_RESPONDER_RESOURCES ); info->responder_resources = conn_param.responder_resources;log_rdma_mr (INFO ,"responder_resources=%d\n" , info->responder_resources);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 222/262 smb: client: Correct typos in multiple comments across various files
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shen Lichuan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e9f49feefb4b13b36441aae51649a67a8389bd40 ]
Fixed some confusing typos that were currently identified witch codespell, the details are as follows:
-in the code comments:fs/smb/client/cifsacl.h:58: inheritence ==> inheritance fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c:242: origiginal ==> original fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c:164: referece ==> reference fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c:292: ned ==> need fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h:779: initital ==> initial fs/smb/client/cifspdu.h:784: altetnative ==> alternative fs/smb/client/cifspdu.h:2409: conrol ==> control fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c:1218: Expirement ==> Experiment fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c:3021: conver ==> convert fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c:3998: asterik ==> asterisk fs/smb/client/file.c:2505: useable ==> usable fs/smb/client/fs_context.h:263: timemout ==> timeout fs/smb/client/misc.c:257: responsbility ==> responsibility fs/smb/client/netmisc.c:1006: divisable ==> divisible fs/smb/client/readdir.c:556: endianess ==> endianness fs/smb/client/readdir.c:818: bu ==> by fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c:2180: snaphots ==> snapshots fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c:3586: otions ==> options fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c:2979: timestaps ==> timestamps fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c:4574: memmory ==> memory fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c:699: origiginal ==> original fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c:222: happenes ==> happens fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c:1347: registartions ==> registrations fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h:114: accoutning ==> accounting
Stable-dep-of: 5349ae5e05fa ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
--- fs/smb/client/cifsacl.h | 2 +- fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c | 4 ++-- fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h | 2 +- fs/smb/client/cifspdu.h | 4 ++-- fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c | 6 +++--- fs/smb/client/file.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/fs_context.h | 2 +- fs/smb/client/misc.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/netmisc.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 4 ++-- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 4 ++-- fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 4 ++-- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h | 2 +- 16 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.h +1 -1
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct smb3_sd {#define ACL_CONTROL_SI 0x0800/* SACL Auto-Inherited */ #define ACL_CONTROL_DI 0x0400/* DACL Auto-Inherited */ #define ACL_CONTROL_SC 0x0200/* SACL computed through inheritance */ -#define ACL_CONTROL_DC 0x0100/* DACL computed through inheritence */ +#define ACL_CONTROL_DC 0x0100/* DACL computed through inheritance */ #define ACL_CONTROL_SS 0x0080/* Create server ACL */ #define ACL_CONTROL_DT 0x0040/* DACL provided by trusted source */ #define ACL_CONTROL_SD 0x0020/* SACL defaulted */
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +1 -1
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,cifs_dbg (FYI ,"dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n" , cifs_pdu->Command); -/* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check +/* save off the original signature so we can modify the smb and check its signature against what the server sent */ memcpy (server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature,8 );
fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c +2 -2
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ __u32 cifs_lock_secret;/* * Bumps refcount for cifs super block. -* Note that it should be only called if a referece to VFS super block is +* Note that it should be only called if a reference to VFS super block is * already held, e.g. in open-type syscalls context. Otherwise it can race with * atomic_dec_and_test in deactivate_locked_super. */
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static void cifs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb =CIFS_SB (sb);/* -* We ned to release all dentries for the cached directories +* We need to release all dentries for the cached directories * before we kill the sb. */ if (cifs_sb->root) {
fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h +1 -1
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ struct TCP_Server_Info { } compression;__u16 signing_algorithm;__le16 cipher_type; -/* save initital negprot hash */ +/* save initial negprot hash */ __u8 preauth_sha_hash[SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE ];bool signing_negotiated;/* true if valid signing context rcvd from server */ bool posix_ext_supported;
fs/smb/client/cifspdu.h +2 -2
@@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ typedef struct smb_com_logoff_andx_rsp {__u16 ByteCount; } __attribute__((packed)) LOGOFF_ANDX_RSP; -typedef union smb_com_tree_disconnect { /* as an altetnative can use flag on +typedef union smb_com_tree_disconnect { /* as an alternative can use flag on tree_connect PDU to effect disconnect */ /* tdis is probably simplest SMB PDU */ struct {
@@ -2405,7 +2405,7 @@ struct cifs_posix_ace { /* access control entry (ACE) */__le64 cifs_uid;/* or gid */ } __attribute__((packed)); -struct cifs_posix_acl {/* access conrol list (ACL) */ +struct cifs_posix_acl {/* access control list (ACL) */ __le16 version;__le16 access_entry_count;/* access ACL - count of entries */ __le16 default_entry_count;/* default ACL - count of entries */
fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c +3 -3
@@ -1214,7 +1214,7 @@ CIFS_open(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_open_parms *oparms, int *oplock, req->CreateDisposition =cpu_to_le32 (disposition); req->CreateOptions =cpu_to_le32 (create_options &CREATE_OPTIONS_MASK ); -/* BB Expirement with various impersonation levels and verify */ +/* BB Experiment with various impersonation levels and verify */ req->ImpersonationLevel =cpu_to_le32 (SECURITY_IMPERSONATION ); req->SecurityFlags =SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING |SECURITY_EFFECTIVE_ONLY ;
@@ -2993,7 +2993,7 @@ static void cifs_init_ace(struct cifs_posix_ace *cifs_ace,/** * posix_acl_to_cifs - convert ACLs from POSIX ACL to cifs format -* @parm_data: ACLs in cifs format to conver to +* @parm_data: ACLs in cifs format to convert to * @acl: ACLs in POSIX ACL format to convert from * @acl_type: the type of POSIX ACLs stored in @acl *
@@ -3970,7 +3970,7 @@ CIFSFindFirst(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, name_len =cifsConvertToUTF16 ((__le16 *) pSMB->FileName, searchName,PATH_MAX , nls_codepage, remap); -/* We can not add the asterik earlier in case +/* We can not add the asterisk earlier in case it got remapped to 0xF03A as if it were part of the directory name instead of a wildcard */ name_len *=2 ;
fs/smb/client/file.c +1 -1
@@ -2421,7 +2421,7 @@ cifs_get_writable_file(struct cifsInodeInfo *cifs_inode, int flags, } } } -/* couldn't find useable FH with same pid, try any available */ +/* couldn't find usable FH with same pid, try any available */ if (!any_available) { any_available = true; goto refind_writable;
fs/smb/client/fs_context.h +1 -1
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ struct smb3_fs_context {unsigned int min_offload;unsigned int retrans; bool sockopt_tcp_nodelay:1; -/* attribute cache timemout for files and directories in jiffies */ +/* attribute cache timeout for files and directories in jiffies */ unsigned long acregmax;unsigned long acdirmax;/* timeout for deferred close of files in jiffies */
fs/smb/client/misc.c +1 -1
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ free_rsp_buf(int resp_buftype, void *rsp) }/* NB: MID can not be set if treeCon not passed in, in that -case it is responsbility of caller to set the mid */ +case it is responsibility of caller to set the mid */ void header_assemble (struct smb_hdr *buffer,char smb_command/* command */ , const struct cifs_tcon *treeCon, int word_count
fs/smb/client/netmisc.c +1 -1
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ struct timespec64 cnvrtDosUnixTm(__le16 le_date, __le16 le_time, int offset)year is 2**7, the last year is 1980+127, which means we need only consider 2 special case years, ie the years 2000 and 2100, and only adjust for the lack of leap year for the year 2100, as 2000 was a -leap year (divisable by 400) */ +leap year (divisible by 400) */ if (year >=120 )/* the year 2100 */ days = days -1 ;/* do not count leap year for the year 2100 */
fs/smb/client/readdir.c +2 -2
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static void cifs_fill_dirent_std(struct cifs_dirent *de, const FIND_FILE_STANDARD_INFO *info) { de->name = &info->FileName[0 ]; -/* one byte length, no endianess conversion */ +/* one byte length, no endianness conversion */ de->namelen = info->FileNameLength; de->resume_key = info->ResumeKey; }
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static bool emit_cached_dirents(struct cached_dirents *cde,* However, this sequence of ->pos values may have holes * in it, for example dot-dirs returned from the server * are suppressed. -* Handle this bu forcing ctx->pos to be the same as the +* Handle this by forcing ctx->pos to be the same as the * ->pos of the current dirent we emit from the cache. * This means that when we emit these entries from the cache * we now emit them with the same ->pos value as in the
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +2 -2
@@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ smb3_enum_snapshots(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,NULL ,0 /* no input data */ , max_response_size, (char **)&retbuf, &ret_data_len); -cifs_dbg (FYI ,"enum snaphots ioctl returned %d and ret buflen is %d\n" , +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"enum snapshots ioctl returned %d and ret buflen is %d\n" , rc, ret_data_len);if (rc)return rc;
@@ -3540,7 +3540,7 @@ static long smb3_simple_falloc(struct file *file, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,/* * At this point, we are trying to fallocate an internal * regions of a sparse file. Since smb2 does not have a -* fallocate command we have two otions on how to emulate this. +* fallocate command we have two options on how to emulate this. * We can either turn the entire file to become non-sparse * which we only do if the fallocate is for virtually * the whole file, or we can overwrite the region with zeroes
fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +2 -2
@@ -2989,7 +2989,7 @@ int smb311_posix_mkdir(const unsigned int xid, struct inode *inode,SMB2_close (xid, tcon, rsp->PersistentFileId, rsp->VolatileFileId); -/* Eventually save off posix specific response info and timestaps */ +/* Eventually save off posix specific response info and timestamps */ err_free_rsp_buf:free_rsp_buf (resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
@@ -4574,7 +4574,7 @@ smb2_readv_callback(struct mid_q_entry *mid) }#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_SMB_DIRECT /* -* If this rdata has a memmory registered, the MR can be freed +* If this rdata has a memory registered, the MR can be freed * MR needs to be freed as soon as I/O finishes to prevent deadlock * because they have limited number and are used for future I/Os */
fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c +1 -1
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ smb2_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) shdr->Command);/* -* Save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check +* Save off the original signature so we can modify the smb and check * our calculated signature against what the server sent. */ memcpy (server_response_sig, shdr->Signature,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE );
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +2 -2
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int smbd_conn_upcall(case RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL :case RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED : -/* This happenes when we fail the negotiation */ +/* This happens when we fail the negotiation */ if (info->transport_status ==SMBD_NEGOTIATE_FAILED ) { info->transport_status =SMBD_DISCONNECTED ;wake_up (&info->conn_wait);
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)* are not locked by srv_mutex. It is possible some processes are * blocked on transport srv_mutex while holding memory registration. * Release the transport srv_mutex to allow them to hit the failure -* path when sending data, and then release memory registartions. +* path when sending data, and then release memory registrations. */ log_rdma_event (INFO ,"freeing mr list\n" );wake_up_interruptible_all (&info->wait_mr);
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h +1 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct smbd_connection {/* Used by transport to wait until all MRs are returned */ wait_queue_head_t wait_for_mr_cleanup; -/* Activity accoutning */ +/* Activity accounting */ atomic_t send_pending;wait_queue_head_t wait_send_pending;wait_queue_head_t wait_post_send;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 223/262 smb: smbdirect: add smbdirect_socket.h
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 22234e37d7e97652cb53133009da5e14793d3c10 ]
This abstracts the common smbdirect layer.
