6.15.10-rc1 review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 301/480 fs/orangefs: Allow 2 more characters in do_c_string()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2138e89cb066b40386b1d9ddd61253347d356474 ]
The do_k_string() and do_c_string() functions do essentially the same thing which is they add a string and a comma onto the end of an existing string. At the end, the caller will overwrite the last comma with a newline. Later, in orangefs_kernel_debug_init(), we add a newline to the string.
The change to do_k_string() is just cosmetic. I moved the "- 1" to the other side of the comparison and made it "+ 1". This has no effect on runtime, I just wanted the functions to match each other and the rest of the file.
However in do_c_string(), I removed the "- 2" which allows us to print two extra characters. I noticed this issue while reviewing the code and I doubt affects anything in real life. My guess is that this was double counting the comma and the newline. The "+ 1" accounts for the newline, and the caller will delete the final comma which ensures there is enough space for the newline.
Removing the "- 2" lets us print 2 more characters, but mainly it makes the code more consistent and understandable for reviewers.
--- fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c +3 -3
@@ -769,8 +769,8 @@ static void do_k_string(void *k_mask, int index)if (*mask & s_kmod_keyword_mask_map[index].mask_val) {if ((strlen (kernel_debug_string) + -strlen (s_kmod_keyword_mask_map[index].keyword)) - <ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN -1 ) { +strlen (s_kmod_keyword_mask_map[index].keyword) +1 ) + <ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN ) {strcat (kernel_debug_string, s_kmod_keyword_mask_map[index].keyword);strcat (kernel_debug_string,"," );
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ static void do_c_string(void *c_mask, int index) (mask->mask2 & cdm_array[index].mask2)) {if ((strlen (client_debug_string) +strlen (cdm_array[index].keyword) +1 ) - <ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN -2 ) { + <ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN ) {strcat (client_debug_string, cdm_array[index].keyword);strcat (client_debug_string,"," );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 302/480 tools subcmd: Tighten the filename size in check_if_command_finished
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 478272d1cdd9959a6d638e9d81f70642f04290c9 ]
FILENAME_MAX is often PATH_MAX (4kb), far more than needed for the /proc path. Make the buffer size sufficient for the maximum integer plus "/proc/" and "/status" with a '\0' terminator.
--- tools/lib/subcmd/run-command.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/lib/subcmd/run-command.c +13 -2
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include <ctype.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> +#include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/wait.h>
@@ -216,10 +217,20 @@ static int wait_or_whine(struct child_process *cmd, bool block)return result; } +/* +* Conservative estimate of number of characaters needed to hold an a decoded +* integer, assume each 3 bits needs a character byte and plus a possible sign +* character. +*/ +#ifndef is_signed_type +#define is_signed_type (type) (((type)(-1)) < (type)1) +#endif +#define MAX_STRLEN_TYPE (type) (sizeof(type) * 8 / 3 + (is_signed_type(type) ? 1 : 0)) +int check_if_command_finished (struct child_process *cmd) {#ifdef __linux__ -char filename[FILENAME_MAX +12 ]; +char filename[6 +MAX_STRLEN_TYPE (typeof (cmd->pid)) +7 +1 ];char status_line[256 ];FILE *status_file;
@@ -227,7 +238,7 @@ int check_if_command_finished(struct child_process *cmd)* Check by reading /proc/<pid>/status as calling waitpid causes * stdout/stderr to be closed and data lost. */ -sprintf (filename,"/proc/%d/status" , cmd->pid); +sprintf (filename,"/proc/%u/status" , cmd->pid); status_file =fopen (filename,"r" );if (status_file ==NULL ) {/* Open failed assume finish_command was called. */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 303/480 dmaengine: mv_xor: Fix missing check after DMA map and missing unmap
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60095aca6b471b7b7a79c80b7395f7e4e414b479 ]
The DMA map functions can fail and should be tested for errors.
In case of error, unmap the already mapped regions.
--- drivers/dma/mv_xor.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/mv_xor.c +19 -2
@@ -1061,8 +1061,16 @@ mv_xor_channel_add(struct mv_xor_device *xordev,*/ mv_chan->dummy_src_addr =dma_map_single (dma_dev->dev, mv_chan->dummy_src,MV_XOR_MIN_BYTE_COUNT ,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (dma_dev->dev, mv_chan->dummy_src_addr)) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + mv_chan->dummy_dst_addr =dma_map_single (dma_dev->dev, mv_chan->dummy_dst,MV_XOR_MIN_BYTE_COUNT ,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (dma_dev->dev, mv_chan->dummy_dst_addr)) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_unmap_src; + } +/* allocate coherent memory for hardware descriptors * note: writecombine gives slightly better performance, but
@@ -1071,8 +1079,10 @@ mv_xor_channel_add(struct mv_xor_device *xordev, mv_chan->dma_desc_pool_virt =dma_alloc_wc (&pdev->dev,MV_XOR_POOL_SIZE , &mv_chan->dma_desc_pool,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!mv_chan->dma_desc_pool_virt) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); +if (!mv_chan->dma_desc_pool_virt) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_unmap_dst; + }/* discover transaction capabilities from the platform data */ dma_dev->cap_mask = cap_mask;
@@ -1155,6 +1165,13 @@ mv_xor_channel_add(struct mv_xor_device *xordev, err_free_dma:dma_free_coherent (&pdev->dev,MV_XOR_POOL_SIZE , mv_chan->dma_desc_pool_virt, mv_chan->dma_desc_pool); +err_unmap_dst: +dma_unmap_single (dma_dev->dev, mv_chan->dummy_dst_addr, +MV_XOR_MIN_BYTE_COUNT ,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +err_unmap_src: +dma_unmap_single (dma_dev->dev, mv_chan->dummy_src_addr, +MV_XOR_MIN_BYTE_COUNT ,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +return ERR_PTR (ret); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 304/480 dmaengine: nbpfaxi: Add missing check after DMA map
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c6ee78fc8f3e653bec427cfd06fec7877ee782bd ]
The DMA map functions can fail and should be tested for errors. If the mapping fails, unmap and return an error.
--- drivers/dma/nbpfaxi.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/dma/nbpfaxi.c +13 -0
@@ -711,6 +711,9 @@ static int nbpf_desc_page_alloc(struct nbpf_channel *chan)list_add_tail (&ldesc->node, &lhead); ldesc->hwdesc_dma_addr =dma_map_single (dchan->device->dev, hwdesc,sizeof (*hwdesc),DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (dchan->device->dev, + ldesc->hwdesc_dma_addr)) + goto unmap_error;dev_dbg (dev,"%s(): mapped 0x%p to %pad\n" , __func__, hwdesc, &ldesc->hwdesc_dma_addr);
@@ -737,6 +740,16 @@ static int nbpf_desc_page_alloc(struct nbpf_channel *chan)spin_unlock_irq (&chan->lock);return ARRAY_SIZE (dpage->desc); + +unmap_error: +while (i--) { + ldesc--; hwdesc--; + +dma_unmap_single (dchan->device->dev, ldesc->hwdesc_dma_addr, +sizeof (hwdesc),DMA_TO_DEVICE ); + } + +return -ENOMEM ; }static void nbpf_desc_put (struct nbpf_desc *desc)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 305/480 mfd: tps65219: Update TPS65214 MFD cells GPIO compatible string
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shree Ramamoorthy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6f27d26e363a41fc651be852094823ce47a43243 ]
This patch reflects the change made to move TPS65215 from 1 GPO and 1 GPIO to 2 GPOs and 1 GPIO. TPS65215 and TPS65219 both have 2 GPOs and 1 GPIO. TPS65214 has 1 GPO and 1 GPIO. TPS65215 will reuse the TPS65219 GPIO compatible string.
TPS65214 TRM: https://www.ti.com/lit/pdf/slvud30
TPS65215 TRM: https://www.ti.com/lit/pdf/slvucw5/
--- drivers/mfd/tps65219.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/tps65219.c +1 -1
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static const struct resource tps65219_regulator_resources[] = {static const struct mfd_cell tps65214_cells[] = {MFD_CELL_RES ("tps65214-regulator" , tps65214_regulator_resources), -MFD_CELL_NAME ("tps65215-gpio" ), +MFD_CELL_NAME ("tps65214-gpio" ), };static const struct mfd_cell tps65215_cells[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 306/480 ASoC: SDCA: Fix some holes in the regmap readable/writeable helpers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Charles Keepax <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 061fade7a67f6cdfe918a675270d84107abbef61 ]
The current regmap readable/writeable helper functions always allow the Next flag and allows any Control Number. Mask the Next flag based on SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_DUAL which is the only Mode that supports it. Also check that the Control Number is valid for the given control.
--- sound/soc/sdca/sdca_regmap.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/sdca/sdca_regmap.c +14 -2
@@ -72,12 +72,18 @@ bool sdca_regmap_readable(struct sdca_function_data *function, unsigned int reg)if (!control)return false; +if (!(BIT (SDW_SDCA_CTL_CNUM (reg)) & control->cn_list)) +return false; +switch (control->mode) {case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RW :case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RO : -case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_DUAL :case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RW1S :case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RW1C : +if (SDW_SDCA_NEXT_CTL (0 ) & reg) +return false; + fallthrough; +case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_DUAL :/* No access to registers marked solely for device use */ return control->layers & ~SDCA_ACCESS_LAYER_DEVICE ;default :
@@ -104,11 +110,17 @@ bool sdca_regmap_writeable(struct sdca_function_data *function, unsigned int regif (!control)return false; +if (!(BIT (SDW_SDCA_CTL_CNUM (reg)) & control->cn_list)) +return false; +switch (control->mode) {case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RW : -case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_DUAL :case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RW1S :case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_RW1C : +if (SDW_SDCA_NEXT_CTL (0 ) & reg) +return false; + fallthrough; +case SDCA_ACCESS_MODE_DUAL :/* No access to registers marked solely for device use */ return control->layers & ~SDCA_ACCESS_LAYER_DEVICE ;default :
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 307/480 ASoC: fsl_xcvr: get channel status data when PHY is not exists
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ca592e20659e0304ebd8f4dabb273da4f9385848 ]
There is no PHY for the XCVR module on i.MX93, the channel status needs to be obtained from FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_* registers. And channel status acknowledge (CSA) bit should be set once channel status is processed.
--- sound/soc/fsl/fsl_xcvr.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_xcvr.c +20 -0
@@ -1423,6 +1423,26 @@ static irqreturn_t irq0_isr(int irq, void *devid)/* clear CS control register */ memset_io (reg_ctrl,0 ,sizeof (val)); } + }else { +regmap_read (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_0 , + (u32 *)&xcvr->rx_iec958.status[0 ]); +regmap_read (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_1 , + (u32 *)&xcvr->rx_iec958.status[4 ]); +regmap_read (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_2 , + (u32 *)&xcvr->rx_iec958.status[8 ]); +regmap_read (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_3 , + (u32 *)&xcvr->rx_iec958.status[12 ]); +regmap_read (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_4 , + (u32 *)&xcvr->rx_iec958.status[16 ]); +regmap_read (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_CS_DATA_5 , + (u32 *)&xcvr->rx_iec958.status[20 ]); +for (i =0 ; i <6 ; i++) { + val = *(u32 *)(xcvr->rx_iec958.status + i *4 ); + *(u32 *)(xcvr->rx_iec958.status + i *4 ) = +bitrev32 (val); + } +regmap_set_bits (xcvr->regmap,FSL_XCVR_RX_DPTH_CTRL , +FSL_XCVR_RX_DPTH_CTRL_CSA ); } }if (isr &FSL_XCVR_IRQ_NEW_UD ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 308/480 ASoC: fsl_xcvr: get channel status data with firmware exists
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6776ecc9dd587c08a6bb334542f9f8821a091013 ]
For the XCVR module on i.MX95, even though it only supports SPDIF, the channel status needs to be obtained from RAM space, which is processed by firmware. Firmware is necessary to trigger the FSL_XCVR_IRQ_NEW_CS interrupt.
This change also applies for the SPDIF & ARC function on i.MX8MP which has the firmware.
--- sound/soc/fsl/fsl_xcvr.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_xcvr.c +3 -2
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static irqreturn_t irq0_isr(int irq, void *devid)if (isr &FSL_XCVR_IRQ_NEW_CS ) {dev_dbg (dev,"Received new CS block\n" ); isr_clr |=FSL_XCVR_IRQ_NEW_CS ; -if (!xcvr->soc_data->spdif_only) { +if (xcvr->soc_data->fw_name) {/* Data RAM is 4KiB, last two pages: 8 and 9. Select page 8. */ regmap_update_bits(xcvr->regmap, FSL_XCVR_EXT_CTRL, FSL_XCVR_EXT_CTRL_PAGE_MASK,
@@ -1517,6 +1517,7 @@ static const struct fsl_xcvr_soc_data fsl_xcvr_imx93_data = { };static const struct fsl_xcvr_soc_data fsl_xcvr_imx95_data = { + .fw_name ="imx/xcvr/xcvr-imx95.bin" , .spdif_only = true, .use_phy = true, .use_edma = true,
@@ -1806,7 +1807,7 @@ static int fsl_xcvr_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) } } -if (xcvr->mode ==FSL_XCVR_MODE_EARC ) { +if (xcvr->soc_data->fw_name) { ret =fsl_xcvr_load_firmware (xcvr);if (ret) {dev_err (dev,"failed to load firmware.\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 309/480 sh: Do not use hyphen in exported variable name
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c32969d0362a790fbc6117e0b6a737a7e510b843 ]
arch/sh/Makefile defines and exports ld-bfd to be used by arch/sh/boot/compressed/Makefile and arch/sh/boot/romimage/Makefile. However some shells, including dash, will not pass through environment variables whose name includes a hyphen. Usually GNU make does not use a shell to recurse, but if e.g. $(srctree) contains '~' it will use a shell here.
Other instances of this problem were previously fixed by commits 2bfbe7881ee0 "kbuild: Do not use hyphen in exported variable name" and 82977af93a0d "sh: rename suffix-y to suffix_y".
Rename the variable to ld_bfd.
References: https://buildd.debian.org/status/fetch.php?pkg=linux&arch=sh4&ver=4.13%7Erc5-1%7Eexp1&stamp=1502943967&raw=0
--- arch/sh/Makefile | 10 +++++----- arch/sh/boot/compressed/Makefile | 4 ++-- arch/sh/boot/romimage/Makefile | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/sh/Makefile +5 -5
@@ -103,16 +103,16 @@ UTS_MACHINE := sh LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -e _stext ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN -ld-bfd := elf32-sh-linux -LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --defsym jiffies=jiffies_64 --oformat $(ld-bfd) +ld_bfd := elf32-sh-linux +LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --defsym jiffies=jiffies_64 --oformat $(ld_bfd) KBUILD_LDFLAGS += -EL else -ld-bfd := elf32-shbig-linux -LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --defsym jiffies=jiffies_64+4 --oformat $(ld-bfd) +ld_bfd := elf32-shbig-linux +LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --defsym jiffies=jiffies_64+4 --oformat $(ld_bfd) KBUILD_LDFLAGS += -EB endif -export ld-bfd +export ld_bfd # Mach groups machdir-$(CONFIG_SOLUTION_ENGINE) += mach-se
arch/sh/boot/compressed/Makefile +2 -2
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ endif ccflags-remove-$(CONFIG_MCOUNT) += -pg -LDFLAGS_vmlinux := --oformat $(ld-bfd) -Ttext $(IMAGE_OFFSET) -e startup \ +LDFLAGS_vmlinux := --oformat $(ld_bfd) -Ttext $(IMAGE_OFFSET) -e startup \ -T $(obj)/../../kernel/vmlinux.lds KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $(obj)/vmlinux.bin.lzo: $(obj)/vmlinux.bin FORCE OBJCOPYFLAGS += -R .empty_zero_page -LDFLAGS_piggy.o := -r --format binary --oformat $(ld-bfd) -T +LDFLAGS_piggy.o := -r --format binary --oformat $(ld_bfd) -T $(obj)/piggy.o: $(obj)/vmlinux.scr $(obj)/vmlinux.bin.$(suffix_y) FORCE $(call if_changed,ld)
arch/sh/boot/romimage/Makefile +2 -2
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ mmcif-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUBTYPE_SH7724) := $(obj)/mmcif-sh7724.o load-$(CONFIG_ROMIMAGE_MMCIF) := $(mmcif-load-y) obj-$(CONFIG_ROMIMAGE_MMCIF) := $(mmcif-obj-y) -LDFLAGS_vmlinux := --oformat $(ld-bfd) -Ttext $(load-y) -e romstart \ +LDFLAGS_vmlinux := --oformat $(ld_bfd) -Ttext $(load-y) -e romstart \ -T $(obj)/../../kernel/vmlinux.lds $(obj)/vmlinux: $(obj)/head.o $(obj-y) $(obj)/piggy.o FORCE
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ OBJCOPYFLAGS += -j .empty_zero_page $(obj)/zeropage.bin: vmlinux FORCE $(call if_changed,objcopy) -LDFLAGS_piggy.o := -r --format binary --oformat $(ld-bfd) -T +LDFLAGS_piggy.o := -r --format binary --oformat $(ld_bfd) -T $(obj)/piggy.o: $(obj)/vmlinux.scr $(obj)/zeropage.bin arch/sh/boot/zImage FORCE $(call if_changed,ld)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 310/480 perf tools: Remove libtraceevent in .gitignore
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Pei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit af470fb532fc803c4c582d15b4bd394682a77a15 ]
The libtraceevent has been removed from the source tree, and .gitignore needs to be updated as well.
--- tools/perf/.gitignore | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/.gitignore +0 -2
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ libbpf/ libperf/ libsubcmd/ libsymbol/ -libtraceevent/ -libtraceevent_plugins/ fixdep Documentation/doc.dep python_ext_build/
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 311/480 clk: clocking-wizard: Fix the round rate handling for versal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shubhrajyoti Datta <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7f5e9ca0a424af44a708bb4727624d56f83ecffa ]
Fix the clk_round_rate implementation for Versal platforms by calling the Versal-specific divider calculation helper. The existing code used the generic divider routine, which results in incorrect round rate.
--- drivers/clk/xilinx/clk-xlnx-clock-wizard.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/xilinx/clk-xlnx-clock-wizard.c +1 -1
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static long clk_wzrd_ver_round_rate_all(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,u32 m, d, o, div, f;int err; - err =clk_wzrd_get_divisors (hw, rate, *prate); + err =clk_wzrd_get_divisors_ver (hw, rate, *prate);if (err)return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 312/480 crypto: qat - fix DMA direction for compression on GEN2 devices
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d41d75fe1b751ee6b347bf1cb1cfe9accc4fcb12 ]
QAT devices perform an additional integrity check during compression by decompressing the output. Starting from QAT GEN4, this verification is done in-line by the hardware. However, on GEN2 devices, the hardware reads back the compressed output from the destination buffer and performs a decompression operation using it as the source.
In the current QAT driver, destination buffers are always marked as write-only. This is incorrect for QAT GEN2 compression, where the buffer is also read during verification. Since commit 6f5dc7658094 ("iommu/vt-d: Restore WO permissions on second-level paging entries"), merged in v6.16-rc1, write-only permissions are strictly enforced, leading to DMAR errors when using QAT GEN2 devices for compression, if VT-d is enabled.
Mark the destination buffers as DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL. This ensures compatibility with GEN2 devices, even though it is not required for QAT GEN4 and later.
--- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_bl.c | 6 +++--- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_compression.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_bl.c +3 -3
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void qat_bl_free_bufl(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,for (i =0 ; i < blout->num_mapped_bufs; i++) {dma_unmap_single (dev, blout->buffers[i].addr, blout->buffers[i].len, -DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); }dma_unmap_single (dev, blpout, sz_out,DMA_TO_DEVICE );
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __qat_bl_sgl_to_bufl(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, } buffers[y].addr =dma_map_single (dev,sg_virt (sg) + left, sg->length - left, -DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );if (unlikely (dma_mapping_error (dev, buffers[y].addr))) goto err_out; buffers[y].len = sg->length;
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static int __qat_bl_sgl_to_bufl(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,if (!dma_mapping_error (dev, buflout->buffers[i].addr))dma_unmap_single (dev, buflout->buffers[i].addr, buflout->buffers[i].len, -DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); }if (!buf->sgl_dst_valid)
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_compression.c +2 -2
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int qat_compression_alloc_dc_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)if (!obuff) goto err; - obuff_p =dma_map_single (dev, obuff, ovf_buff_sz,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + obuff_p =dma_map_single (dev, obuff, ovf_buff_sz,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );if (unlikely (dma_mapping_error (dev, obuff_p))) goto err;
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static void qat_free_dc_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)return ;dma_unmap_single (dev, dc_data->ovf_buff_p, dc_data->ovf_buff_sz, -DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );kfree_sensitive (dc_data->ovf_buff);kfree (dc_data); accel_dev->dc_data =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 313/480 crypto: qat - fix seq_file position update in adf_ring_next()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6908c5f4f066a0412c3d9a6f543a09fa7d87824b ]
The adf_ring_next() function in the QAT debug transport interface fails to correctly update the position index when reaching the end of the ring elements. This triggers the following kernel warning when reading ring files, such as /sys/kernel/debug/qat_c6xx_<D:B:D:F>/transport/bank_00/ring_00:
[27725.022965] seq_file: buggy .next function adf_ring_next [intel_qat] did not update position index
Ensure that the *pos index is incremented before returning NULL when after the last element in the ring is found, satisfying the seq_file API requirements and preventing the warning.
--- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_transport_debug.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_transport_debug.c +3 -1
@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ static void *adf_ring_next(struct seq_file *sfile, void *v, loff_t *pos)struct adf_etr_ring_data *ring = sfile->private;if (*pos >= (ADF_SIZE_TO_RING_SIZE_IN_BYTES (ring->ring_size) / -ADF_MSG_SIZE_TO_BYTES (ring->msg_size))) +ADF_MSG_SIZE_TO_BYTES (ring->msg_size))) { + (*pos)++;return NULL ; + }return ring->base_addr + (ADF_MSG_SIZE_TO_BYTES (ring->msg_size) * (*pos)++);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 314/480 fbdev: imxfb: Check fb_add_videomode to prevent null-ptr-deref
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chenyuan Yang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit da11e6a30e0bb8e911288bdc443b3dc8f6a7cac7 ]
fb_add_videomode() can fail with -ENOMEM when its internal kmalloc() cannot allocate a struct fb_modelist. If that happens, the modelist stays empty but the driver continues to register. Add a check for its return value to prevent poteintial null-ptr-deref, which is similar to the commit 17186f1f90d3 ("fbdev:
Fix do_register_framebuffer to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var").
--- drivers/video/fbdev/imxfb.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/imxfb.c +7 -2
@@ -996,8 +996,13 @@ static int imxfb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) info->fix.smem_start = fbi->map_dma;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&info->modelist); -for (i =0 ; i < fbi->num_modes; i++) -fb_add_videomode (&fbi->mode[i].mode, &info->modelist); +for (i =0 ; i < fbi->num_modes; i++) { + ret =fb_add_videomode (&fbi->mode[i].mode, &info->modelist); +if (ret) { +dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to add videomode\n" ); + goto failed_cmap; + } + }/* * This makes sure that our colour bitfield
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 315/480 smb: client: allow parsing zero-length AV pairs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit be77ab6b9fbe348daf3c2d3ee40f23ca5110a339 ]
Zero-length AV pairs should be considered as valid target infos. Don't skip the next AV pairs that follow them.
--- fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +2 -2
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static struct ntlmssp2_name *find_next_av(struct cifs_ses *ses, len =AV_LEN (av);if (AV_TYPE (av) ==NTLMSSP_AV_EOL )return NULL ; -if (!len || (u8 *)av +sizeof (*av) + len > end) +if ((u8 *)av +sizeof (*av) + len > end)return NULL ;return av; }
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static int find_av_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, u16 type, char **name, u16 maxlen)av_for_each_entry (ses, av) { len =AV_LEN (av); -if (AV_TYPE (av) != type) +if (AV_TYPE (av) != type || !len)continue ;if (!IS_ALIGNED (len,sizeof (__le16))) { cifs_dbg(VFS | ONCE, "%s: bad length(%u) for type %u\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 316/480 jfs: fix metapage reference count leak in dbAllocCtl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zheng Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 856db37592021e9155384094e331e2d4589f28b1 ]
In dbAllocCtl(), read_metapage() increases the reference count of the metapage. However, when dp->tree.budmin < 0, the function returns -EIO without calling release_metapage() to decrease the reference count, leading to a memory leak.
Add release_metapage(mp) before the error return to properly manage the metapage reference count and prevent the leak.
--- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +3 -1
@@ -1809,8 +1809,10 @@ dbAllocCtl(struct bmap * bmp, s64 nblocks, int l2nb, s64 blkno, s64 * results)return -EIO ; dp = (struct dmap *) mp->data; -if (dp->tree.budmin <0 ) +if (dp->tree.budmin <0 ) { +release_metapage (mp);return -EIO ; + }/* try to allocate the blocks. */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 317/480 mtd: rawnand: atmel: Fix dma_mapping_error() address
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1e6b933c56b1e9fda93caa0b8bae39f3f421e5c ]
It seems like what was intended is to test if the dma_map of the previous line failed but the wrong dma address was passed.
Rule: add
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c +1 -1
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int atmel_nand_dma_transfer(struct atmel_nand_controller *nc,dma_cookie_t cookie; buf_dma =dma_map_single (nc->dev, buf, len, dir); -if (dma_mapping_error (nc->dev, dev_dma)) { +if (dma_mapping_error (nc->dev, buf_dma)) {dev_err (nc->dev,"Failed to prepare a buffer for DMA access\n" ); goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 318/480 mtd: rawnand: rockchip: Add missing check after DMA map
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3b36f86dc47261828f96f826077131a35dd825fd ]
The DMA map functions can fail and should be tested for errors.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/rockchip-nand-controller.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/rockchip-nand-controller.c +15 -0
@@ -656,9 +656,16 @@ static int rk_nfc_write_page_hwecc(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, dma_data =dma_map_single (nfc->dev, (void *)nfc->page_buf, mtd->writesize,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (nfc->dev, dma_data)) +return -ENOMEM ; + dma_oob =dma_map_single (nfc->dev, nfc->oob_buf, ecc->steps * oob_step,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (nfc->dev, dma_oob)) { +dma_unmap_single (nfc->dev, dma_data, mtd->writesize,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +return -ENOMEM ; + }reinit_completion (&nfc->done);writel (INT_DMA , nfc->regs + nfc->cfg->int_en_off);
@@ -772,9 +779,17 @@ static int rk_nfc_read_page_hwecc(struct nand_chip *chip, u8 *buf, int oob_on, dma_data =dma_map_single (nfc->dev, nfc->page_buf, mtd->writesize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (nfc->dev, dma_data)) +return -ENOMEM ; + dma_oob =dma_map_single (nfc->dev, nfc->oob_buf, ecc->steps * oob_step,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (dma_mapping_error (nfc->dev, dma_oob)) { +dma_unmap_single (nfc->dev, dma_data, mtd->writesize, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +return -ENOMEM ; + }/* * The first blocks (4, 8 or 16 depending on the device)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 319/480 mtd: rawnand: atmel: set pmecc data setup time
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Balamanikandan Gunasundar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f552a7c7e0a14215cb8a6fd89e60fa3932a74786 ]
Setup the pmecc data setup time as 3 clock cycles for 133MHz as recommended by the datasheet.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/pmecc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/pmecc.c +6 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct atmel_pmecc_caps {int nstrengths;int el_offset;bool correct_erased_chunks; +bool clk_ctrl; };struct atmel_pmecc {
@@ -843,6 +844,10 @@ static struct atmel_pmecc *atmel_pmecc_create(struct platform_device *pdev,if (IS_ERR (pmecc->regs.errloc))return ERR_CAST (pmecc->regs.errloc); +/* pmecc data setup time */ +if (caps->clk_ctrl) +writel (PMECC_CLK_133MHZ , pmecc->regs.base +ATMEL_PMECC_CLK ); +/* Disable all interrupts before registering the PMECC handler. */ writel (0xffffffff , pmecc->regs.base +ATMEL_PMECC_IDR );atmel_pmecc_reset (pmecc);
@@ -896,6 +901,7 @@ static struct atmel_pmecc_caps at91sam9g45_caps = { .strengths = atmel_pmecc_strengths, .nstrengths = 5, .el_offset = 0x8c, + .clk_ctrl = true, };static struct atmel_pmecc_caps sama5d4_caps = {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 320/480 drm/xe/vf: Disable CSC support on VF
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukasz Laguna <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f62408efc8669b82541295a4611494c8c8c52684 ]
CSC is not accessible by VF drivers, so disable its support flag on VF to prevent further initialization attempts.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_device.c +1 -0
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ static void sriov_update_device_info(struct xe_device *xe)/* disable features that are not available/applicable to VFs */ if (IS_SRIOV_VF (xe)) { xe->info.probe_display =0 ; + xe->info.has_heci_cscfi =0 ; xe->info.has_heci_gscfi =0 ; xe->info.skip_guc_pc =1 ; xe->info.skip_pcode =1 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 321/480 selftests: ALSA: fix memory leak in utimer test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: WangYuli <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6260da046819b7bda828bacae148fc8856fdebd7 ]
Free the malloc'd buffer in TEST_F(timer_f, utimer) to prevent memory leak.
--- tools/testing/selftests/alsa/utimer-test.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/testing/selftests/alsa/utimer-test.c +1 -0
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ TEST_F(timer_f, utimer) {pthread_join (ticking_thread,NULL );ASSERT_EQ (total_ticks,TICKS_COUNT );pclose (rfp); +free (buf); }TEST (wrong_timers_test) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 322/480 ALSA: usb: scarlett2: Fix missing NULL check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit df485a4b2b3ee5b35c80f990beb554e38a8a5fb1 ]
scarlett2_input_select_ctl_info() sets up the string arrays allocated via kasprintf(), but it misses NULL checks, which may lead to NULL dereference Oops. Let's add the proper NULL check.
--- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c +6 -1
@@ -3971,8 +3971,13 @@ static int scarlett2_input_select_ctl_info( goto unlock;/* Loop through each input */ -for (i =0 ; i < inputs; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < inputs; i++) { values[i] =kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"Input %d" , i +1 ); +if (!values[i]) { + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto unlock; + } + } err =snd_ctl_enum_info (uinfo,1 , i, (const char *const *)values);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 323/480 perf record: Cache build-ID of hit DSOs only
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6235ce77749f45cac27f630337e2fdf04e8a6c73 ]
It post-processes samples to find which DSO has samples. Based on that info, it can save used DSOs in the build-ID cache directory. But for some reason, it saves all DSOs without checking the hit mark. Skipping unused DSOs can give some speedup especially with --buildid-mmap being default.
On my idle machine, time perf record -a sleep 1 goes down from 3 sec to 1.5 sec with this change.
--- tools/perf/util/build-id.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +1 -1
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static int dso__cache_build_id(struct dso *dso, struct machine *machine,char *allocated_name =NULL ;int ret =0 ; -if (!dso__has_build_id (dso)) +if (!dso__has_build_id (dso) || !dso__hit (dso))return 0 ;if (dso__is_kcore (dso)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 324/480 vdpa/mlx5: Fix needs_teardown flag calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6f0f3d7fc4e05797b801ded4910a64d16db230e9 ]
needs_teardown is a device flag that indicates when virtual queues need to be recreated. This happens for certain configuration changes: queue size and some specific features.
