tpm: Disable TPM2_TCG_HMAC by default
Subsystems (4)
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerPATCH 1/1 tpm: Disable TPM2_TCG_HMAC by default
After reading all the feedback, right now disabling the TPM2_TCG_HMAC is the right call.
Other views discussed:
A. Having a kernel command-line parameter or refining the feature
otherwise. This goes to the area of improvements. E.g., one example is my own idea where the null key specific code would be replaced with a persistent handle parameter (which can be *unambigously* defined as part of attestation process when done correctly).
B. Removing the code. I don't buy this because that is same as saying
that HMAC encryption cannot work at all (if really nitpicking) in any form. Also I disagree on the view that the feature could not be refined to something more reasoable.
Also, both A and B are worst options in terms of backporting.
Thuss, this is the best possible choice.
---
PS. I did not post this last week because that would have been most likely the most counter-productive action to taken. It's better sometimes to take a bit of time to think (which can be seen that I've given also more reasonable weight to my own eaerlier proposals).
I also accept further changes, if there is e.g., inconsistency with TCG_TPM_HMAC setting or similar (obviously).
--- drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ if TCG_TPM config TCG_TPM2_HMAC bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus" - default X86_64 + default n select CRYPTO_ECDH select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Quoted 12 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
After reading all the feedback, right now disabling the
TPM2_TCG_HMACis the right call.Other views discussed:
A. Having a kernel command-line parameter or refining the feature
otherwise. This goes to the area of improvements. E.g., one example is my own idea where the null key specific code would be replaced with a persistent handle parameter (which can be *unambigously* defined as part of attestation process when done correctly).
Quoted 8 lines
B. Removing the code. I don't buy this because that is same as saying
that HMAC encryption cannot work at all (if really nitpicking) in any form. Also I disagree on the view that the feature could not be refined to something more reasoable.Also, both A and B are worst options in terms of backporting.
Thus, this is the best possible choice.
I think this is reasonable; it's adding runtime overhead and not adding enough benefit to be the default upstream.
Quoted 27 lines
Cc [email protected] # v6.10+Fixes d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation")Suggested-by Chris Fenner <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>---
PS. I did not post this last week because that would have been most likely the most counter-productive action to taken. It's better sometimes to take a bit of time to think (which can be seen that I've given also more reasonable weight to my own eaerlier proposals).I also accept further changes, if there is e.g., inconsistency with
TCG_TPM_HMACsetting or similar (obviously).
---drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig| 2 +-1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ if TCG_TPMconfig
TCG_TPM2_HMAC
bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus"drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +1
-1- default X86_64 + default n
Quoted 5 lines
select
CRYPTO_ECDH
selectCRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB
selectCRYPTO_LIB_SHA256Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
J.
Signature · 4 lines
] https://www.earth.li/~noodles/ [] Is this real - that's the first [ ] PGP/GPG Key @ the.earth.li [] thing I think every morning. [ ] via keyserver, web or email. [] [ ] RSA: 4096/0x94FA372B2DA8B985 [] [
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 18 lines · Jonathan McDowell
Quoted 17 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
After reading all the feedback, right now disabling the
TPM2_TCG_HMACis the right call.Other views discussed:
A. Having a kernel command-line parameter or refining the feature
otherwise. This goes to the area of improvements. E.g., one example is my own idea where the null key specific code would be replaced with a persistent handle parameter (which can be *unambigously* defined as part of attestation process when done correctly).B. Removing the code. I don't buy this because that is same as saying
that HMAC encryption cannot work at all (if really nitpicking) in any form. Also I disagree on the view that the feature could not be refined to something more reasoable.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Also, both A and B are worst options in terms of backporting.
Thus, this is the best possible choice.
I think this is reasonable; it's adding runtime overhead and not adding enough benefit to be the default upstream.
Yes, I think this is a balanced change. I agree what you say and at the same time this gives more space to refine it something usable. Right now it is much harder to tackle those issue, as it is part of the default config. By looking at things from this angle, the change is also benefical for the feature itself (in the long run).
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Thank you! I appreciate this and will append this to the commit.
BR, Jarkko
Chris Fenner
Reviewed-byAgreed, the feature needs some work in order to provide meaningful security value, and disabling it by default facilitates that work.
Quoted 38 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 18 lines · Jonathan McDowell
Quoted 17 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
After reading all the feedback, right now disabling the
TPM2_TCG_HMACis the right call.Other views discussed:
A. Having a kernel command-line parameter or refining the feature
otherwise. This goes to the area of improvements. E.g., one example is my own idea where the null key specific code would be replaced with a persistent handle parameter (which can be *unambigously* defined as part of attestation process when done correctly).B. Removing the code. I don't buy this because that is same as saying
that HMAC encryption cannot work at all (if really nitpicking) in any form. Also I disagree on the view that the feature could not be refined to something more reasoable.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Also, both A and B are worst options in terms of backporting.
Thus, this is the best possible choice.
I think this is reasonable; it's adding runtime overhead and not adding enough benefit to be the default upstream.
Yes, I think this is a balanced change. I agree what you say and at the same time this gives more space to refine it something usable. Right now it is much harder to tackle those issue, as it is part of the default config. By looking at things from this angle, the change is also benefical for the feature itself (in the long run).
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>Thank you! I appreciate this and will append this to the commit.
BR, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Chris Fenner
Agreed, the feature needs some work in order to provide meaningful security value, and disabling it by default facilitates that work.
Reviewed-by Chris Fenner <[email protected]>
Thanks!
BR, Jarkko