Currently with just a few things in it, but that will change over time until everything is in common.
Will be used in client and server in the next commits
Stable-dep-of: 5349ae5e05fa ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
--- fs/smb/common/smbdirect/smbdirect_socket.h | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/smb/common/smbdirect/smbdirect_socket.h
fs/smb/common/smbdirect/smbdirect_socket.h new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* +* Copyright (c) 2025 Stefan Metzmacher +*/ + +#ifndef __FS_SMB_COMMON_SMBDIRECT_SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_H__ +#define __FS_SMB_COMMON_SMBDIRECT_SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_H__ + +enum smbdirect_socket_status { +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CREATED , +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTING , +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTED , +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_NEGOTIATE_FAILED , +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTING , +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTED , +SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DESTROYED +}; + +struct smbdirect_socket { +enum smbdirect_socket_status status; + +/* RDMA related */ +struct { +struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; + } rdma; + +/* IB verbs related */ +struct { +struct ib_pd *pd; +struct ib_cq *send_cq; +struct ib_cq *recv_cq; + +/* +* shortcuts for rdma.cm_id->{qp,device}; +*/ +struct ib_qp *qp; +struct ib_device *dev; + } ib; +}; + +#endif /* __FS_SMB_COMMON_SMBDIRECT_SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 224/262 smb: client: make use of common smbdirect_socket
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c3011b9a7deaaaabdf955815d29eac39c8b75e67 ]
This is the next step in the direction of a common smbdirect layer. Currently only structures are shared, but that will change over time until everything is shared.
Stable-dep-of: 5349ae5e05fa ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
--- fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 258 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h | 12 +- 3 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c +1 -1
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)seq_printf (m,"\nSMBDirect (in hex) protocol version: %x " "transport status: %x" , server->smbd_conn->protocol, - server->smbd_conn->transport_status); + server->smbd_conn->socket.status); seq_printf(m, "\nConn receive_credit_max: %x " "send_credit_target: %x max_send_size: %x", server->smbd_conn->receive_credit_max,
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +141 -117
732 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h +4 -8
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@#include <rdma/rdma_cm.h> #include <linux/mempool.h> +#include "../common/smbdirect/smbdirect_socket.h" +extern int rdma_readwrite_threshold;extern int smbd_max_frmr_depth;extern int smbd_keep_alive_interval;
@@ -50,14 +52,8 @@ enum smbd_connection_status {* 5. mempools for allocating packets */ struct smbd_connection { -enum smbd_connection_status transport_status; - -/* RDMA related */ -struct rdma_cm_id *id; -struct ib_qp_init_attr qp_attr; -struct ib_pd *pd; -struct ib_cq *send_cq, *recv_cq; -struct ib_device_attr dev_attr; +struct smbdirect_socket socket; +int ri_rc;struct completion ri_done;wait_queue_head_t conn_wait;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 225/262 smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5349ae5e05fa37409fd48a1eb483b199c32c889b ]
We should call ib_dma_unmap_single() and mempool_free() before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection().
And smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection() needs to be the last function to call as all other state might already be gone after it returns.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +8 -6
@@ -282,18 +282,20 @@ static void send_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)log_rdma_send (INFO ,"smbd_request 0x%p completed wc->status=%d\n" , request, wc->status); -if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_SEND ) { -log_rdma_send (ERR ,"wc->status=%d wc->opcode=%d\n" , - wc->status, wc->opcode); -smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (request->info); - } -for (i =0 ; i < request->num_sge; i++)ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, request->sge[i].addr, request->sge[i].length,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_SEND ) { +log_rdma_send (ERR ,"wc->status=%d wc->opcode=%d\n" , + wc->status, wc->opcode); +mempool_free (request, info->request_mempool); +smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info); +return ; + } +if (atomic_dec_and_test (&request->info->send_pending))wake_up (&request->info->wait_send_pending);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 226/262 smb: client: make sure we call ib_dma_unmap_single() only if we called ib_dma_map_single already
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 047682c370b6f18fec818b57b0ed8b501bdb79f8 ]
In case of failures either ib_dma_map_single() might not be called yet or ib_dma_unmap_single() was already called.
We should make sure put_receive_buffer() only calls ib_dma_unmap_single() if needed.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +9 -2
@@ -1043,6 +1043,7 @@ static int smbd_post_recv(if (rc) {ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, response->sge.addr, response->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + response->sge.length =0 ;smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info);log_rdma_recv (ERR ,"ib_post_recv failed rc=%d\n" , rc); }
@@ -1202,8 +1203,13 @@ static void put_receive_buffer(struct smbdirect_socket *sc = &info->socket;unsigned long flags; -ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, response->sge.addr, - response->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (likely (response->sge.length !=0 )) { +ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, + response->sge.addr, + response->sge.length, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + response->sge.length =0 ; + }spin_lock_irqsave (&info->receive_queue_lock, flags);list_add_tail (&response->list, &info->receive_queue);
@@ -1241,6 +1247,7 @@ static int allocate_receive_buffers(struct smbd_connection *info, int num_buf) goto allocate_failed; response->info = info; + response->sge.length =0 ;list_add_tail (&response->list, &info->receive_queue); info->count_receive_queue++; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 227/262 smb: client: let recv_done() cleanup before notifying the callers.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bdd7afc6dca5e0ebbb75583484aa6ea9e03fbb13 ]
We should call put_receive_buffer() before waking up the callers.
For the internal error case of response->type being unexpected, we now also call smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection() instead of not waking up the callers at all.
Note that the SMBD_TRANSFER_DATA case still has problems, which will be addressed in the next commit in order to make it easier to review this one.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +8 -6
@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_RECV ) {log_rdma_recv (INFO ,"wc->status=%d opcode=%d\n" , wc->status, wc->opcode); -smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info); goto error; }
@@ -484,8 +483,9 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) info->full_packet_received = true; info->negotiate_done =process_negotiation_response (response, wc->byte_len); +put_receive_buffer (info, response);complete (&info->negotiate_completion); -break ; +return ;/* SMBD data transfer packet */ case SMBD_TRANSFER_DATA :
@@ -542,14 +542,16 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) }return ; - -default : -log_rdma_recv (ERR , -"unexpected response type=%d\n" , response->type); } +/* +* This is an internal error! +*/ +log_rdma_recv (ERR ,"unexpected response type=%d\n" , response->type); +WARN_ON_ONCE (response->type !=SMBD_TRANSFER_DATA ); error:put_receive_buffer (info, response); +smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info); } static struct rdma_cm_id *smbd_create_id(
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 228/262 pptp: fix pptp_xmit() error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae633388cae349886f1a3cfb27aa092854b24c1b ]
I accidentally added a bug in pptp_xmit() that syzbot caught for us.
Only call ip_rt_put() if a route has been allocated.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffdb PGD df3b067 P4D df3b067 PUD df3d067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6346 Comm: syz.0.336 Not tainted 6.16.0-next-20250804-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:arch_atomic_add_return arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:85 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:846 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:327 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcuref_put+0x172/0x210 include/linux/rcuref.h:173 Call Trace: <TASK> dst_release+0x24/0x1b0 net/core/dst.c:167 ip_rt_put include/net/route.h:285 [inline] pptp_xmit+0x14b/0x1a90 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:267 __ppp_channel_push+0xf2/0x1c0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2166 ppp_channel_push+0x123/0x660 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2198 ppp_write+0x2b0/0x400 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:544 vfs_write+0x27b/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
--- drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c +4 -3
@@ -159,17 +159,17 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)int len;unsigned char *data;__u32 seq_recv; -struct rtable *rt =NULL ; +struct rtable *rt;struct net_device *tdev;struct iphdr *iph;int max_headroom;if (sk_pppox (po)->sk_state &PPPOX_DEAD ) - goto tx_error; + goto tx_drop; rt =pptp_route_output (po, &fl4);if (IS_ERR (rt)) - goto tx_error; + goto tx_drop; tdev = rt->dst.dev;
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) tx_error:ip_rt_put (rt); +tx_drop:kfree_skb (skb);return 1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 229/262 smb: client: return an error if rdma_connect does not return within 5 seconds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 03537826f77f1c829d0593d211b38b9c876c1722 ]
This matches the timeout for tcp connections.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +4 -2
@@ -1647,8 +1647,10 @@ static struct smbd_connection *_smbd_get_connection( goto rdma_connect_failed; } -wait_event_interruptible ( - info->conn_wait, sc->status !=SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTING ); +wait_event_interruptible_timeout ( + info->conn_wait, + sc->status !=SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTING , +msecs_to_jiffies (RDMA_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT ));if (sc->status !=SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTED ) {log_rdma_event (ERR ,"rdma_connect failed port=%d\n" , port);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 230/262 sunrpc: fix handling of server side tls alerts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
commit bee47cb026e762841f3faece47b51f985e215edb upstream.
Scott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from the msg iterator's kvec..
kTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between the control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS aler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS alert's level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer.
This patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv.
--- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +35 -8
@@ -257,20 +257,47 @@ svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket }static int -svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (struct svc_sock *svsk,struct msghdr *msg) +svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (struct socket *sock,unsigned int *msg_flags) {union {struct cmsghdr cmsg;u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (u8))]; } u; -struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock; +u8 alert[2 ]; +struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len =sizeof (alert), + }; +struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen =sizeof (u), + }; +int ret; + +iov_iter_kvec (&msg.msg_iter,ITER_DEST , &alert_kvec,1 , + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, &msg,MSG_DONTWAIT ); +if (ret >0 && +tls_get_record_type (sock->sk, &u.cmsg) ==TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT ) { +iov_iter_revert (&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret =svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg (sock, &msg, &u.cmsg, -EAGAIN ); + } +return ret; +} + +static int +svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg (struct svc_sock *svsk,struct msghdr *msg) +{int ret; +struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen =sizeof (u); ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, msg,MSG_DONTWAIT ); -if (unlikely (msg->msg_controllen !=sizeof (u))) - ret =svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg (sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); +if (msg->msg_flags &MSG_CTRUNC ) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC |MSG_EOR ); +if (ret ==0 || ret == -EIO ) + ret =svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, &msg->msg_flags); + }return ret; }
@@ -321,7 +348,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_msg(struct siov_iter_advance (&msg.msg_iter, seek); buflen -= seek; } - len =svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (svsk, &msg); + len =svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg (svsk, &msg);if (len >0 )svc_flush_bvec (bvec, len, seek);
@@ -1019,7 +1046,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struc iov.iov_base = ((char *)&svsk->sk_marker) + svsk->sk_tcplen; iov.iov_len = want;iov_iter_kvec (&msg.msg_iter,ITER_DEST , &iov,1 , want); - len =svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (svsk, &msg); + len =svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg (svsk, &msg);if (len <0 )return len; svsk->sk_tcplen += len;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 231/262 perf/core: Dont leak AUX buffer refcount on allocation failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 5468c0fbccbb9d156522c50832244a8b722374fb upstream.