Currently, the needs_teardown state can be incorrectly reset by subsequent .set_vq_num() calls. For example, for 1 rx VQ with size 512 and 1 tx VQ with size 256:
.set_vq_num(0, 512) -> sets needs_teardown to true (rx queue has a
non-default size)
.set_vq_num(1, 256) -> sets needs_teardown to false (tx queue has a
default size)
This change takes into account the previous value of the needs_teardown flag when re-calculating it during VQ size configuration.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +1 -1
@@ -2491,7 +2491,7 @@ static void mlx5_vdpa_set_vq_num(struct vdpa_device *vdev, u16 idx, u32 num) } mvq = &ndev->vqs[idx]; - ndev->needs_teardown = num != mvq->num_ent; + ndev->needs_teardown |= num != mvq->num_ent; mvq->num_ent = num; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 325/480 vhost-scsi: Fix log flooding with target does not exist errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 69cd720a8a5e9ef0f05ce5dd8c9ea6e018245c82 ]
As part of the normal initiator side scanning the guest's scsi layer will loop over all possible targets and send an inquiry. Since the max number of targets for virtio-scsi is 256, this can result in 255 error messages about targets not existing if you only have a single target. When there's more than 1 vhost-scsi device each with a single target, then you get N * 255 log messages.
It looks like the log message was added by accident in:
commit 3f8ca2e115e5 ("vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handler")
when we added common helpers. Then in:
commit 09d7583294aa ("vhost/scsi: Use common handling code in request queue handler")
we converted the scsi command processing path to use the new helpers so we started to see the extra log messages during scanning.
The patches were just making some code common but added the vq_err call and I'm guessing the patch author forgot to enable the vq_err call (vq_err is implemented by pr_debug which defaults to off). So this patch removes the call since it's expected to hit this path during device discovery.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/scsi.c +1 -3
@@ -1148,10 +1148,8 @@ vhost_scsi_get_req(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vhost_scsi_ctx *vc,/* validated at handler entry */ vs_tpg =vhost_vq_get_backend (vq); tpg =READ_ONCE (vs_tpg[*vc->target]); -if (unlikely (!tpg)) { -vq_err (vq,"Target 0x%x does not exist\n" , *vc->target); +if (unlikely (!tpg)) goto out; - } }if (tpgp)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 326/480 vhost-scsi: Fix check for inline_sg_cnt exceeding preallocated limit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 400cad513c78f9af72c5a20f3611c1f1dc71d465 ]
The condition comparing ret to VHOST_SCSI_PREALLOC_SGLS was incorrect, as ret holds the result of kstrtouint() (typically 0 on success), not the parsed value. Update the check to use cnt, which contains the actual user-provided value.
prevents silently accepting values exceeding the maximum inline_sg_cnt.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vhost/scsi.c +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int vhost_scsi_set_inline_sg_cnt(const char *buf,if (ret)return ret; -if (ret >VHOST_SCSI_PREALLOC_SGLS ) { +if (cnt >VHOST_SCSI_PREALLOC_SGLS ) {pr_err ("Max inline_sg_cnt is %u\n" ,VHOST_SCSI_PREALLOC_SGLS );return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 327/480 vdpa/mlx5: Fix release of uninitialized resources on error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cc51a66815999afb7e9cd845968de4fdf07567b7 ]
The commit in the fixes tag made sure that mlx5_vdpa_free() is the single entrypoint for removing the vdpa device resources added in mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(), even in the cleanup path of mlx5_vdpa_dev_add().
This means that all functions from mlx5_vdpa_free() should be able to handle uninitialized resources. This was not the case though:mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() and mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx() were not able to do so. This caused the splat below when adding a vdpa device without a MAC address.
This patch fixes these remaining issues:
- Makes mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() return early if called on uninitialized resources.
- Moves mlx5_cmd_init_async_ctx() early on during device addition because it can't fail. This means that mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx() also can't fail. To mirror this, move the call site of mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx() in mlx5_vdpa_free().
An additional comment was added in mlx5_vdpa_free() to document the expectations of functions called from this context.
Splat:
mlx5_core 0000:b5:03.2: mlx5_vdpa_dev_add:3950:(pid 2306) warning: No mac address provisioned?
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2306 at kernel/workqueue.c:4207 __flush_work+0x9a/0xb0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x61/0x90 ? __timer_delete_sync+0x2b/0x40 mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources+0x1c/0x40 [mlx5_vdpa] mlx5_vdpa_free+0x45/0x160 [mlx5_vdpa] vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa] device_release+0x31/0x90 kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130 mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x327/0x890 [mlx5_vdpa] vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x2c1/0x4d0 [vdpa] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd8/0x130 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220 ? __pfx_vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x10/0x10 [vdpa] genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x27b/0x3b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430 __sys_sendto+0x1fa/0x210 ? ___pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2b0 ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x51/0x90 ? filemap_map_pages+0x515/0x660 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0 ? do_read_fault+0x108/0x220 ? do_pte_missing+0x14a/0x3e0 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x321/0x730 ? count_memcg_events+0x13f/0x180 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1fb/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x700 ? syscall_exit_work+0x104/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0c25b0feca [...] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c | 3 +++ drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c +3 -0
@@ -908,6 +908,9 @@ void mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources(struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev) {struct mlx5_vdpa_mr_resources *mres = &mvdev->mres; +if (!mres->wq_gc) +return ; +atomic_set (&mres->shutdown,1 );flush_delayed_work (&mres->gc_dwork_ent);
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +6 -4
@@ -3432,15 +3432,17 @@ static void mlx5_vdpa_free(struct vdpa_device *vdev) ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev); +/* Functions called here should be able to work with +* uninitialized resources. +*/ free_fixed_resources (ndev);mlx5_vdpa_clean_mrs (mvdev);mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources (&ndev->mvdev); -mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx (&mvdev->async_ctx); -if (!is_zero_ether_addr (ndev->config.mac)) { pfmdev =pci_get_drvdata (pci_physfn (mvdev->mdev->pdev));mlx5_mpfs_del_mac (pfmdev, ndev->config.mac); } +mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx (&mvdev->async_ctx);mlx5_vdpa_free_resources (&ndev->mvdev);free_irqs (ndev);kfree (ndev->event_cbs);
@@ -3888,6 +3890,8 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, const char *name, mvdev->actual_features = (device_features &BIT_ULL (VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 )); +mlx5_cmd_init_async_ctx (mdev, &mvdev->async_ctx); + ndev->vqs =kcalloc (max_vqs,sizeof (*ndev->vqs),GFP_KERNEL ); ndev->event_cbs =kcalloc (max_vqs +1 ,sizeof (*ndev->event_cbs),GFP_KERNEL );if (!ndev->vqs || !ndev->event_cbs) {
@@ -3960,8 +3964,6 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, const char *name, ndev->rqt_size =1 ; } -mlx5_cmd_init_async_ctx (mdev, &mvdev->async_ctx); - ndev->mvdev.mlx_features = device_features; mvdev->vdev.dma_dev = &mdev->pdev->dev; err =mlx5_vdpa_alloc_resources (&ndev->mvdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 328/480 vdpa: Fix IDR memory leak in VDUSE module exit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anders Roxell <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d9ea58b5dc6b4b50fbb6a10c73f840e8b10442b7 ]
Add missing idr_destroy() call in vduse_exit() to properly free the vduse_idr radix tree nodes. Without this, module load/unload cycles leak 576-byte radix tree node allocations, detectable by kmemleak as:
unreferenced object (size 576):
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81234567>] radix_tree_node_alloc+0xa0/0xf0
[<ffffffff81234568>] idr_get_free+0x128/0x280The vduse_idr is initialized via DEFINE_IDR() at line 136 and used throughout the VDUSE (vDPA Device in Userspace) driver for device ID management. The fix follows the documented pattern in lib/idr.c and matches the cleanup approach used by other drivers.
This leak was discovered through comprehensive module testing with cumulative kmemleak detection across 10 load/unload iterations per module.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c +1 -0
@@ -2216,6 +2216,7 @@ static void vduse_exit(void)cdev_del (&vduse_ctrl_cdev);unregister_chrdev_region (vduse_major,VDUSE_DEV_MAX );class_unregister (&vduse_class); +idr_destroy (&vduse_idr); }module_exit (vduse_exit);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 329/480 vhost: Reintroduce kthread API and add mode selection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cindy Lu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d9896e9f6d02d8aa85e63f736871f96c59a5263 ]
Since commit 6e890c5d5021 ("vhost: use vhost_tasks for worker threads"), the vhost uses vhost_task and operates as a child of the owner thread. This is required for correct CPU usage accounting, especially when using containers.
However, this change has caused confusion for some legacy userspace applications, and we didn't notice until it's too late.
Unfortunately, it's too late to revert - we now have userspace depending both on old and new behaviour :(
To address the issue, reintroduce kthread mode for vhost workers and provide a configuration to select between kthread and task worker.
- Add 'fork_owner' parameter to vhost_dev to let users select kthread or task mode. Default mode is task mode(VHOST_FORK_OWNER_TASK).
- Reintroduce kthread mode support:
* Bring back the original vhost_worker() implementation, and renamed to vhost_run_work_kthread_list().
* Add cgroup support for the kthread
* Introduce struct vhost_worker_ops:
- Encapsulates create / stop / wake‑up callbacks.
- vhost_worker_create() selects the proper ops according to inherit_owner.
- Userspace configuration interface:
* New IOCTLs:
- VHOST_SET_FORK_FROM_OWNER lets userspace select task mode (VHOST_FORK_OWNER_TASK) or kthread mode (VHOST_FORK_OWNER_KTHREAD)
- VHOST_GET_FORK_FROM_OWNER reads the current worker mode
* Expose module parameter 'fork_from_owner_default' to allow system administrators to configure the default mode for vhost workers
* Kconfig option CONFIG_VHOST_ENABLE_FORK_OWNER_CONTROL controls whether these IOCTLs and the parameter are available
- The VHOST_NEW_WORKER functionality requires fork_owner to be set to true, with validation added to ensure proper configuration
This partially reverts or improves upon:
commit 6e890c5d5021 ("vhost: use vhost_tasks for worker threads") commit 1cdaafa1b8b4 ("vhost: replace single worker pointer with xarray")
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vhost/Kconfig | 18 +++ drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 22 ++++ include/uapi/linux/vhost.h | 29 +++++ 4 files changed, 295 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/Kconfig +18 -0
@@ -95,4 +95,22 @@ config VHOST_CROSS_ENDIAN_LEGACY If unsure, say "N". +config VHOST_ENABLE_FORK_OWNER_CONTROL + bool "Enable VHOST_ENABLE_FORK_OWNER_CONTROL" + default y + help + This option enables two IOCTLs: VHOST_SET_FORK_FROM_OWNER and + VHOST_GET_FORK_FROM_OWNER. These allow userspace applications + to modify the vhost worker mode for vhost devices. + + Also expose module parameter 'fork_from_owner_default' to allow users + to configure the default mode for vhost workers. + + By default, `VHOST_ENABLE_FORK_OWNER_CONTROL` is set to `y`, + users can change the worker thread mode as needed. + If this config is disabled (n),the related IOCTLs and parameters will + be unavailable. + + If unsure, say "Y". + endif
drivers/vhost/vhost.c +226 -18
330 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/vhost/vhost.h +22 -0
@@ -26,7 +26,18 @@ struct vhost_work {unsigned long flags; }; +struct vhost_worker ; +struct vhost_dev ; + +struct vhost_worker_ops { +int (*create)(struct vhost_worker *worker,struct vhost_dev *dev, +const char *name); +void (*stop)(struct vhost_worker *worker); +void (*wakeup)(struct vhost_worker *worker); +}; +struct vhost_worker { +struct task_struct *kthread_task;struct vhost_task *vtsk;struct vhost_dev *dev;/* Used to serialize device wide flushing with worker swapping. */
@@ -36,6 +47,7 @@ struct vhost_worker {u32 id;int attachment_cnt;bool killed; +const struct vhost_worker_ops *ops; };/* Poll a file (eventfd or socket) */
@@ -176,6 +188,16 @@ struct vhost_dev {int byte_weight;struct xarray worker_xa;bool use_worker; +/* +* If fork_owner is true we use vhost_tasks to create +* the worker so all settings/limits like cgroups, NPROC, +* scheduler, etc are inherited from the owner. If false, +* we use kthreads and only attach to the same cgroups +* as the owner for compat with older kernels. +* here we use true as default value. +* The default value is set by fork_from_owner_default +*/ +bool fork_owner;int (*msg_handler)(struct vhost_dev *dev,u32 asid,struct vhost_iotlb_msg *msg); };
include/uapi/linux/vhost.h +29 -0
@@ -235,4 +235,33 @@*/ #define VHOST_VDPA_GET_VRING_SIZE _IOWR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x82, \ struct vhost_vring_state) + +/* fork_owner values for vhost */ +#define VHOST_FORK_OWNER_KTHREAD 0 +#define VHOST_FORK_OWNER_TASK 1 + +/** +* VHOST_SET_FORK_FROM_OWNER - Set the fork_owner flag for the vhost device, +* This ioctl must called before VHOST_SET_OWNER. +* Only available when CONFIG_VHOST_ENABLE_FORK_OWNER_CONTROL=y +* +* @param fork_owner: An 8-bit value that determines the vhost thread mode +* +* When fork_owner is set to VHOST_FORK_OWNER_TASK(default value): +* - Vhost will create vhost worker as tasks forked from the owner, +* inheriting all of the owner's attributes. +* +* When fork_owner is set to VHOST_FORK_OWNER_KTHREAD: +* - Vhost will create vhost workers as kernel threads. +*/ +#define VHOST_SET_FORK_FROM_OWNER _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x83, __u8) + +/** +* VHOST_GET_FORK_OWNER - Get the current fork_owner flag for the vhost device. +* Only available when CONFIG_VHOST_ENABLE_FORK_OWNER_CONTROL=y +* +* @return: An 8-bit value indicating the current thread mode. +*/ +#define VHOST_GET_FORK_FROM_OWNER _IOR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x84, __u8) +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 330/480 bpf: Check flow_dissector ctx accesses are aligned
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Chaignon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ead3d7b2b6afa5ee7958620c4329982a7d9c2b78 ]
flow_dissector_is_valid_access doesn't check that the context access is aligned. As a consequence, an unaligned access within one of the exposed field is considered valid and later rejected by flow_dissector_convert_ctx_access when we try to convert it.
The later rejection is problematic because it's reported as a verifier bug with a kernel warning and doesn't point to the right instruction in verifier logs.
--- net/core/filter.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/core/filter.c +3 -0
@@ -9463,6 +9463,9 @@ static bool flow_dissector_is_valid_access(int off, int size,if (off <0 || off >=sizeof (struct __sk_buff ))return false; +if (off % size !=0 ) +return false; +if (type ==BPF_WRITE )return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 331/480 bpf: Check netfilter ctx accesses are aligned
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Chaignon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9e6448f7b1efb27f8d508b067ecd33ed664a4246 ]
Similarly to the previous patch fixing the flow_dissector ctx accesses, nf_is_valid_access also doesn't check that ctx accesses are aligned. Contrary to flow_dissector programs, netfilter programs don't have context conversion. The unaligned ctx accesses are therefore allowed by the verifier.
--- net/netfilter/nf_bpf_link.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_bpf_link.c +3 -0
@@ -295,6 +295,9 @@ static bool nf_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,if (off <0 || off >=sizeof (struct bpf_nf_ctx ))return false; +if (off % size !=0 ) +return false; +if (type ==BPF_WRITE )return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 332/480 apparmor: ensure WB_HISTORY_SIZE value is a power of 2
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryan Lee <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c055e62560b958354625604293652753d82bcae ]
WB_HISTORY_SIZE was defined to be a value not a power of 2, despite a comment in the declaration of struct match_workbuf stating it is and a modular arithmetic usage in the inc_wb_pos macro assuming that it is. Bump WB_HISTORY_SIZE's value up to 32 and add a BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2 line to ensure that any future changes to the value of WB_HISTORY_SIZE respect this requirement.
--- security/apparmor/include/match.h | 3 ++- security/apparmor/match.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/apparmor/include/match.h +2 -1
@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,void aa_dfa_free_kref (struct kref *kref); -#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 24 +/* This needs to be a power of 2 */ +#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 32struct match_workbuf {unsigned int count;unsigned int pos;
security/apparmor/match.c +1 -0
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,#define inc_wb_pos (wb) \ do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2(WB_HISTORY_SIZE); \ wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); \ wb->len = (wb->len + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); \ } while (0)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 333/480 apparmor: fix loop detection used in conflicting attachment resolution
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryan Lee <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a88db916b8c77552f49f7d9f8744095ea01a268f ]
Conflicting attachment resolution is based on the number of states traversed to reach an accepting state in the attachment DFA, accounting for DFA loops traversed during the matching process. However, the loop counting logic had multiple bugs:
- The inc_wb_pos macro increments both position and length, but length is supposed to saturate upon hitting buffer capacity, instead of wrapping around.
- If no revisited state is found when traversing the history, is_loop would still return true, as if there was a loop found the length of the history buffer, instead of returning false and signalling that no loop was found. As a result, the adjustment step of aa_dfa_leftmatch would sometimes produce negative counts with loop- free DFAs that traversed enough states.
- The iteration in the is_loop for loop is supposed to stop before i = wb->len, so the conditional should be < instead of <=.
This patch fixes the above bugs as well as the following nits:
- The count and size fields in struct match_workbuf were not used, so they can be removed.
- The history buffer in match_workbuf semantically stores aa_state_t and not unsigned ints, even if aa_state_t is currently unsigned int.
- The local variables in is_loop are counters, and thus should be unsigned ints instead of aa_state_t's.
--- security/apparmor/include/match.h | 5 +---- security/apparmor/match.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/include/match.h +1 -4
@@ -140,15 +140,12 @@ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);/* This needs to be a power of 2 */ #define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 32struct match_workbuf { -unsigned int count;unsigned int pos;unsigned int len; -unsigned int size;/* power of 2, same as history size */ -unsigned int history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE ]; +aa_state_t history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE ]; };#define DEFINE_MATCH_WB (N ) \ struct match_workbuf N = { \ - .count = 0, \ .pos = 0, \ .len = 0, \ }
security/apparmor/match.c +11 -11
@@ -679,35 +679,35 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,return state; } -#define inc_wb_pos (wb) \ -do { \ +#define inc_wb_pos (wb) \ +do { \ BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2(WB_HISTORY_SIZE); \ wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); \ - wb->len = (wb->len + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); \ + wb->len = (wb->len + 1) > WB_HISTORY_SIZE ? WB_HISTORY_SIZE : \ + wb->len + 1; \ } while (0)/* For DFAs that don't support extended tagging of states */ +/* adjust is only set if is_loop returns true */ static bool is_loop (struct match_workbuf *wb,aa_state_t state,unsigned int *adjust) { -aa_state_t pos = wb->pos; -aa_state_t i; +int pos = wb->pos; +int i;if (wb->history[pos] < state)return false; -for (i =0 ; i <= wb->len; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i < wb->len; i++) {if (wb->history[pos] == state) { *adjust = i;return true; } -if (pos ==0 ) - pos =WB_HISTORY_SIZE ; - pos--; +/* -1 wraps to WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1 */ + pos = (pos -1 ) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE -1 ); } - *adjust = i; -return true; +return false; } static aa_state_t leftmatch_fb(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 334/480 scripts: gdb: move MNT_* constants to gdb-parsed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 41a7f737685eed2700654720d3faaffdf0132135 ]
Since these are now no longer defines, but in an enum.
--- scripts/gdb/linux/constants.py.in | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
scripts/gdb/linux/constants.py.in +6 -6
@@ -74,12 +74,12 @@ if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_MODULES): LX_GDBPARSED(MOD_RO_AFTER_INIT) /* linux/mount.h */ -LX_VALUE(MNT_NOSUID) -LX_VALUE(MNT_NODEV) -LX_VALUE(MNT_NOEXEC) -LX_VALUE(MNT_NOATIME) -LX_VALUE(MNT_NODIRATIME) -LX_VALUE(MNT_RELATIME) +LX_GDBPARSED(MNT_NOSUID) +LX_GDBPARSED(MNT_NODEV) +LX_GDBPARSED(MNT_NOEXEC) +LX_GDBPARSED(MNT_NOATIME) +LX_GDBPARSED(MNT_NODIRATIME) +LX_GDBPARSED(MNT_RELATIME) /* linux/threads.h */ LX_VALUE(NR_CPUS)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 335/480 apparmor: Fix unaligned memory accesses in KUnit test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c68804199dd9d63868497a27b5da3c3cd15356db ]
The testcase triggers some unnecessary unaligned memory accesses on the
parisc architecture:
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x12f28e27 in policy_unpack_test_init+0x180/0x374 (iir 0x0cdc1280)
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x12f28e67 in policy_unpack_test_init+0x270/0x374 (iir 0x64dc00ce)
Use the existing helper functions put_unaligned_le32() and put_unaligned_le16() to avoid such warnings on architectures which prefer aligned memory accesses.
--- security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c +4 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@#include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_unpack.h" +#include <linux/unaligned.h> +#define TEST_STRING_NAME "TEST_STRING"#define TEST_STRING_DATA "testing"#define TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET \
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf, *(buf +1 ) =strlen (TEST_U32_NAME ) +1 ;strscpy (buf +3 ,TEST_U32_NAME , e->end - (void *)(buf +3 )); *(buf +3 +strlen (TEST_U32_NAME ) +1 ) =AA_U32 ; - *((__le32 *)(buf +3 +strlen (TEST_U32_NAME ) +2 )) =cpu_to_le32 (TEST_U32_DATA ); +put_unaligned_le32 (TEST_U32_DATA , buf +3 +strlen (TEST_U32_NAME ) +2 ); buf = e->start +TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET ; *buf =AA_NAME ;
@@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf, *(buf +1 ) =strlen (TEST_ARRAY_NAME ) +1 ;strscpy (buf +3 ,TEST_ARRAY_NAME , e->end - (void *)(buf +3 )); *(buf +3 +strlen (TEST_ARRAY_NAME ) +1 ) =AA_ARRAY ; - *((__le16 *)(buf +3 +strlen (TEST_ARRAY_NAME ) +2 )) =cpu_to_le16 (TEST_ARRAY_SIZE ); +put_unaligned_le16 (TEST_ARRAY_SIZE , buf +3 +strlen (TEST_ARRAY_NAME ) +2 );return e; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 336/480 i3c: master: svc: Fix npcm845 FIFO_EMPTY quirk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stanley Chu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bc4a09d8e79cadccdd505f47b01903a80bc666e7 ]
In a private write transfer, the driver pre-fills the FIFO to work around the FIFO_EMPTY quirk. However, if an IBIWON event occurs, the hardware emits a NACK and the driver initiates a retry. During the retry, driver attempts to pre-fill the FIFO again if there is remaining data, but since the FIFO is already full, this leads to data loss.
Check available space in FIFO to prevent overflow.
--- drivers/i3c/master/svc-i3c-master.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/i3c/master/svc-i3c-master.c +14 -8
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@#define SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_TXTRIG_FIFO_NOT_FULL GENMASK(5, 4)#define SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_RXTRIG_FIFO_NOT_EMPTY 0#define SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_RXCOUNT (x) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(28, 24), (x)) +#define SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_TXCOUNT (x) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(20, 16), (x))#define SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_TXFULL BIT(30)#define SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_RXEMPTY BIT(31)
@@ -1308,14 +1309,19 @@ static int svc_i3c_master_xfer(struct svc_i3c_master *master,* FIFO start filling as soon as possible after EmitStartAddr. */ if (svc_has_quirk (master,SVC_I3C_QUIRK_FIFO_EMPTY ) && !rnw && xfer_len) { -u32 end = xfer_len >SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE ?0 :SVC_I3C_MWDATAB_END ; -u32 len =min_t (u32, xfer_len,SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE ); - -writesb (master->regs +SVC_I3C_MWDATAB1 , out, len -1 ); -/* Mark END bit if this is the last byte */ -writel (out[len -1 ] | end, master->regs +SVC_I3C_MWDATAB ); - xfer_len -= len; - out += len; +u32 space, end, len; + + reg =readl (master->regs +SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL ); + space =SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE -SVC_I3C_MDATACTRL_TXCOUNT (reg); +if (space) { + end = xfer_len > space ?0 :SVC_I3C_MWDATAB_END ; + len =min_t (u32, xfer_len, space); +writesb (master->regs +SVC_I3C_MWDATAB1 , out, len -1 ); +/* Mark END bit if this is the last byte */ +writel (out[len -1 ] | end, master->regs +SVC_I3C_MWDATAB ); + xfer_len -= len; + out += len; + } } ret = readl_poll_timeout(master->regs + SVC_I3C_MSTATUS, reg,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 337/480 module: Restore the moduleparam prefix length check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bdc877ba6b7ff1b6d2ebeff11e63da4a50a54854 ]
The moduleparam code allows modules to provide their own definition of MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX, instead of using the default KBUILD_MODNAME ".".
Commit 730b69d22525 ("module: check kernel param length at compile time, not runtime") added a check to ensure the prefix doesn't exceed MODULE_NAME_LEN, as this is what param_sysfs_builtin() expects.
Later, commit 58f86cc89c33 ("VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS: stricter checking for sysfs perms.") removed this check, but there is no indication this was intentional.
Since the check is still useful for param_sysfs_builtin() to function properly, reintroduce it in __module_param_call(), but in a modernized form using static_assert().
While here, clean up the __module_param_call() comments. In particular, remove the comment "Default value instead of permissions?", which comes from commit 9774a1f54f17 ("[PATCH] Compile-time check re world-writeable module params"). This comment was related to the test variable __param_perm_check_##name, which was removed in the previously mentioned commit 58f86cc89c33.
--- include/linux/moduleparam.h | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/moduleparam.h +2 -3
@@ -282,10 +282,9 @@ struct kparam_array#define __moduleparam_const const#endif -/* This is the fundamental function for registering boot/module -parameters. */ +/* This is the fundamental function for registering boot/module parameters. */ #define __module_param_call (prefix, name, ops, arg, perm, level, flags) \ -/* Default value instead of permissions? */ \ + static_assert(sizeof(""prefix) - 1 <= MAX_PARAM_PREFIX_LEN); \ static const char __param_str_##name[] = prefix #name; \ static struct kernel_param __moduleparam_const __param_##name \ __used __section("__param") \
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 338/480 ucount: fix atomic_long_inc_below() argument type
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Uros Bizjak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f8cd9193b62e92ad25def5370ca8ea2bc7585381 ]
The type of u argument of atomic_long_inc_below() should be long to avoid unwanted truncation to int.
The patch fixes the wrong argument type of an internal function to prevent unwanted argument truncation. It fixes an internal locking primitive; it should not have any direct effect on userspace.
Mark said
: AFAICT there's no problem in practice because atomic_long_inc_below() : is only used by inc_ucount(), and it looks like the value is : constrained between 0 and INT_MAX.
:
: In inc_ucount() the limit value is taken from
: user_namespace::ucount_max[], and AFAICT that's only written by : sysctls, to the table setup by setup_userns_sysctls(), where : UCOUNT_ENTRY() limits the value between 0 and INT_MAX.
:
: This is certainly a cleanup, but there might be no functional issue in : practice as above.
--- kernel/ucount.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/ucount.c +1 -1
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts) } } -static inline bool atomic_long_inc_below (atomic_long_t *v,int u) +static inline bool atomic_long_inc_below (atomic_long_t *v,long u) {long c, old; c =atomic_long_read (v);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 339/480 rtc: ds1307: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cf6eb547a24af7ad7bbd2abe9c5327f956bbeae8 ]
When ds3231_clk_sqw_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1307.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1307.c +1 -1
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ static long ds3231_clk_sqw_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,return ds3231_clk_sqw_rates[i]; } -return 0 ; +return ds3231_clk_sqw_rates[ARRAY_SIZE (ds3231_clk_sqw_rates) -1 ]; } static int ds3231_clk_sqw_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 340/480 rtc: hym8563: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d0a518eb0a692a2ab8357e844970660c5ea37720 ]
When hym8563_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c +1 -1
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static long hym8563_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int hym8563_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 341/480 rtc: nct3018y: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 437c59e4b222cd697b4cf95995d933e7d583c5f1 ]
When nct3018y_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-nct3018y.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-nct3018y.c +1 -1
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static long nct3018y_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int nct3018y_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 342/480 rtc: pcf85063: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 186ae1869880e58bb3f142d222abdb35ecb4df0f ]
When pcf85063_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c +1 -1
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static long pcf85063_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int pcf85063_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 343/480 rtc: pcf8563: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 906726a5efeefe0ef0103ccff5312a09080c04ae ]
When pcf8563_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf8563.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf8563.c +1 -1
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static long pcf8563_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int pcf8563_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 344/480 rtc: rv3028: fix incorrect maximum clock rate handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Masney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b574acb3cf7591d2513a9f29f8c2021ad55fb881 ]
When rv3028_clkout_round_rate() is called with a requested rate higher than the highest supported rate, it currently returns 0, which disables the clock. According to the clk API, round_rate() should instead return the highest supported rate. Update the function to return the maximum supported rate in this case.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-rv3028.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-rv3028.c +1 -1
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ static long rv3028_clkout_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,if (clkout_rates[i] <= rate)return clkout_rates[i]; -return 0 ; +return clkout_rates[0 ]; } static int rv3028_clkout_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 345/480 f2fs: turn off one_time when forcibly set to foreground GC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daeho Jeong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8142daf8a53806689186ee255cc02f89af7f8890 ]
one_time mode is only for background GC. So, we need to set it back to false when foreground GC is enforced.
--- fs/f2fs/gc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/f2fs/gc.c +1 -0
@@ -1893,6 +1893,7 @@ int f2fs_gc(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct f2fs_gc_control *gc_control)/* Let's run FG_GC, if we don't have enough space. */ if (has_not_enough_free_secs (sbi,0 ,0 )) { gc_type =FG_GC ; + gc_control->one_time = false;/* * For example, if there are many prefree_segments below given
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 346/480 f2fs: fix bio memleak when committing super block
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sheng Yong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 554d9b7242a73d701ce121ac81bb578a3fca538e ]
When committing new super block, bio is allocated but not freed, and kmemleak complains:
unreferenced object 0xffff88801d185600 (size 192):
comm "kworker/3:2", pid 128, jiffies 4298624992
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 67 c3 00 81 88 ff ff .........g......