Failure of the AUX buffer allocation leaks the reference count.
Set the reference count to 1 only when the allocation succeeds.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +4 -3
@@ -6595,9 +6595,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, goto unlock; } -atomic_set (&rb->aux_mmap_count,1 ); user_extra = nr_pages; - goto accounting; }
@@ -6699,8 +6697,10 @@ accounting: }else { ret =rb_alloc_aux (rb, event, vma->vm_pgoff, nr_pages, event->attr.aux_watermark, flags); -if (!ret) +if (!ret) { +atomic_set (&rb->aux_mmap_count,1 ); rb->aux_mmap_locked = extra; + } } unlock:
@@ -6710,6 +6710,7 @@ unlock:atomic_inc (&event->mmap_count); }else if (rb) { +/* AUX allocation failed */ atomic_dec (&rb->mmap_count); } aux_unlock:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 232/262 perf/core: Exit early on perf_mmap() fail
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 07091aade394f690e7b655578140ef84d0e8d7b0 upstream.
When perf_mmap() fails to allocate a buffer, it still invokes the event_mapped() callback of the related event. On X86 this might increase the perf_rdpmc_allowed reference counter. But nothing undoes this as perf_mmap_close() is never called in this case, which causes another reference count leak.
Return early on failure to prevent that.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
kernel/events/core.c +3 -0
@@ -6718,6 +6718,9 @@ aux_unlock:mutex_unlock (aux_mutex);mutex_unlock (&event->mmap_mutex); +if (ret) +return ret; +/* * Since pinned accounting is per vm we cannot allow fork() to copy our * vma.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 233/262 perf/core: Prevent VMA split of buffer mappings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit b024d7b56c77191cde544f838debb7f8451cd0d6 upstream.
The perf mmap code is careful about mmap()'ing the user page with the ringbuffer and additionally the auxiliary buffer, when the event supports it. Once the first mapping is established, subsequent mapping have to use the same offset and the same size in both cases. The reference counting for the ringbuffer and the auxiliary buffer depends on this being correct.
Though perf does not prevent that a related mapping is split via mmap(2), munmap(2) or mremap(2). A split of a VMA results in perf_mmap_open() calls, which take reference counts, but then the subsequent perf_mmap_close() calls are not longer fulfilling the offset and size checks. This leads to reference count leaks.
As perf already has the requirement for subsequent mappings to match the initial mapping, the obvious consequence is that VMA splits, caused by resizing of a mapping or partial unmapping, have to be prevented.
Implement the vm_operations_struct::may_split() callback and return unconditionally -EINVAL.
That ensures that the mapping offsets and sizes cannot be changed after the fact. Remapping to a different fixed address with the same size is still possible as it takes the references for the new mapping and drops those of the old mapping.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
kernel/events/core.c +10 -0
@@ -6499,11 +6499,21 @@ out_put:ring_buffer_put (rb);/* could be last */ } +static int perf_mmap_may_split (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long addr) +{ +/* +* Forbid splitting perf mappings to prevent refcount leaks due to +* the resulting non-matching offsets and sizes. See open()/close(). +*/ +return -EINVAL ; +} +static const struct vm_operations_struct perf_mmap_vmops = { .open = perf_mmap_open, .close = perf_mmap_close,/* non mergeable */ .fault = perf_mmap_fault, .page_mkwrite = perf_mmap_fault, + .may_split = perf_mmap_may_split, };static int perf_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 234/262 selftests/perf_events: Add a mmap() correctness test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
commit 084d2ac4030c5919e85bba1f4af26e33491469cb upstream.
Exercise various mmap(), munmap() and mremap() invocations, which might cause a perf buffer mapping to be split or truncated.
To avoid hard coding the perf event and having dependencies on architectures and configuration options, scan through event types in sysfs and try to open them. On success, try to mmap() and if that succeeds try to mmap() the AUX buffer.
In case that no AUX buffer supporting event is found, only test the base buffer mapping. If no mappable event is found or permissions are not sufficient, skip the tests.
Reserve a PROT_NONE region for both rb and aux tests to allow testing the case where mremap unmaps beyond the end of a mapped VMA to prevent it from unmapping unrelated mappings.
--- tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/.gitignore | 1 tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/Makefile | 2 tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/mmap.c | 236 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/mmap.c
tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only sigtrap_threads remove_on_exec +mmap
tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ CFLAGS += -Wl,-no-as-needed -Wall $(KHDR_INCLUDES) LDFLAGS += -lpthread -TEST_GEN_PROGS := sigtrap_threads remove_on_exec +TEST_GEN_PROGS := sigtrap_threads remove_on_exec mmap include ../lib.mk
tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/mmap.c new file +236 -0
236 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 235/262 net/packet: fix a race in packet_set_ring() and packet_notifier()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Quang Le <[email protected]>
commit 01d3c8417b9c1b884a8a981a3b886da556512f36 upstream.
When packet_set_ring() releases po->bind_lock, another thread can run packet_notifier() and process an NETDEV_UP event.
This race and the fix are both similar to that of commit 15fe076edea7 ("net/packet: fix a race in packet_bind() and packet_notifier()").
There too the packet_notifier NETDEV_UP event managed to run while a po->bind_lock critical section had to be temporarily released. And the fix was similarly to temporarily set po->num to zero to keep the socket unhooked until the lock is retaken.
The po->bind_lock in packet_set_ring and packet_notifier precede the introduction of git history.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +6 -6
@@ -4566,10 +4566,10 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *spin_lock (&po->bind_lock); was_running =packet_sock_flag (po,PACKET_SOCK_RUNNING ); num = po->num; -if (was_running) { -WRITE_ONCE (po->num,0 ); +WRITE_ONCE (po->num,0 ); +if (was_running)__unregister_prot_hook (sk, false); - } +spin_unlock (&po->bind_lock);synchronize_net ();
@@ -4601,10 +4601,10 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *mutex_unlock (&po->pg_vec_lock);spin_lock (&po->bind_lock); -if (was_running) { -WRITE_ONCE (po->num, num); +WRITE_ONCE (po->num, num); +if (was_running)register_prot_hook (sk); - } +spin_unlock (&po->bind_lock);if (pg_vec && (po->tp_version >TPACKET_V2 )) {/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 236/262 vsock: Do not allow binding to VMADDR_PORT_ANY
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Budimir Markovic <[email protected]>
commit aba0c94f61ec05315fa7815d21aefa4c87f6a9f4 upstream.
It is possible for a vsock to autobind to VMADDR_PORT_ANY. This can cause a use-after-free when a connection is made to the bound socket. The socket returned by accept() also has port VMADDR_PORT_ANY but is not on the list of unbound sockets. Binding it will result in an extra refcount decrement similar to the one fixed in fcdd2242c023 (vsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction).
Modify the check in __vsock_bind_connectible() to also prevent binding to VMADDR_PORT_ANY.
--- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +2 -1
@@ -688,7 +688,8 @@ static int __vsock_bind_connectible(struunsigned int i;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_PORT_RETRIES ; i++) { -if (port <=LAST_RESERVED_PORT ) +if (port ==VMADDR_PORT_ANY || + port <=LAST_RESERVED_PORT ) port =LAST_RESERVED_PORT +1 ; new_addr.svm_port = port++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 237/262 ksmbd: fix null pointer dereference error in generate_encryptionkey
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 9b493ab6f35178afd8d619800df9071992f715de upstream.
If client send two session setups with krb5 authenticate to ksmbd, null pointer dereference error in generate_encryptionkey could happen. sess->Preauth_HashValue is set to NULL if session is valid. So this patch skip generate encryption key if session is valid.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +16 -2
@@ -1610,11 +1610,24 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmb rsp->SecurityBufferLength =cpu_to_le16 (out_len); -if ((conn->sign || server_conf.enforced_signing) || +/* +* If session state is SMB2_SESSION_VALID, We can assume +* that it is reauthentication. And the user/password +* has been verified, so return it here. +*/ +if (sess->state ==SMB2_SESSION_VALID ) { +if (conn->binding) + goto binding_session; +return 0 ; + } + +if ((rsp->SessionFlags !=SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST_LE && + (conn->sign || server_conf.enforced_signing)) || (req->SecurityMode &SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED )) sess->sign = true; -if (smb3_encryption_negotiated (conn)) { +if (smb3_encryption_negotiated (conn) && + !(req->Flags &SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING )) { retval = conn->ops->generate_encryptionkey (conn, sess);if (retval) { ksmbd_debug(SMB,
@@ -1627,6 +1640,7 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmb sess->sign = false; } +binding_session:if (conn->dialect >=SMB30_PROT_ID ) { chann =lookup_chann_list (sess, conn);if (!chann) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 238/262 ksmbd: fix Preauh_HashValue race condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 44a3059c4c8cc635a1fb2afd692d0730ca1ba4b6 upstream.
If client send multiple session setup requests to ksmbd, Preauh_HashValue race condition could happen.
There is no need to free sess->Preauh_HashValue at session setup phase. It can be freed together with session at connection termination phase.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +0 -4
@@ -1831,8 +1831,6 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *wksmbd_conn_set_good (conn); sess->state =SMB2_SESSION_VALID ; } -kfree (sess->Preauth_HashValue); - sess->Preauth_HashValue =NULL ; }else if (conn->preferred_auth_mech ==KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP ) {if (negblob->MessageType == NtLmNegotiate) { rc =ntlm_negotiate (work, negblob, negblob_len, rsp);
@@ -1859,8 +1857,6 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *wkfree (preauth_sess); } } -kfree (sess->Preauth_HashValue); - sess->Preauth_HashValue =NULL ; }else {pr_info_ratelimited ("Unknown NTLMSSP message type : 0x%x\n" ,le32_to_cpu (negblob->MessageType));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 239/262 ksmbd: fix corrupted mtime and ctime in smb2_open
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 4f8ff9486fd94b9d6a4932f2aefb9f2fc3bd0cf6 upstream.
If STATX_BASIC_STATS flags are not given as an argument to vfs_getattr, It can not get ctime and mtime in kstat.
This causes a problem showing mtime and ctime outdated from cifs.ko.
File: /xfstest.test/foo
Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 regular file
Device: 0,65 Inode: 2033391 Links: 1
Access: (0755/-rwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: system_u:object_r:cifs_t:s0
Access: 2025-07-23 22:15:30.136051900 +0100
Modify: 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
Change: 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
Birth: 2025-07-23 22:15:30.136051900 +0100
--- fs/smb/server/vfs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/vfs.c +2 -1
@@ -563,7 +563,8 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_getattr(const struct path {int err; - err =vfs_getattr (path, stat,STATX_BTIME ,AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT ); + err =vfs_getattr (path, stat,STATX_BASIC_STATS |STATX_BTIME , +AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT );if (err)pr_err ("getattr failed, err %d\n" , err);return err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 240/262 ksmbd: limit repeated connections from clients with the same IP
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit e6bb9193974059ddbb0ce7763fa3882bd60d4dc3 upstream.
Repeated connections from clients with the same IP address may exhaust the max connections and prevent other normal client connections. This patch limit repeated connections from clients with the same IP.
--- fs/smb/server/connection.h | 1 + fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
fs/smb/server/connection.h +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct ksmbd_conn {struct mutex srv_mutex;int status;unsigned int cli_cap; +__be32 inet_addr;char *request_buf;struct ksmbd_transport *transport;struct nls_table *local_nls;
fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c +17 -0
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static struct tcp_transport *alloc_transreturn NULL ; } + conn->inet_addr =inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr; conn->transport =KSMBD_TRANS (t);KSMBD_TRANS (t)->conn = conn;KSMBD_TRANS (t)->ops = &ksmbd_tcp_transport_ops;
@@ -230,6 +231,8 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p) {struct socket *client_sk =NULL ;struct interface *iface = (struct interface *)p; +struct inet_sock *csk_inet; +struct ksmbd_conn *conn;int ret;while (!kthread_should_stop ()) {
@@ -248,6 +251,20 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p)continue ; } +/* +* Limits repeated connections from clients with the same IP. +*/ + csk_inet =inet_sk (client_sk->sk); +down_read (&conn_list_lock); +list_for_each_entry (conn, &conn_list, conns_list) +if (csk_inet->inet_daddr == conn->inet_addr) { + ret = -EAGAIN ; +break ; + } +up_read (&conn_list_lock); +if (ret == -EAGAIN ) +continue ; +if (server_conf.max_connections &&atomic_inc_return (&active_num_conn) >= server_conf.max_connections) { pr_info_ratelimited("Limit the maximum number of connections(%u)\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 241/262 smb: server: Fix extension string in ksmbd_extract_shortname()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 8e7d178d06e8937454b6d2f2811fa6a15656a214 upstream.
In ksmbd_extract_shortname(), strscpy() is incorrectly called with the length of the source string (excluding the NUL terminator) rather than the size of the destination buffer. This results in "__" being copied to 'extension' rather than "___" (two underscores instead of three).
Use the destination buffer size instead to ensure that the string "___" (three underscores) is copied correctly.
--- fs/smb/server/smb_common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/smb_common.c +1 -1
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ int ksmbd_extract_shortname(struct ksmbd p =strrchr (longname,'.' );if (p == longname) {/*name starts with a dot*/ -strscpy (extension,"___" ,strlen ("___" )); +strscpy (extension,"___" ,sizeof (extension)); }else {if (p) { p++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 242/262 USB: serial: option: add Foxconn T99W709
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Slark Xiao <[email protected]>
commit ad1244e1ce18f8c1a5ebad8074bfcf10eacb0311 upstream.
T99W709 is designed based on MTK T300(5G redcap) chip. There are 7 serial ports to be enumerated: AP_LOG, GNSS, AP_META, AT, MD_META, NPT, DBG. RSVD(5) for ADB port.
test evidence as below:
T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 7 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0489 ProdID=e15f Rev=00.01 S: Manufacturer=MediaTek Inc. S: Product=USB DATA CARD S: SerialNumber=355511220000399 C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs I: If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +2 -0
@@ -2346,6 +2346,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option .driver_info = RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x0489, 0xe145, 0xff), /* Foxconn T99W651 RNDIS */ .driver_info = RSVD(5) | RSVD(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x0489, 0xe15f, 0xff), /* Foxconn T99W709 */ + .driver_info = RSVD(5) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x0489, 0xe167, 0xff), /* Foxconn T99W640 MBIM */ .driver_info = RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x1508, 0x1001), /* Fibocom NL668 (IOT version) */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 243/262 i2c: stm32f7: Use devm_clk_get_enabled()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andi Shyti <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7ba2b17a87466e1410ae0ccc94d8eb381de177c2 ]
Replace the pair of functions, devm_clk_get() andclk_prepare_enable(), with a single functiondevm_clk_get_enabled().
Stable-dep-of: 6aae87fe7f18 ("i2c: stm32f7: unmap DMA mapped buffer")
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 37 ++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +12 -25
@@ -2177,23 +2177,16 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_probe(struct plat i2c_dev->wakeup_src =of_property_read_bool (pdev->dev.of_node,"wakeup-source" ); - i2c_dev->clk =devm_clk_get (&pdev->dev,NULL ); + i2c_dev->clk =devm_clk_get_enabled (&pdev->dev,NULL );if (IS_ERR (i2c_dev->clk))return dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev,PTR_ERR (i2c_dev->clk), -"Failed to get controller clock\n" ); - - ret =clk_prepare_enable (i2c_dev->clk); -if (ret) { -dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to prepare_enable clock\n" ); -return ret; - } +"Failed to enable controller clock\n" ); rst =devm_reset_control_get (&pdev->dev,NULL ); -if (IS_ERR (rst)) { - ret =dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev,PTR_ERR (rst), -"Error: Missing reset ctrl\n" ); - goto clk_free; - } +if (IS_ERR (rst)) +return dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev,PTR_ERR (rst), +"Error: Missing reset ctrl\n" ); +reset_control_assert (rst);udelay (2 );reset_control_deassert (rst);
@@ -2208,7 +2201,7 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_probe(struct platif (ret) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to request irq event %i\n" , irq_event); - goto clk_free; +return ret; } ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq_error, stm32f7_i2c_isr_error, 0,
@@ -2216,29 +2209,28 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_probe(struct platif (ret) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to request irq error %i\n" , irq_error); - goto clk_free; +return ret; } setup =of_device_get_match_data (&pdev->dev);if (!setup) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Can't get device data\n" ); - ret = -ENODEV ; - goto clk_free; +return -ENODEV ; } i2c_dev->setup = *setup; ret =stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing (i2c_dev, &i2c_dev->setup);if (ret) - goto clk_free; +return ret;/* Setup Fast mode plus if necessary */ if (i2c_dev->bus_rate >I2C_MAX_FAST_MODE_FREQ ) { ret =stm32f7_i2c_setup_fm_plus_bits (pdev, i2c_dev);if (ret) - goto clk_free; +return ret; ret =stm32f7_i2c_write_fm_plus_bits (i2c_dev, true);if (ret) - goto clk_free; +return ret; } adap = &i2c_dev->adap;
@@ -2349,9 +2341,6 @@ clr_wakeup_capable: fmp_clear:stm32f7_i2c_write_fm_plus_bits (i2c_dev, false); -clk_free: -clk_disable_unprepare (i2c_dev->clk); -return ret; }
@@ -2385,8 +2374,6 @@ static void stm32f7_i2c_remove(struct pl }stm32f7_i2c_write_fm_plus_bits (i2c_dev, false); - -clk_disable_unprepare (i2c_dev->clk); }static int __maybe_unused stm32f7_i2c_runtime_suspend (struct device *dev)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 244/262 i2c: stm32f7: use dev_err_probe upon calls of devm_request_irq
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alain Volmat <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a51e224c2f42417e95a3e1a672ade221bcd006ba ]
Convert error handling upon calls of devm_request_irq functions during the probe of the driver.
Stable-dep-of: 6aae87fe7f18 ("i2c: stm32f7: unmap DMA mapped buffer")
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +4 -10
@@ -2198,19 +2198,13 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_probe(struct plat stm32f7_i2c_isr_event_thread,IRQF_ONESHOT , pdev->name, i2c_dev); -if (ret) { -dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to request irq event %i\n" , - irq_event); -return ret; - } +if (ret) +return dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev, ret,"Failed to request irq event\n" ); ret =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, irq_error, stm32f7_i2c_isr_error,0 , pdev->name, i2c_dev); -if (ret) { -dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to request irq error %i\n" , - irq_error); -return ret; - } +if (ret) +return dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev, ret,"Failed to request irq error\n" ); setup =of_device_get_match_data (&pdev->dev);if (!setup) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 245/262 i2c: stm32f7: perform most of irq job in threaded handler
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alain Volmat <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e6103cd45ef0e14eb02f0666bc6b494902cfe821 ]
The irq handling is currently split between the irq handler and the threaded irq handler. Some of the handling (such as dma related stuffs) done within the irq handler might sleep or take some time leading to issues if the kernel is built with realtime constraints. In order to fix that, perform an overall rework to perform most of the job within the threaded handler and only keep fifo access in the non threaded handler.