01 08 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 650ecdb1):
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3a9/0x460
mempool_alloc_noprof+0x12f/0x310
bio_alloc_bioset+0x1e2/0x7e0
__f2fs_commit_super+0xe0/0x370
f2fs_commit_super+0x4ed/0x8c0
f2fs_record_error_work+0xc7/0x190
process_one_work+0x7db/0x1970
worker_thread+0x518/0xea0
kthread+0x359/0x690
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30The issue can be reproduced by:
mount /dev/vda /mnt
i=0
while :; do
echo '[h]abc' > /sys/fs/f2fs/vda/extension_list
echo '[h]!abc' > /sys/fs/f2fs/vda/extension_list
echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
dmesg | grep "new suspected memory leaks"
[ $? -eq 0 ] && break
i=$((i + 1))
echo "$i"
done
umount /mnt--- fs/f2fs/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/f2fs/super.c +1 -0
@@ -3446,6 +3446,7 @@ static int __f2fs_commit_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct folio *folio,f2fs_bug_on (sbi,1 ); ret =submit_bio_wait (bio); +bio_put (bio);folio_end_writeback (folio);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 347/480 f2fs: fix to avoid invalid wait context issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 90d5c9ba3ed91950f1546bf123a7a57cd958b452 ]
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.13.0-rc1 #84 Tainted: G O
-----------------------------
cat/56160 is trying to lock:ffff888105c86648 (&cprc->stat_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: update_general_status+0x32a/0x8c0 [f2fs] other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
2 locks held by cat/56160:
#0: ffff88810a002a98 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: seq_read_iter+0x56/0x4c0
#1: ffffffffa0462638 (f2fs_stat_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: stat_show+0x29/0x1020 [f2fs]
stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 56160 Comm: cat Tainted: G O 6.13.0-rc1 #84 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xd0 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x8d4/0xbb0 lock_acquire+0xd6/0x300 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50 update_general_status+0x32a/0x8c0 [f2fs] stat_show+0x50/0x1020 [f2fs] seq_read_iter+0x116/0x4c0 seq_read+0xfa/0x130 full_proxy_read+0x66/0x90 vfs_read+0xc4/0x350 ksys_read+0x74/0xf0 __x64_sys_read+0x1d/0x20 x64_sys_call+0x17d9/0x1b80 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f RIP: 0033:0x7f2ca53147e2
- seq_read
- stat_show
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&f2fs_stat_lock, flags) : f2fs_stat_lock is raw_spinlock_t type variable
- update_general_status
- spin_lock(&sbi->cprc_info.stat_lock); : stat_lock is spinlock_t type variable
The root cause is the lock order is incorrect [1], we should not acquire spinlock_t lock after raw_spinlock_t lock, as if CONFIG_PREEMPT_LOCK is on, spinlock_t is implemented based on rtmutex, which can sleep after holding the lock.
To fix this issue, let's use change f2fs_stat_lock lock type from raw_spinlock_t to spinlock_t, it's safe due to:
- we don't need to use raw version of spinlock as the path is not performance sensitive.
- we don't need to use irqsave version of spinlock as it won't be used in irq context.
Quoted from [1]:
"Extend lockdep to validate lock wait-type context.
The current wait-types are:
LD_WAIT_FREE, /* wait free, rcu etc.. */ LD_WAIT_SPIN, /* spin loops, raw_spinlock_t etc.. */ LD_WAIT_CONFIG, /* CONFIG_PREEMPT_LOCK, spinlock_t etc.. */ LD_WAIT_SLEEP, /* sleeping locks, mutex_t etc.. */
Where lockdep validates that the current lock (the one being acquired) fits in the current wait-context (as generated by the held stack).
This ensures that there is no attempt to acquire mutexes while holding spinlocks, to acquire spinlocks while holding raw_spinlocks and so on. In other words, its a more fancy might_sleep()."
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
--- fs/f2fs/debug.c | 17 +++++++---------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/debug.c +7 -10
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@#include "gc.h" static LIST_HEAD (f2fs_stat_list); -static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK (f2fs_stat_lock); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (f2fs_stat_lock);#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS static struct dentry *f2fs_debugfs_root;#endif
@@ -439,9 +439,8 @@ static int stat_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) {struct f2fs_stat_info *si;int i =0 , j =0 ; -unsigned long flags; -raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&f2fs_stat_lock, flags); +spin_lock (&f2fs_stat_lock);list_for_each_entry (si, &f2fs_stat_list, stat_list) {struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = si->sbi;
@@ -753,7 +752,7 @@ static int stat_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)seq_printf (s," - paged : %llu KB\n" , si->page_mem >>10 ); } -raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&f2fs_stat_lock, flags); +spin_unlock (&f2fs_stat_lock);return 0 ; }
@@ -765,7 +764,6 @@ int f2fs_build_stats(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super =F2FS_RAW_SUPER (sbi);struct f2fs_stat_info *si;struct f2fs_dev_stats *dev_stats; -unsigned long flags;int i; si =f2fs_kzalloc (sbi,sizeof (struct f2fs_stat_info ),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -817,9 +815,9 @@ int f2fs_build_stats(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)atomic_set (&sbi->max_aw_cnt,0 ); -raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&f2fs_stat_lock, flags); +spin_lock (&f2fs_stat_lock);list_add_tail (&si->stat_list, &f2fs_stat_list); -raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&f2fs_stat_lock, flags); +spin_unlock (&f2fs_stat_lock);return 0 ; }
@@ -827,11 +825,10 @@ int f2fs_build_stats(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)void f2fs_destroy_stats (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) {struct f2fs_stat_info *si =F2FS_STAT (sbi); -unsigned long flags; -raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&f2fs_stat_lock, flags); +spin_lock (&f2fs_stat_lock);list_del (&si->stat_list); -raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&f2fs_stat_lock, flags); +spin_unlock (&f2fs_stat_lock);kfree (si->dev_stats);kfree (si);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 348/480 f2fs: fix KMSAN uninit-value in extent_info usage
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Abinash Singh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 154467f4ad033473e5c903a03e7b9bca7df9a0fa ]
KMSAN reported a use of uninitialized value in __is_extent_mergeable()
and __is_back_mergeable() via the read extent tree path.
The root cause is that get_read_extent_info() only initializes three fields (fofs, blk, len) of struct extent_info, leaving the remaining fields uninitialized. This leads to undefined behavior when those fields are accessed later, especially during extent merging.
Fix it by zero-initializing the extent_info struct before population.
--- fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c +1 -1
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ void f2fs_init_read_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage)struct f2fs_extent *i_ext = &F2FS_INODE (ipage)->i_ext;struct extent_tree *et;struct extent_node *en; -struct extent_info ei; +struct extent_info ei = {0 };if (!__may_extent_tree (inode,EX_READ )) {/* drop largest read extent */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 349/480 f2fs: fix to check upper boundary for value of gc_boost_zoned_gc_percent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: yohan.joung <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 10dcaa56ef93f2a45e4c3fec27d8e1594edad110 ]
to check the upper boundary when setting gc_boost_zoned_gc_percent
--- fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c +7 -0
@@ -621,6 +621,13 @@ static ssize_t __sbi_store(struct f2fs_attr *a,return count; } +if (!strcmp (a->attr.name,"gc_boost_zoned_gc_percent" )) { +if (t >100 ) +return -EINVAL ; + *ui = (unsigned int )t; +return count; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_IOSTAT if (!strcmp (a->attr.name,"iostat_enable" )) { sbi->iostat_enable = !!t;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 350/480 f2fs: fix to check upper boundary for gc_valid_thresh_ratio
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7a96d1d73ce9de5041e891a623b722f900651561 ]
This patch adds missing upper boundary check while setting gc_valid_thresh_ratio via sysfs.
--- fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c +7 -0
@@ -628,6 +628,13 @@ static ssize_t __sbi_store(struct f2fs_attr *a,return count; } +if (!strcmp (a->attr.name,"gc_valid_thresh_ratio" )) { +if (t >100 ) +return -EINVAL ; + *ui = (unsigned int )t; +return count; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_IOSTAT if (!strcmp (a->attr.name,"iostat_enable" )) { sbi->iostat_enable = !!t;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 351/480 f2fs: fix to check upper boundary for gc_no_zoned_gc_percent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a919ae794ad2dc6d04b3eea2f9bc86332c1630cc ]
This patch adds missing upper boundary check while setting gc_no_zoned_gc_percent via sysfs.
--- fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c +7 -0
@@ -621,6 +621,13 @@ static ssize_t __sbi_store(struct f2fs_attr *a,return count; } +if (!strcmp (a->attr.name,"gc_no_zoned_gc_percent" )) { +if (t >100 ) +return -EINVAL ; + *ui = (unsigned int )t; +return count; + } +if (!strcmp (a->attr.name,"gc_boost_zoned_gc_percent" )) {if (t >100 )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 352/480 f2fs: doc: fix wrong quota mount option description
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 81b6ecca2f15922e8d653dc037df5871e754be6e ]
We should use "{usr,grp,prj}jquota=" to disable journaled quota, rather than using off{usr,grp,prj}jquota.
--- Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst +3 -3
@@ -236,9 +236,9 @@ usrjquota=<file> Appoint specified file and type during mount, so that quota grpjquota=<file> information can be properly updated during recovery flow, prjjquota=<file> <quota file>: must be in root directory; jqfmt=<quota type> <quota type>: [vfsold,vfsv0,vfsv1]. -offusrjquota Turn off user journalled quota. -offgrpjquota Turn off group journalled quota. -offprjjquota Turn off project journalled quota. +usrjquota= Turn off user journalled quota. +grpjquota= Turn off group journalled quota. +prjjquota= Turn off project journalled quota. quota Enable plain user disk quota accounting. noquota Disable all plain disk quota option. alloc_mode=%s Adjust block allocation policy, which supports "reuse"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 353/480 f2fs: fix to avoid UAF in f2fs_sync_inode_meta()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7c30d79930132466f5be7d0b57add14d1a016bda ]
syzbot reported an UAF issue as below: [1] [2]
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashReport&x=16594c60580000
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100567dc8 by task kworker/u4:0/8 CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller-00017-g642656a36791 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x151/0x1b7 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:316 [inline] print_report+0x158/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x13c/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0x100/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1553 f2fs_update_inode+0x72/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:588 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x135/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:706 f2fs_write_inode+0x416/0x790 fs/f2fs/inode.c:734 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4cf/0xb80 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_sb_inodes+0xb32/0x1910 fs/fs-writeback.c:1903 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x118/0x3f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1974 wb_writeback+0x3da/0xa00 fs/fs-writeback.c:2081 wb_check_background_flush fs/fs-writeback.c:2151 [inline] wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2239 [inline] wb_workfn+0xbba/0x1030 fs/fs-writeback.c:2266 process_one_work+0x73d/0xcb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2299 worker_thread+0xa60/0x1260 kernel/workqueue.c:2446 kthread+0x26d/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:386 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 </TASK> Allocated by task 298: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:333 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:202 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3421 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3431 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3438 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x102/0x270 mm/slub.c:3454 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3255 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x350 fs/f2fs/super.c:1437 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x18c/0x7e0 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:486 f2fs_lookup+0x3c1/0xb50 fs/f2fs/namei.c:484 __lookup_slow+0x2b9/0x3e0 fs/namei.c:1689 lookup_slow+0x5a/0x80 fs/namei.c:1706 walk_component+0x2e7/0x410 fs/namei.c:1997 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2454 [inline] path_lookupat+0x16d/0x450 fs/namei.c:2478 filename_lookup+0x251/0x600 fs/namei.c:2507 vfs_statx+0x107/0x4b0 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3434 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xda/0x7c0 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x52/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x131/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:241 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:249 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:178 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1745 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1771 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3686 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x291/0x560 mm/slub.c:3711 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1584 i_callback+0x4b/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x552/0xbe0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x502/0xf40 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x1db/0x650 kernel/softirq.c:624 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:662 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:479 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x52/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:711 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x10 kernel/softirq.c:723 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1118 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1118 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:691 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb4/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2807 [inline] call_rcu+0xdc/0x10f0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2926 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x87d/0x930 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x616/0x690 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x4e1/0x920 fs/namei.c:4396 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4437 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4435 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4435 x64_sys_call+0x289/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100567a10 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1360
The buggy address is located 952 bytes inside of
1360-byte region [ffff888100567a10, ffff888100567f60)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004015800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x100560 head:ffffea0004015800 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff8881002c4d80 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080160016 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0xd2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 298, tgid 298 (syz-executor330), ts 26489303743, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:33 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x213/0x220 mm/page_alloc.c:2637 prep_new_page+0x1b/0x110 mm/page_alloc.c:2644 get_page_from_freelist+0x3a98/0x3b10 mm/page_alloc.c:4539 __alloc_pages+0x234/0x610 mm/page_alloc.c:5837 alloc_slab_page+0x6c/0xf0 include/linux/gfp.h:-1 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1962 [inline] new_slab+0x90/0x3e0 mm/slub.c:2015 ___slab_alloc+0x6f9/0xb80 mm/slub.c:3203 __slab_alloc+0x5d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3302 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3387 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3431 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3438 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x149/0x270 mm/slub.c:3454 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3255 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x350 fs/f2fs/super.c:1437 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x18c/0x7e0 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4ca0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:486 f2fs_fill_super+0x5360/0x6dc0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4488 mount_bdev+0x282/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1445 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4743 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632
page_owner free stack trace missing
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888100567c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100567d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888100567d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888100567e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100567e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&x=13654c60580000
[ 24.675720][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="loop0" ino=3 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.705426][ T296] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 24.706608][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:73): avc: denied { remove_name } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="file0" dev="loop0" ino=4 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.711550][ T296] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 296 at fs/f2fs/inode.c:847 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1262/0x1540
[ 24.734141][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:74): avc: denied { rename } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="file0" dev="loop0" ino=4 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.742969][ T296] Modules linked in:
[ 24.765201][ T28] audit: type=1400 audit(1745327318.732:75): avc: denied { add_name } for pid=298 comm="syz-executor399" name="bus" scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 24.768847][ T296] CPU: 0 PID: 296 Comm: syz-executor399 Not tainted 6.1.129-syzkaller-00017-g642656a36791 #0
[ 24.799506][ T296] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
[ 24.809401][ T296] RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1262/0x1540
[ 24.815018][ T296] Code: 34 70 4a ff eb 0d e8 2d 70 4a ff 4d 89 e5 4c 8b 64 24 18 48 8b 5c 24 28 4c 89 e7 e8 78 38 03 00 e9 84 fc ff ff e8 0e 70 4a ff <0f> 0b 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 7f 21 92 ff f0 41 80 0e 04 e9 61
[ 24.834584][ T296] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000db7a40 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 24.840465][ T296] RAX: ffffffff822aca42 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888110948000
[ 24.848291][ T296] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 24.856064][ T296] RBP: ffffc90000db7bb0 R08: ffffffff822ac6a8 R09: ffffed10200b005d
[ 24.864073][ T296] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: ffff888100580000
[ 24.871812][ T296] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88810fef4078 R15: 1ffff920001b6f5cThe root cause is w/ a fuzzed image, f2fs may missed to clear FI_DIRTY_INODE flag for target inode, after f2fs_evict_inode(), the inode is still linked in sbi->inode_list[DIRTY_META] global list, once it triggers checkpoint, f2fs_sync_inode_meta() may access the released inode.
In f2fs_evict_inode(), let's always call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear FI_DIRTY_INODE flag and drop inode from global dirty list to avoid this UAF issue.
--- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +6 -2
@@ -950,8 +950,12 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)if (likely (!f2fs_cp_error (sbi) && !is_sbi_flag_set (sbi,SBI_CP_DISABLED )))f2fs_bug_on (sbi,is_inode_flag_set (inode,FI_DIRTY_INODE )); -else -f2fs_inode_synced (inode); + +/* +* anyway, it needs to remove the inode from sbi->inode_list[DIRTY_META] +* list to avoid UAF in f2fs_sync_inode_meta() during checkpoint. +*/ +f2fs_inode_synced (inode);/* for the case f2fs_new_inode() was failed, .i_ino is zero, skip it */ if (inode->i_ino)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 354/480 f2fs: fix to avoid panic in f2fs_evict_inode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a509a55f8eecc8970b3980c6f06886bbff0e2f68 ]
As syzbot [1] reported as below:
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450
R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520
</TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200
The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of
1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056
page_owner free stack trace missing
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000
This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed.
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857!
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected]
Tracepoints before panic:
f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05
f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2
The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped.
However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status.
Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode().
PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs:
F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink
--- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +13 -0
@@ -934,6 +934,19 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)f2fs_update_inode_page (inode);if (dquot_initialize_needed (inode))set_sbi_flag (sbi,SBI_QUOTA_NEED_REPAIR ); + +/* +* If both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() failed +* due to fuzzed corrupted inode, call f2fs_inode_synced() to +* avoid triggering later f2fs_bug_on(). +*/ +if (is_inode_flag_set (inode,FI_DIRTY_INODE )) { +f2fs_warn (sbi, +"f2fs_evict_inode: inode is dirty, ino:%lu" , + inode->i_ino); +f2fs_inode_synced (inode); +set_sbi_flag (sbi,SBI_NEED_FSCK ); + } }if (freeze_protected)sb_end_intwrite (inode->i_sb);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 355/480 f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-boundary access in devs.path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5661998536af52848cc4d52a377e90368196edea ]
- touch /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123
- truncate -s $((1024*1024*1024)) \
/mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123
- touch /mnt/f2fs/file
- truncate -s $((1024*1024*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
- mkfs.f2fs /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 \
-c /mnt/f2fs/file
- mount /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 \
/mnt/f2fs/loop
[16937.192225] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mount Device [ 0]: /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123\xff\x01, 511, 0 - 3ffff [16937.192268] F2FS-fs (loop0): Failed to find devices
If device path length equals to MAX_PATH_LEN, sbi->devs.path[] may not end up w/ null character due to path array is fully filled, So accidently, fields locate after path[] may be treated as part of device path, result in parsing wrong device path.
struct f2fs_dev_info {
...
char path[MAX_PATH_LEN];
...
};
Let's add one byte space for sbi->devs.path[] to store null character of device path string.
--- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +1 -1
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ struct f2fs_bio_info {struct f2fs_dev_info {struct file *bdev_file;struct block_device *bdev; -char path[MAX_PATH_LEN ]; +char path[MAX_PATH_LEN +1 ];unsigned int total_segments;block_t start_blk;block_t end_blk;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 356/480 f2fs: vm_unmap_ram() may be called from an invalid context
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Prusakowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 08a7efc5b02a0620ae16aa9584060e980a69cb55 ]
When testing F2FS with xfstests using UFS backed virtual disks the kernel complains sometimes that f2fs_release_decomp_mem() calls vm_unmap_ram() from an invalid context. Example trace from f2fs/007 test:
f2fs/007 5s ... [12:59:38][ 8.902525] run fstests f2fs/007
[ 11.468026] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2978 [ 11.471849] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 68, name: irq/22-ufshcd [ 11.475357] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [ 11.476970] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 11.478531] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 68 Comm: irq/22-ufshcd Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc5-xfstests-ufs-g40f92e79b0aa #9 PREEMPT(none) [ 11.478535] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 11.478536] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 11.478537] Call Trace: [ 11.478543] <TASK> [ 11.478545] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 11.478554] __might_resched.cold+0xaf/0xbe [ 11.478557] vm_unmap_ram+0x21/0xb0 [ 11.478560] f2fs_release_decomp_mem+0x59/0x80 [ 11.478563] f2fs_free_dic+0x18/0x1a0 [ 11.478565] f2fs_finish_read_bio+0xd7/0x290 [ 11.478570] blk_update_request+0xec/0x3b0 [ 11.478574] ? sbitmap_queue_clear+0x3b/0x60 [ 11.478576] scsi_end_request+0x27/0x1a0 [ 11.478582] scsi_io_completion+0x40/0x300 [ 11.478583] ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xa3/0xe0 [ 11.478588] ufshcd_sl_intr+0x194/0x1f0 [ 11.478592] ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x68/0xb0 [ 11.478594] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478599] irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60 [ 11.478602] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478603] irq_thread+0xb9/0x180 [ 11.478605] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478607] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478609] kthread+0x10a/0x230 [ 11.478614] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478615] ret_from_fork+0x7e/0xd0 [ 11.478619] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478621] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 11.478623] </TASK>
This patch modifies in_task() check inside f2fs_read_end_io() to also check if interrupts are disabled. This ensures that pages are unmapped asynchronously in an interrupt handler.
--- fs/f2fs/data.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +1 -1
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static void f2fs_read_end_io(struct bio *bio) {struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_P_SB (bio_first_page_all (bio));struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx; -bool intask =in_task (); +bool intask =in_task () && !irqs_disabled ();iostat_update_and_unbind_ctx (bio); ctx = bio->bi_private;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 357/480 f2fs: fix to update upper_p in __get_secs_required() correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6840faddb65683b4e7bd8196f177b038a1e19faf ]
Commit 1acd73edbbfe ("f2fs: fix to account dirty data in __get_secs_required()") missed to calculate upper_p w/ data_secs, fix it.
--- fs/f2fs/segment.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.h +1 -1
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static inline void __get_secs_required(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,if (lower_p) *lower_p = node_secs + dent_secs + data_secs;if (upper_p) - *upper_p = node_secs + dent_secs + + *upper_p = node_secs + dent_secs + data_secs + (node_blocks ?1 :0 ) + (dent_blocks ?1 :0 ) + (data_blocks ?1 :0 );if (curseg_p)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 358/480 f2fs: fix to calculate dirty data during has_not_enough_free_secs()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e194e140ab7de2ce2782e64b9e086a43ca6ff4f2 ]
In lfs mode, dirty data needs OPU, we'd better calculate lower_p and upper_p w/ them during has_not_enough_free_secs(), otherwise we may encounter out-of-space issue due to we missed to reclaim enough free section w/ foreground gc.
--- fs/f2fs/segment.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.h +1 -2
@@ -623,8 +623,7 @@ static inline void __get_secs_required(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,unsigned int dent_blocks = total_dent_blocks %CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC (sbi);unsigned int data_blocks =0 ; -if (f2fs_lfs_mode (sbi) && -unlikely (is_sbi_flag_set (sbi,SBI_CP_DISABLED ))) { +if (f2fs_lfs_mode (sbi)) { total_data_blocks =get_pages (sbi,F2FS_DIRTY_DATA ); data_secs = total_data_blocks /CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC (sbi); data_blocks = total_data_blocks %CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC (sbi);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 359/480 f2fs: fix to trigger foreground gc during f2fs_map_blocks() in lfs mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1005a3ca28e90c7a64fa43023f866b960a60f791 ]
w/ "mode=lfs" mount option, generic/299 will cause system panic as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2835! Call Trace: <TASK> f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x6f4/0xc50 f2fs_map_blocks+0x970/0x1550 f2fs_iomap_begin+0xb2/0x1e0 iomap_iter+0x1d6/0x430 __iomap_dio_rw+0x208/0x9a0 f2fs_file_write_iter+0x6b3/0xfa0 aio_write+0x15d/0x2e0 io_submit_one+0x55e/0xab0 __x64_sys_io_submit+0xa5/0x230 do_syscall_64+0x84/0x2f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0010:new_curseg+0x70f/0x720
The root cause of we run out-of-space is: in f2fs_map_blocks(), f2fs may trigger foreground gc only if it allocates any physical block, it will be a little bit later when there is multiple threads writing data w/ aio/dio/bufio method in parallel, since we always use OPU in lfs mode, so f2fs_map_blocks() does block allocations aggressively.
In order to fix this issue, let's give a chance to trigger foreground gc in prior to block allocation in f2fs_map_blocks().
--- fs/f2fs/data.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +4 -1
@@ -1572,8 +1572,11 @@ int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_map_blocks *map, int flag) end = pgofs + maxblocks; next_dnode: -if (map->m_may_create) +if (map->m_may_create) { +if (f2fs_lfs_mode (sbi)) +f2fs_balance_fs (sbi, true);f2fs_map_lock (sbi, flag); + }/* When reading holes, we need its node page */ set_new_dnode (&dn, inode,NULL ,NULL ,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 360/480 exfat: fdatasync flag should be same like generic_write_sync()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhengxu Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2f2d42a17b5a6711378d39df74f1f69a831c5d4e ]
Test: androbench by default setting, use 64GB sdcard.
the random write speed:
without this patch 3.5MB/s
with this patch 7MB/s
After patch "11a347fb6cef", the random write speed decreased significantly. the .write_iter() interface had been modified, and check the differences with generic_file_write_iter(), when calling generic_write_sync() and exfat_file_write_iter() to call vfs_fsync_range(), the fdatasync flag is wrong, and make not use the fdatasync mode, and make random write speed decreased. So use generic_write_sync() instead of vfs_fsync_range().
--- fs/exfat/file.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/exfat/file.c +2 -3
@@ -623,9 +623,8 @@ static ssize_t exfat_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)if (pos > valid_size) pos = valid_size; -if (iocb_is_dsync (iocb) && iocb->ki_pos > pos) { -ssize_t err =vfs_fsync_range (file, pos, iocb->ki_pos -1 , - iocb->ki_flags &IOCB_SYNC ); +if (iocb->ki_pos > pos) { +ssize_t err =generic_write_sync (iocb, iocb->ki_pos - pos);if (err <0 )return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 361/480 i2c: muxes: mule: Fix an error handling path in mule_i2c_mux_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 33ac5155891cab165c93b51b0e22e153eacc2ee7 ]
If an error occurs in the loop that creates the device adapters, then a reference to 'dev' still needs to be released.
Use for_each_child_of_node_scoped() to both fix the issue and save one line of code.
--- drivers/i2c/muxes/i2c-mux-mule.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/muxes/i2c-mux-mule.c +1 -2
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ static int mule_i2c_mux_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)struct mule_i2c_reg_mux *priv;struct i2c_client *client;struct i2c_mux_core *muxc; -struct device_node *dev;unsigned int readback;int ndev, ret;bool old_fw;
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ static int mule_i2c_mux_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) "Failed to register mux remove\n");/* Create device adapters */ -for_each_child_of_node (mux_dev->of_node, dev) { +for_each_child_of_node_scoped (mux_dev->of_node, dev) {u32 reg; ret =of_property_read_u32 (dev,"reg" , ®);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 362/480 vfio: Fix unbalanced vfio_df_close call in no-iommu mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b25e271b377999191b12f0afbe1861edcf57e3fe ]
For devices with no-iommu enabled in IOMMUFD VFIO compat mode, the group open path skips vfio_df_open(), leaving open_count at 0. This causes a warning in vfio_assert_device_open(device) when vfio_df_close() is called during group close.
The correct behavior is to skip only the IOMMUFD bind in the device open path for no-iommu devices. Commit 6086efe73498 omitted vfio_df_open(), which was too broad. This patch restores the previous behavior, ensuring the vfio_df_open is called in the group open path.
--- drivers/vfio/group.c | 7 +++---- drivers/vfio/iommufd.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/group.c +3 -4
@@ -192,11 +192,10 @@ static int vfio_df_group_open(struct vfio_device_file *df)* implies they expected translation to exist */ if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ) || -vfio_iommufd_device_has_compat_ioas (device, df->iommufd)) +vfio_iommufd_device_has_compat_ioas (device, df->iommufd)) { ret = -EPERM ; -else - ret =0 ; - goto out_put_kvm; + goto out_put_kvm; + } } ret =vfio_df_open (df);
drivers/vfio/iommufd.c +4 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ int vfio_df_iommufd_bind(struct vfio_device_file *df)lockdep_assert_held (&vdev->dev_set->lock); +/* Returns 0 to permit device opening under noiommu mode */ +if (vfio_device_is_noiommu (vdev)) +return 0 ; +return vdev->ops->bind_iommufd (vdev, ictx, &df->devid); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 363/480 vfio: Prevent open_count decrement to negative
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 982ddd59ed97dc7e63efd97ed50273ffb817bd41 ]
When vfio_df_close() is called with open_count=0, it triggers a warning in vfio_assert_device_open() but still decrements open_count to -1. This allows a subsequent open to incorrectly pass the open_count == 0 check, leading to unintended behavior, such as setting df->access_granted = true.
For example, running an IOMMUFD compat no-IOMMU device with VFIO tests
(https://github.com/awilliam/tests/blob/master/vfio-noiommu-pci-device-open.c)
results in a warning and a failed VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD ioctl on the first run, but the second run succeeds incorrectly.
Add checks to avoid decrementing open_count below zero.
--- drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c +2 -1
@@ -583,7 +583,8 @@ void vfio_df_close(struct vfio_device_file *df)lockdep_assert_held (&device->dev_set->lock); -vfio_assert_device_open (device); +if (!vfio_assert_device_open (device)) +return ;if (device->open_count ==1 )vfio_df_device_last_close (df); device->open_count--;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 364/480 vfio/pds: Fix missing detach_ioas op
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brett Creeley <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fe24d5bc635e103a517ec201c3cb571eeab8be2f ]
When CONFIG_IOMMUFD is enabled and a device is bound to the pds_vfio_pci driver, the following WARN_ON() trace is seen and probe fails:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5040 at drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c:317 __vfio_register_dev+0x130/0x140 [vfio]
<...>pds_vfio_pci 0000:08:00.1: probe with driver pds_vfio_pci failed with error -22
This is because the driver's vfio_device_ops.detach_ioas isn't set.
Fix this by using the generic vfio_iommufd_physical_detach_ioas function.
--- drivers/vfio/pci/pds/vfio_dev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/vfio/pci/pds/vfio_dev.c +1 -0
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops pds_vfio_ops = { .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas, + .detach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_detach_ioas, };const struct vfio_device_ops *pds_vfio_ops_info (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 365/480 vfio/pci: Separate SR-IOV VF dev_set
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e908f58b6beb337cbe4481d52c3f5c78167b1aab ]
In the below noted Fixes commit we introduced a reflck mutex to allow better scaling between devices for open and close. The reflck was based on the hot reset granularity, device level for root bus devices which cannot support hot reset or bus/slot reset otherwise. Overlooked in this were SR-IOV VFs, where there's also no bus reset option, but the default for a non-root-bus, non-slot-based device is bus level reflck granularity.
The reflck mutex has since become the dev_set mutex (via commit 2cd8b14aaa66 ("vfio/pci: Move to the device set infrastructure")) and is our defacto serialization for various operations and ioctls. It still seems to be the case though that sets of vfio-pci devices really only need serialization relative to hot resets affecting the entire set, which is not relevant to SR-IOV VFs. As described in the Closes link below, this serialization contributes to startup latency when multiple VFs sharing the same "bus" are opened concurrently.
Mark the device itself as the basis of the dev_set for SR-IOV VFs.
--- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +1 -1
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev)return -EBUSY ; } -if (pci_is_root_bus (pdev->bus)) { +if (pci_is_root_bus (pdev->bus) || pdev->is_virtfn) { ret =vfio_assign_device_set (&vdev->vdev, vdev); }else if (!pci_probe_reset_slot (pdev->slot)) { ret =vfio_assign_device_set (&vdev->vdev, pdev->slot);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 366/480 scsi: mpt3sas: Fix a fw_event memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e90b38781e3bdd651edaf789585687611638862 ]
In _mpt3sas_fw_work() the fw_event reference is removed, it should also be freed in all cases.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c +1 -2
@@ -10790,8 +10790,7 @@ _mpt3sas_fw_work(struct MPT3SAS_ADAPTER *ioc, struct fw_event_work *fw_event)break ;case MPI2_EVENT_PCIE_TOPOLOGY_CHANGE_LIST :_scsih_pcie_topology_change_event (ioc, fw_event); - ioc->current_event =NULL ; -return ; +break ; } out:fw_event_work_put (fw_event);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 367/480 scsi: Revert "scsi: iscsi: Fix HW conn removal use after free"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7bdc68921481c19cd8c85ddf805a834211c19e61 ]
This reverts commit c577ab7ba5f3bf9062db8a58b6e89d4fe370447e.