Stable-dep-of: 6aae87fe7f18 ("i2c: stm32f7: unmap DMA mapped buffer")
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +56 -70
@@ -1496,17 +1496,11 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_slave_isrstatic irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event (int irq,void *data) {struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = data; -struct stm32f7_i2c_msg *f7_msg = &i2c_dev->f7_msg; -struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma; -void __iomem *base = i2c_dev->base; -u32 status, mask; -int ret =IRQ_HANDLED ; +u32 status; -/* Check if the interrupt if for a slave device */ -if (!i2c_dev->master_mode) { - ret =stm32f7_i2c_slave_isr_event (i2c_dev); -return ret; - } +/* Check if the interrupt is for a slave device */ +if (!i2c_dev->master_mode) +return IRQ_WAKE_THREAD ; status =readl_relaxed (i2c_dev->base +STM32F7_I2C_ISR );
@@ -1518,6 +1512,29 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_eventif (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_RXNE )stm32f7_i2c_read_rx_data (i2c_dev); +/* Wake up the thread if other flags are raised */ +if (status & + (STM32F7_I2C_ISR_NACKF |STM32F7_I2C_ISR_STOPF | +STM32F7_I2C_ISR_TC |STM32F7_I2C_ISR_TCR )) +return IRQ_WAKE_THREAD ; + +return IRQ_HANDLED ; +} + +static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event_thread (int irq,void *data) +{ +struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = data; +struct stm32f7_i2c_msg *f7_msg = &i2c_dev->f7_msg; +struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma; +void __iomem *base = i2c_dev->base; +u32 status, mask; +int ret; + +if (!i2c_dev->master_mode) +return stm32f7_i2c_slave_isr_event (i2c_dev); + + status =readl_relaxed (i2c_dev->base +STM32F7_I2C_ISR ); +/* NACK received */ if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_NACKF ) { dev_dbg(i2c_dev->dev, "<%s>: Receive NACK (addr %x)\n",
@@ -1530,33 +1547,28 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event f7_msg->result = -ENXIO ; } -/* STOP detection flag */ -if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_STOPF ) { -/* Disable interrupts */ -if (stm32f7_i2c_is_slave_registered (i2c_dev)) - mask =STM32F7_I2C_XFER_IRQ_MASK ; +if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_TCR ) { +if (f7_msg->smbus) +stm32f7_i2c_smbus_reload (i2c_dev);else - mask =STM32F7_I2C_ALL_IRQ_MASK ; -stm32f7_i2c_disable_irq (i2c_dev, mask); - -/* Clear STOP flag */ -writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_STOPCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR ); - -if (i2c_dev->use_dma && !f7_msg->result) { - ret =IRQ_WAKE_THREAD ; - }else { - i2c_dev->master_mode = false; -complete (&i2c_dev->complete); - } +stm32f7_i2c_reload (i2c_dev); }/* Transfer complete */ if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_TC ) { +/* Wait for dma transfer completion before sending next message */ +if (i2c_dev->use_dma && !f7_msg->result) { + ret =wait_for_completion_timeout (&i2c_dev->dma->dma_complete,HZ ); +if (!ret) { +dev_dbg (i2c_dev->dev,"<%s>: Timed out\n" , __func__); +stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req (i2c_dev); +dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->chan_using); + f7_msg->result = -ETIMEDOUT ; + } + }if (f7_msg->stop) { mask =STM32F7_I2C_CR2_STOP ;stm32f7_i2c_set_bits (base +STM32F7_I2C_CR2 , mask); - }else if (i2c_dev->use_dma && !f7_msg->result) { - ret =IRQ_WAKE_THREAD ; }else if (f7_msg->smbus) {stm32f7_i2c_smbus_rep_start (i2c_dev); }else {
@@ -1566,47 +1578,18 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event } } -if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_TCR ) { -if (f7_msg->smbus) -stm32f7_i2c_smbus_reload (i2c_dev); +/* STOP detection flag */ +if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_STOPF ) { +/* Disable interrupts */ +if (stm32f7_i2c_is_slave_registered (i2c_dev)) + mask =STM32F7_I2C_XFER_IRQ_MASK ;else -stm32f7_i2c_reload (i2c_dev); - } - -return ret; -} - -static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event_thread (int irq,void *data) -{ -struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = data; -struct stm32f7_i2c_msg *f7_msg = &i2c_dev->f7_msg; -struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma; -u32 status; -int ret; - -/* -* Wait for dma transfer completion before sending next message or -* notity the end of xfer to the client -*/ - ret =wait_for_completion_timeout (&i2c_dev->dma->dma_complete,HZ ); -if (!ret) { -dev_dbg (i2c_dev->dev,"<%s>: Timed out\n" , __func__); -stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req (i2c_dev); -dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->chan_using); - f7_msg->result = -ETIMEDOUT ; - } + mask =STM32F7_I2C_ALL_IRQ_MASK ; +stm32f7_i2c_disable_irq (i2c_dev, mask); - status =readl_relaxed (i2c_dev->base +STM32F7_I2C_ISR ); +/* Clear STOP flag */ +writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_STOPCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR ); -if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_TC ) { -if (f7_msg->smbus) { -stm32f7_i2c_smbus_rep_start (i2c_dev); - }else { - i2c_dev->msg_id++; - i2c_dev->msg++; -stm32f7_i2c_xfer_msg (i2c_dev, i2c_dev->msg); - } - }else { i2c_dev->master_mode = false;complete (&i2c_dev->complete); }
@@ -1614,7 +1597,7 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_eventreturn IRQ_HANDLED ; } -static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_error (int irq,void *data) +static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_error_thread (int irq,void *data) {struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = data;struct stm32f7_i2c_msg *f7_msg = &i2c_dev->f7_msg;
@@ -2201,8 +2184,11 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_probe(struct platif (ret)return dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev, ret,"Failed to request irq event\n" ); - ret =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, irq_error, stm32f7_i2c_isr_error,0 , - pdev->name, i2c_dev); + ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (&pdev->dev, irq_error, +NULL , + stm32f7_i2c_isr_error_thread, +IRQF_ONESHOT , + pdev->name, i2c_dev);if (ret)return dev_err_probe (&pdev->dev, ret,"Failed to request irq error\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 246/262 i2c: stm32f7: simplify status messages in case of errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alain Volmat <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 33a00d919253022aabafecae6bc88a6fad446589 ]
Avoid usage of __func__ when reporting an error message since dev_err/dev_dbg are already providing enough details to identify the source of the message.
Stable-dep-of: 6aae87fe7f18 ("i2c: stm32f7: unmap DMA mapped buffer")
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +5 -7
@@ -1601,6 +1601,7 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_error {struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = data;struct stm32f7_i2c_msg *f7_msg = &i2c_dev->f7_msg; +u16 addr = f7_msg->addr;void __iomem *base = i2c_dev->base;struct device *dev = i2c_dev->dev;struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma;
@@ -1610,8 +1611,7 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_error/* Bus error */ if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_BERR ) { -dev_err (dev,"<%s>: Bus error accessing addr 0x%x\n" , - __func__, f7_msg->addr); +dev_err (dev,"Bus error accessing addr 0x%x\n" , addr);writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_BERRCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR );stm32f7_i2c_release_bus (&i2c_dev->adap); f7_msg->result = -EIO ;
@@ -1619,21 +1619,19 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_error/* Arbitration loss */ if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_ARLO ) { -dev_dbg (dev,"<%s>: Arbitration loss accessing addr 0x%x\n" , - __func__, f7_msg->addr); +dev_dbg (dev,"Arbitration loss accessing addr 0x%x\n" , addr);writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_ARLOCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR ); f7_msg->result = -EAGAIN ; }if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_PECERR ) { -dev_err (dev,"<%s>: PEC error in reception accessing addr 0x%x\n" , - __func__, f7_msg->addr); +dev_err (dev,"PEC error in reception accessing addr 0x%x\n" , addr);writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_PECCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR ); f7_msg->result = -EINVAL ; }if (status &STM32F7_I2C_ISR_ALERT ) { -dev_dbg (dev,"<%s>: SMBus alert received\n" , __func__); +dev_dbg (dev,"SMBus alert received\n" );writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_ALERTCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR );i2c_handle_smbus_alert (i2c_dev->alert->ara);return IRQ_HANDLED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 247/262 i2c: stm32f7: unmap DMA mapped buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Clément Le Goffic <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6aae87fe7f180cd93a74466cdb6cf2aa9bb28798 ]
Before each I2C transfer using DMA, the I2C buffer is DMA'pped to make sure the memory buffer is DMA'able. This is handle in the function stm32_i2c_prep_dma_xfer().
If the transfer fails for any reason the I2C buffer must be unmap. Use the dma_callback to factorize the code and fix this issue.
Note that the stm32f7_i2c_dma_callback() is now called in case of DMA transfer success and error and that the complete() on the dma_complete completion structure is done inconditionnally in case of transfer success or error as well as the dmaengine_terminate_async(). This is allowed as a complete() in case transfer error has no effect as well as a dmaengine_terminate_async() on a transfer success.
Also fix the unneeded cast and remove not more needed variables.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 20 +++++++------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +7 -13
@@ -726,10 +726,11 @@ static void stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req(static void stm32f7_i2c_dma_callback (void *arg) { -struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = (struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *)arg; +struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = arg;struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma;stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req (i2c_dev); +dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->chan_using);dma_unmap_single (i2c_dev->dev, dma->dma_buf, dma->dma_len, dma->dma_data_dir);complete (&dma->dma_complete);
@@ -1525,7 +1526,6 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event {struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = data;struct stm32f7_i2c_msg *f7_msg = &i2c_dev->f7_msg; -struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma;void __iomem *base = i2c_dev->base;u32 status, mask;int ret;
@@ -1540,10 +1540,8 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_eventdev_dbg (i2c_dev->dev,"<%s>: Receive NACK (addr %x)\n" , __func__, f7_msg->addr);writel_relaxed (STM32F7_I2C_ICR_NACKCF , base +STM32F7_I2C_ICR ); -if (i2c_dev->use_dma) { -stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req (i2c_dev); -dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->chan_using); - } +if (i2c_dev->use_dma) +stm32f7_i2c_dma_callback (i2c_dev); f7_msg->result = -ENXIO ; }
@@ -1561,8 +1559,7 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_event ret =wait_for_completion_timeout (&i2c_dev->dma->dma_complete,HZ );if (!ret) {dev_dbg (i2c_dev->dev,"<%s>: Timed out\n" , __func__); -stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req (i2c_dev); -dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->chan_using); +stm32f7_i2c_dma_callback (i2c_dev); f7_msg->result = -ETIMEDOUT ; } }
@@ -1604,7 +1601,6 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_erroru16 addr = f7_msg->addr;void __iomem *base = i2c_dev->base;struct device *dev = i2c_dev->dev; -struct stm32_i2c_dma *dma = i2c_dev->dma;u32 status; status =readl_relaxed (i2c_dev->base +STM32F7_I2C_ISR );
@@ -1648,10 +1644,8 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32f7_i2c_isr_error }/* Disable dma */ -if (i2c_dev->use_dma) { -stm32f7_i2c_disable_dma_req (i2c_dev); -dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->chan_using); - } +if (i2c_dev->use_dma) +stm32f7_i2c_dma_callback (i2c_dev); i2c_dev->master_mode = false;complete (&i2c_dev->complete);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 248/262 sched/core: Remove ifdeffery for saved_state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Elliot Berman <[email protected]>
commit fbaa6a181a4b1886cbf4214abdf9a2df68471510 upstream.
In preparation for freezer to also use saved_state, remove the CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT compilation guard around saved_state.
On the arm64 platform I tested which did not have CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT, there was no statistically significant deviation by applying this patch.