The invocation of iscsi_put_conn() in iscsi_iter_destory_conn_fn() is used to free the initial reference counter of iscsi_cls_conn. For non-qla4xxx cases, the ->destroy_conn() callback (e.g., iscsi_conn_teardown) will call iscsi_remove_conn() and iscsi_put_conn() to remove the connection from the children list of session and free the connection at last. However for qla4xxx, it is not the case. The ->destroy_conn() callback of qla4xxx will keep the connection in the session conn_list and doesn't use iscsi_put_conn() to free the initial reference counter. Therefore, it seems necessary to keep the iscsi_put_conn() in the iscsi_iter_destroy_conn_fn(), otherwise, there will be memory leak problem.
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c +2 -0
@@ -2143,6 +2143,8 @@ static int iscsi_iter_destroy_conn_fn(struct device *dev, void *data)return 0 ;iscsi_remove_conn (iscsi_dev_to_conn (dev)); +iscsi_put_conn (iscsi_dev_to_conn (dev)); +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 368/480 scsi: ufs: core: Use link recovery when h8 exit fails during runtime resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seunghui Lee <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35dabf4503b94a697bababe94678a8bc989c3223 ]
If the h8 exit fails during runtime resume process, the runtime thread enters runtime suspend immediately and the error handler operates at the same time. It becomes stuck and cannot be recovered through the error handler. To fix this, use link recovery instead of the error handler.
--- drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +9 -1
@@ -4322,7 +4322,7 @@ static int ufshcd_uic_pwr_ctrl(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct uic_command *cmd) hba->uic_async_done =NULL ;if (reenable_intr)ufshcd_enable_intr (hba,UIC_COMMAND_COMPL ); -if (ret) { +if (ret && !hba->pm_op_in_progress) {ufshcd_set_link_broken (hba);ufshcd_schedule_eh_work (hba); }
@@ -4330,6 +4330,14 @@ static int ufshcd_uic_pwr_ctrl(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct uic_command *cmd)spin_unlock_irqrestore (hba->host->host_lock, flags);mutex_unlock (&hba->uic_cmd_mutex); +/* +* If the h8 exit fails during the runtime resume process, it becomes +* stuck and cannot be recovered through the error handler. To fix +* this, use link recovery instead of the error handler. +*/ +if (ret && hba->pm_op_in_progress) + ret =ufshcd_link_recovery (hba); +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 369/480 scsi: sd: Make sd shutdown issue START STOP UNIT appropriately
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Salomon Dushimirimana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e48727c26c4d839ff9b4b73d1cae486bea7fe19 ]
Commit aa3998dbeb3a ("ata: libata-scsi: Disable scsi device manage_system_start_stop") enabled libata EH to manage device power mode trasitions for system suspend/resume and removed the flag from ata_scsi_dev_config. However, since the sd_shutdown() function still relies on the manage_system_start_stop flag, a spin-down command is not issued to the disk with command "echo 1 > /sys/block/sdb/device/delete"
sd_shutdown() can be called for both system/runtime start stop operations, so utilize the manage_run_time_start_stop flag set in the ata_scsi_dev_config and issue a spin-down command during disk removal when the system is running. This is in addition to when the system is powering off and manage_shutdown flag is set. The manage_system_start_stop flag will still be used for drivers that still set the flag.
--- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/sd.c +3 -1
@@ -4173,7 +4173,9 @@ static void sd_shutdown(struct device *dev)if ((system_state !=SYSTEM_RESTART && sdkp->device->manage_system_start_stop) || (system_state ==SYSTEM_POWER_OFF && - sdkp->device->manage_shutdown)) { + sdkp->device->manage_shutdown) || + (system_state ==SYSTEM_RUNNING && + sdkp->device->manage_runtime_start_stop)) {sd_printk (KERN_NOTICE , sdkp,"Stopping disk\n" );sd_start_stop_device (sdkp,0 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 370/480 kconfig: qconf: fix ConfigList::updateListAllforAll()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 721bfe583c52ba1ea74b3736a31a9dcfe6dd6d95 ]
ConfigList::updateListForAll() and ConfigList::updateListAllforAll() are identical.
Commit f9b918fae678 ("kconfig: qconf: move ConfigView::updateList(All) to ConfigList class") was a misconversion.
--- scripts/kconfig/qconf.cc | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/kconfig/qconf.cc +1 -1
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ void ConfigList::updateListAllForAll() while (it.hasNext()) { ConfigList *list = it.next(); - list->updateList(); + list->updateListAll(); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 371/480 vfio/pci: Do vf_token checks for VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 86624ba3b522b6512def25534341da93356c8da4 ]
This was missed during the initial implementation. The VFIO PCI encodes the vf_token inside the device name when opening the device from the group FD, something like:
"0000:04:10.0 vf_token=bd8d9d2b-5a5f-4f5a-a211-f591514ba1f3"
This is used to control access to a VF unless there is co-ordination with the owner of the PF.
Since we no longer have a device name in the cdev path, pass the token directly through VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD using an optional field indicated by VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN.
--- drivers/vfio/device_cdev.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++-- .../vfio/pci/hisilicon/hisi_acc_vfio_pci.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/nvgrace-gpu/main.c | 2 + drivers/vfio/pci/pds/vfio_dev.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/qat/main.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 22 +++++++---- drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/main.c | 3 ++ include/linux/vfio.h | 4 ++ include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/vfio.h | 12 +++++- 12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/device_cdev.c +35 -3
@@ -60,22 +60,50 @@ static void vfio_df_get_kvm_safe(struct vfio_device_file *df)spin_unlock (&df->kvm_ref_lock); } +static int vfio_df_check_token (struct vfio_device *device, +const struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd *bind) +{ +uuid_t uuid; + +if (!device->ops->match_token_uuid) { +if (bind->flags &VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN ) +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; + } + +if (!(bind->flags &VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN )) +return device->ops->match_token_uuid (device,NULL ); + +if (copy_from_user (&uuid,u64_to_user_ptr (bind->token_uuid_ptr), +sizeof (uuid))) +return -EFAULT ; +return device->ops->match_token_uuid (device, &uuid); +} +long vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd (struct vfio_device_file *df,struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd __user *arg) { +const u32 VALID_FLAGS =VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN ;struct vfio_device *device = df->device;struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd bind;unsigned long minsz; +u32 user_size;int ret;static_assert (__same_type (arg->out_devid, df->devid)); minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd, out_devid); -if (copy_from_user (&bind, arg, minsz)) -return -EFAULT ; + ret =get_user (user_size, &arg->argsz); +if (ret) +return ret; +if (user_size < minsz) +return -EINVAL ; + ret =copy_struct_from_user (&bind, minsz, arg, user_size); +if (ret) +return ret; -if (bind.argsz < minsz || bind.flags || bind.iommufd <0 ) +if (bind.iommufd <0 || bind.flags & ~VALID_FLAGS )return -EINVAL ;/* BIND_IOMMUFD only allowed for cdev fds */
@@ -93,6 +121,10 @@ long vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd(struct vfio_device_file *df, goto out_unlock; } + ret =vfio_df_check_token (device, &bind); +if (ret) + goto out_unlock; + df->iommufd =iommufd_ctx_from_fd (bind.iommufd);if (IS_ERR (df->iommufd)) { ret =PTR_ERR (df->iommufd);
drivers/vfio/pci/hisilicon/hisi_acc_vfio_pci.c +1 -0
@@ -1580,6 +1580,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops hisi_acc_vfio_pci_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c +1 -0
@@ -1387,6 +1387,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops mlx5vf_pci_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
drivers/vfio/pci/nvgrace-gpu/main.c +2 -0
@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops nvgrace_gpu_pci_ops = { .mmap = nvgrace_gpu_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
@@ -715,6 +716,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
drivers/vfio/pci/pds/vfio_dev.c +1 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops pds_vfio_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
drivers/vfio/pci/qat/main.c +1 -0
@@ -614,6 +614,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops qat_vf_pci_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +1 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops vfio_pci_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +14 -8
@@ -1821,9 +1821,13 @@ void vfio_pci_core_request(struct vfio_device *core_vdev, unsigned int count) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfio_pci_core_request); -static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token (struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, -bool vf_token,uuid_t *uuid) +int vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid (struct vfio_device *core_vdev, +const uuid_t *uuid) + { +struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev = + container_of(core_vdev, struct vfio_pci_core_device, vdev); +/* * There's always some degree of trust or collaboration between SR-IOV * PF and VFs, even if just that the PF hosts the SR-IOV capability and
@@ -1854,7 +1858,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,bool match;if (!pf_vdev) { -if (!vf_token) +if (!uuid)return 0 ;/* PF is not vfio-pci, no VF token */ pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
@@ -1862,7 +1866,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,return -EINVAL ; } -if (!vf_token) { +if (!uuid) {pci_info_ratelimited (vdev->pdev,"VF token required to access device\n" );return -EACCES ;
@@ -1880,7 +1884,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, }else if (vdev->vf_token) {mutex_lock (&vdev->vf_token->lock);if (vdev->vf_token->users) { -if (!vf_token) { +if (!uuid) {mutex_unlock (&vdev->vf_token->lock);pci_info_ratelimited (vdev->pdev,"VF token required to access device\n" );
@@ -1893,12 +1897,12 @@ static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, "Incorrect VF token provided for device\n");return -EACCES ; } - }else if (vf_token) { + }else if (uuid) {uuid_copy (&vdev->vf_token->uuid, uuid); }mutex_unlock (&vdev->vf_token->lock); - }else if (vf_token) { + }else if (uuid) {pci_info_ratelimited (vdev->pdev,"VF token incorrectly provided, not a PF or VF\n" );return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1906,6 +1910,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,return 0 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid);#define VF_TOKEN_ARG "vf_token="
@@ -1952,7 +1957,8 @@ int vfio_pci_core_match(struct vfio_device *core_vdev, char *buf) } } - ret =vfio_pci_validate_vf_token (vdev, vf_token, &uuid); + ret = core_vdev->ops->match_token_uuid (core_vdev, + vf_token ? &uuid :NULL );if (ret)return ret;
drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/main.c +3 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops virtiovf_vfio_pci_lm_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops virtiovf_vfio_pci_tran_lm_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
@@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ static const struct vfio_device_ops virtiovf_vfio_pci_ops = { .mmap = vfio_pci_core_mmap, .request = vfio_pci_core_request, .match = vfio_pci_core_match, + .match_token_uuid = vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid, .bind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_bind, .unbind_iommufd = vfio_iommufd_physical_unbind, .attach_ioas = vfio_iommufd_physical_attach_ioas,
include/linux/vfio.h +4 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ struct vfio_device {* @match: Optional device name match callback (return: 0 for no-match, >0 for * match, -errno for abort (ex. match with insufficient or incorrect * additional args) +* @match_token_uuid: Optional device token match/validation. Return 0 +* if the uuid is valid for the device, -errno otherwise. uuid is NULL +* if none was provided. * @dma_unmap: Called when userspace unmaps IOVA from the container * this device is attached to. * @device_feature: Optional, fill in the VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl
@@ -132,6 +135,7 @@ struct vfio_device_ops {int (*mmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev,struct vm_area_struct *vma);void (*request)(struct vfio_device *vdev,unsigned int count);int (*match)(struct vfio_device *vdev,char *buf); +int (*match_token_uuid)(struct vfio_device *vdev,const uuid_t *uuid);void (*dma_unmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev,u64 iova,u64 length);int (*device_feature)(struct vfio_device *device,u32 flags,void __user *arg,size_t argsz);
include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h +2 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ ssize_t vfio_pci_core_write(struct vfio_device *core_vdev, const char __user *buint vfio_pci_core_mmap (struct vfio_device *core_vdev,struct vm_area_struct *vma);void vfio_pci_core_request (struct vfio_device *core_vdev,unsigned int count);int vfio_pci_core_match (struct vfio_device *core_vdev,char *buf); +int vfio_pci_core_match_token_uuid (struct vfio_device *core_vdev, +const uuid_t *uuid);int vfio_pci_core_enable (struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev);void vfio_pci_core_disable (struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev);void vfio_pci_core_finish_enable (struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev);
include/uapi/linux/vfio.h +11 -1
@@ -905,10 +905,12 @@ struct vfio_device_feature {* VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD - _IOR(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 18, * struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd) * @argsz: User filled size of this data. -* @flags: Must be 0. +* @flags: Must be 0 or a bit flags of VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_* * @iommufd: iommufd to bind. * @out_devid: The device id generated by this bind. devid is a handle for * this device/iommufd bond and can be used in IOMMUFD commands. +* @token_uuid_ptr: Valid if VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN. Points to a 16 byte +* UUID in the same format as VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE_PCI_VF_TOKEN. * * Bind a vfio_device to the specified iommufd. *
@@ -917,13 +919,21 @@ struct vfio_device_feature {* * Unbind is automatically conducted when device fd is closed. * +* A token is sometimes required to open the device, unless this is known to be +* needed VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN should not be set and token_uuid_ptr is +* ignored. The only case today is a PF/VF relationship where the VF bind must +* be provided the same token as VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE_PCI_VF_TOKEN provided to +* the PF. +* * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure. */ struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd {__u32 argsz;__u32 flags; +#define VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_FLAG_TOKEN (1 << 0)__s32 iommufd;__u32 out_devid; +__aligned_u64 token_uuid_ptr; };#define VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD _IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 18)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 372/480 sched/psi: Fix psi_seq initialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99b773d720aeea1ef2170dce5fcfa80649e26b78 ]
With the seqcount moved out of the group into a global psi_seq, re-initializing the seqcount on group creation is causing seqcount corruption.
--- kernel/sched/psi.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/psi.c +1 -5
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ struct psi_group psi_system = { .pcpu = &system_group_pcpu, }; -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(seqcount_t, psi_seq); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(seqcount_t, psi_seq) = SEQCNT_ZERO(psi_seq);static inline void psi_write_begin (int cpu) {
@@ -200,11 +200,7 @@ static void poll_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t);static void group_init (struct psi_group *group) { -int cpu; - group->enabled = true; -for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) -seqcount_init (per_cpu_ptr (&psi_seq, cpu)); group->avg_last_update =sched_clock (); group->avg_next_update = group->avg_last_update + psi_period;mutex_init (&group->avgs_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 373/480 padata: Remove comment for reorder_work
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82a0302e7167d0b7c6cde56613db3748f8dd806d ]
Remove comment for reorder_work which no longer exists.
--- include/linux/padata.h | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/padata.h +0 -1
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ struct padata_cpumask {* @processed: Number of already processed objects. * @cpu: Next CPU to be processed. * @cpumask: The cpumasks in use for parallel and serial workers. -* @reorder_work: work struct for reordering. */ struct parallel_data {struct padata_shell *ps;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 374/480 PCI: pnv_php: Clean up allocated IRQs on unplug
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4668619092554e1b95c9a5ac2941ca47ba6d548a ]
When the root of a nested PCIe bridge configuration is unplugged, the pnv_php driver leaked the allocated IRQ resources for the child bridges' hotplug event notifications, resulting in a panic.
Fix this by walking all child buses and deallocating all its IRQ resources before calling pci_hp_remove_devices().
Also modify the lifetime of the workqueue at struct pnv_php_slot::wq so that it is only destroyed in pnv_php_free_slot(), instead of pnv_php_disable_irq(). This is required since pnv_php_disable_irq() will now be called by workers triggered by hot unplug interrupts, so the workqueue needs to stay allocated.
The abridged kernel panic that occurs without this patch is as follows:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 687 at kernel/irq/msi.c:292 msi_device_data_release+0x6c/0x9c CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 687 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2 Call Trace: msi_device_data_release+0x34/0x9c (unreliable) release_nodes+0x64/0x13c devres_release_all+0xc0/0x140 device_del+0x2d4/0x46c pci_destroy_dev+0x5c/0x194 pci_hp_remove_devices+0x90/0x128 pci_hp_remove_devices+0x44/0x128 pnv_php_disable_slot+0x54/0xd4 power_write_file+0xf8/0x18c pci_slot_attr_store+0x40/0x5c sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x78 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0x3bc/0x50c ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x124/0x230 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
--- drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +77 -19
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@* PCI Hotplug Driver for PowerPC PowerNV platform. * * Copyright Gavin Shan, IBM Corporation 2016. +* Copyright (C) 2025 Raptor Engineering, LLC */ #include <linux/bitfield.h>
@@ -36,8 +37,10 @@ static void pnv_php_register(struct device_node *dn);static void pnv_php_unregister_one (struct device_node *dn);static void pnv_php_unregister (struct device_node *dn); +static void pnv_php_enable_irq (struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot); +static void pnv_php_disable_irq (struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, -bool disable_device) +bool disable_device,bool disable_msi) {struct pci_dev *pdev = php_slot->pdev;u16 ctrl;
@@ -53,19 +56,15 @@ static void pnv_php_disable_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, php_slot->irq =0 ; } -if (php_slot->wq) { -destroy_workqueue (php_slot->wq); - php_slot->wq =NULL ; - } - -if (disable_device) { +if (disable_device || disable_msi) {if (pdev->msix_enabled)pci_disable_msix (pdev);else if (pdev->msi_enabled)pci_disable_msi (pdev); + } +if (disable_device)pci_disable_device (pdev); - } }static void pnv_php_free_slot (struct kref *kref)
@@ -74,7 +73,8 @@ static void pnv_php_free_slot(struct kref *kref) struct pnv_php_slot, kref);WARN_ON (!list_empty (&php_slot->children)); -pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, false); +pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, false, false); +destroy_workqueue (php_slot->wq);kfree (php_slot->name);kfree (php_slot); }
@@ -561,8 +561,58 @@ static int pnv_php_reset_slot(struct hotplug_slot *slot, bool probe)static int pnv_php_enable_slot (struct hotplug_slot *slot) {struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot =to_pnv_php_slot (slot); +u32 prop32; +int ret; + + ret =pnv_php_enable (php_slot, true); +if (ret) +return ret; + +/* (Re-)enable interrupt if the slot supports surprise hotplug */ + ret =of_property_read_u32 (php_slot->dn,"ibm,slot-surprise-pluggable" , + &prop32); +if (!ret && prop32) +pnv_php_enable_irq (php_slot); -return pnv_php_enable (php_slot, true); +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Disable any hotplug interrupts for all slots on the provided bus, as well as +* all downstream slots in preparation for a hot unplug. +*/ +static int pnv_php_disable_all_irqs (struct pci_bus *bus) +{ +struct pci_bus *child_bus; +struct pci_slot *slot; + +/* First go down child buses */ +list_for_each_entry (child_bus, &bus->children, node) +pnv_php_disable_all_irqs (child_bus); + +/* Disable IRQs for all pnv_php slots on this bus */ +list_for_each_entry (slot, &bus->slots, list) { +struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot =to_pnv_php_slot (slot->hotplug); + +pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, false, true); + } + +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Disable any hotplug interrupts for all downstream slots on the provided +* bus in preparation for a hot unplug. +*/ +static int pnv_php_disable_all_downstream_irqs (struct pci_bus *bus) +{ +struct pci_bus *child_bus; + +/* Go down child buses, recursively deactivating their IRQs */ +list_for_each_entry (child_bus, &bus->children, node) +pnv_php_disable_all_irqs (child_bus); + +return 0 ; }static int pnv_php_disable_slot (struct hotplug_slot *slot)
@@ -579,6 +629,13 @@ static int pnv_php_disable_slot(struct hotplug_slot *slot) php_slot->state != PNV_PHP_STATE_REGISTERED)return 0 ; +/* +* Free all IRQ resources from all child slots before remove. +* Note that we do not disable the root slot IRQ here as that +* would also deactivate the slot hot (re)plug interrupt! +*/ +pnv_php_disable_all_downstream_irqs (php_slot->bus); +/* Remove all devices behind the slot */ pci_lock_rescan_remove ();pci_hp_remove_devices (php_slot->bus);
@@ -647,6 +704,15 @@ static struct pnv_php_slot *pnv_php_alloc_slot(struct device_node *dn)return NULL ; } +/* Allocate workqueue for this slot's interrupt handling */ + php_slot->wq =alloc_workqueue ("pciehp-%s" ,0 ,0 , php_slot->name); +if (!php_slot->wq) { +SLOT_WARN (php_slot,"Cannot alloc workqueue\n" ); +kfree (php_slot->name); +kfree (php_slot); +return NULL ; + } +if (dn->child &&PCI_DN (dn->child)) php_slot->slot_no =PCI_SLOT (PCI_DN (dn->child)->devfn);else
@@ -843,14 +909,6 @@ static void pnv_php_init_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, int irq)u16 sts, ctrl;int ret; -/* Allocate workqueue */ - php_slot->wq =alloc_workqueue ("pciehp-%s" ,0 ,0 , php_slot->name); -if (!php_slot->wq) { -SLOT_WARN (php_slot,"Cannot alloc workqueue\n" ); -pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, true); -return ; - } -/* Check PDC (Presence Detection Change) is broken or not */ ret =of_property_read_u32 (php_slot->dn,"ibm,slot-broken-pdc" , &broken_pdc);
@@ -869,7 +927,7 @@ static void pnv_php_init_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, int irq) ret =request_irq (irq, pnv_php_interrupt,IRQF_SHARED , php_slot->name, php_slot);if (ret) { -pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, true); +pnv_php_disable_irq (php_slot, true, true);SLOT_WARN (php_slot,"Error %d enabling IRQ %d\n" , ret, irq);return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 375/480 PCI: pnv_php: Work around switches with broken presence detection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 80f9fc2362797538ebd4fd70a1dfa838cc2c2cdb ]
The Microsemi Switchtec PM8533 PFX 48xG3 [11f8:8533] PCIe switch system was observed to incorrectly assert the Presence Detect Set bit in its capabilities when tested on a Raptor Computing Systems Blackbird system, resulting in the hot insert path never attempting a rescan of the bus and any downstream devices not being re-detected.
Work around this by additionally checking whether the PCIe data link is active or not when performing presence detection on downstream switches' ports, similar to the pciehp_hpc.c driver.
--- drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +27 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,20 @@ static int pnv_php_get_power_state(struct hotplug_slot *slot, u8 *state)return 0 ; } +static int pcie_check_link_active (struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ +u16 lnk_status; +int ret; + + ret =pcie_capability_read_word (pdev,PCI_EXP_LNKSTA , &lnk_status); +if (ret ==PCIBIOS_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND ||PCI_POSSIBLE_ERROR (lnk_status)) +return -ENODEV ; + + ret = !!(lnk_status &PCI_EXP_LNKSTA_DLLLA ); + +return ret; +} +static int pnv_php_get_adapter_state (struct hotplug_slot *slot,u8 *state) {struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot =to_pnv_php_slot (slot);
@@ -403,6 +417,19 @@ static int pnv_php_get_adapter_state(struct hotplug_slot *slot, u8 *state)*/ ret =pnv_pci_get_presence_state (php_slot->id, &presence);if (ret >=0 ) { +if (pci_pcie_type (php_slot->pdev) ==PCI_EXP_TYPE_DOWNSTREAM && + presence ==OPAL_PCI_SLOT_EMPTY ) { +/* +* Similar to pciehp_hpc, check whether the Link Active +* bit is set to account for broken downstream bridges +* that don't properly assert Presence Detect State, as +* was observed on the Microsemi Switchtec PM8533 PFX +* [11f8:8533]. +*/ +if (pcie_check_link_active (php_slot->pdev) >0 ) + presence =OPAL_PCI_SLOT_PRESENT ; + } + *state = presence; ret =0 ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 376/480 powerpc/eeh: Export eeh_unfreeze_pe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e82b34eed04b0ddcff4548b62633467235672fd3 ]
The PowerNV hotplug driver needs to be able to clear any frozen PE(s) on the PHB after suprise removal of a downstream device.
Export the eeh_unfreeze_pe() symbol to allow implementation of this functionality in the php_nv module.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c +1 -0
@@ -1139,6 +1139,7 @@ int eeh_unfreeze_pe(struct eeh_pe *pe)return ret; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (eeh_unfreeze_pe);static struct pci_device_id eeh_reset_ids[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 377/480 powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device hotplug safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1010b4c012b0d78dfb9d3132b49aa2ef024a07a7 ]
Multiple race conditions existed between the PCIe hotplug driver and the EEH driver, leading to a variety of kernel oopses of the same general nature:
<pcie device unplug>
<eeh driver trigger>
<hotplug removal trigger>
<pcie tree reconfiguration>
<eeh recovery next step>
<oops in EEH driver bus iteration loop>
A second class of oops is also seen when the underlying bus disappears during device recovery.
Refactor the EEH module to be PCI rescan and remove safe. Also clean up a few minor formatting / readability issues.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c | 10 ++++--- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c +32 -16
@@ -257,13 +257,12 @@ static void eeh_pe_report_edev(struct eeh_dev *edev, eeh_report_fn fn,struct pci_driver *driver;enum pci_ers_result new_result; -pci_lock_rescan_remove (); pdev = edev->pdev;if (pdev)get_device (&pdev->dev); -pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();if (!pdev) {eeh_edev_info (edev,"no device" ); + *result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT ;return ; }device_lock (&pdev->dev);
@@ -304,8 +303,9 @@ static void eeh_pe_report(const char *name, struct eeh_pe *root,struct eeh_dev *edev, *tmp;pr_info ("EEH: Beginning: '%s'\n" , name); - eeh_for_each_pe(root, pe) eeh_pe_for_each_dev(pe, edev, tmp) -eeh_pe_report_edev (edev, fn, result); +eeh_for_each_pe (root, pe) +eeh_pe_for_each_dev (pe, edev, tmp) +eeh_pe_report_edev (edev, fn, result);if (result)pr_info ("EEH: Finished:'%s' with aggregate recovery state:'%s'\n" , name,pci_ers_result_name (*result));
@@ -383,6 +383,8 @@ static void eeh_dev_restore_state(struct eeh_dev *edev, void *userdata)if (!edev)return ; +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); +/* * The content in the config space isn't saved because * the blocked config space on some adapters. We have
@@ -393,14 +395,19 @@ static void eeh_dev_restore_state(struct eeh_dev *edev, void *userdata)if (list_is_last (&edev->entry, &edev->pe->edevs))eeh_pe_restore_bars (edev->pe); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; } pdev =eeh_dev_to_pci_dev (edev); -if (!pdev) +if (!pdev) { +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; + }pci_restore_state (pdev); + +pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/**
@@ -647,9 +654,7 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus,if (any_passed || driver_eeh_aware || (pe->type &EEH_PE_VF )) {eeh_pe_dev_traverse (pe, eeh_rmv_device, rmv_data); }else { -pci_lock_rescan_remove ();pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); -pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/*
@@ -665,8 +670,6 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus,if (rc)return rc; -pci_lock_rescan_remove (); -/* Restore PE */ eeh_ops->configure_bridge (pe);eeh_pe_restore_bars (pe);
@@ -674,7 +677,6 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus,/* Clear frozen state */ rc =eeh_clear_pe_frozen_state (pe, false);if (rc) { -pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return rc; }
@@ -709,7 +711,6 @@ static int eeh_reset_device(struct eeh_pe *pe, struct pci_bus *bus, pe->tstamp = tstamp; pe->freeze_count = cnt; -pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return 0 ; }
@@ -843,10 +844,13 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe) {LIST_HEAD_INIT(rmv_data.removed_vf_list), 0};int devices =0 ; +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); + bus =eeh_pe_bus_get (pe);if (!bus) {pr_err ("%s: Cannot find PCI bus for PHB#%x-PE#%x\n" , __func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; }
@@ -1094,10 +1098,15 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe)eeh_pe_state_clear (pe,EEH_PE_PRI_BUS , true);eeh_pe_dev_mode_mark (pe,EEH_DEV_REMOVED ); -pci_lock_rescan_remove (); -pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); -pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); + bus =eeh_pe_bus_get (pe); +if (bus) +pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); +else +pr_err ("%s: PCI bus for PHB#%x-PE#%x disappeared\n" , + __func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr); +/* The passed PE should no longer be used */ +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; }
@@ -1114,6 +1123,8 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe)eeh_clear_slot_attention (edev->pdev);eeh_pe_state_clear (pe,EEH_PE_RECOVERING , true); + +pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/**
@@ -1132,6 +1143,7 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)unsigned long flags;int rc; +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); do { rc = eeh_ops->next_error(&pe);
@@ -1171,10 +1183,12 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)break ;case EEH_NEXT_ERR_NONE : +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ;default :pr_warn ("%s: Invalid value %d from next_error()\n" , __func__, rc); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();return ; }
@@ -1186,7 +1200,9 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)if (rc ==EEH_NEXT_ERR_FROZEN_PE || rc ==EEH_NEXT_ERR_FENCED_PHB ) {eeh_pe_state_mark (pe,EEH_PE_RECOVERING ); +pci_unlock_rescan_remove ();eeh_handle_normal_event (pe); +pci_lock_rescan_remove (); }else {eeh_for_each_pe (pe, tmp_pe)eeh_pe_for_each_dev (tmp_pe, edev, tmp_edev)
@@ -1199,7 +1215,6 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void) eeh_report_failure, NULL);eeh_set_channel_state (pe, pci_channel_io_perm_failure); -pci_lock_rescan_remove ();list_for_each_entry (hose, &hose_list, list_node) { phb_pe =eeh_phb_pe_get (hose); if (!phb_pe ||
@@ -1218,7 +1233,6 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void) }pci_hp_remove_devices (bus); } -pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }/*
@@ -1228,4 +1242,6 @@ void eeh_handle_special_event(void)if (rc ==EEH_NEXT_ERR_DEAD_IOC )break ; }while (rc !=EEH_NEXT_ERR_NONE ); + +pci_unlock_rescan_remove (); }
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c +6 -4
@@ -671,10 +671,12 @@ static void eeh_bridge_check_link(struct eeh_dev *edev) eeh_ops->write_config (edev, cap +PCI_EXP_LNKCTL ,2 , val);/* Check link */ -if (!edev->pdev->link_active_reporting) { -eeh_edev_dbg (edev,"No link reporting capability\n" ); -msleep (1000 ); -return ; +if (edev->pdev) { +if (!edev->pdev->link_active_reporting) { +eeh_edev_dbg (edev,"No link reporting capability\n" ); +msleep (1000 ); +return ; + } }/* Wait the link is up until timeout (5s) */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 378/480 PCI: pnv_php: Fix surprise plug detection and recovery
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timothy Pearson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a2a2a6fc2469524caa713036297c542746d148dc ]
The existing PowerNV hotplug code did not handle surprise plug events correctly, leading to a complete failure of the hotplug system after device removal and a required reboot to detect new devices.
This comes down to two issues:
1) When a device is surprise removed, often the bridge upstream port will cause a PE freeze on the PHB. If this freeze is not cleared, the MSI interrupts from the bridge hotplug notification logic will not be received by the kernel, stalling all plug events on all slots associated with the PE.
2) When a device is removed from a slot, regardless of surprise or programmatic removal, the associated PHB/PE ls left frozen. If this freeze is not cleared via a fundamental reset, skiboot is unable to clear the freeze and cannot retrain / rescan the slot. This also requires a reboot to clear the freeze and redetect the device in the slot.