Test methodology:
perf bench sched message -g 40 -l 40
--- include/linux/sched.h | 2 -- kernel/sched/core.c | 10 ++-------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/sched.h +0 -2
@@ -753,10 +753,8 @@ struct task_struct {#endif unsigned int __state; -#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT /* saved state for "spinlock sleepers" */ unsigned int saved_state; -#endif /* * This begins the randomizable portion of task_struct. Only
kernel/sched/core.c +2 -8
@@ -2238,17 +2238,15 @@ int __task_state_match(struct task_strucif (READ_ONCE (p->__state) & state)return 1 ; -#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT if (READ_ONCE (p->saved_state) & state)return -1 ; -#endif +return 0 ; }static __always_inline int task_state_match(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int state) { -#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT int match;/*
@@ -2260,9 +2258,6 @@ int task_state_match(struct task_structraw_spin_unlock_irq (&p->pi_lock);return match; -#else -return __task_state_match (p, state); -#endif }/*
@@ -4059,7 +4054,6 @@ bool ttwu_state_match(struct task_struct *success = !!(match =__task_state_match (p, state)); -#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT /* * Saved state preserves the task state across blocking on * an RT lock. If the state matches, set p::saved_state to
@@ -4075,7 +4069,7 @@ bool ttwu_state_match(struct task_struct*/ if (match <0 ) p->saved_state =TASK_RUNNING ; -#endif +return match >0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 249/262 freezer,sched: Use saved_state to reduce some spurious wakeups
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Elliot Berman <[email protected]>
commit 8f0eed4a78a81668bc78923ea09f51a7a663c2b0 upstream.
After commit f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic"), tasks that transition directly from TASK_FREEZABLE to TASK_FROZEN are always woken up on the thaw path. Prior to that commit, tasks could ask freezer to consider them "frozen enough" via freezer_do_not_count(). The commit replaced freezer_do_not_count() with a TASK_FREEZABLE state which allows freezer to immediately mark the task as TASK_FROZEN without waking up the task. This is efficient for the suspend path, but on the thaw path, the task is always woken up even if the task didn't need to wake up and goes back to its TASK_(UN)INTERRUPTIBLE state. Although these tasks are capable of handling of the wakeup, we can observe a power/perf impact from the extra wakeup.
We observed on Android many tasks wait in the TASK_FREEZABLE state (particularly due to many of them being binder clients). We observed nearly 4x the number of tasks and a corresponding linear increase in latency and power consumption when thawing the system. The latency increased from ~15ms to ~50ms.
Avoid the spurious wakeups by saving the state of TASK_FREEZABLE tasks. If the task was running before entering TASK_FROZEN state (__refrigerator()) or if the task received a wake up for the saved state, then the task is woken on thaw. saved_state from PREEMPT_RT locks can be re-used because freezer would not stomp on the rtlock wait flow:TASK_RTLOCK_WAIT isn't considered freezable.
--- kernel/freezer.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------- kernel/sched/core.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
kernel/freezer.c +19 -22
@@ -71,7 +71,11 @@ bool __refrigerator(bool check_kthr_stopfor (;;) {bool freeze; +raw_spin_lock_irq (¤t->pi_lock);set_current_state (TASK_FROZEN ); +/* unstale saved_state so that __thaw_task() will wake us up */ + current->saved_state =TASK_RUNNING ; +raw_spin_unlock_irq (¤t->pi_lock);spin_lock_irq (&freezer_lock); freeze =freezing (current) && !(check_kthr_stop &&kthread_should_stop ());
@@ -129,6 +133,7 @@ static int __set_task_frozen(struct taskWARN_ON_ONCE (debug_locks && p->lockdep_depth);#endif + p->saved_state = p->__state;WRITE_ONCE (p->__state,TASK_FROZEN );return TASK_FROZEN ; }
@@ -170,42 +175,34 @@ bool freeze_task(struct task_struct *p) }/* -* The special task states (TASK_STOPPED, TASK_TRACED) keep their canonical -* state in p->jobctl. If either of them got a wakeup that was missed because -* TASK_FROZEN, then their canonical state reflects that and the below will -* refuse to restore the special state and instead issue the wakeup. +* Restore the saved_state before the task entered freezer. For typical task +* in the __refrigerator(), saved_state == TASK_RUNNING so nothing happens +* here. For tasks which were TASK_NORMAL | TASK_FREEZABLE, their initial state +* is restored unless they got an expected wakeup (see ttwu_state_match()). +* Returns 1 if the task state was restored. */ -static int __set_task_special (struct task_struct *p,void *arg) +static int __restore_freezer_state (struct task_struct *p,void *arg) { -unsigned int state =0 ; +unsigned int state = p->saved_state; -if (p->jobctl &JOBCTL_TRACED ) - state =TASK_TRACED ; - -else if (p->jobctl &JOBCTL_STOPPED ) - state =TASK_STOPPED ; - -if (state) +if (state !=TASK_RUNNING ) {WRITE_ONCE (p->__state, state); +return 1 ; + } -return state; +return 0 ; }void __thaw_task (struct task_struct *p) { -unsigned long flags, flags2; +unsigned long flags;spin_lock_irqsave (&freezer_lock, flags);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (freezing (p))) goto unlock; -if (lock_task_sighand (p, &flags2)) { -/* TASK_FROZEN -> TASK_{STOPPED,TRACED} */ -bool ret =task_call_func (p, __set_task_special,NULL ); -unlock_task_sighand (p, &flags2); -if (ret) - goto unlock; - } +if (task_call_func (p, __restore_freezer_state,NULL )) + goto unlock;wake_up_state (p,TASK_FROZEN ); unlock:
kernel/sched/core.c +13 -8
@@ -2251,7 +2251,7 @@ int task_state_match(struct task_struct/* * Serialize against current_save_and_set_rtlock_wait_state() and -* current_restore_rtlock_saved_state(). +* current_restore_rtlock_saved_state(), and __refrigerator(). */ raw_spin_lock_irq (&p->pi_lock); match =__task_state_match (p, state);
@@ -4034,13 +4034,17 @@ static void ttwu_queue(struct task_struc* The caller holds p::pi_lock if p != current or has preemption * disabled when p == current. * -* The rules of PREEMPT_RT saved_state: +* The rules of saved_state: * * The related locking code always holds p::pi_lock when updating * p::saved_state, which means the code is fully serialized in both cases. * -* The lock wait and lock wakeups happen via TASK_RTLOCK_WAIT. No other -* bits set. This allows to distinguish all wakeup scenarios. +* For PREEMPT_RT, the lock wait and lock wakeups happen via TASK_RTLOCK_WAIT. +* No other bits set. This allows to distinguish all wakeup scenarios. +* +* For FREEZER, the wakeup happens via TASK_FROZEN. No other bits set. This +* allows us to prevent early wakeup of tasks before they can be run on +* asymmetric ISA architectures (eg ARMv9). */ static __always_inline bool ttwu_state_match(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int state, int *success)
@@ -4056,10 +4060,11 @@ bool ttwu_state_match(struct task_struct/* * Saved state preserves the task state across blocking on -* an RT lock. If the state matches, set p::saved_state to -* TASK_RUNNING, but do not wake the task because it waits -* for a lock wakeup. Also indicate success because from -* the regular waker's point of view this has succeeded. +* an RT lock or TASK_FREEZABLE tasks. If the state matches, +* set p::saved_state to TASK_RUNNING, but do not wake the task +* because it waits for a lock wakeup or __thaw_task(). Also +* indicate success because from the regular waker's point of +* view this has succeeded. * * After acquiring the lock the task will restore p::__state * from p::saved_state which ensures that the regular
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 250/262 freezer,sched: Do not restore saved_state of a thawed task
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Elliot Berman <[email protected]>
commit 23ab79e8e469e2605beec2e3ccb40d19c68dd2e0 upstream.
It is possible for a task to be thawed multiple times when mixing the *legacy* cgroup freezer and system-wide freezer. To do this, freeze the cgroup, do system-wide freeze/thaw, then thaw the cgroup. When this happens, then a stale saved_state can be written to the task's state and cause task to hang indefinitely. Fix this by only trying to thaw tasks that are actually frozen.
This change also has the marginal benefit avoiding unnecessary wake_up_state(p, TASK_FROZEN) if we know the task is already thawed. There is not possibility of time-of-compare/time-of-use race when we skip the wake_up_state because entering/exiting TASK_FROZEN is guarded by freezer_lock.
--- kernel/freezer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/freezer.c +1 -1
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ void __thaw_task(struct task_struct *p)if (WARN_ON_ONCE (freezing (p))) goto unlock; -if (task_call_func (p, __restore_freezer_state,NULL )) +if (!frozen (p) ||task_call_func (p, __restore_freezer_state,NULL )) goto unlock;wake_up_state (p,TASK_FROZEN );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 251/262 freezer,sched: Clean saved_state when restoring it during thaw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Elliot Berman <[email protected]>
commit 418146e39891ef1fb2284dee4cabbfe616cd21cf upstream.
Clean saved_state after using it during thaw. Cleaning the saved_state allows us to avoid some unnecessary branches in ttwu_state_match.
--- kernel/freezer.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/freezer.c +1 -0
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ static int __restore_freezer_state(strucif (state !=TASK_RUNNING ) {WRITE_ONCE (p->__state, state); + p->saved_state =TASK_RUNNING ;return 1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 252/262 sched,freezer: Remove unnecessary warning in __thaw_task
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Ridong <[email protected]>
commit 9beb8c5e77dc10e3889ff5f967eeffba78617a88 upstream.
Commit cff5f49d433f ("cgroup_freezer: cgroup_freezing: Check if not frozen") modified the cgroup_freezing() logic to verify that the FROZEN flag is not set, affecting the return value of the freezing() function, in order to address a warning in __thaw_task.
A race condition exists that may allow tasks to escape being frozen. The following scenario demonstrates this issue:
CPU 0 (get_signal path) CPU 1 (freezer.state reader)try_to_freeze read freezer.state__refrigerator freezer_read
update_if_frozen
WRITE_ONCE(current->__state, TASK_FROZEN); ... /* Task is now marked frozen */ /* frozen(task) == true */ /* Assuming other tasks are frozen */ freezer->state |= CGROUP_FROZEN;
/* freezing(current) returns false */
/* because cgroup is frozen (not freezing) */ break out__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
/* Bug: Task resumes running when it should remain frozen */
The existing !frozen(p) check in __thaw_task makes the WARN_ON_ONCE(freezing(p)) warning redundant. Removing this warning enables reverting commit cff5f49d433f ("cgroup_freezer: cgroup_freezing: Check if not frozen") to resolve the issue.
This patch removes the warning from __thaw_task. A subsequent patch will revert commit cff5f49d433f ("cgroup_freezer: cgroup_freezing: Check if not frozen") to complete the fix.