Issue the appropriate unfreeze and rescan commands on hotplug events, and don't oops on hotplug if pci_bus_to_OF_node() returns NULL.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/pci-hotplug.c | 3 + drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/pci-hotplug.c +3 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ void pci_hp_add_devices(struct pci_bus *bus)struct pci_controller *phb;struct device_node *dn =pci_bus_to_OF_node (bus); +if (!dn) +return ; + phb =pci_bus_to_host (bus); mode =PCI_PROBE_NORMAL ;
drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +107 -3
148 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 379/480 tools/power turbostat: regression fix: --show C1E%
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Len Brown <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5d939fbdd480cdf276eccc01eda3ed41e37d3f8a ]
The new default idle counter groupings broke "--show C1E%" (or any other C-state %)
Also delete a stray debug printf from the same offending commit.
--- tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c +0 -4
@@ -2385,7 +2385,6 @@ unsigned long long bic_lookup(char *name_list, enum show_hide_mode mode) }if (i ==MAX_BIC ) { -fprintf (stderr,"deferred %s\n" , name_list);if (mode ==SHOW_LIST ) { deferred_add_names[deferred_add_index++] = name_list;if (deferred_add_index >=MAX_DEFERRED ) {
@@ -10314,9 +10313,6 @@ void probe_cpuidle_residency(void)int min_state =1024 , max_state =0 ;char *sp; -if (!DO_BIC (BIC_pct_idle)) -return ; -for (state =10 ; state >=0 ; --state) {sprintf (path,"/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d/cpuidle/state%d/name" , base_cpu, state);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 380/480 pNFS/flexfiles: dont attempt pnfs on fatal DS errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tigran Mkrtchyan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f06bedfa62d57f7b67d44aacd6badad2e13a803f ]
When an applications get killed (SIGTERM/SIGINT) while pNFS client performs a connection to DS, client ends in an infinite loop of connect-disconnect. This
source of the issue, it that flexfilelayoutdev#nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds gets an error on nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect with status ERESTARTSYS, which is set by rpc_signal_task, but the error is treated as transient, thus retried.
The issue is reproducible with Ctrl+C the following script(there should be ~1000 files in a directory, client should must not have any connections to DSes):
``` echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches for i in * do head -1 $i done ```
The change aims to propagate the nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds error state to the caller that can decide whatever this is a retryable error or not.
--- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 26 ++++++++++++++--------- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c +16 -10
@@ -762,14 +762,14 @@ ff_layout_choose_ds_for_read(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg, {struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment *fls =FF_LAYOUT_LSEG (lseg);struct nfs4_ff_layout_mirror *mirror; -struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds; +struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );u32 idx;/* mirrors are initially sorted by efficiency */ for (idx = start_idx; idx < fls->mirror_array_cnt; idx++) { mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, false); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds))continue ; if (check_device &&
@@ -777,10 +777,10 @@ ff_layout_choose_ds_for_read(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg,continue ; *best_idx = idx; -return ds; +break ; } -return NULL ; +return ds; } static struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ ff_layout_pg_init_write(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio,for (i =0 ; i < pgio->pg_mirror_count; i++) { mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (pgio->pg_lseg, i); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (pgio->pg_lseg, mirror, true); -if (!ds) { +if (IS_ERR (ds)) {if (!ff_layout_no_fallback_to_mds (pgio->pg_lseg)) goto out_mds;pnfs_generic_pg_cleanup (pgio);
@@ -1867,6 +1867,7 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)u32 idx = hdr->pgio_mirror_idx;int vers;struct nfs_fh *fh; +bool ds_fatal_error = false; dprintk("--> %s ino %lu pgbase %u req %zu@%llu\n", __func__, hdr->inode->i_ino,
@@ -1874,8 +1875,10 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr) mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, false); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds)) { + ds_fatal_error =nfs_error_is_fatal (PTR_ERR (ds)); goto out_failed; + } ds_clnt =nfs4_ff_find_or_create_ds_client (mirror, ds->ds_clp, hdr->inode);
@@ -1923,7 +1926,7 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)return PNFS_ATTEMPTED ; out_failed: -if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg)) +if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg) && !ds_fatal_error)return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; trace_pnfs_mds_fallback_read_pagelist(hdr->inode, hdr->args.offset, hdr->args.count,
@@ -1945,11 +1948,14 @@ ff_layout_write_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr, int sync)int vers;struct nfs_fh *fh;u32 idx = hdr->pgio_mirror_idx; +bool ds_fatal_error = false; mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, true); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds)) { + ds_fatal_error =nfs_error_is_fatal (PTR_ERR (ds)); goto out_failed; + } ds_clnt =nfs4_ff_find_or_create_ds_client (mirror, ds->ds_clp, hdr->inode);
@@ -2000,7 +2006,7 @@ ff_layout_write_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr, int sync)return PNFS_ATTEMPTED ; out_failed: -if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg)) +if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg) && !ds_fatal_error)return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; trace_pnfs_mds_fallback_write_pagelist(hdr->inode, hdr->args.offset, hdr->args.count,
@@ -2043,7 +2049,7 @@ static int ff_layout_initiate_commit(struct nfs_commit_data *data, int how) idx =calc_ds_index_from_commit (lseg, data->ds_commit_index); mirror =FF_LAYOUT_COMP (lseg, idx); ds =nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds (lseg, mirror, true); -if (!ds) +if (IS_ERR (ds)) goto out_err; ds_clnt = nfs4_ff_find_or_create_ds_client(mirror, ds->ds_clp,
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c +3 -3
@@ -370,11 +370,11 @@ nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg, struct nfs4_ff_layout_mirror *mirror, bool fail_return) { -struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds =NULL ; +struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds;struct inode *ino = lseg->pls_layout->plh_inode;struct nfs_server *s =NFS_SERVER (ino);unsigned int max_payload; -int status; +int status = -EAGAIN ;if (!ff_layout_init_mirror_ds (lseg->pls_layout, mirror)) goto noconnect;
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg,ff_layout_send_layouterror (lseg);if (fail_return || !ff_layout_has_available_ds (lseg))pnfs_error_mark_layout_for_return (ino, lseg); - ds =NULL ; + ds =ERR_PTR (status); out:return ds; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 381/480 NFS: Fix wakeup of __nfs_lookup_revalidate() in unblock_revalidate()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1db3a48e83bb64a70bf27263b7002585574a9c2d ]
Use store_release_wake_up() to add the appropriate memory barrier before calling wake_up_var(&dentry->d_fsdata).
--- fs/nfs/dir.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/dir.c +1 -3
@@ -1828,9 +1828,7 @@ static void block_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry)static void unblock_revalidate (struct dentry *dentry) { -/* store_release ensures wait_var_event() sees the update */ -smp_store_release (&dentry->d_fsdata,NULL ); -wake_up_var (&dentry->d_fsdata); +store_release_wake_up (&dentry->d_fsdata,NULL ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 382/480 NFS: Fix filehandle bounds checking in nfs_fh_to_dentry()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ef93a685e01a281b5e2a25ce4e3428cf9371a205 ]
The function needs to check the minimal filehandle length before it can access the embedded filehandle.
--- fs/nfs/export.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/export.c +9 -2
@@ -66,14 +66,21 @@ nfs_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb, struct fid *fid, {struct nfs_fattr *fattr =NULL ;struct nfs_fh *server_fh =nfs_exp_embedfh (fid->raw); -size_t fh_size = offsetof(struct nfs_fh , data) + server_fh->size; +size_t fh_size = offsetof(struct nfs_fh , data);const struct nfs_rpc_ops *rpc_ops;struct dentry *dentry;struct inode *inode; -int len =EMBED_FH_OFF +XDR_QUADLEN (fh_size); +int len =EMBED_FH_OFF ;u32 *p = fid->raw;int ret; +/* Initial check of bounds */ +if (fh_len < len +XDR_QUADLEN (fh_size) || + fh_len >XDR_QUADLEN (NFS_MAXFHSIZE )) +return NULL ; +/* Calculate embedded filehandle size */ + fh_size += server_fh->size; + len +=XDR_QUADLEN (fh_size);/* NULL translates to ESTALE */ if (fh_len < len || fh_type != len)return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 383/480 NFSv4.2: another fix for listxattr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9acb237deff7667b0f6b10fe6b1b70c4429ea049 ]
Currently, when the server supports NFS4.1 security labels then security.selinux label in included twice. Instead, only add it when the server doesn't possess security label support.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -4
@@ -10866,7 +10866,7 @@ const struct nfs4_minor_version_ops *nfs_v4_minor_ops[] = {static ssize_t nfs4_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *list,size_t size) { -ssize_t error, error2, error3, error4; +ssize_t error, error2, error3, error4 =0 ;size_t left = size; error =generic_listxattr (dentry, list, left);
@@ -10894,9 +10894,11 @@ static ssize_t nfs4_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) left -= error3; } - error4 =security_inode_listsecurity (d_inode (dentry), list, left); -if (error4 <0 ) -return error4; +if (!nfs_server_capable (d_inode (dentry),NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL )) { + error4 =security_inode_listsecurity (d_inode (dentry), list, left); +if (error4 <0 ) +return error4; + } error += error2 + error3 + error4;if (size && error > size)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 384/480 NFS: Fixup allocation flags for nfsiods __GFP_NORETRY
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99765233ab42bf7a4950377ad7894dce8a5c0e60 ]
If the NFS client is doing writeback from a workqueue context, avoid using __GFP_NORETRY for allocations if the task has set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO or PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS. The combination of these flags makes memory allocation failures much more likely.
We've seen those allocation failures show up when the loopback driver is doing writeback from a workqueue to a file on NFS, where memory allocation failure results in errors or corruption within the loopback device's filesystem.
--- fs/nfs/internal.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/internal.h +6 -3
@@ -671,9 +671,12 @@ nfs_write_match_verf(const struct nfs_writeverf *verf,static inline gfp_t nfs_io_gfp_mask (void ) { -if (current->flags &PF_WQ_WORKER ) -return GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN; -return GFP_KERNEL ; +gfp_t ret =current_gfp_context (GFP_KERNEL ); + +/* For workers __GFP_NORETRY only with __GFP_IO or __GFP_FS */ +if ((current->flags &PF_WQ_WORKER ) && ret ==GFP_KERNEL ) + ret |= __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN; +return ret; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 385/480 md/md-cluster: handle REMOVE message earlier
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 948b1fe12005d39e2b49087b50e5ee55c9a8f76f ]
Commit a1fd37f97808 ("md: Don't wait for MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED for HOT_REMOVE_DISK ioctl") introduced a regression in the md_cluster module. (Failed cases 02r1_Manage_re-add & 02r10_Manage_re-add)
Consider a 2-node cluster:
- node1 set faulty & remove command on a disk.
- node2 must correctly update the array metadata.
Before a1fd37f97808, on node1, the delay between msg:METADATA_UPDATED (triggered by faulty) and msg:REMOVE was sufficient for node2 to reload the disk info (written by node1).
After a1fd37f97808, node1 no longer waits between faulty and remove, causing it to send msg:REMOVE while node2 is still reloading disk info. This often results in node2 failing to remove the faulty disk.
== how to trigger ==
set up a 2-node cluster (node1 & node2) with disks vdc & vdd.
on node1:
mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -b clustered -n2 /dev/vdc /dev/vdd --assume-clean ssh node2-ip mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/vdc /dev/vdd
mdadm --manage /dev/md0 --fail /dev/vdc --remove /dev/vdc
check array status on both nodes with "mdadm -D /dev/md0". node1 output:
Number Major Minor RaidDevice State
- 0 0 0 removed
1 254 48 1 active sync /dev/vdd
node2 output:
Number Major Minor RaidDevice State
- 0 0 0 removed
1 254 48 1 active sync /dev/vdd
0 254 32 - faulty /dev/vdc
--- drivers/md/md.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md.c +6 -3
@@ -9692,8 +9692,8 @@ void md_check_recovery(struct mddev *mddev)* remove disk. */ rdev_for_each_safe (rdev, tmp, mddev) { -if (test_and_clear_bit (ClusterRemove, &rdev->flags) && - rdev->raid_disk <0 ) +if (rdev->raid_disk <0 && +test_and_clear_bit (ClusterRemove, &rdev->flags))md_kick_rdev_from_array (rdev); } }
@@ -9999,8 +9999,11 @@ static void check_sb_changes(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)/* Check for change of roles in the active devices */ rdev_for_each_safe (rdev2, tmp, mddev) { -if (test_bit (Faulty, &rdev2->flags)) +if (test_bit (Faulty, &rdev2->flags)) { +if (test_bit (ClusterRemove, &rdev2->flags)) +set_bit (MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED , &mddev->recovery);continue ; + }/* Check if the roles changed */ role =le16_to_cpu (sb->dev_roles[rdev2->desc_nr]);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 386/480 netpoll: prevent hanging NAPI when netcons gets enabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2da4def0f487f24bbb0cece3bb2bcdcb918a0b72 ]
Paolo spotted hangs in NIPA running driver tests against virtio. The tests hang in virtnet_close() -> virtnet_napi_tx_disable().
The problem is only reproducible if running multiple of our tests in sequence (I used TEST_PROGS="xdp.py ping.py netcons_basic.sh \netpoll_basic.py stats.py"). Initial suspicion was that this is a simple case of double-disable of NAPI, but instrumenting the code reveals:
Deadlocked on NAPI ffff888007cd82c0 (virtnet_poll_tx):
state: 0x37, disabled: false, owner: 0, listed: false, weight: 64
The NAPI was not in fact disabled, owner is 0 (rather than -1), so the NAPI "thinks" it's scheduled for CPU 0 but it's not listed (!list_empty(&n->poll_list) => false). It seems odd that normal NAPI processing would wedge itself like this.
Better suspicion is that netpoll gets enabled while NAPI is polling, and also grabs the NAPI instance. This confuses napi_complete_done():
[netpoll] [normal NAPI]
napi_poll()
have = netpoll_poll_lock()
rcu_access_pointer(dev->npinfo)
return NULL # no netpoll
__napi_poll()
->poll(->weight)
poll_napi()
cmpxchg(->poll_owner, -1, cpu)
poll_one_napi()
set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, ->state)
napi_complete_done()
if (NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)
return false
# exit without clearing SCHEDThis feels very unlikely, but perhaps virtio has some interactions with the hypervisor in the NAPI ->poll that makes the race window larger?
Best I could to to prove the theory was to add and trigger this warning in napi_poll (just before netpoll_poll_unlock()):
WARN_ONCE(!have && rcu_access_pointer(n->dev->npinfo) &&
napi_is_scheduled(n) && list_empty(&n->poll_list),
"NAPI race with netpoll %px", n);If this warning hits the next virtio_close() will hang.
This patch survived 30 test iterations without a hang (without it the longest clean run was around 10). Credit for triggering this goes to Breno's recent netconsole tests.
--- net/core/netpoll.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/core/netpoll.c +7 -0
@@ -831,6 +831,13 @@ int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)if (err) goto flush;rtnl_unlock (); + +/* Make sure all NAPI polls which started before dev->npinfo +* was visible have exited before we start calling NAPI poll. +* NAPI skips locking if dev->npinfo is NULL. +*/ +synchronize_rcu (); +return 0 ; flush:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 387/480 phy: mscc: Fix parsing of unicast frames
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6fb5ff63b35b7e849cc8510957f25753f87f63d2 ]
According to the 1588 standard, it is possible to use both unicast and multicast frames to send the PTP information. It was noticed that if the frames were unicast they were not processed by the analyzer meaning that they were not timestamped. Therefore fix this to match also these unicast frames.
--- drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.c | 1 + drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.c +1 -0
@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ static int vsc85xx_eth1_conf(struct phy_device *phydev, enum ts_blk blk, get_unaligned_be32(ptp_multicast)); }else { val |=ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_MULTICAST ; + val |=ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_UNICAST ;vsc85xx_ts_write_csr (phydev, blk,MSCC_ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2 (0 ), val); vsc85xx_ts_write_csr(phydev, blk,
drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_ptp.h +1 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define MSCC_ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2 (x) (MSCC_ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ENA(x) + 3)#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_MASK_MASK GENMASK(22, 20)#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_MULTICAST 0x400000 +#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_ANY_UNICAST 0x200000#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_FULL_ADDR 0x100000#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_SRC_DEST_MASK GENMASK(17, 16)#define ANA_ETH1_FLOW_ADDR_MATCH2_SRC_DEST 0x020000
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 388/480 net: ipa: add IPA v5.1 and v5.5 to ipa_version_string()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luca Weiss <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f2aa00e4f65efcf25ff6bc8198e21f031e7b9b1b ]
Handle the case for v5.1 and v5.5 instead of returning "0.0".
Also reword the comment below since I don't see any evidence of such a check happening, and - since 5.5 has been missing - can happen.
--- drivers/net/ipa/ipa_sysfs.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ipa/ipa_sysfs.c +5 -1
@@ -37,8 +37,12 @@ static const char *ipa_version_string(struct ipa *ipa)return "4.11" ;case IPA_VERSION_5_0 :return "5.0" ; +case IPA_VERSION_5_1 : +return "5.1" ; +case IPA_VERSION_5_5 : +return "5.5" ;default : -return "0.0" ;/* Won't happen (checked at probe time) */ +return "0.0" ;/* Should not happen */ } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 389/480 pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit de9c4861fb42f0cd72da844c3c34f692d5895b7b ]
Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge()
We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might read uninit data as reported by syzbot.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline] ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314 pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709
--- drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c +9 -6
@@ -159,9 +159,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)int len;unsigned char *data;__u32 seq_recv; - - -struct rtable *rt; +struct rtable *rt =NULL ;struct net_device *tdev;struct iphdr *iph;int max_headroom;
@@ -179,16 +177,20 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)if (skb_headroom (skb) < max_headroom ||skb_cloned (skb) ||skb_shared (skb)) {struct sk_buff *new_skb =skb_realloc_headroom (skb, max_headroom); -if (!new_skb) { -ip_rt_put (rt); + +if (!new_skb) goto tx_error; - } +if (skb->sk)skb_set_owner_w (new_skb, skb->sk);consume_skb (skb); skb = new_skb; } +/* Ensure we can safely access protocol field and LCP code */ +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,3 )) + goto tx_error; + data = skb->data; islcp = ((data[0 ] <<8 ) + data[1 ]) ==PPP_LCP &&1 <= data[2 ] && data[2 ] <=7 ;
@@ -262,6 +264,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)return 1 ; tx_error: +ip_rt_put (rt);kfree_skb (skb);return 1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 390/480 nvmet: initialize discovery subsys after debugfs is initialized
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mohamed Khalfella <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 528589947c1802b9357c2a9b96d88cc4a11cd88b ]
During nvme target initialization discovery subsystem is initialized before "nvmet" debugfs directory is created. This results in discovery subsystem debugfs directory to be created in debugfs root directory.
nvmet_init() ->
nvmet_init_discovery() ->
nvmet_subsys_alloc() ->
nvmet_debugfs_subsys_setup()In other words, the codepath above is exeucted before nvmet_debugfs is created. We get /sys/kernel/debug/nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery instead of /sys/kernel/debug/nvmet/nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery. Move nvmet_init_discovery() call after nvmet_init_debugfs() to fix it.
--- drivers/nvme/target/core.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/core.c +6 -6
@@ -1906,24 +1906,24 @@ static int __init nvmet_init(void)if (!nvmet_wq) goto out_free_buffered_work_queue; - error =nvmet_init_discovery (); + error =nvmet_init_debugfs ();if (error) goto out_free_nvmet_work_queue; - error =nvmet_init_debugfs (); + error =nvmet_init_discovery ();if (error) - goto out_exit_discovery; + goto out_exit_debugfs; error =nvmet_init_configfs ();if (error) - goto out_exit_debugfs; + goto out_exit_discovery;return 0 ; -out_exit_debugfs: -nvmet_exit_debugfs (); out_exit_discovery:nvmet_exit_discovery (); +out_exit_debugfs: +nvmet_exit_debugfs (); out_free_nvmet_work_queue:destroy_workqueue (nvmet_wq); out_free_buffered_work_queue:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 391/480 s390/ap: Unmask SLCF bit in card and queue ap functions sysfs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 123b7c7c2ba725daf3bfa5ce421d65b92cb5c075 ]
The SLCF bit ("stateless command filtering") introduced with CEX8 cards was because of the function mask's default value suppressed when user space read the ap function for an AP card or queue. Unmask this bit so that user space applications like lszcrypt can evaluate and list this feature.
--- arch/s390/include/asm/ap.h | 2 +- drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/ap.h +1 -1
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ struct ap_tapq_hwinfo { unsigned int accel : 1; /* A */ unsigned int ep11 : 1; /* X */ unsigned int apxa : 1; /* APXA */ - unsigned int : 1; + unsigned int slcf : 1; /* Cmd filtering avail. */ unsigned int class : 8; unsigned int bs : 2; /* SE bind/assoc */ unsigned int : 14;
drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h +1 -1
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct ap_card {atomic64_t total_request_count;/* # requests ever for this AP device.*/ }; -#define TAPQ_CARD_HWINFO_MASK 0xFEFF0000FFFF0F0FUL +#define TAPQ_CARD_HWINFO_MASK 0xFFFF0000FFFF0F0FUL#define ASSOC_IDX_INVALID 0x10000#define to_ap_card (x) container_of((x), struct ap_card, ap_dev.device)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 392/480 s390/mm: Set high_memory at the end of the identity mapping
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 56f4cfab1c93b14da422cdcd23898eb008033696 ]
The value of high_memory variable is set by set_high_memory() function to a value returned by memblock_end_of_DRAM(). The latter function returns by default the upper bound of the last online memory block, not the upper bound of the directly mapped memory region. As result, in case the end of memory happens to be offline, high_memory variable is set to a value that is short on the last offline memory blocks size:
RANGE SIZE STATE REMOVABLE BLOCK
0x0000000000000000-0x000000ffffffffff 1T online yes 0-511
0x0000010000000000-0x0000011fffffffff 128G offline 512-575
Memory block size: 2G Total online memory: 1T Total offline memory: 128G
crash> p/x vm_layout
$1 = {
kaslr_offset = 0x3453e918000,
kaslr_offset_phys = 0xa534218000,
identity_base = 0x0,
identity_size = 0x12000000000
}
crash> p/x high_memory
$2 = 0x10000000000
In the past the value of high_memory was derived from max_low_pfn, which in turn was derived from the identity_size. Since identity_size accommodates the whole memory size - including tailing offline blocks, the offlined blocks did not impose any problem. But since commit e120d1bc12da ("arch, mm: set high_memory in free_area_init()") the value of high_memory is derived from the last memblock online region, and that is where the problem comes from.
The value of high_memory is used by several drivers and by external tools (e.g. crash tool aborts while loading a dump).
Similarily to ARM, use the override path provided by set_high_memory() function and set the value of high_memory at the end of the identity mapping early. That forces set_high_memory() to leave in high_memory the correct value, even when the end of available memory is offline.
--- arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +6 -0
@@ -719,6 +719,11 @@ static void __init memblock_add_physmem_info(void)memblock_set_node (0 ,ULONG_MAX , &memblock.memory,0 ); } +static void __init setup_high_memory (void ) +{ + high_memory =__va (ident_map_size); +} +/* * Reserve memory used for lowcore. */
@@ -951,6 +956,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)free_physmem_info ();setup_memory_end (); +setup_high_memory ();memblock_dump_all ();setup_memory ();
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 393/480 netlink: specs: ethtool: fix module EEPROM input/output arguments
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01051012887329ea78eaca19b1d2eac4c9f601b5 ]
Module (SFP) eeprom GET has a lot of input params, they are all mistakenly listed as output in the spec. Looks like kernel doesn't output them at all. Correct what are the inputs and what the outputs.
--- Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml +3 -3
@@ -2077,9 +2077,6 @@ operations: do: &module-eeprom-get-op request: - attributes: - - header - reply: attributes: - header - offset
@@ -2087,6 +2084,9 @@ operations: - page - bank - i2c-address + reply: + attributes: + - header - data dump: *module-eeprom-get-op -
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 394/480 block: Fix default IO priority if there is no IO context
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e2ba58ccc9099514380c3300cbc0750b5055fc1c ]
Upstream commit 53889bcaf536 ("block: make __get_task_ioprio() easier to read") changes the IO priority returned to the caller if no IO context is defined for the task. Prior to this commit, the returned IO priority was determined by task_nice_ioclass() and task_nice_ioprio(). Now it is always IOPRIO_DEFAULT, which translates to IOPRIO_CLASS_NONE with priority
0. However, task_nice_ioclass() returns IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, IOPRIO_CLASS_RT, or IOPRIO_CLASS_BE depending on the task scheduling policy, and task_nice_ioprio() returns a value determined by task_nice(). This causes regressions in test code checking the IO priority and class of IO operations on tasks with no IO context.
Fix the problem by returning the IO priority calculated from task_nice_ioclass() and task_nice_ioprio() if no IO context is defined to match earlier behavior.
--- include/linux/ioprio.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/ioprio.h +2 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ static inline int __get_task_ioprio(struct task_struct *p)int prio;if (!ioc) -return IOPRIO_DEFAULT ; +return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE (task_nice_ioclass (p), +task_nice_ioprio (p));if (p != current)lockdep_assert_held (&p->alloc_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 395/480 block: ensure discard_granularity is zero when discard is not supported
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fad6551fcf537375702b9af012508156a16a1ff7 ]
Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-block states:
What: /sys/block/<disk>/queue/discard_granularity [...]
A discard_granularity of 0 means that the device does not support discard functionality.
but this got broken when sorting out the block limits updates. Fix this by setting the discard_granularity limit to zero when the combined max_discard_sectors is zero.
--- block/blk-settings.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
block/blk-settings.c +10 -3
@@ -347,12 +347,19 @@ int blk_validate_limits(struct queue_limits *lim) lim->max_discard_sectors =min (lim->max_hw_discard_sectors, lim->max_user_discard_sectors); +/* +* When discard is not supported, discard_granularity should be reported +* as 0 to userspace. +*/ +if (lim->max_discard_sectors) + lim->discard_granularity = +max (lim->discard_granularity, lim->physical_block_size); +else + lim->discard_granularity =0 ; +if (!lim->max_discard_segments) lim->max_discard_segments =1 ; -if (lim->discard_granularity < lim->physical_block_size) - lim->discard_granularity = lim->physical_block_size; -/* * By default there is no limit on the segment boundary alignment, * but if there is one it can't be smaller than the page size as
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 396/480 ASoC: tas2781: Fix the wrong step for TLV on tas2781
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baojun Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9843cf7b6fd6f938c16fde51e86dd0e3ddbefb12 ]
The step for TLV on tas2781, should be 50 (-0.5dB).
--- include/sound/tas2781-tlv.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/sound/tas2781-tlv.h +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#ifndef __TAS2781_TLV_H__#define __TAS2781_TLV_H__ -static const __maybe_unused DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(dvc_tlv, -10000, 100, 0); +static const __maybe_unused DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(dvc_tlv, -10000, 50, 0); static const __maybe_unused DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(amp_vol_tlv, 1100, 50, 0);#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 397/480 spi: cs42l43: Property entry should be a null-terminated array
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Simon Trimmer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ffcfd071eec7973e58c4ffff7da4cb0e9ca7b667 ]
The software node does not specify a count of property entries, so the array must be null-terminated.
When unterminated, this can lead to a fault in the downstream cs35l56 amplifier driver, because the node parse walks off the end of the array into unknown memory.
--- drivers/spi/spi-cs42l43.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/spi/spi-cs42l43.c +1 -1
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static struct spi_board_info *cs42l43_create_bridge_amp(struct cs42l43_spi *privstruct spi_board_info *info;if (spkid >=0 ) { - props =devm_kmalloc (priv->dev,sizeof (*props),GFP_KERNEL ); + props =devm_kcalloc (priv->dev,2 ,sizeof (*props),GFP_KERNEL );if (!props)return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 398/480 net/mlx5: Correctly set gso_segs when LRO is used
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 77bf1c55b2acc7fa3734b14f4561e3d75aea1a90 ]
When gso_segs is left at 0, a number of assumptions will end up being incorrect throughout the stack.
For example, in the GRO-path, we set NAPI_GRO_CB()->count to gso_segs. So, if a non-LRO'ed packet followed by an LRO'ed packet is being processed in GRO, the first one will have NAPI_GRO_CB()->count set to 1 and the next one to 0 (in dev_gro_receive()).
Since commit 531d0d32de3e
("net/mlx5: Correctly set gso_size when LRO is used")
these packets will get merged (as their gso_size now matches). So, we end up in gro_complete() with NAPI_GRO_CB()->count == 1 and thus don't call inet_gro_complete(). Meaning, checksum-validation in tcp_checksum_complete() will fail with a "hw csum failure".
Even before the above mentioned commit, incorrect gso_segs means that other things like TCP's accounting of incoming packets (tp->segs_in, data_segs_in, rcv_ooopack) will be incorrect. Which means that if one does bytes_received/data_segs_in, the result will be bigger than the MTU.
Fix this by initializing gso_segs correctly when LRO is used.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c +1 -0
@@ -1567,6 +1567,7 @@ static inline void mlx5e_build_rx_skb(struct mlx5_cqe64 *cqe,unsigned int hdrlen =mlx5e_lro_update_hdr (skb, cqe, cqe_bcnt);skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_size =DIV_ROUND_UP (cqe_bcnt - hdrlen, lro_num_seg); +skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_segs = lro_num_seg;/* Subtract one since we already counted this as one * "regular" packet in mlx5e_complete_rx_cqe() */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 399/480 ipv6: reject malicious packets in ipv6_gso_segment()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d45cf1e7d7180256e17c9ce88e32e8061a7887fe ]
syzbot was able to craft a packet with very long IPv6 extension headers leading to an overflow of skb->transport_header.
This 16bit field has a limited range.
Add skb_reset_transport_header_careful() helper and use it from ipv6_gso_segment()
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5871 Comm: syz-executor211 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-g7abc678e3084 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline] RIP: 0010:ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x54a/0xe10 net/nsh/nsh.c:110 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x342/0x510 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x857/0x11b0 net/core/dev.c:3950 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x84/0x120 net/core/dev.c:4000 sch_direct_xmit+0xd3/0x4b0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:329 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4102 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x17b6/0x3a70 net/core/dev.c:4679
--- include/linux/skbuff.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/skbuff.h +23 -0
@@ -3032,6 +3032,29 @@ static inline void skb_reset_transport_header(struct sk_buff *skb) skb->transport_header = offset; } +/** +* skb_reset_transport_header_careful - conditionally reset transport header +* @skb: buffer to alter +* +* Hardened version of skb_reset_transport_header(). +* +* Returns: true if the operation was a success. +*/ +static inline bool __must_check +skb_reset_transport_header_careful (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +long offset = skb->data - skb->head; + + if (unlikely(offset != (typeof(skb->transport_header))offset)) +return false; + + if (unlikely(offset == (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U)) +return false; + + skb->transport_header = offset; +return true; +} +static inline void skb_set_transport_header (struct sk_buff *skb,const int offset) {
net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c +3 -1
@@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, ops =rcu_dereference (inet6_offloads[proto]);if (likely (ops && ops->callbacks.gso_segment)) { -skb_reset_transport_header (skb); +if (!skb_reset_transport_header_careful (skb)) + goto out; + segs = ops->callbacks.gso_segment (skb, features);if (!segs) skb->network_header =skb_mac_header (skb) + nhoff - skb->head;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 400/480 net: mdio: mdio-bcm-unimac: Correct rate fallback logic
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a81649a4efd382497bf3d34a623360263adc6993 ]
When the parent clock is a gated clock which has multiple parents, the clock provider (clk-scmi typically) might return a rate of 0 since there is not one of those particular parent clocks that should be chosen for returning a rate. Prior to ee975351cf0c ("net: mdio: mdio-bcm-unimac:
Manage clock around I/O accesses"), we would not always be passing a clock reference depending upon how mdio-bcm-unimac was instantiated. In that case, we would take the fallback path where the rate is hard coded to 250MHz.