--- kernel/freezer.c | 15 +++------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
kernel/freezer.c +3 -12
@@ -196,18 +196,9 @@ static int __restore_freezer_state(strucvoid __thaw_task (struct task_struct *p) { -unsigned long flags; - -spin_lock_irqsave (&freezer_lock, flags); -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (freezing (p))) - goto unlock; - -if (!frozen (p) ||task_call_func (p, __restore_freezer_state,NULL )) - goto unlock; - -wake_up_state (p,TASK_FROZEN ); -unlock: -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&freezer_lock, flags); +guard (spinlock_irqsave)(&freezer_lock); +if (frozen (p) && !task_call_func (p, __restore_freezer_state,NULL )) +wake_up_state (p,TASK_FROZEN ); }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/262 Bluetooth: btusb: Add USB ID 3625:010b for TP-LINK Archer TX10UB Nano
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zenm Chen <[email protected]>
commit d9da920233ec85af8b9c87154f2721a7dc4623f5 upstream.
Add USB ID 3625:010b for TP-LINK Archer TX10UB Nano which is based on a Realtek RTL8851BU chip.
The information in /sys/kernel/debug/usb/devices about the Bluetooth device is listed as the below:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 9 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=3625 ProdID=010b Rev= 0.00
S: Manufacturer=Realtek
S: Product=802.11ax WLAN Adapter
S: SerialNumber=00e04c000001
C:* #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
A: FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 2 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 3 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 4 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 5 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 6 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 63 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 63 Ivl=1ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 8 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=rtl8851bu
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=09(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=0a(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=0b(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=0c(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
--- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +4 -0
@@ -508,6 +508,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id quirks { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3549), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + /* Realtek 8851BU Bluetooth devices */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x3625, 0x010b), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + /* Realtek 8852AE Bluetooth devices */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0x2852), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/262 net: usbnet: Avoid potential RCU stall on LINK_CHANGE event
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Ernberg <[email protected]>
commit 0d9cfc9b8cb17dbc29a98792d36ec39a1cf1395f upstream.
The Gemalto Cinterion PLS83-W modem (cdc_ether) is emitting confusing link up and down events when the WWAN interface is activated on the modem-side.
Interrupt URBs will in consecutive polls grab:
* Link Connected
* Link Disconnected
* Link Connected
Where the last Connected is then a stable link state.
When the system is under load this may cause the unlink_urbs() work in __handle_link_change() to not complete before the next usbnet_link_change() call turns the carrier on again, allowing rx_submit() to queue new SKBs.
In that event the URB queue is filled faster than it can drain, ending up in a RCU stall:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 0-.... } 33108 jiffies s: 201 root: 0x1/.
rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug):
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
Call trace:
arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8
local_bh_enable+0x18/0x20
__netdev_alloc_skb+0x18c/0x1cc
rx_submit+0x68/0x1f8 [usbnet]
rx_alloc_submit+0x4c/0x74 [usbnet]
usbnet_bh+0x1d8/0x218 [usbnet]
usbnet_bh_tasklet+0x10/0x18 [usbnet]
tasklet_action_common+0xa8/0x110
tasklet_action+0x2c/0x34
handle_softirqs+0x2cc/0x3a0
__do_softirq+0x10/0x18
____do_softirq+0xc/0x14
call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34
do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa8/0xb8
irq_exit_rcu+0xc/0x30
el1_interrupt+0x34/0x48
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x1c
el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x48
xhci_urb_dequeue+0x1ac/0x45c [xhci_hcd]
unlink1+0xd4/0xdc [usbcore]
usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x70/0xb0 [usbcore]
usb_unlink_urb+0x24/0x44 [usbcore]
unlink_urbs.constprop.0.isra.0+0x64/0xa8 [usbnet]
__handle_link_change+0x34/0x70 [usbnet]
usbnet_deferred_kevent+0x1c0/0x320 [usbnet]
process_scheduled_works+0x2d0/0x48c
worker_thread+0x150/0x1dc
kthread+0xd8/0xe8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20Get around the problem by delaying the carrier on to the scheduled work.
This needs a new flag to keep track of the necessary action.
The carrier ok check cannot be removed as it remains required for the LINK_RESET event flow.
--- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 11 ++++++++--- include/linux/usb/usbnet.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +8 -3
@@ -1122,6 +1122,9 @@ static void __handle_link_change(struct* tx queue is stopped by netcore after link becomes off */ }else { +if (test_and_clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags)) +netif_carrier_on (dev->net); +/* submitting URBs for reading packets */ tasklet_schedule (&dev->bh); }
@@ -2015,10 +2018,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(usbnet_manage_power);void usbnet_link_change (struct usbnet *dev,bool link,bool need_reset) {/* update link after link is reseted */ -if (link && !need_reset) -netif_carrier_on (dev->net); -else +if (link && !need_reset) { +set_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags); + }else { +clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags);netif_carrier_off (dev->net); + }if (need_reset && link)usbnet_defer_kevent (dev,EVENT_LINK_RESET );
include/linux/usb/usbnet.h +1 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct usbnet {# define EVENT_LINK_CHANGE 11# define EVENT_SET_RX_MODE 12# define EVENT_NO_IP_ALIGN 13 +# define EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON 14/* This one is special, as it indicates that the device is going away * there are cyclic dependencies between tasklet, timer and bh * that must be broken
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/262 net: usbnet: Fix the wrong netif_carrier_on() call
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ammar Faizi <[email protected]>
commit 8466d393700f9ccef68134d3349f4e0a087679b9 upstream.
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag causes usbnet to malfunction (identified via git bisect). Post-commit, my external RJ45 LAN cable fails to connect. Linus also reported the same issue after pulling that commit.
The code has a logic error: netif_carrier_on() is only called when the link is already on. Fix this by moving the netif_carrier_on() call outside the if-statement entirely. This ensures it is always called when EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON is set and properly clears it regardless of the link state.
--- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +3 -3
@@ -1113,6 +1113,9 @@ static void __handle_link_change(structif (!test_bit (EVENT_DEV_OPEN , &dev->flags))return ; +if (test_and_clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags)) +netif_carrier_on (dev->net); +if (!netif_carrier_ok (dev->net)) {/* kill URBs for reading packets to save bus bandwidth */ unlink_urbs (dev, &dev->rxq);
@@ -1122,9 +1125,6 @@ static void __handle_link_change(struct* tx queue is stopped by netcore after link becomes off */ }else { -if (test_and_clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags)) -netif_carrier_on (dev->net); -/* submitting URBs for reading packets */ tasklet_schedule (&dev->bh); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/262 x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Commit 7b306dfa326f70114312b320d083b21fa9481e1e upstream.
An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private. The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation.
CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit that, when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this vulnerability is not needed.
Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP guest is vulnerable.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 11 ++++++++++- 6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +7 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,13 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned*/ if (op ==SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE &&pvalidate (paddr,RMP_PG_SIZE_4K ,1 ))sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX ,GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE ); + +/* +* If validating memory (making it private) and affected by the +* cache-coherency vulnerability, perform the cache eviction mitigation. +*/ +if (op ==SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && !has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO )) +sev_evict_cache ((void *)paddr,1 ); }void snp_set_page_private (unsigned long paddr)
arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c +13 -0
@@ -115,5 +115,18 @@ void get_cpuflags(void)cpuid (0x80000001 , &ignored, &ignored, &cpu.flags[6 ], &cpu.flags[1 ]); } + +if (max_amd_level >=0x8000001f ) { +u32 ebx; + +/* +* The X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO feature bit is in +* the virtualization flags entry (word 8) and set by +* scattered.c, so the bit needs to be explicitly set. +*/ +cpuid (0x8000001f , &ignored, &ebx, &ignored, &ignored); +if (ebx &BIT (31 )) +set_bit (X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO , cpu.flags); + } } }
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY ( 8*32+ 1)/* Intel FlexPriority */ #define X86_FEATURE_EPT ( 8*32+ 2)/* Intel Extended Page Table */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPID ( 8*32+ 3)/* Intel Virtual Processor ID */ +#define X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO ( 8*32+ 4)/* "" SNP cache coherency software work around not needed */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL ( 8*32+15)/* Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */ #define X86_FEATURE_XENPV ( 8*32+16)/* "" Xen paravirtual guest */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO, CPUID_EBX, 31, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_SMBA, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x80000020, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_BMEC, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x80000020, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 },
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +36 -0
@@ -1068,6 +1068,24 @@ static void __head setup_cpuid_table(con } } +static inline void sev_evict_cache (void *va,int npages) +{ +volatile u8 val__always_unused ; +u8 *bytes = va; +int page_idx; + +/* +* For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page +* using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines +* associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a +* full CLFLUSH sequence. +*/ +for (page_idx =0 ; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) { + val = bytes[page_idx *PAGE_SIZE ]; + val = bytes[page_idx *PAGE_SIZE +PAGE_SIZE -1 ]; + } +} +static void pvalidate_pages (struct snp_psc_desc *desc) {struct psc_entry *e;
@@ -1100,6 +1118,24 @@ static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX ,GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE ); } } + +/* +* If not affected by the cache-coherency vulnerability there is no need +* to perform the cache eviction mitigation. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO )) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry; i++) { + e = &desc->entries[i]; + +/* +* If validating memory (making it private) perform the cache +* eviction mitigation. +*/ +if (e->operation ==SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ) +sev_evict_cache (pfn_to_kaddr (e->gfn), e->pagesize ?512 :1 ); + } }static int vmgexit_psc (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +10 -1
@@ -688,12 +688,14 @@ static void __head early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long npages, enum psc_op op) { -unsigned long paddr_end; +unsigned long vaddr_begin, paddr_end;u64 val;int ret; vaddr = vaddr &PAGE_MASK ; + vaddr_begin = vaddr; + paddr = paddr &PAGE_MASK ; paddr_end = paddr + (npages <<PAGE_SHIFT );
@@ -736,6 +738,13 @@ early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vadd paddr +=PAGE_SIZE ; } +/* +* If validating memory (making it private) and affected by the +* cache-coherency vulnerability, perform the cache eviction mitigation. +*/ +if (op ==SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && !cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO )) +sev_evict_cache ((void *)vaddr_begin, npages); +return ; e_term:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 257/262 ALSA: intel_hdmi: Fix off-by-one error in __hdmi_lpe_audio_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 8cbe564974248ee980562be02f2b1912769562c7 upstream.
In __hdmi_lpe_audio_probe(), strscpy() is incorrectly called with the length of the source string (excluding the NUL terminator) rather than the size of the destination buffer. This results in one character less being copied from 'card->shortname' to 'pcm->name'.
Use the destination buffer size instead to ensure the card name is copied correctly.
--- sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c +1 -1
@@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ static int __hdmi_lpe_audio_probe(struct/* setup private data which can be retrieved when required */ pcm->private_data = ctx; pcm->info_flags =0 ; -strscpy (pcm->name, card->shortname,strlen (card->shortname)); +strscpy (pcm->name, card->shortname,sizeof (pcm->name));/* setup the ops for playback */ snd_pcm_set_ops (pcm,SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK , &had_pcm_ops);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 258/262 ALSA: scarlett2: Add retry on -EPROTO from scarlett2_usb_tx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geoffrey D. Bennett <[email protected]>
commit 8a15ca0ca51399b652b1bbb23b590b220cf03d62 upstream.
During communication with Focusrite Scarlett Gen 2/3/4 USB audio interfaces, -EPROTO is sometimes returned from scarlett2_usb_tx(), snd_usb_ctl_msg() which can cause initialisation and control operations to fail intermittently.
This patch adds up to 5 retries in scarlett2_usb(), with a delay starting at 5ms and doubling each time. This follows the same approach as the fix for usb_set_interface() in endpoint.c (commit f406005e162b ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add retry on -EPROTO from usb_set_interface()")), which resolved similar -EPROTO issues during device initialisation, and is the same approach as in fcp.c:fcp_usb().
--- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c +7 -0
@@ -1279,6 +1279,8 @@ static int scarlett2_usb(struct scarlett2_usb_packet *req, *resp =NULL ;size_t req_buf_size =struct_size (req, data, req_size);size_t resp_buf_size =struct_size (resp, data, resp_size); +int retries =0 ; +const int max_retries =5 ;int err; req =kmalloc (req_buf_size,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -1302,10 +1304,15 @@ static int scarlett2_usb(if (req_size)memcpy (req->data, req_data, req_size); +retry: err =scarlett2_usb_tx (dev, private->bInterfaceNumber, req, req_buf_size);if (err != req_buf_size) { +if (err == -EPROTO && ++retries <= max_retries) { +msleep (5 * (1 << (retries -1 ))); + goto retry; + } usb_audio_err( mixer->chip, "%s USB request result cmd %x was %d\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 259/262 x86/fpu: Delay instruction pointer fixup until after warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
commit 1cec9ac2d071cfd2da562241aab0ef701355762a upstream.
Right now, if XRSTOR fails a console message like this is be printed:
Bad FPU state detected at restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x9a/0x170, reinitializing FPU registers.
However, the text location (...+0x9a in this case) is the instruction *AFTER* the XRSTOR. The highlighted instruction in the "Code:" dump also points one instruction late.
The reason is that the "fixup" moves RIP up to pass the bad XRSTOR and keep on running after returning from the #GP handler. But it does this fixup before warning.
The resulting warning output is nonsensical because it looks like the non-FPU-related instruction is #GP'ing.
Do not fix up RIP until after printing the warning. Do this by using the more generic and standard ex_handler_default().
--- arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/extable.c +2 -3
@@ -121,13 +121,12 @@ static bool ex_handler_sgx(const structstatic bool ex_handler_fprestore (const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,struct pt_regs *regs) { - regs->ip =ex_fixup_addr (fixup); -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Bad FPU state detected at %pB, reinitializing FPU registers." , (void *)instruction_pointer (regs));fpu_reset_from_exception_fixup (); -return true; + +return ex_handler_default (fixup, regs); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 260/262 MIPS: mm: tlb-r4k: Uniquify TLB entries on init
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>
commit 35ad7e181541aa5757f9f316768d3e64403ec843 upstream.
Hardware or bootloader will initialize TLB entries to any value, which may collide with kernel's UNIQUE_ENTRYHI value. On MIPS microAptiv/M5150 family of cores this will trigger machine check exception and cause boot failure. On M5150 simulation this could happen 7 times out of 1000 boots.
Replace local_flush_tlb_all() with r4k_tlb_uniquify() which probes each TLB ENTRIHI unique value for collisions before it's written, and in case of collision try a different ASID.
--- arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c +55 -1
@@ -506,6 +506,60 @@ static int __init set_ntlb(char *str)__setup ("ntlb=" , set_ntlb); +/* Initialise all TLB entries with unique values */ +static void r4k_tlb_uniquify (void ) +{ +int entry =num_wired_entries (); + +htw_stop (); +write_c0_entrylo0 (0 ); +write_c0_entrylo1 (0 ); + +while (entry < current_cpu_data.tlbsize) { +unsigned long asid_mask =cpu_asid_mask (¤t_cpu_data); +unsigned long asid =0 ; +int idx; + +/* Skip wired MMID to make ginvt_mmid work */ +if (cpu_has_mmid) + asid =MMID_KERNEL_WIRED +1 ; + +/* Check for match before using UNIQUE_ENTRYHI */ +do { +if (cpu_has_mmid) { +write_c0_memorymapid (asid); +write_c0_entryhi (UNIQUE_ENTRYHI (entry)); + }else { +write_c0_entryhi (UNIQUE_ENTRYHI (entry) | asid); + } +mtc0_tlbw_hazard (); +tlb_probe (); +tlb_probe_hazard (); + idx =read_c0_index (); +/* No match or match is on current entry */ +if (idx <0 || idx == entry) +break ; +/* +* If we hit a match, we need to try again with +* a different ASID. +*/ + asid++; + }while (asid < asid_mask); + +if (idx >=0 && idx != entry) +panic ("Unable to uniquify TLB entry %d" , idx); + +write_c0_index (entry); +mtc0_tlbw_hazard (); +tlb_write_indexed (); + entry++; + } + +tlbw_use_hazard (); +htw_start (); +flush_micro_tlb (); +} +/* * Configure TLB (for init or after a CPU has been powered off). */
@@ -545,7 +599,7 @@ static void r4k_tlb_configure(void) temp_tlb_entry = current_cpu_data.tlbsize -1 ;/* From this point on the ARC firmware is dead. */ -local_flush_tlb_all (); +r4k_tlb_uniquify ();/* Did I tell you that ARC SUCKS? */ }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 261/262 mm/hmm: move pmd_to_hmm_pfn_flags() to the respective #ifdeffery
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit 188cb385bbf04d486df3e52f28c47b3961f5f0c0 upstream.
When pmd_to_hmm_pfn_flags() is unused, it prevents kernel builds with clang, make W=1 and CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=n:
mm/hmm.c:186:29: warning: unused function 'pmd_to_hmm_pfn_flags' [-Wunused-function]
Fix this by moving the function to the respective existing ifdeffery for its the only user.
See also:
6863f5643dd7 ("kbuild: allow Clang to find unused static inline functions for W=1 build")
--- mm/hmm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/hmm.c +1 -1
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static inline unsigned long hmm_pfn_flagreturn order <<HMM_PFN_ORDER_SHIFT ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE static inline unsigned long pmd_to_hmm_pfn_flags (struct hmm_range *range,pmd_t pmd) {
@@ -183,7 +184,6 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_to_hmm_phmm_pfn_flags_order (PMD_SHIFT -PAGE_SHIFT ); } -#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE static int hmm_vma_handle_pmd (struct mm_walk *walk,unsigned long addr,unsigned long end,unsigned long hmm_pfns[],pmd_t pmd)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 262/262 usb: gadget : fix use-after-free in composite_dev_cleanup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tao Xue <[email protected]>
commit 151c0aa896c47a4459e07fee7d4843f44c1bb18e upstream.
1. In func configfs_composite_bind() -> composite_os_desc_req_prepare():
if kmalloc fails, the pointer cdev->os_desc_req will be freed but not set to NULL. Then it will return a failure to the upper-level function.
2. in func configfs_composite_bind() -> composite_dev_cleanup():
it will checks whether cdev->os_desc_req is NULL. If it is not NULL, it will attempt to use it.This will lead to a use-after-free issue.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in composite_dev_cleanup+0xf4/0x2c0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000004827837a00 by task init/1 CPU: 10 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G O 5.10.97-oh #1 kasan_report+0x188/0x1cc __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc composite_dev_cleanup+0xf4/0x2c0 configfs_composite_bind+0x210/0x7ac udc_bind_to_driver+0xb4/0x1ec usb_gadget_probe_driver+0xec/0x21c gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x264/0x27c
--- drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c +5 -0
@@ -2489,6 +2489,11 @@ int composite_os_desc_req_prepare(structif (!cdev->os_desc_req->buf) { ret = -ENOMEM ;usb_ep_free_request (ep0, cdev->os_desc_req); +/* +* Set os_desc_req to NULL so that composite_dev_cleanup() +* will not try to free it again. +*/ + cdev->os_desc_req =NULL ; goto end; } cdev->os_desc_req->context = cdev;
# Librecast Test Results
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast
CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.6.102-rc1-g7ec7f0298ca2 #39 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Tue Aug 12 19:03:15 -00 2025 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:27:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.102-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Am 12.08.2025 um 19:26 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. Built with GCC 14.2 on Debian Trixie. No dmesg oddities or regressions found. I did not see any of the Python warning messages here which I did see in the 6.1.148-rc1 build.
Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider
Signature · 8 lines
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge, enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world, not so the world can see you. -- David McCullough Jr. OpenPGP: 0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244 Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected] https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected]
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:27:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.102-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:27:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.102-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v6.6:
10 builds: 10 pass, 0 fail
28 boots: 28 pass, 0 fail
120 tests: 120 pass, 0 failLinux version: 6.6.102-rc1-g7ec7f0298ca2
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra186-p3509-0000+p3636-0001, tegra194-p2972-0000,
tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
tegra30-cardhu-a04Jon
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:27:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.102-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:27:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.102-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
## Build
* kernel: 6.6.102-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git commit: 7ec7f0298ca2b610c71e74b76d032616fe2cbaf5
* git describe: v6.6.101-263-g7ec7f0298ca2
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.6.y/build/v6.6.101-263-g7ec7f0298ca2
## Test Regressions (compared to v6.6.100-77-g1a25720a319a)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.6.100-77-g1a25720a319a)
## Test Fixes (compared to v6.6.100-77-g1a25720a319a)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.6.100-77-g1a25720a319a)
## Test result summary
total: 279827, pass: 261488, fail: 5549, skip: 12412, xfail: 378
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 129 total, 129 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 44 total, 44 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 23 total, 23 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 26 total, 25 passed, 1 failed
* parisc: 4 total, 4 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 32 total, 31 passed, 1 failed
* riscv: 15 total, 15 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 14 total, 13 passed, 1 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 7 total, 7 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 37 total, 36 passed, 1 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* commands
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-x86
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* lava
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-build-clang
* log-parser-build-gcc
* log-parser-test
* ltp-capability
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* modules
* perf
* rcutorture
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines · On Tue, 12 Aug 2025 19:26:28 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman…
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.102 release. There are 262 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:27:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64:
Thanks!
Cheers,
Miguel