Make sure that we still fallback to using a fixed rate for the divider calculation, otherwise we simply ignore the desired MDIO bus clock frequency which can prevent us from interfacing with Ethernet PHYs properly.
--- drivers/net/mdio/mdio-bcm-unimac.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/mdio/mdio-bcm-unimac.c +2 -3
@@ -209,10 +209,9 @@ static int unimac_mdio_clk_set(struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv)if (ret)return ret; -if (!priv->clk) + rate =clk_get_rate (priv->clk); +if (!rate) rate =250000000 ; -else - rate =clk_get_rate (priv->clk); div = (rate / (2 * priv->clk_freq)) -1 ;if (div & ~MDIO_CLK_DIV_MASK ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 401/480 net: drop UFO packets in udp_rcv_segment()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d46e51f1c78b9ab9323610feb14238d06d46d519 ]
When sending a packet with virtio_net_hdr to tun device, if the gso_type in virtio_net_hdr is SKB_GSO_UDP and the gso_size is less than udphdr size, below crash may happen.
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4572! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 62 Comm: mytest Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #203 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_pull_rcsum+0x8e/0xa0 Code: 00 00 5b c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 93 88 00 00 00 f7 da e8 37 44 38 00 f7 d8 89 83 88 00 00 00 48 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 5b c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 0f 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 000 RSP: 0018:ffffc900001fba38 EFLAGS: 00000297 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffff8880040c1000 RCX: ffffc900001fb948 RDX: ffff888003e6d700 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800411a062 RBP: ffff8880040c1000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff888003606c00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888004060900 R14: ffff888004050000 R15: ffff888004060900 FS: 000000002406d3c0(0000) GS:ffff888084a19000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000040 CR3: 0000000004007000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x176/0x4b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2445 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x155/0x1f0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2475 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x71/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:2626 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x433/0xb00 net/ipv4/udp.c:2690 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xa6/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x72/0x90 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:579 ip_sublist_rcv+0x122/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:636 ip_list_rcv+0xf7/0x130 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:670 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x21d/0x240 net/core/dev.c:6067 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x186/0x2b0 net/core/dev.c:6210 napi_complete_done+0x78/0x180 net/core/dev.c:6580 tun_get_user+0xa63/0x1120 drivers/net/tun.c:1909 tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1984 vfs_write+0x300/0x420 fs/read_write.c:593 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:686 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 </TASK>
To trigger gso segment in udp_queue_rcv_skb(), we should also set option UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP to enable udp_sk(sk)->encap_rcv. When the encap_rcv hook return 1 in udp_queue_rcv_one_skb(), udp_csum_pull_header() will try to pull udphdr, but the skb size has been segmented to gso size, which leads to this crash.
Previous commit cf329aa42b66 ("udp: cope with UDP GRO packet misdirection") introduces segmentation in UDP receive path only for GRO, which was never intended to be used for UFO, so drop UFO packets in udp_rcv_segment().
--- include/net/udp.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/udp.h +18 -6
@@ -586,6 +586,16 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *udp_rcv_segment(struct sock *sk, {netdev_features_t features =NETIF_F_SG ;struct sk_buff *segs; +int drop_count; + +/* +* Segmentation in UDP receive path is only for UDP GRO, drop udp +* fragmentation offload (UFO) packets. +*/ +if (skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type &SKB_GSO_UDP ) { + drop_count =1 ; + goto drop; + }/* Avoid csum recalculation by skb_segment unless userspace explicitly * asks for the final checksum values
@@ -609,16 +619,18 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *udp_rcv_segment(struct sock *sk,*/ segs =__skb_gso_segment (skb, features, false);if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (segs)) { -int segs_nr =skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_segs; - -atomic_add (segs_nr, &sk->sk_drops); -SNMP_ADD_STATS (__UDPX_MIB (sk, ipv4),UDP_MIB_INERRORS , segs_nr); -kfree_skb (skb); -return NULL ; + drop_count =skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_segs; + goto drop; }consume_skb (skb);return segs; + +drop: +atomic_add (drop_count, &sk->sk_drops); +SNMP_ADD_STATS (__UDPX_MIB (sk, ipv4),UDP_MIB_INERRORS , drop_count); +kfree_skb (skb); +return NULL ; }static inline void udp_post_segment_fix_csum (struct sk_buff *skb)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 402/480 net/sched: taprio: enforce minimum value for picos_per_byte
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takamitsu Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae8508b25def57982493c48694ef135973bfabe0 ]
Syzbot reported a WARNING in taprio_get_start_time().
When link speed is 470,589 or greater, q->picos_per_byte becomes too small, causing length_to_duration(q, ETH_ZLEN) to return zero.
This zero value leads to validation failures in fill_sched_entry() and parse_taprio_schedule(), allowing arbitrary values to be assigned to entry->interval and cycle_time. As a result, sched->cycle can become zero.
Since SPEED_800000 is the largest defined speed in include/uapi/linux/ethtool.h, this issue can occur in realistic scenarios.
To ensure length_to_duration() returns a non-zero value for minimum-sized Ethernet frames (ETH_ZLEN = 60), picos_per_byte must be at least 17 (60 * 17 > PSEC_PER_NSEC which is 1000).
This patch enforces a minimum value of 17 for picos_per_byte when the calculated value would be lower, and adds a warning message to inform users that scheduling accuracy may be affected at very high link speeds.
--- net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_taprio.c +18 -3
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ static struct static_key_false taprio_have_working_mqprio;#define TAPRIO_SUPPORTED_FLAGS \ (TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAG_TXTIME_ASSIST | TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAG_FULL_OFFLOAD)#define TAPRIO_FLAGS_INVALID U32_MAX +/* Minimum value for picos_per_byte to ensure non-zero duration +* for minimum-sized Ethernet frames (ETH_ZLEN = 60). +* 60 * 17 > PSEC_PER_NSEC (1000) +*/ +#define TAPRIO_PICOS_PER_BYTE_MIN 17struct sched_entry {/* Durations between this GCL entry and the GCL entry where the
@@ -1284,7 +1289,8 @@ static void taprio_start_sched(struct Qdisc *sch, }static void taprio_set_picos_per_byte (struct net_device *dev, -struct taprio_sched *q) +struct taprio_sched *q, +struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) {struct ethtool_link_ksettings ecmd;int speed =SPEED_10 ;
@@ -1300,6 +1306,15 @@ static void taprio_set_picos_per_byte(struct net_device *dev, skip: picos_per_byte = (USEC_PER_SEC *8 ) / speed; +if (picos_per_byte <TAPRIO_PICOS_PER_BYTE_MIN ) { +if (!extack) +pr_warn ("Link speed %d is too high. Schedule may be inaccurate.\n" , + speed); +NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD (extack, +"Link speed %d is too high. Schedule may be inaccurate." , + speed); + picos_per_byte =TAPRIO_PICOS_PER_BYTE_MIN ; + }atomic64_set (&q->picos_per_byte, picos_per_byte); netdev_dbg(dev, "taprio: set %s's picos_per_byte to: %lld, linkspeed: %d\n",
@@ -1324,7 +1339,7 @@ static int taprio_dev_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,if (dev !=qdisc_dev (q->root))continue ; -taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q); +taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q,NULL ); stab =rtnl_dereference (q->root->stab);
@@ -1848,7 +1863,7 @@ static int taprio_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, q->flags = taprio_flags;/* Needed for length_to_duration() during netlink attribute parsing */ -taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q); +taprio_set_picos_per_byte (dev, q, extack); err =taprio_parse_mqprio_opt (dev, mqprio, extack, q->flags);if (err <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 403/480 sunrpc: fix client side handling of tls alerts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cc5d59081fa26506d02de2127ab822f40d88bc5a ]
A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's iterator's kvec.
Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Scott found that a msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv.
--- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +30 -10
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp)static int xs_sock_process_cmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg, -struct cmsghdr *cmsg,int ret) +unsigned int *msg_flags,struct cmsghdr *cmsg,int ret) {u8 content_type =tls_get_record_type (sock->sk, cmsg);u8 level, description;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,* record, even though there might be more frames * waiting to be decrypted. */ - msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR ; + *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR ;break ;case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT :tls_alert_recv (sock->sk, msg, &level, &description);
@@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, }static int -xs_sock_recv_cmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,int flags) +xs_sock_recv_cmsg (struct socket *sock,unsigned int *msg_flags,int flags) {union {struct cmsghdr cmsg;u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (u8))]; } u; +u8 alert[2 ]; +struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len =sizeof (alert), + }; +struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen =sizeof (u), + };int ret; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen =sizeof (u); - ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, msg, flags); -if (msg->msg_controllen !=sizeof (u)) - ret =xs_sock_process_cmsg (sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); +iov_iter_kvec (&msg.msg_iter,ITER_DEST , &alert_kvec,1 , + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, &msg, flags); +if (ret >0 && +tls_get_record_type (sock->sk, &u.cmsg) ==TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT ) { +iov_iter_revert (&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret =xs_sock_process_cmsg (sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg, + -EAGAIN ); + }return ret; }
@@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek)ssize_t ret;if (seek !=0 )iov_iter_advance (&msg->msg_iter, seek); - ret =xs_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, msg, flags); + ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, msg, flags); +/* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */ +if (msg->msg_flags &MSG_CTRUNC ) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC |MSG_EOR ); +if (ret ==0 || ret == -EIO ) + ret =xs_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags); + }return ret >0 ? ret + seek : ret; }
@@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t count) {iov_iter_discard (&msg->msg_iter,ITER_DEST , count); -return xs_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, msg, flags); +return xs_sock_recvmsg (sock, msg, flags,0 ); }#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 404/480 drm/xe/pf: Disable PF restart worker on device removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Wajdeczko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c286ce6b01f633806b4db3e4ec8e0162928299cd ]
We can't let restart worker run once device is removed, since other data that it might want to access could be already released. Explicitly disable worker as part of device cleanup action.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_gt_sriov_pf.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_gt_sriov_pf.c +31 -1
@@ -47,9 +47,16 @@ static int pf_alloc_metadata(struct xe_gt *gt)static void pf_init_workers (struct xe_gt *gt) { +xe_gt_assert (gt,IS_SRIOV_PF (gt_to_xe (gt)));INIT_WORK (>->sriov.pf.workers.restart, pf_worker_restart_func); } +static void pf_fini_workers (struct xe_gt *gt) +{ +xe_gt_assert (gt,IS_SRIOV_PF (gt_to_xe (gt))); +disable_work_sync (>->sriov.pf.workers.restart); +} +/** * xe_gt_sriov_pf_init_early - Prepare SR-IOV PF data structures on PF. * @gt: the &xe_gt to initialize
@@ -79,6 +86,21 @@ int xe_gt_sriov_pf_init_early(struct xe_gt *gt)return 0 ; } +static void pf_fini_action (void *arg) +{ +struct xe_gt *gt = arg; + +pf_fini_workers (gt); +} + +static int pf_init_late (struct xe_gt *gt) +{ +struct xe_device *xe =gt_to_xe (gt); + +xe_gt_assert (gt,IS_SRIOV_PF (xe)); +return devm_add_action_or_reset (xe->drm.dev, pf_fini_action, gt); +} +/** * xe_gt_sriov_pf_init - Prepare SR-IOV PF data structures on PF. * @gt: the &xe_gt to initialize
@@ -95,7 +117,15 @@ int xe_gt_sriov_pf_init(struct xe_gt *gt)if (err)return err; -return xe_gt_sriov_pf_migration_init (gt); + err =xe_gt_sriov_pf_migration_init (gt); +if (err) +return err; + + err =pf_init_late (gt); +if (err) +return err; + +return 0 ; }static bool pf_needs_enable_ggtt_guest_update (struct xe_device *xe)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 405/480 x86/irq: Plug vector setup race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ce0b5eedcb753697d43f61dd2e27d68eb5d3150f ]
Hogan reported a vector setup race, which overwrites the interrupt descriptor in the per CPU vector array resulting in a disfunctional device.
CPU0 CPU1
interrupt is raised in APIC IRR but not handled
free_irq()
per_cpu(vector_irq, CPU1)[vector] = VECTOR_SHUTDOWN;
request_irq() common_interrupt() d = this_cpu_read(vector_irq[vector]);
per_cpu(vector_irq, CPU1)[vector] = desc;
if (d == VECTOR_SHUTDOWN)
this_cpu_write(vector_irq[vector], VECTOR_UNUSED);free_irq() cannot observe the pending vector in the CPU1 APIC as there is no way to query the remote CPUs APIC IRR.
This requires that request_irq() uses the same vector/CPU as the one which was freed, but this also can be triggered by a spurious interrupt.
Interestingly enough this problem managed to be hidden for more than a decade.
Prevent this by reevaluating vector_irq under the vector lock, which is held by the interrupt activation code when vector_irq is updated.
To avoid ifdeffery or IS_ENABLED() nonsense, move the [un]lock_vector_lock() declarations out under the CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY guard as it's only provided when CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC=y.
The current CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY guard is selected by CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC, but can also be selected by other parts of the Kconfig system, which makes 32-bit UP builds with CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC=n fail.
Can we just get rid of this !APIC nonsense once and forever?
--- arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h | 12 ++++--- arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h +7 -5
@@ -92,8 +92,6 @@ struct irq_cfg {extern struct irq_cfg *irq_cfg (unsigned int irq);extern struct irq_cfg *irqd_cfg (struct irq_data *irq_data); -extern void lock_vector_lock (void ); -extern void unlock_vector_lock (void );#ifdef CONFIG_SMP extern void vector_schedule_cleanup (struct irq_cfg *);extern void irq_complete_move (struct irq_cfg *cfg);
@@ -101,12 +99,16 @@ extern void irq_complete_move(struct irq_cfg *cfg);static inline void vector_schedule_cleanup (struct irq_cfg *c) { }static inline void irq_complete_move (struct irq_cfg *c) { }#endif -extern void apic_ack_edge (struct irq_data *data); -#else /* CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC +extern void lock_vector_lock (void ); +extern void unlock_vector_lock (void ); +#else static inline void lock_vector_lock (void ) {}static inline void unlock_vector_lock (void ) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY */ +#endif /* Statistics */ extern atomic_t irq_err_count;
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c +48 -15
81 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 406/480 eth: fbnic: unlink NAPIs from queues on error to open
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4b31bcb025cb497da2b01f87173108ff32d350d2 ]
CI hit a UaF in fbnic in the AF_XDP portion of the queues.py test. The UaF is in the __sk_mark_napi_id_once() call in xsk_bind(), NAPI has been freed. Looks like the device failed to open earlier, and we lack clearing the NAPI pointer from the queue.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/meta/fbnic/fbnic_netdev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/meta/fbnic/fbnic_netdev.c +3 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int __fbnic_open(struct fbnic_net *fbn)dev_warn (fbd->dev,"Error %d sending host ownership message to the firmware\n" , err); - goto free_resources; + goto err_reset_queues; } err =fbnic_time_start (fbn);
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ int __fbnic_open(struct fbnic_net *fbn)fbnic_time_stop (fbn); release_ownership:fbnic_fw_xmit_ownership_msg (fbn->fbd, false); +err_reset_queues: +fbnic_reset_netif_queues (fbn); free_resources:fbnic_free_resources (fbn); free_napi_vectors:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 407/480 net: airoha: npu: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE macros
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4e7e471e2e3f9085fe1dbe821c4dd904a917c66a ]
Introduce missing MODULE_FIRMWARE definitions for firmware autoload.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_npu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_npu.c +2 -0
@@ -518,6 +518,8 @@ static struct platform_driver airoha_npu_driver = { };module_platform_driver (airoha_npu_driver); +MODULE_FIRMWARE (NPU_EN7581_FIRMWARE_DATA ); +MODULE_FIRMWARE (NPU_EN7581_FIRMWARE_RV32 );MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );MODULE_AUTHOR ("Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>" );MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("Airoha Network Processor Unit driver" );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 408/480 benet: fix BUG when creating VFs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a40f8af2ba1b9bdf46e2db10e8c9710538fbc63 ]
benet crashes as soon as SRIOV VFs are created:
kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:3457!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 7408 Comm: test.sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [...] RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x5f/0x70 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __iommu_dma_free+0xe8/0x1c0 be_cmd_set_mac_list+0x3fe/0x640 [be2net] be_cmd_set_mac+0xaf/0x110 [be2net] be_vf_eth_addr_config+0x19f/0x330 [be2net] be_vf_setup+0x4f7/0x990 [be2net] be_pci_sriov_configure+0x3a1/0x470 [be2net] sriov_numvfs_store+0x20b/0x380 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x354/0x530 vfs_write+0x9b9/0xf60 ksys_write+0xf3/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x3d0
be_cmd_set_mac_list() calls dma_free_coherent() under a spin_lock_bh. Fix it by freeing only after the lock has been released.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c +1 -1
@@ -3852,8 +3852,8 @@ int be_cmd_set_mac_list(struct be_adapter *adapter, u8 *mac_array, status =be_mcc_notify_wait (adapter); err: -dma_free_coherent (&adapter->pdev->dev, cmd.size, cmd.va, cmd.dma);spin_unlock_bh (&adapter->mcc_lock); +dma_free_coherent (&adapter->pdev->dev, cmd.size, cmd.va, cmd.dma);return status; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 409/480 net/sched: mqprio: fix stack out-of-bounds write in tc entry parsing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maher Azzouzi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ffd2dc4c6c49ff4f1e5d34e454a6a55608104c17 ]
TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX is validated using NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE), which allows the value TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE (16). This leads to a 4-byte out-of-bounds stack write in the fp[] array, which only has room for 16 elements (0–15).
Fix this by changing the policy to allow only up to TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE - 1.
--- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_mqprio.c +1 -1
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int mqprio_parse_opt(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_mqprio_qopt *qopt,static const struct nla_policy mqprio_tc_entry_policy[TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_MAX +1 ] = { [TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX ] =NLA_POLICY_MAX (NLA_U32 , -TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE ), +TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE -1 ), [TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_FP ] =NLA_POLICY_RANGE (NLA_U32 ,TC_FP_EXPRESS ,TC_FP_PREEMPTIBLE ),
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 410/480 s390/mm: Allocate page table with PAGE_SIZE granularity
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sumanth Korikkar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit daa8af80d283ee9a7d42dd6f164a65036665b9d4 ]
Make vmem_pte_alloc() consistent by always allocating page table of PAGE_SIZE granularity, regardless of whether page_table_alloc() (with slab) or memblock_alloc() is used. This ensures page table can be fully freed when the corresponding page table entries are removed.
--- arch/s390/mm/vmem.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/s390/mm/vmem.c +2 -3
@@ -64,13 +64,12 @@ void *vmem_crst_alloc(unsigned long val)pte_t __ref *vmem_pte_alloc (void ) { -unsigned long size =PTRS_PER_PTE *sizeof (pte_t);pte_t *pte;if (slab_is_available ()) - pte = (pte_t *)page_table_alloc (&init_mm); + pte = (pte_t *)page_table_alloc (&init_mm);else - pte = (pte_t *)memblock_alloc (size, size); + pte = (pte_t *)memblock_alloc (PAGE_SIZE ,PAGE_SIZE );if (!pte)return NULL ;memset64 ((u64 *)pte, _PAGE_INVALID,PTRS_PER_PTE );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 411/480 eth: fbnic: remove the debugging trick of super high page bias
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e407fceeaf1b2959892b4fc9b584843d3f2bfc05 ]
Alex added page bias of LONG_MAX, which is admittedly quite a clever way of catching overflows of the pp ref count. The page pool code was "optimized" to leave the ref at 1 for freed pages so it can't catch basic bugs by itself any more. (Something we should probably address under DEBUG_NET...)
Unfortunately for fbnic since commit f7dc3248dcfb ("skbuff: Optimization of SKB coalescing for page pool") core _may_ actually take two extra pp refcounts, if one of them is returned before driver gives up the bias the ret < 0 check in page_pool_unref_netmem() will trigger.
While at it add a FBNIC_ to the name of the driver constant.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/meta/fbnic/fbnic_txrx.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/ethernet/meta/fbnic/fbnic_txrx.h | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/meta/fbnic/fbnic_txrx.c +2 -2
@@ -661,8 +661,8 @@ static void fbnic_page_pool_init(struct fbnic_ring *ring, unsigned int idx, {struct fbnic_rx_buf *rx_buf = &ring->rx_buf[idx]; -page_pool_fragment_page (page,PAGECNT_BIAS_MAX ); - rx_buf->pagecnt_bias =PAGECNT_BIAS_MAX ; +page_pool_fragment_page (page,FBNIC_PAGECNT_BIAS_MAX ); + rx_buf->pagecnt_bias =FBNIC_PAGECNT_BIAS_MAX ; rx_buf->page = page; }
drivers/net/ethernet/meta/fbnic/fbnic_txrx.h +2 -4
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ struct fbnic_queue_stats {struct u64_stats_sync syncp; }; -/* Pagecnt bias is long max to reserve the last bit to catch overflow -* cases where if we overcharge the bias it will flip over to be negative. -*/ -#define PAGECNT_BIAS_MAX LONG_MAX +#define FBNIC_PAGECNT_BIAS_MAX PAGE_SIZE +struct fbnic_rx_buf {struct page *page;long pagecnt_bias;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 412/480 NFS/localio: nfs_close_local_fh() fix check for file closed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e144d53cf21fb9d02626c669533788c6bdc61ce3 ]
If the struct nfs_file_localio is closed, its list entry will be empty, but the nfs_uuid->files list might still contain other entries.
--- fs/nfs_common/nfslocalio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfs_common/nfslocalio.c +1 -1
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ void nfs_close_local_fh(struct nfs_file_localio *nfl)rcu_read_unlock ();return ; } -if (list_empty (&nfs_uuid->files)) { +if (list_empty (&nfl->list)) {/* nfs_uuid_put() has started closing files, wait for it * to finished */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 413/480 NFS/localio: nfs_uuid_put() fix races with nfs_open/close_local_fh()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fdd015de767977f21892329af5e12276eb80375f ]
In order for the wait in nfs_uuid_put() to be safe, it is necessary to ensure that nfs_uuid_add_file() doesn't add a new entry once the nfs_uuid->net has been NULLed out.
Also fix up the wake_up_var_locked() / wait_var_event_spinlock() to both use the nfs_uuid address, since nfl, and &nfl->uuid could be used elsewhere.
--- fs/nfs_common/nfslocalio.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/nfs_common/nfslocalio.c +15 -8
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static bool nfs_uuid_put(nfs_uuid_t *nfs_uuid)/* nfs_close_local_fh() is doing the * close and we must wait. until it unlinks */ - wait_var_event_spinlock(nfl, + wait_var_event_spinlock(nfs_uuid, list_first_entry_or_null( &nfs_uuid->files, struct nfs_file_localio,
@@ -243,15 +243,20 @@ void nfs_localio_invalidate_clients(struct list_head *nn_local_clients, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nfs_localio_invalidate_clients); -static void nfs_uuid_add_file (nfs_uuid_t *nfs_uuid,struct nfs_file_localio *nfl) +static int nfs_uuid_add_file (nfs_uuid_t *nfs_uuid,struct nfs_file_localio *nfl) { +int ret =0 ; +/* Add nfl to nfs_uuid->files if it isn't already */ spin_lock (&nfs_uuid->lock); -if (list_empty (&nfl->list)) { +if (rcu_access_pointer (nfs_uuid->net) ==NULL ) { + ret = -ENXIO ; + }else if (list_empty (&nfl->list)) {rcu_assign_pointer (nfl->nfs_uuid, nfs_uuid);list_add_tail (&nfl->list, &nfs_uuid->files); }spin_unlock (&nfs_uuid->lock); +return ret; }/*
@@ -285,11 +290,13 @@ struct nfsd_file *nfs_open_local_fh(nfs_uuid_t *uuid, }rcu_read_unlock ();/* We have an implied reference to net thanks to nfsd_net_try_get */ - localio = nfs_to->nfsd_open_local_fh (net, uuid->dom, rpc_clnt, - cred, nfs_fh, pnf, fmode); + localio = nfs_to->nfsd_open_local_fh (net, uuid->dom, rpc_clnt, cred, + nfs_fh, pnf, fmode); +if (!IS_ERR (localio) &&nfs_uuid_add_file (uuid, nfl) <0 ) { +/* Delete the cached file when racing with nfs_uuid_put() */ +nfs_to_nfsd_file_put_local (pnf); + }nfs_to_nfsd_net_put (net); -if (!IS_ERR (localio)) -nfs_uuid_add_file (uuid, nfl);return localio; }
@@ -338,7 +345,7 @@ void nfs_close_local_fh(struct nfs_file_localio *nfl)*/ spin_lock (&nfs_uuid->lock);list_del_init (&nfl->list); -wake_up_var_locked (&nfl->nfs_uuid, &nfs_uuid->lock); +wake_up_var_locked (nfs_uuid, &nfs_uuid->lock);spin_unlock (&nfs_uuid->lock); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nfs_close_local_fh);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 414/480 NFS/localio: nfs_uuid_put() fix the wake up after unlinking the file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4ec752ce6debd5a0e7e0febf6bcf780ccda6ab5e ]
Use store_release_wake_up() instead of wake_up_var_locked(), because the waiter cannot retake the nfs_uuid->lock.
--- fs/nfs_common/nfslocalio.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs_common/nfslocalio.c +1 -2
@@ -198,8 +198,7 @@ static bool nfs_uuid_put(nfs_uuid_t *nfs_uuid)/* Now we can allow racing nfs_close_local_fh() to * skip the locking. */ -RCU_INIT_POINTER (nfl->nfs_uuid,NULL ); -wake_up_var_locked (&nfl->nfs_uuid, &nfs_uuid->lock); +store_release_wake_up (&nfl->nfs_uuid,RCU_INITIALIZER (NULL )); }/* Remove client from nn->local_clients */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 415/480 net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix skb handling for XDP_PASS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Meghana Malladi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d942fe13f72bec92f6c689fbd74c5ec38228c16a ]
emac_rx_packet() is a common function for handling traffic for both xdp and non-xdp use cases. Use common logic for handling skb with or without xdp to prevent any incorrect packet processing. This patch fixes ping working with XDP_PASS for icssg driver.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/icssg/icssg_common.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/icssg/icssg_common.c +8 -7
@@ -706,9 +706,9 @@ static int emac_rx_packet(struct prueth_emac *emac, u32 flow_id, u32 *xdp_state)struct page_pool *pool;struct sk_buff *skb;struct xdp_buff xdp; +int headroom, ret;u32 *psdata;void *pa; -int ret; *xdp_state =0 ; pool = rx_chn->pg_pool;
@@ -757,22 +757,23 @@ static int emac_rx_packet(struct prueth_emac *emac, u32 flow_id, u32 *xdp_state)xdp_prepare_buff (&xdp, pa,PRUETH_HEADROOM , pkt_len, false); *xdp_state =emac_run_xdp (emac, &xdp, page, &pkt_len); -if (*xdp_state ==ICSSG_XDP_PASS ) - skb =xdp_build_skb_from_buff (&xdp); -else +if (*xdp_state !=ICSSG_XDP_PASS ) goto requeue; + headroom = xdp.data - xdp.data_hard_start; + pkt_len = xdp.data_end - xdp.data; }else { -/* prepare skb and send to n/w stack */ - skb =napi_build_skb (pa,PAGE_SIZE ); + headroom =PRUETH_HEADROOM ; } +/* prepare skb and send to n/w stack */ + skb =napi_build_skb (pa,PAGE_SIZE );if (!skb) { ndev->stats.rx_dropped++;page_pool_recycle_direct (pool, page); goto requeue; } -skb_reserve (skb,PRUETH_HEADROOM ); +skb_reserve (skb, headroom);skb_put (skb, pkt_len); skb->dev = ndev;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 416/480 irqchip: Build IMX_MU_MSI only on ARM
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3b6a18f0da8720d612d8a682ea5c55870da068e0 ]
Compile-testing IMX_MU_MSI on x86 without PCI_MSI support results in a build failure:
drivers/gpio/gpio-sprd.c:8:include/linux/gpio/driver.h:41:33: error: field 'msiinfo' has incomplete type drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c:4:include/linux/msi.h:528:33: error: field 'alloc_info' has incomplete type
Tighten the dependency further to only allow compile testing on Arm. This could be refined further to allow certain x86 configs.
This was submitted before to address a different build failure, which was fixed differently, but the problem has now returned in a different form.
--- drivers/irqchip/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/irqchip/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ config IMX_MU_MSI tristate "i.MX MU used as MSI controller" depends on OF && HAS_IOMEM depends on ARCH_MXC || COMPILE_TEST + depends on ARM || ARM64 default m if ARCH_MXC select IRQ_DOMAIN select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 417/480 ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda-sdw-bpt: fix SND_SOF_SOF_HDA_SDW_BPT dependencies
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 614d416dd8aee2675fb591c598308a901a660db8 ]
The hda-sdw-bpt code links against the soundwire driver, but that fails when trying to link from built-in code into loadable module:
x86_64-linux-ld: vmlinux.o: in function `intel_ace2x_bpt_close_stream.isra.0':
intel_ace2x.c:(.text+0x137a531): undefined reference to `hda_sdw_bpt_close'
x86_64-linux-ld: vmlinux.o: in function `intel_ace2x_bpt_send_async':
intel_ace2x.c:(.text+0x137aa45): undefined reference to `hda_sdw_bpt_open'
x86_64-linux-ld: intel_ace2x.c:(.text+0x137ab67): undefined reference to `hda_sdw_bpt_close'
x86_64-linux-ld: intel_ace2x.c:(.text+0x137ac30): undefined reference to `hda_sdw_bpt_send_async'
x86_64-linux-ld: vmlinux.o: in function `intel_ace2x_bpt_wait':
intel_ace2x.c:(.text+0x137aced): undefined reference to `hda_sdw_bpt_wait'
Ensure that both SOUNDWIRE_INTEL and SND_SOF_SOF_HDA_SDW_BPT are selected at the same time by SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_LNL, and that this happens even if SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_SOUNDWIRE is a loadable module but SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_LNL is built-in.
This follows the same logic as commit c5a61db9bf89 ("ASoC: SOF: fix intel-soundwire link failure").
--- sound/soc/sof/intel/Kconfig | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/sof/intel/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -266,9 +266,10 @@ config SND_SOC_SOF_METEORLAKE config SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_LNL tristate + select SOUNDWIRE_INTEL if SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_SOUNDWIRE != n select SND_SOC_SOF_HDA_GENERIC select SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_SOUNDWIRE_LINK_BASELINE - select SND_SOF_SOF_HDA_SDW_BPT if SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_SOUNDWIRE + select SND_SOF_SOF_HDA_SDW_BPT if SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_SOUNDWIRE != n select SND_SOC_SOF_IPC4 select SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_MTL
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 418/480 ALSA: hda/ca0132: Fix missing error handling in ca0132_alt_select_out()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9f320dfb0ffc555aa2eac8331dee0c2c16f67633 ]
There are a couple of cases where the error is ignored or the error code isn't propagated in ca0132_alt_select_out(). Fix those.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +4 -1
@@ -4802,7 +4802,8 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_out(struct hda_codec *codec)if (err <0 ) goto exit; -if (ca0132_alt_select_out_quirk_set (codec) <0 ) + err =ca0132_alt_select_out_quirk_set (codec); +if (err <0 ) goto exit;switch (spec->cur_out_type) {
@@ -4892,6 +4893,8 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_out(struct hda_codec *codec) spec->bass_redirection_val); else err =ca0132_alt_surround_set_bass_redirection (codec,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto exit;/* Unmute DSP now that we're done with output selection. */ err = dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x96,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 419/480 s390/boot: Fix startup debugging log
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikhail Zaslonko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e29409faec87ffd2de2ed20b6109f303f129281b ]
Fix 'kernel image' end address for kaslr case.
--- arch/s390/boot/startup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/boot/startup.c +1 -1
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static unsigned long setup_kernel_memory_layout(unsigned long kernel_size) kernel_start =round_down (kernel_end - kernel_size,THREAD_SIZE );boot_debug ("Randomization range: 0x%016lx-0x%016lx\n" , vmax - kaslr_len, vmax);boot_debug ("kernel image: 0x%016lx-0x%016lx (kaslr)\n" , kernel_start, - kernel_size + kernel_size); + kernel_start + kernel_size); }else if (vmax < __NO_KASLR_END_KERNEL || vsize > __NO_KASLR_END_KERNEL) { kernel_start =round_down (vmax - kernel_size,THREAD_SIZE ); boot_debug("kernel image: 0x%016lx-0x%016lx (constrained)\n", kernel_start,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 420/480 smb: server: remove separate empty_recvmsg_queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01027a62b508c48c762096f347de925eedcbd008 ]
There's no need to maintain two lists, we can just have a single list of receive buffers, which are free to use.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 60 +++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +8 -52
@@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ struct smb_direct_transport {spinlock_t recvmsg_queue_lock;struct list_head recvmsg_queue; -spinlock_t empty_recvmsg_queue_lock; -struct list_head empty_recvmsg_queue; -int send_credit_target;atomic_t send_credits;spinlock_t lock_new_recv_credits;
@@ -276,32 +273,6 @@ static void put_recvmsg(struct smb_direct_transport *t,spin_unlock (&t->recvmsg_queue_lock); } -static struct -smb_direct_recvmsg *get_empty_recvmsg (struct smb_direct_transport *t) -{ -struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg =NULL ; - -spin_lock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -if (!list_empty (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue)) { - recvmsg =list_first_entry (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue, - struct smb_direct_recvmsg, list); -list_del (&recvmsg->list); - } -spin_unlock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -return recvmsg; -} - -static void put_empty_recvmsg (struct smb_direct_transport *t, -struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg) -{ -ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, recvmsg->sge.addr, - recvmsg->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); - -spin_lock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -list_add_tail (&recvmsg->list, &t->empty_recvmsg_queue); -spin_unlock (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -} -static void enqueue_reassembly (struct smb_direct_transport *t,struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg,int data_length)
@@ -386,9 +357,6 @@ static struct smb_direct_transport *alloc_transport(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id)spin_lock_init (&t->recvmsg_queue_lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&t->recvmsg_queue); -spin_lock_init (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue_lock); -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&t->empty_recvmsg_queue); -init_waitqueue_head (&t->wait_send_pending);atomic_set (&t->send_pending,0 );
@@ -554,7 +522,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) wc->opcode);smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t); } -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -568,7 +536,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)switch (recvmsg->type) {case SMB_DIRECT_MSG_NEGOTIATE_REQ :if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_negotiate_req )) { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; } t->negotiation_requested = true;
@@ -585,7 +553,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->byte_len < offsetof(struct smb_direct_data_transfer , padding)) { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -593,7 +561,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (data_length) {if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_data_transfer ) + (u64 )data_length) { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -613,7 +581,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) avail_recvmsg_count = t->count_avail_recvmsg;spin_unlock (&t->receive_credit_lock); }else { -put_empty_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = --(t->recv_credits);
@@ -811,7 +779,6 @@ static void smb_direct_post_recv_credits(struct work_struct *work)struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg;int receive_credits, credits =0 ;int ret; -int use_free =1 ;spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = t->recv_credits;
@@ -819,18 +786,9 @@ static void smb_direct_post_recv_credits(struct work_struct *work)if (receive_credits < t->recv_credit_target) {while (true) { -if (use_free) - recvmsg =get_free_recvmsg (t); -else - recvmsg =get_empty_recvmsg (t); -if (!recvmsg) { -if (use_free) { - use_free =0 ; -continue ; - }else { -break ; - } - } + recvmsg =get_free_recvmsg (t); +if (!recvmsg) +break ; recvmsg->type =SMB_DIRECT_MSG_DATA_TRANSFER ; recvmsg->first_segment = false;
@@ -1806,8 +1764,6 @@ static void smb_direct_destroy_pools(struct smb_direct_transport *t)while ((recvmsg =get_free_recvmsg (t)))mempool_free (recvmsg, t->recvmsg_mempool); -while ((recvmsg =get_empty_recvmsg (t))) -mempool_free (recvmsg, t->recvmsg_mempool);mempool_destroy (t->recvmsg_mempool); t->recvmsg_mempool =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 421/480 smb: server: make sure we call ib_dma_unmap_single() only if we called ib_dma_map_single already
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit afb4108c92898350e66b9a009692230bcdd2ac73 ]
In case of failures either ib_dma_map_single() might not be called yet or ib_dma_unmap_single() was already called.
We should make sure put_recvmsg() only calls ib_dma_unmap_single() if needed.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +9 -2
@@ -265,8 +265,13 @@ smb_direct_recvmsg *get_free_recvmsg(struct smb_direct_transport *t)static void put_recvmsg (struct smb_direct_transport *t,struct smb_direct_recvmsg *recvmsg) { -ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, recvmsg->sge.addr, - recvmsg->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (likely (recvmsg->sge.length !=0 )) { +ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, + recvmsg->sge.addr, + recvmsg->sge.length, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + recvmsg->sge.length =0 ; + }spin_lock (&t->recvmsg_queue_lock);list_add (&recvmsg->list, &t->recvmsg_queue);
@@ -638,6 +643,7 @@ static int smb_direct_post_recv(struct smb_direct_transport *t,ib_dma_unmap_single (t->cm_id->device, recvmsg->sge.addr, recvmsg->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + recvmsg->sge.length =0 ;smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ret; }
@@ -1819,6 +1825,7 @@ static int smb_direct_create_pools(struct smb_direct_transport *t)if (!recvmsg) goto err; recvmsg->transport = t; + recvmsg->sge.length =0 ;list_add (&recvmsg->list, &t->recvmsg_queue); } t->count_avail_recvmsg = t->recv_credit_max;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 422/480 smb: server: let recv_done() consistently call put_recvmsg/smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfe76fdbb9729c650f3505d9cfb2f70ddda2dbdc ]
We should call put_recvmsg() before smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection() in order to call it before waking up the callers.
In all error cases we should call smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection() in order to avoid stale connections.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +13 -5
@@ -521,13 +521,13 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) t = recvmsg->transport;if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_RECV ) { +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);if (wc->status !=IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR ) {pr_err ("Recv error. status='%s (%d)' opcode=%d\n" ,ib_wc_status_msg (wc->status), wc->status, wc->opcode);smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t); } -put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg);return ; }
@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)case SMB_DIRECT_MSG_NEGOTIATE_REQ :if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_negotiate_req )) {put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ; } t->negotiation_requested = true;
@@ -549,7 +550,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) t->status =SMB_DIRECT_CS_CONNECTED ;enqueue_reassembly (t, recvmsg,0 );wake_up_interruptible (&t->wait_status); -break ; +return ;case SMB_DIRECT_MSG_DATA_TRANSFER : {struct smb_direct_data_transfer *data_transfer = (struct smb_direct_data_transfer *)recvmsg->packet;
@@ -559,6 +560,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->byte_len < offsetof(struct smb_direct_data_transfer , padding)) {put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ; }
@@ -567,6 +569,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->byte_len <sizeof (struct smb_direct_data_transfer ) + (u64 )data_length) {put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t);return ; }
@@ -609,11 +612,16 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (is_receive_credit_post_required (receive_credits, avail_recvmsg_count))mod_delayed_work (smb_direct_wq, &t->post_recv_credits_work,0 ); -break ; +return ; } -default : -break ; } + +/* +* This is an internal error! +*/ +WARN_ON_ONCE (recvmsg->type !=SMB_DIRECT_MSG_DATA_TRANSFER ); +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection (t); } static int smb_direct_post_recv(struct smb_direct_transport *t,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 423/480 smb: server: let recv_done() avoid touching data_transfer after cleanup/move
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a6c015b7ac2d8c5233337e5793f50d04fac17669 ]
Calling enqueue_reassembly() and wake_up_interruptible(&t->wait_reassembly_queue) or put_receive_buffer() means the recvmsg/data_transfer pointer might get re-used by another thread, which means these should be
the last operations before calling return.
--- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +7 -5
@@ -581,16 +581,11 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)else t->full_packet_received = true; -enqueue_reassembly (t, recvmsg, (int )data_length); -wake_up_interruptible (&t->wait_reassembly_queue); -spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = --(t->recv_credits); avail_recvmsg_count = t->count_avail_recvmsg;spin_unlock (&t->receive_credit_lock); }else { -put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); -spin_lock (&t->receive_credit_lock); receive_credits = --(t->recv_credits); avail_recvmsg_count = ++(t->count_avail_recvmsg);
@@ -612,6 +607,13 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (is_receive_credit_post_required (receive_credits, avail_recvmsg_count))mod_delayed_work (smb_direct_wq, &t->post_recv_credits_work,0 ); + +if (data_length) { +enqueue_reassembly (t, recvmsg, (int )data_length); +wake_up_interruptible (&t->wait_reassembly_queue); + }else +put_recvmsg (t, recvmsg); +return ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 424/480 smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5349ae5e05fa37409fd48a1eb483b199c32c889b ]
We should call ib_dma_unmap_single() and mempool_free() before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection().
And smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection() needs to be the last function to call as all other state might already be gone after it returns.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +8 -6
@@ -281,18 +281,20 @@ static void send_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)log_rdma_send (INFO ,"smbd_request 0x%p completed wc->status=%d\n" , request, wc->status); -if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_SEND ) { -log_rdma_send (ERR ,"wc->status=%d wc->opcode=%d\n" , - wc->status, wc->opcode); -smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (request->info); - } -for (i =0 ; i < request->num_sge; i++)ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, request->sge[i].addr, request->sge[i].length,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_SEND ) { +log_rdma_send (ERR ,"wc->status=%d wc->opcode=%d\n" , + wc->status, wc->opcode); +mempool_free (request, info->request_mempool); +smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info); +return ; + } +if (atomic_dec_and_test (&request->info->send_pending))wake_up (&request->info->wait_send_pending);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 425/480 smb: client: remove separate empty_packet_queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 24b6afc36db748467e853e166a385df07e443859 ]
There's no need to maintain two lists, we can just have a single list of receive buffers, which are free to use.
It just added unneeded complexity and resulted in ib_dma_unmap_single() not being called from recv_done() for empty keepalive packets.
--- fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c | 6 ++-- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 62 +++----------------------------------- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h | 4 --- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c +2 -4
@@ -432,10 +432,8 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) server->smbd_conn->receive_credit_target);seq_printf (m,"\nPending send_pending: %x " ,atomic_read (&server->smbd_conn->send_pending)); -seq_printf (m,"\nReceive buffers count_receive_queue: %x " -"count_empty_packet_queue: %x" , - server->smbd_conn->count_receive_queue, - server->smbd_conn->count_empty_packet_queue); +seq_printf (m,"\nReceive buffers count_receive_queue: %x " , + server->smbd_conn->count_receive_queue); seq_printf(m, "\nMR responder_resources: %x " "max_frmr_depth: %x mr_type: %x", server->smbd_conn->responder_resources,
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +5 -57
122 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.h +0 -4
@@ -110,10 +110,6 @@ struct smbd_connection {int count_receive_queue;spinlock_t receive_queue_lock; -struct list_head empty_packet_queue; -int count_empty_packet_queue; -spinlock_t empty_packet_queue_lock; -wait_queue_head_t wait_receive_queues;/* Reassembly queue */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 426/480 smb: client: make sure we call ib_dma_unmap_single() only if we called ib_dma_map_single already
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 047682c370b6f18fec818b57b0ed8b501bdb79f8 ]
In case of failures either ib_dma_map_single() might not be called yet or ib_dma_unmap_single() was already called.
We should make sure put_receive_buffer() only calls ib_dma_unmap_single() if needed.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +9 -2
@@ -1057,6 +1057,7 @@ static int smbd_post_recv(if (rc) {ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, response->sge.addr, response->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + response->sge.length =0 ;smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info);log_rdma_recv (ERR ,"ib_post_recv failed rc=%d\n" , rc); }
@@ -1186,8 +1187,13 @@ static void put_receive_buffer(struct smbdirect_socket *sc = &info->socket;unsigned long flags; -ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, response->sge.addr, - response->sge.length,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (likely (response->sge.length !=0 )) { +ib_dma_unmap_single (sc->ib.dev, + response->sge.addr, + response->sge.length, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); + response->sge.length =0 ; + }spin_lock_irqsave (&info->receive_queue_lock, flags);list_add_tail (&response->list, &info->receive_queue);
@@ -1221,6 +1227,7 @@ static int allocate_receive_buffers(struct smbd_connection *info, int num_buf) goto allocate_failed; response->info = info; + response->sge.length =0 ;list_add_tail (&response->list, &info->receive_queue); info->count_receive_queue++; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 427/480 smb: client: let recv_done() cleanup before notifying the callers.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bdd7afc6dca5e0ebbb75583484aa6ea9e03fbb13 ]
We should call put_receive_buffer() before waking up the callers.
For the internal error case of response->type being unexpected, we now also call smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection() instead of not waking up the callers at all.
Note that the SMBD_TRANSFER_DATA case still has problems, which will be addressed in the next commit in order to make it easier to review this one.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +8 -6
@@ -454,7 +454,6 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)if (wc->status !=IB_WC_SUCCESS || wc->opcode !=IB_WC_RECV ) {log_rdma_recv (INFO ,"wc->status=%d opcode=%d\n" , wc->status, wc->opcode); -smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info); goto error; }
@@ -471,8 +470,9 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) info->full_packet_received = true; info->negotiate_done =process_negotiation_response (response, wc->byte_len); +put_receive_buffer (info, response);complete (&info->negotiate_completion); -break ; +return ;/* SMBD data transfer packet */ case SMBD_TRANSFER_DATA :
@@ -529,14 +529,16 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) }return ; - -default : -log_rdma_recv (ERR , -"unexpected response type=%d\n" , response->type); } +/* +* This is an internal error! +*/ +log_rdma_recv (ERR ,"unexpected response type=%d\n" , response->type); +WARN_ON_ONCE (response->type !=SMBD_TRANSFER_DATA ); error:put_receive_buffer (info, response); +smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection (info); } static struct rdma_cm_id *smbd_create_id(
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 428/480 smb: client: let recv_done() avoid touching data_transfer after cleanup/move
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 24eff17887cb45c25a427e662dda352973c5c171 ]
Calling enqueue_reassembly() and wake_up_interruptible(&info->wait_reassembly_queue) or put_receive_buffer() means the response/data_transfer pointer might get re-used by another thread, which means these should be
the last operations before calling return.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 25 +++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +11 -14
@@ -479,10 +479,6 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) data_transfer =smbd_response_payload (response); data_length =le32_to_cpu (data_transfer->data_length); -/* -* If this is a packet with data playload place the data in -* reassembly queue and wake up the reading thread -*/ if (data_length) {if (info->full_packet_received) response->first_segment = true;
@@ -491,16 +487,7 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) info->full_packet_received = false; else info->full_packet_received = true; - -enqueue_reassembly ( - info, - response, - data_length); - }else -put_receive_buffer (info, response); - -if (data_length) -wake_up_interruptible (&info->wait_reassembly_queue); + }atomic_dec (&info->receive_credits); info->receive_credit_target =
@@ -528,6 +515,16 @@ static void recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) info->keep_alive_requested =KEEP_ALIVE_PENDING ; } +/* +* If this is a packet with data playload place the data in +* reassembly queue and wake up the reading thread +*/ +if (data_length) { +enqueue_reassembly (info, response, data_length); +wake_up_interruptible (&info->wait_reassembly_queue); + }else +put_receive_buffer (info, response); +return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 429/480 nvmet: exit debugfs after discovery subsystem exits
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mohamed Khalfella <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 80f21806b8e34ae1e24c0fc6a0f0dfd9b055e130 ]
Commit 528589947c180 ("nvmet: initialize discovery subsys after debugfs is initialized") changed nvmet_init() to initialize nvme discovery after "nvmet" debugfs directory is initialized. The change broke nvmet_exit() because discovery subsystem now depends on debugfs. Debugfs should be destroyed after discovery subsystem. Fix nvmet_exit() to do that.
--- drivers/nvme/target/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/target/core.c +1 -1
@@ -1938,8 +1938,8 @@ static int __init nvmet_init(void) static void __exit nvmet_exit(void) {nvmet_exit_configfs (); -nvmet_exit_debugfs ();nvmet_exit_discovery (); +nvmet_exit_debugfs ();ida_destroy (&cntlid_ida);destroy_workqueue (nvmet_wq);destroy_workqueue (buffered_io_wq);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 430/480 pptp: fix pptp_xmit() error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae633388cae349886f1a3cfb27aa092854b24c1b ]
I accidentally added a bug in pptp_xmit() that syzbot caught for us.
Only call ip_rt_put() if a route has been allocated.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffdb PGD df3b067 P4D df3b067 PUD df3d067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6346 Comm: syz.0.336 Not tainted 6.16.0-next-20250804-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:arch_atomic_add_return arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:85 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:846 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:327 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcuref_put+0x172/0x210 include/linux/rcuref.h:173 Call Trace: <TASK> dst_release+0x24/0x1b0 net/core/dst.c:167 ip_rt_put include/net/route.h:285 [inline] pptp_xmit+0x14b/0x1a90 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:267 __ppp_channel_push+0xf2/0x1c0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2166 ppp_channel_push+0x123/0x660 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2198 ppp_write+0x2b0/0x400 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:544 vfs_write+0x27b/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
--- drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c +4 -3
@@ -159,17 +159,17 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)int len;unsigned char *data;__u32 seq_recv; -struct rtable *rt =NULL ; +struct rtable *rt;struct net_device *tdev;struct iphdr *iph;int max_headroom;if (sk_pppox (po)->sk_state &PPPOX_DEAD ) - goto tx_error; + goto tx_drop; rt =pptp_route_output (po, &fl4);if (IS_ERR (rt)) - goto tx_error; + goto tx_drop; tdev = rt->dst.dev;
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) tx_error:ip_rt_put (rt); +tx_drop:kfree_skb (skb);return 1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 431/480 smb: client: return an error if rdma_connect does not return within 5 seconds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 03537826f77f1c829d0593d211b38b9c876c1722 ]
This matches the timeout for tcp connections.
--- fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smbdirect.c +4 -2
@@ -1636,8 +1636,10 @@ static struct smbd_connection *_smbd_get_connection( goto rdma_connect_failed; } -wait_event_interruptible ( - info->conn_wait, sc->status !=SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTING ); +wait_event_interruptible_timeout ( + info->conn_wait, + sc->status !=SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTING , +msecs_to_jiffies (RDMA_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT ));if (sc->status !=SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_CONNECTED ) {log_rdma_event (ERR ,"rdma_connect failed port=%d\n" , port);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 432/480 tools/power turbostat: Fix bogus SysWatt for forked program
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 44207567fa64e995d4f2ec2d45af4c947cb1a465 ]
Similar to delta_cpu(), delta_platform() is called in turbostat main loop. This ensures accurate SysWatt readings in periodic monitoring mode
$ sudo turbostat -S -q --show power -i 1 CoreTmp PkgTmp PkgWatt CorWatt GFXWatt RAMWatt PKG_% RAM_% SysWatt 60 61 6.21 1.13 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.07 58 61 6.00 1.07 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.75 58 61 5.74 1.05 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.22 58 60 6.27 1.11 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.55
However, delta_platform() is missing for forked program and causes bogus SysWatt reporting,
$ sudo turbostat -S -q --show power sleep 1 1.004736 sec CoreTmp PkgTmp PkgWatt CorWatt GFXWatt RAMWatt PKG_% RAM_% SysWatt 57 58 6.05 1.02 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Add missing delta_platform() for forked program.
--- tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c +1 -0
@@ -9593,6 +9593,7 @@ int fork_it(char **argv)timersub (&tv_odd, &tv_even, &tv_delta);if (for_all_cpus_2 (delta_cpu,ODD_COUNTERS ,EVEN_COUNTERS ))fprintf (outf,"%s: Counter reset detected\n" , progname); +delta_platform (&platform_counters_odd, &platform_counters_even);compute_average (EVEN_COUNTERS );format_all_counters (EVEN_COUNTERS );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 433/480 nfsd: dont set the ctime on delegated atime updates
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
commit f9a348e0de19226fc3c7e81de7677d3fa2c4b2d8 upstream.
Clients will typically precede a DELEGRETURN for a delegation with delegated timestamp with a SETATTR to set the timestamps on the server to match what the client has.
knfsd implements this by using the nfsd_setattr() infrastructure, which will set ATTR_CTIME on any update that goes to notify_change(). This is problematic as it means that the client will get a spurious ctime update when updating the atime.
POSIX unfortunately doesn't phrase it succinctly, but updating the atime due to reads should not update the ctime. In this case, the client is sending a SETATTR to update the atime on the server to match its latest value. The ctime should not be advanced in this case as that would incorrectly indicate a change to the inode.
Fix this by not implicitly setting ATTR_CTIME when ATTR_DELEG is set in __nfsd_setattr(). The decoder for FATTR4_WORD2_TIME_DELEG_MODIFY already sets ATTR_CTIME, so this is sufficient to make it skip setting the ctime on atime-only updates.
--- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/vfs.c +9 -1
@@ -466,7 +466,15 @@ static int __nfsd_setattr(struct dentryif (!iap->ia_valid)return 0 ; - iap->ia_valid |=ATTR_CTIME ; +/* +* If ATTR_DELEG is set, then this is an update from a client that +* holds a delegation. If this is an update for only the atime, the +* ctime should not be changed. If the update contains the mtime +* too, then ATTR_CTIME should already be set. +*/ +if (!(iap->ia_valid &ATTR_DELEG )) + iap->ia_valid |=ATTR_CTIME ; +return notify_change (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, iap,NULL ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 434/480 nfsd: avoid ref leak in nfsd_open_local_fh()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit e5a73150776f18547ee685c9f6bfafe549714899 upstream.
If two calls to nfsd_open_local_fh() race and both successfully call nfsd_file_acquire_local(), they will both get an extra reference to the net to accompany the file reference stored in *pnf.
One of them will fail to store (using xchg()) the file reference in *pnf and will drop that reference but WON'T drop the accompanying reference to the net. This leak means that when the nfs server is shut down it will hang in nfsd_shutdown_net() waiting for &nn->nfsd_net_free_done.
This patch adds the missing nfsd_net_put().
--- fs/nfsd/localio.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/localio.c +3 -2
@@ -103,10 +103,11 @@ nfsd_open_local_fh(struct net *net, struct auth_domain *dom,if (nfsd_file_get (new) ==NULL ) goto again;/* -* Drop the ref we were going to install and the -* one we were going to return. +* Drop the ref we were going to install (both file and +* net) and the one we were going to return (only file). */ nfsd_file_put (localio); +nfsd_net_put (net);nfsd_file_put (localio); localio = new; }
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 435/480 sunrpc: fix handling of server side tls alerts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
commit bee47cb026e762841f3faece47b51f985e215edb upstream.
Scott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from the msg iterator's kvec..
kTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between the control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS aler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS alert's level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer.
This patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv.
--- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +35 -8
@@ -257,20 +257,47 @@ svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket }static int -svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (struct svc_sock *svsk,struct msghdr *msg) +svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (struct socket *sock,unsigned int *msg_flags) {union {struct cmsghdr cmsg;u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (u8))]; } u; -struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock; +u8 alert[2 ]; +struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len =sizeof (alert), + }; +struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen =sizeof (u), + }; +int ret; + +iov_iter_kvec (&msg.msg_iter,ITER_DEST , &alert_kvec,1 , + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, &msg,MSG_DONTWAIT ); +if (ret >0 && +tls_get_record_type (sock->sk, &u.cmsg) ==TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT ) { +iov_iter_revert (&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret =svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg (sock, &msg, &u.cmsg, -EAGAIN ); + } +return ret; +} + +static int +svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg (struct svc_sock *svsk,struct msghdr *msg) +{int ret; +struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen =sizeof (u); ret =sock_recvmsg (sock, msg,MSG_DONTWAIT ); -if (unlikely (msg->msg_controllen !=sizeof (u))) - ret =svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg (sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); +if (msg->msg_flags &MSG_CTRUNC ) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC |MSG_EOR ); +if (ret ==0 || ret == -EIO ) + ret =svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (sock, &msg->msg_flags); + }return ret; }
@@ -321,7 +348,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_msg(struct siov_iter_advance (&msg.msg_iter, seek); buflen -= seek; } - len =svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (svsk, &msg); + len =svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg (svsk, &msg);if (len >0 )svc_flush_bvec (bvec, len, seek);
@@ -1019,7 +1046,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struc iov.iov_base = ((char *)&svsk->sk_marker) + svsk->sk_tcplen; iov.iov_len = want;iov_iter_kvec (&msg.msg_iter,ITER_DEST , &iov,1 , want); - len =svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg (svsk, &msg); + len =svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg (svsk, &msg);if (len <0 )return len; svsk->sk_tcplen += len;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 436/480 perf/core: Preserve AUX buffer allocation failure result
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 54473e0ef849f44e5ee43e6d6746c27030c3825b upstream.
A recent overhaul sets the return value to 0 unconditionally after the allocations, which causes reference count leaks and corrupts the user->vm accounting.
Preserve the AUX buffer allocation failure return value, so that the subsequent code works correctly.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +1 -2
@@ -7052,6 +7052,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file,perf_event_update_time (event);perf_event_init_userpage (event);perf_event_update_userpage (event); + ret =0 ; }else { ret =rb_alloc_aux (rb, event, vma->vm_pgoff, nr_pages, event->attr.aux_watermark, flags);
@@ -7059,8 +7060,6 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, rb->aux_mmap_locked = extra; } - ret =0 ; - unlock:if (!ret) {atomic_long_add (user_extra, &user->locked_vm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 437/480 perf/core: Dont leak AUX buffer refcount on allocation failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 5468c0fbccbb9d156522c50832244a8b722374fb upstream.
Failure of the AUX buffer allocation leaks the reference count.
Set the reference count to 1 only when the allocation succeeds.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +4 -3
@@ -6988,8 +6988,6 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, ret =0 ; goto unlock; } - -atomic_set (&rb->aux_mmap_count,1 ); } user_lock_limit = sysctl_perf_event_mlock >> (PAGE_SHIFT -10 );
@@ -7056,8 +7054,10 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, }else { ret =rb_alloc_aux (rb, event, vma->vm_pgoff, nr_pages, event->attr.aux_watermark, flags); -if (!ret) +if (!ret) { +atomic_set (&rb->aux_mmap_count,1 ); rb->aux_mmap_locked = extra; + } } unlock:
@@ -7067,6 +7067,7 @@ unlock:atomic_inc (&event->mmap_count); }else if (rb) { +/* AUX allocation failed */ atomic_dec (&rb->mmap_count); } aux_unlock:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 438/480 perf/core: Exit early on perf_mmap() fail
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 07091aade394f690e7b655578140ef84d0e8d7b0 upstream.
When perf_mmap() fails to allocate a buffer, it still invokes the event_mapped() callback of the related event. On X86 this might increase the perf_rdpmc_allowed reference counter. But nothing undoes this as perf_mmap_close() is never called in this case, which causes another reference count leak.
Return early on failure to prevent that.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +4 -2
@@ -7075,6 +7075,9 @@ aux_unlock:mutex_unlock (aux_mutex);mutex_unlock (&event->mmap_mutex); +if (ret) +return ret; +/* * Since pinned accounting is per vm we cannot allow fork() to copy our * vma.
@@ -7082,8 +7085,7 @@ aux_unlock:vm_flags_set (vma,VM_DONTCOPY |VM_DONTEXPAND |VM_DONTDUMP ); vma->vm_ops = &perf_mmap_vmops; -if (!ret) - ret =map_range (rb, vma); + ret =map_range (rb, vma);if (!ret && event->pmu->event_mapped) event->pmu->event_mapped (event, vma->vm_mm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 439/480 perf/core: Handle buffer mapping fail correctly in perf_mmap()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit f74b9f4ba63ffdf597aaaa6cad7e284cb8e04820 upstream.
After successful allocation of a buffer or a successful attachment to an existing buffer perf_mmap() tries to map the buffer read only into the page table. If that fails, the already set up page table entries are zapped, but the other perf specific side effects of that failure are not handled. The calling code just cleans up the VMA and does not invoke perf_mmap_close().
This leaks reference counts, corrupts user->vm accounting and also results in an unbalanced invocation of event::event_mapped().
Cure this by moving the event::event_mapped() invocation before the map_range() call so that on map_range() failure perf_mmap_close() can be invoked without causing an unbalanced event::event_unmapped() call.
perf_mmap_close() undoes the reference counts and eventually frees buffers.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +11 -3
@@ -7085,11 +7085,19 @@ aux_unlock:vm_flags_set (vma,VM_DONTCOPY |VM_DONTEXPAND |VM_DONTDUMP ); vma->vm_ops = &perf_mmap_vmops; - ret =map_range (rb, vma); - -if (!ret && event->pmu->event_mapped) +if (event->pmu->event_mapped) event->pmu->event_mapped (event, vma->vm_mm); +/* +* Try to map it into the page table. On fail, invoke +* perf_mmap_close() to undo the above, as the callsite expects +* full cleanup in this case and therefore does not invoke +* vmops::close(). +*/ + ret =map_range (rb, vma); +if (ret) +perf_mmap_close (vma); +return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 440/480 perf/core: Prevent VMA split of buffer mappings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit b024d7b56c77191cde544f838debb7f8451cd0d6 upstream.
The perf mmap code is careful about mmap()'ing the user page with the ringbuffer and additionally the auxiliary buffer, when the event supports it. Once the first mapping is established, subsequent mapping have to use the same offset and the same size in both cases. The reference counting for the ringbuffer and the auxiliary buffer depends on this being correct.
Though perf does not prevent that a related mapping is split via mmap(2), munmap(2) or mremap(2). A split of a VMA results in perf_mmap_open() calls, which take reference counts, but then the subsequent perf_mmap_close() calls are not longer fulfilling the offset and size checks. This leads to reference count leaks.
As perf already has the requirement for subsequent mappings to match the initial mapping, the obvious consequence is that VMA splits, caused by resizing of a mapping or partial unmapping, have to be prevented.
Implement the vm_operations_struct::may_split() callback and return unconditionally -EINVAL.
That ensures that the mapping offsets and sizes cannot be changed after the fact. Remapping to a different fixed address with the same size is still possible as it takes the references for the new mapping and drops those of the old mapping.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
kernel/events/core.c +10 -0
@@ -6790,10 +6790,20 @@ static vm_fault_t perf_mmap_pfn_mkwrite(return vmf->pgoff ==0 ?0 :VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; } +static int perf_mmap_may_split (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long addr) +{ +/* +* Forbid splitting perf mappings to prevent refcount leaks due to +* the resulting non-matching offsets and sizes. See open()/close(). +*/ +return -EINVAL ; +} +static const struct vm_operations_struct perf_mmap_vmops = { .open = perf_mmap_open, .close = perf_mmap_close,/* non mergeable */ .pfn_mkwrite = perf_mmap_pfn_mkwrite, + .may_split = perf_mmap_may_split, };static int map_range (struct perf_buffer *rb,struct vm_area_struct *vma)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 441/480 selftests/perf_events: Add a mmap() correctness test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
commit 084d2ac4030c5919e85bba1f4af26e33491469cb upstream.
Exercise various mmap(), munmap() and mremap() invocations, which might cause a perf buffer mapping to be split or truncated.
To avoid hard coding the perf event and having dependencies on architectures and configuration options, scan through event types in sysfs and try to open them. On success, try to mmap() and if that succeeds try to mmap() the AUX buffer.
In case that no AUX buffer supporting event is found, only test the base buffer mapping. If no mappable event is found or permissions are not sufficient, skip the tests.
Reserve a PROT_NONE region for both rb and aux tests to allow testing the case where mremap unmaps beyond the end of a mapped VMA to prevent it from unmapping unrelated mappings.
--- tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/.gitignore | 1 tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/Makefile | 2 tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/mmap.c | 236 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/mmap.c
tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ sigtrap_threads remove_on_exec watermark_signal +mmap
tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ CFLAGS += -Wl,-no-as-needed -Wall $(KHDR_INCLUDES) LDFLAGS += -lpthread -TEST_GEN_PROGS := sigtrap_threads remove_on_exec watermark_signal +TEST_GEN_PROGS := sigtrap_threads remove_on_exec watermark_signal mmap include ../lib.mk
tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/mmap.c new file +236 -0
236 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 442/480 net/packet: fix a race in packet_set_ring() and packet_notifier()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Quang Le <[email protected]>
commit 01d3c8417b9c1b884a8a981a3b886da556512f36 upstream.
When packet_set_ring() releases po->bind_lock, another thread can run packet_notifier() and process an NETDEV_UP event.
This race and the fix are both similar to that of commit 15fe076edea7 ("net/packet: fix a race in packet_bind() and packet_notifier()").
There too the packet_notifier NETDEV_UP event managed to run while a po->bind_lock critical section had to be temporarily released. And the fix was similarly to temporarily set po->num to zero to keep the socket unhooked until the lock is retaken.
The po->bind_lock in packet_set_ring and packet_notifier precede the introduction of git history.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +6 -6
@@ -4573,10 +4573,10 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *spin_lock (&po->bind_lock); was_running =packet_sock_flag (po,PACKET_SOCK_RUNNING ); num = po->num; -if (was_running) { -WRITE_ONCE (po->num,0 ); +WRITE_ONCE (po->num,0 ); +if (was_running)__unregister_prot_hook (sk, false); - } +spin_unlock (&po->bind_lock);synchronize_net ();
@@ -4608,10 +4608,10 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *mutex_unlock (&po->pg_vec_lock);spin_lock (&po->bind_lock); -if (was_running) { -WRITE_ONCE (po->num, num); +WRITE_ONCE (po->num, num); +if (was_running)register_prot_hook (sk); - } +spin_unlock (&po->bind_lock);if (pg_vec && (po->tp_version >TPACKET_V2 )) {/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 443/480 vsock: Do not allow binding to VMADDR_PORT_ANY
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Budimir Markovic <[email protected]>
commit aba0c94f61ec05315fa7815d21aefa4c87f6a9f4 upstream.
It is possible for a vsock to autobind to VMADDR_PORT_ANY. This can cause a use-after-free when a connection is made to the bound socket. The socket returned by accept() also has port VMADDR_PORT_ANY but is not on the list of unbound sockets. Binding it will result in an extra refcount decrement similar to the one fixed in fcdd2242c023 (vsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction).
Modify the check in __vsock_bind_connectible() to also prevent binding to VMADDR_PORT_ANY.
--- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +2 -1
@@ -689,7 +689,8 @@ static int __vsock_bind_connectible(struunsigned int i;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_PORT_RETRIES ; i++) { -if (port <=LAST_RESERVED_PORT ) +if (port ==VMADDR_PORT_ANY || + port <=LAST_RESERVED_PORT ) port =LAST_RESERVED_PORT +1 ; new_addr.svm_port = port++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 444/480 ksmbd: fix null pointer dereference error in generate_encryptionkey
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 9b493ab6f35178afd8d619800df9071992f715de upstream.
If client send two session setups with krb5 authenticate to ksmbd, null pointer dereference error in generate_encryptionkey could happen. sess->Preauth_HashValue is set to NULL if session is valid. So this patch skip generate encryption key if session is valid.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +16 -2
@@ -1621,11 +1621,24 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmb rsp->SecurityBufferLength =cpu_to_le16 (out_len); -if ((conn->sign || server_conf.enforced_signing) || +/* +* If session state is SMB2_SESSION_VALID, We can assume +* that it is reauthentication. And the user/password +* has been verified, so return it here. +*/ +if (sess->state ==SMB2_SESSION_VALID ) { +if (conn->binding) + goto binding_session; +return 0 ; + } + +if ((rsp->SessionFlags !=SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST_LE && + (conn->sign || server_conf.enforced_signing)) || (req->SecurityMode &SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED )) sess->sign = true; -if (smb3_encryption_negotiated (conn)) { +if (smb3_encryption_negotiated (conn) && + !(req->Flags &SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING )) { retval = conn->ops->generate_encryptionkey (conn, sess);if (retval) { ksmbd_debug(SMB,
@@ -1638,6 +1651,7 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmb sess->sign = false; } +binding_session:if (conn->dialect >=SMB30_PROT_ID ) { chann =lookup_chann_list (sess, conn);if (!chann) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 445/480 ksmbd: fix Preauh_HashValue race condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 44a3059c4c8cc635a1fb2afd692d0730ca1ba4b6 upstream.
If client send multiple session setup requests to ksmbd, Preauh_HashValue race condition could happen.
There is no need to free sess->Preauh_HashValue at session setup phase. It can be freed together with session at connection termination phase.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +0 -4
@@ -1847,8 +1847,6 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *wksmbd_conn_set_good (conn); sess->state =SMB2_SESSION_VALID ; } -kfree (sess->Preauth_HashValue); - sess->Preauth_HashValue =NULL ; }else if (conn->preferred_auth_mech ==KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP ) {if (negblob->MessageType == NtLmNegotiate) { rc =ntlm_negotiate (work, negblob, negblob_len, rsp);
@@ -1875,8 +1873,6 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *wkfree (preauth_sess); } } -kfree (sess->Preauth_HashValue); - sess->Preauth_HashValue =NULL ; }else {pr_info_ratelimited ("Unknown NTLMSSP message type : 0x%x\n" ,le32_to_cpu (negblob->MessageType));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 446/480 ksmbd: fix corrupted mtime and ctime in smb2_open
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 4f8ff9486fd94b9d6a4932f2aefb9f2fc3bd0cf6 upstream.
If STATX_BASIC_STATS flags are not given as an argument to vfs_getattr, It can not get ctime and mtime in kstat.
This causes a problem showing mtime and ctime outdated from cifs.ko.
File: /xfstest.test/foo
Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 regular file
Device: 0,65 Inode: 2033391 Links: 1
Access: (0755/-rwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: system_u:object_r:cifs_t:s0
Access: 2025-07-23 22:15:30.136051900 +0100
Modify: 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
Change: 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
Birth: 2025-07-23 22:15:30.136051900 +0100
--- fs/smb/server/vfs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/vfs.c +2 -1
@@ -546,7 +546,8 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_getattr(const struct path {int err; - err =vfs_getattr (path, stat,STATX_BTIME ,AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT ); + err =vfs_getattr (path, stat,STATX_BASIC_STATS |STATX_BTIME , +AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT );if (err)pr_err ("getattr failed, err %d\n" , err);return err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 447/480 smb: client: fix netns refcount leak after net_passive changes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>
commit 59b33fab4ca4d7dacc03367082777627e05d0323 upstream.
After commit 5c70eb5c593d ("net: better track kernel sockets lifetime"), kernel sockets now use net_passive reference counting. However, commit 95d2b9f693ff ("Revert "smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod"") restored the manual socket refcount manipulation without adapting to this new mechanism, causing a memory leak.
The issue can be reproduced by[1]:
1. Creating a network namespace
2. Mounting and Unmounting CIFS within the namespace
3. Deleting the namespace
Some memory leaks may appear after a period of time following step 3.
unreferenced object 0xffff9951419f6b00 (size 256):
comm "ip", pid 447, jiffies 4294692389 (age 14.730s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 77 c2 44 51 99 ff ff .........w.DQ...
backtrace:
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x30e/0x3d0
__kmalloc+0x52/0x120
net_alloc_generic+0x1d/0x30
copy_net_ns+0x86/0x200
create_new_namespaces+0x117/0x300
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x60/0xa0
ksys_unshare+0x148/0x360
__x64_sys_unshare+0x12/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2...
unreferenced object 0xffff9951442e7500 (size 32):
comm "mount.cifs", pid 475, jiffies 4294693782 (age 13.343s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
40 c5 38 46 51 99 ff ff 18 01 96 42 51 99 ff ff @.8FQ......BQ...
01 00 00 00 6f 00 c5 07 6f 00 d8 07 00 00 00 00 ....o...o.......
backtrace:
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x30e/0x3d0
kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0x90
ref_tracker_alloc+0x8e/0x1d0
sk_alloc+0x18c/0x1c0
inet_create+0xf1/0x370
__sock_create+0xd7/0x1e0
generic_ip_connect+0x1d4/0x5a0 [cifs]
cifs_get_tcp_session+0x5d0/0x8a0 [cifs]
cifs_mount_get_session+0x47/0x1b0 [cifs]
dfs_mount_share+0xfa/0xa10 [cifs]
cifs_mount+0x68/0x2b0 [cifs]
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x10b/0x760 [cifs]
smb3_get_tree+0x112/0x2e0 [cifs]
vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xf0
path_mount+0x2d4/0xa00
__se_sys_mount+0x165/0x1d0Root cause:
When creating kernel sockets, sk_alloc() calls net_passive_inc() for sockets with sk_net_refcnt=0. The CIFS code manually converts kernel sockets to user sockets by setting sk_net_refcnt=1, but doesn't call the corresponding net_passive_dec(). This creates an imbalance in the net_passive counter, which prevents the network namespace from being destroyed when its last user reference is dropped. As a result, the entire namespace and all its associated resources remain allocated.
Timeline of patches leading to this issue:
- commit ef7134c7fc48 ("smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace.") in v6.12 fixed the original netns UAF by manually managing socket refcounts
- commit e9f2517a3e18 ("smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod") in v6.13 attempted to use kernel sockets but introduced TCP timer issues
- commit 5c70eb5c593d ("net: better track kernel sockets lifetime") in v6.14-rc5 introduced the net_passive mechanism with sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() for proper socket conversion
- commit 95d2b9f693ff ("Revert "smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod"") in v6.15-rc3 reverted to manual refcount management without adapting to the new net_passive changes
Fix this by using sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() which properly handles the net_passive counter when converting kernel sockets to user sockets.
--- fs/smb/client/connect.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/connect.c +3 -6
@@ -3362,18 +3362,15 @@ generic_ip_connect(struct TCP_Server_Infstruct net *net =cifs_net_ns (server);struct sock *sk; - rc =__sock_create (net, sfamily,SOCK_STREAM , -IPPROTO_TCP , &server->ssocket,1 ); + rc =sock_create_kern (net, sfamily,SOCK_STREAM , +IPPROTO_TCP , &server->ssocket);if (rc <0 ) {cifs_server_dbg (VFS ,"Error %d creating socket\n" , rc);return rc; } sk = server->ssocket->sk; -__netns_tracker_free (net, &sk->ns_tracker, false); - sk->sk_net_refcnt =1 ; -get_net_track (net, &sk->ns_tracker,GFP_KERNEL ); -sock_inuse_add (net,1 ); +sk_net_refcnt_upgrade (sk);/* BB other socket options to set KEEPALIVE, NODELAY? */ cifs_dbg (FYI ,"Socket created\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 448/480 smb: client: set symlink type as native for POSIX mounts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
commit a967e758f8e9d8ce5ef096743393df5e6e51644b upstream.
SMB3.1.1 POSIX mounts require symlinks to be created natively with IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK reparse point.
--- fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c | 2 +- fs/smb/client/fs_context.c | 18 ------------------ fs/smb/client/fs_context.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++- fs/smb/client/link.c | 11 +++-------- fs/smb/client/reparse.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c +1 -1
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, stelse seq_puts (s,",nativesocket" );seq_show_option (s,"symlink" , -cifs_symlink_type_str (get_cifs_symlink_type (cifs_sb))); +cifs_symlink_type_str (cifs_symlink_type (cifs_sb)));seq_printf (s,",rsize=%u" , cifs_sb->ctx->rsize);seq_printf (s,",wsize=%u" , cifs_sb->ctx->wsize);
fs/smb/client/fs_context.c +0 -18
@@ -1851,24 +1851,6 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(sreturn -EINVAL ; } -enum cifs_symlink_type get_cifs_symlink_type (struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb) -{ -if (cifs_sb->ctx->symlink_type ==CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_DEFAULT ) { -if (cifs_sb->ctx->mfsymlinks) -return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_MFSYMLINKS ; -else if (cifs_sb->ctx->sfu_emul) -return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_SFU ; -else if (cifs_sb->ctx->linux_ext && !cifs_sb->ctx->no_linux_ext) -return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_UNIX ; -else if (cifs_sb->ctx->reparse_type !=CIFS_REPARSE_TYPE_NONE ) -return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NATIVE ; -else -return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NONE ; - }else { -return cifs_sb->ctx->symlink_type; - } -} -int smb3_init_fs_context (struct fs_context *fc) {struct smb3_fs_context *ctx;
fs/smb/client/fs_context.h +17 -1
@@ -341,7 +341,23 @@ struct smb3_fs_context {extern const struct fs_parameter_spec smb3_fs_parameters[]; -extern enum cifs_symlink_type get_cifs_symlink_type (struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb); +static inline enum cifs_symlink_type cifs_symlink_type (struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb) +{ +bool posix =cifs_sb_master_tcon (cifs_sb)->posix_extensions; + +if (cifs_sb->ctx->symlink_type !=CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_DEFAULT ) +return cifs_sb->ctx->symlink_type; + +if (cifs_sb->ctx->mfsymlinks) +return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_MFSYMLINKS ; +else if (cifs_sb->ctx->sfu_emul) +return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_SFU ; +else if (cifs_sb->ctx->linux_ext && !cifs_sb->ctx->no_linux_ext) +return posix ?CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NATIVE :CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_UNIX ; +else if (cifs_sb->ctx->reparse_type !=CIFS_REPARSE_TYPE_NONE ) +return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NATIVE ; +return CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NONE ; +}extern int smb3_init_fs_context (struct fs_context *fc);extern void smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents (struct smb3_fs_context *ctx);
fs/smb/client/link.c +3 -8
@@ -606,14 +606,7 @@ cifs_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, st/* BB what if DFS and this volume is on different share? BB */ rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; -switch (get_cifs_symlink_type (cifs_sb)) { -case CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_DEFAULT : -/* should not happen, get_cifs_symlink_type() resolves the default */ -break ; - -case CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NONE : -break ; - +switch (cifs_symlink_type (cifs_sb)) {case CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_UNIX :#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY if (pTcon->unix_ext) {
@@ -653,6 +646,8 @@ cifs_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, st goto symlink_exit; }break ; +default : +break ; }if (rc ==0 ) {
fs/smb/client/reparse.c +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int smb2_create_reparse_symlink(const un struct dentry *dentry, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const char *full_path, const char *symname) { - switch (get_cifs_symlink_type(CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb))) { + switch (cifs_symlink_type(CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb))) { case CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NATIVE: return create_native_symlink(xid, inode, dentry, tcon, full_path, symname);case CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_NFS :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 449/480 smb: client: default to nonativesocket under POSIX mounts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
commit 6b445309eec2bc0594f3e24c7777aeef891d386e upstream.
SMB3.1.1 POSIX mounts require sockets to be created with NFS reparse points.
--- fs/smb/client/fs_context.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/smb/client/fs_context.c +1 -0
@@ -1674,6 +1674,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(spr_warn_once ("conflicting posix mount options specified\n" ); ctx->linux_ext =1 ; ctx->no_linux_ext =0 ; + ctx->nonativesocket =1 ;/* POSIX mounts use NFS style reparse points */ }break ;case Opt_nocase:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 450/480 ksmbd: limit repeated connections from clients with the same IP
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit e6bb9193974059ddbb0ce7763fa3882bd60d4dc3 upstream.
Repeated connections from clients with the same IP address may exhaust the max connections and prevent other normal client connections. This patch limit repeated connections from clients with the same IP.
--- fs/smb/server/connection.h | 1 + fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
fs/smb/server/connection.h +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct ksmbd_conn {struct mutex srv_mutex;int status;unsigned int cli_cap; +__be32 inet_addr;char *request_buf;struct ksmbd_transport *transport;struct nls_table *local_nls;
fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c +17 -0
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static struct tcp_transport *alloc_transreturn NULL ; } + conn->inet_addr =inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr; conn->transport =KSMBD_TRANS (t);KSMBD_TRANS (t)->conn = conn;KSMBD_TRANS (t)->ops = &ksmbd_tcp_transport_ops;
@@ -230,6 +231,8 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p) {struct socket *client_sk =NULL ;struct interface *iface = (struct interface *)p; +struct inet_sock *csk_inet; +struct ksmbd_conn *conn;int ret;while (!kthread_should_stop ()) {
@@ -248,6 +251,20 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p)continue ; } +/* +* Limits repeated connections from clients with the same IP. +*/ + csk_inet =inet_sk (client_sk->sk); +down_read (&conn_list_lock); +list_for_each_entry (conn, &conn_list, conns_list) +if (csk_inet->inet_daddr == conn->inet_addr) { + ret = -EAGAIN ; +break ; + } +up_read (&conn_list_lock); +if (ret == -EAGAIN ) +continue ; +if (server_conf.max_connections &&atomic_inc_return (&active_num_conn) >= server_conf.max_connections) { pr_info_ratelimited("Limit the maximum number of connections(%u)\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 451/480 smb: server: Fix extension string in ksmbd_extract_shortname()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 8e7d178d06e8937454b6d2f2811fa6a15656a214 upstream.
In ksmbd_extract_shortname(), strscpy() is incorrectly called with the length of the source string (excluding the NUL terminator) rather than the size of the destination buffer. This results in "__" being copied to 'extension' rather than "___" (two underscores instead of three).
Use the destination buffer size instead to ensure that the string "___" (three underscores) is copied correctly.
--- fs/smb/server/smb_common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/smb_common.c +1 -1
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ int ksmbd_extract_shortname(struct ksmbd p =strrchr (longname,'.' );if (p == longname) {/*name starts with a dot*/ -strscpy (extension,"___" ,strlen ("___" )); +strscpy (extension,"___" ,sizeof (extension)); }else {if (p) { p++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 452/480 USB: serial: option: add Foxconn T99W709
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Slark Xiao <[email protected]>
commit ad1244e1ce18f8c1a5ebad8074bfcf10eacb0311 upstream.
T99W709 is designed based on MTK T300(5G redcap) chip. There are 7 serial ports to be enumerated: AP_LOG, GNSS, AP_META, AT, MD_META, NPT, DBG. RSVD(5) for ADB port.
test evidence as below:
T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 7 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0489 ProdID=e15f Rev=00.01 S: Manufacturer=MediaTek Inc. S: Product=USB DATA CARD S: SerialNumber=355511220000399 C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs I: If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +2 -0
@@ -2346,6 +2346,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option .driver_info = RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x0489, 0xe145, 0xff), /* Foxconn T99W651 RNDIS */ .driver_info = RSVD(5) | RSVD(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x0489, 0xe15f, 0xff), /* Foxconn T99W709 */ + .driver_info = RSVD(5) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x0489, 0xe167, 0xff), /* Foxconn T99W640 MBIM */ .driver_info = RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x1508, 0x1001), /* Fibocom NL668 (IOT version) */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 453/480 Bluetooth: btusb: Add USB ID 3625:010b for TP-LINK Archer TX10UB Nano
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zenm Chen <[email protected]>
commit d9da920233ec85af8b9c87154f2721a7dc4623f5 upstream.
Add USB ID 3625:010b for TP-LINK Archer TX10UB Nano which is based on a Realtek RTL8851BU chip.
The information in /sys/kernel/debug/usb/devices about the Bluetooth device is listed as the below:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 9 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=3625 ProdID=010b Rev= 0.00
S: Manufacturer=Realtek
S: Product=802.11ax WLAN Adapter
S: SerialNumber=00e04c000001
C:* #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
A: FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 2 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 3 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 4 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 5 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 6 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 63 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 63 Ivl=1ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 8 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=rtl8851bu
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=09(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=0a(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=0b(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=0c(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
--- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +4 -0
@@ -516,6 +516,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id quirks { USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0xb850), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK }, { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3600), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK }, + /* Realtek 8851BU Bluetooth devices */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x3625, 0x010b), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + /* Realtek 8852AE Bluetooth devices */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0x2852), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 454/480 net: usbnet: Avoid potential RCU stall on LINK_CHANGE event
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Ernberg <[email protected]>
commit 0d9cfc9b8cb17dbc29a98792d36ec39a1cf1395f upstream.
The Gemalto Cinterion PLS83-W modem (cdc_ether) is emitting confusing link up and down events when the WWAN interface is activated on the modem-side.
Interrupt URBs will in consecutive polls grab:
* Link Connected
* Link Disconnected
* Link Connected
Where the last Connected is then a stable link state.
When the system is under load this may cause the unlink_urbs() work in __handle_link_change() to not complete before the next usbnet_link_change() call turns the carrier on again, allowing rx_submit() to queue new SKBs.
In that event the URB queue is filled faster than it can drain, ending up in a RCU stall:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 0-.... } 33108 jiffies s: 201 root: 0x1/.
rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug):
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
Call trace:
arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8
local_bh_enable+0x18/0x20
__netdev_alloc_skb+0x18c/0x1cc
rx_submit+0x68/0x1f8 [usbnet]
rx_alloc_submit+0x4c/0x74 [usbnet]
usbnet_bh+0x1d8/0x218 [usbnet]
usbnet_bh_tasklet+0x10/0x18 [usbnet]
tasklet_action_common+0xa8/0x110
tasklet_action+0x2c/0x34
handle_softirqs+0x2cc/0x3a0
__do_softirq+0x10/0x18
____do_softirq+0xc/0x14
call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34
do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa8/0xb8
irq_exit_rcu+0xc/0x30
el1_interrupt+0x34/0x48
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x1c
el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x48
xhci_urb_dequeue+0x1ac/0x45c [xhci_hcd]
unlink1+0xd4/0xdc [usbcore]
usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x70/0xb0 [usbcore]
usb_unlink_urb+0x24/0x44 [usbcore]
unlink_urbs.constprop.0.isra.0+0x64/0xa8 [usbnet]
__handle_link_change+0x34/0x70 [usbnet]
usbnet_deferred_kevent+0x1c0/0x320 [usbnet]
process_scheduled_works+0x2d0/0x48c
worker_thread+0x150/0x1dc
kthread+0xd8/0xe8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20Get around the problem by delaying the carrier on to the scheduled work.
This needs a new flag to keep track of the necessary action.
The carrier ok check cannot be removed as it remains required for the LINK_RESET event flow.
--- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 11 ++++++++--- include/linux/usb/usbnet.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +8 -3
@@ -1122,6 +1122,9 @@ static void __handle_link_change(struct* tx queue is stopped by netcore after link becomes off */ }else { +if (test_and_clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags)) +netif_carrier_on (dev->net); +/* submitting URBs for reading packets */ tasklet_schedule (&dev->bh); }
@@ -2009,10 +2012,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(usbnet_manage_power);void usbnet_link_change (struct usbnet *dev,bool link,bool need_reset) {/* update link after link is reseted */ -if (link && !need_reset) -netif_carrier_on (dev->net); -else +if (link && !need_reset) { +set_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags); + }else { +clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags);netif_carrier_off (dev->net); + }if (need_reset && link)usbnet_defer_kevent (dev,EVENT_LINK_RESET );
include/linux/usb/usbnet.h +1 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct usbnet {# define EVENT_LINK_CHANGE 11# define EVENT_SET_RX_MODE 12# define EVENT_NO_IP_ALIGN 13 +# define EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON 14/* This one is special, as it indicates that the device is going away * there are cyclic dependencies between tasklet, timer and bh * that must be broken
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 455/480 net: usbnet: Fix the wrong netif_carrier_on() call
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ammar Faizi <[email protected]>
commit 8466d393700f9ccef68134d3349f4e0a087679b9 upstream.
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag causes usbnet to malfunction (identified via git bisect). Post-commit, my external RJ45 LAN cable fails to connect. Linus also reported the same issue after pulling that commit.
The code has a logic error: netif_carrier_on() is only called when the link is already on. Fix this by moving the netif_carrier_on() call outside the if-statement entirely. This ensures it is always called when EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON is set and properly clears it regardless of the link state.
--- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +3 -3
@@ -1113,6 +1113,9 @@ static void __handle_link_change(structif (!test_bit (EVENT_DEV_OPEN , &dev->flags))return ; +if (test_and_clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags)) +netif_carrier_on (dev->net); +if (!netif_carrier_ok (dev->net)) {/* kill URBs for reading packets to save bus bandwidth */ unlink_urbs (dev, &dev->rxq);
@@ -1122,9 +1125,6 @@ static void __handle_link_change(struct* tx queue is stopped by netcore after link becomes off */ }else { -if (test_and_clear_bit (EVENT_LINK_CARRIER_ON , &dev->flags)) -netif_carrier_on (dev->net); -/* submitting URBs for reading packets */ tasklet_schedule (&dev->bh); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 456/480 x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Commit 7b306dfa326f70114312b320d083b21fa9481e1e upstream.
An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private. The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation.
CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit that, when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this vulnerability is not needed.
Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP guest is vulnerable.
--- arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c | 13 ++++++++++ arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c +13 -0
@@ -106,5 +106,18 @@ void get_cpuflags(void)cpuid (0x80000001 , &ignored, &ignored, &cpu.flags[6 ], &cpu.flags[1 ]); } + +if (max_amd_level >=0x8000001f ) { +u32 ebx; + +/* +* The X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO feature bit is in +* the virtualization flags entry (word 8) and set by +* scattered.c, so the bit needs to be explicitly set. +*/ +cpuid (0x8000001f , &ignored, &ebx, &ignored, &ignored); +if (ebx &BIT (31 )) +set_bit (X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO , cpu.flags); + } } }
arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c +46 -0
68 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY ( 8*32+ 1)/* "flexpriority" Intel FlexPriority */ #define X86_FEATURE_EPT ( 8*32+ 2)/* "ept" Intel Extended Page Table */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPID ( 8*32+ 3)/* "vpid" Intel Virtual Processor ID */ +#define X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO ( 8*32+ 4)/* SNP cache coherency software work around not needed */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL ( 8*32+15)/* "vmmcall" Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */ #define X86_FEATURE_XENPV ( 8*32+16)/* Xen paravirtual guest */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_FAST_CPPC, CPUID_EDX, 15, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO, CPUID_EBX, 31, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_SMBA, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x80000020, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_BMEC, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x80000020, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 457/480 ALSA: intel_hdmi: Fix off-by-one error in __hdmi_lpe_audio_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 8cbe564974248ee980562be02f2b1912769562c7 upstream.
In __hdmi_lpe_audio_probe(), strscpy() is incorrectly called with the length of the source string (excluding the NUL terminator) rather than the size of the destination buffer. This results in one character less being copied from 'card->shortname' to 'pcm->name'.
Use the destination buffer size instead to ensure the card name is copied correctly.
--- sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c +1 -1
@@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@ static int __hdmi_lpe_audio_probe(struct/* setup private data which can be retrieved when required */ pcm->private_data = ctx; pcm->info_flags =0 ; -strscpy (pcm->name, card->shortname,strlen (card->shortname)); +strscpy (pcm->name, card->shortname,sizeof (pcm->name));/* setup the ops for playback */ snd_pcm_set_ops (pcm,SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK , &had_pcm_ops);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 458/480 ALSA: scarlett2: Add retry on -EPROTO from scarlett2_usb_tx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geoffrey D. Bennett <[email protected]>
commit 8a15ca0ca51399b652b1bbb23b590b220cf03d62 upstream.
During communication with Focusrite Scarlett Gen 2/3/4 USB audio interfaces, -EPROTO is sometimes returned from scarlett2_usb_tx(), snd_usb_ctl_msg() which can cause initialisation and control operations to fail intermittently.
This patch adds up to 5 retries in scarlett2_usb(), with a delay starting at 5ms and doubling each time. This follows the same approach as the fix for usb_set_interface() in endpoint.c (commit f406005e162b ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add retry on -EPROTO from usb_set_interface()")), which resolved similar -EPROTO issues during device initialisation, and is the same approach as in fcp.c:fcp_usb().
--- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c +7 -0
@@ -2351,6 +2351,8 @@ static int scarlett2_usb(struct scarlett2_usb_packet *req, *resp =NULL ;size_t req_buf_size =struct_size (req, data, req_size);size_t resp_buf_size =struct_size (resp, data, resp_size); +int retries =0 ; +const int max_retries =5 ;int err; req =kmalloc (req_buf_size,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -2374,10 +2376,15 @@ static int scarlett2_usb(if (req_size)memcpy (req->data, req_data, req_size); +retry: err =scarlett2_usb_tx (dev, private->bInterfaceNumber, req, req_buf_size);if (err != req_buf_size) { +if (err == -EPROTO && ++retries <= max_retries) { +msleep (5 * (1 << (retries -1 ))); + goto retry; + } usb_audio_err( mixer->chip, "%s USB request result cmd %x was %d\n",