5.15.190-rc1 review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 440/644 ext4: fix largest free orders lists corruption on mb_optimize_scan switch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
commit 7d345aa1fac4c2ec9584fbd6f389f2c2368671d5 upstream.
The grp->bb_largest_free_order is updated regardless of whether mb_optimize_scan is enabled. This can lead to inconsistencies between grp->bb_largest_free_order and the actual s_mb_largest_free_orders list index when mb_optimize_scan is repeatedly enabled and disabled via remount.
For example, if mb_optimize_scan is initially enabled, largest free order is 3, and the group is in s_mb_largest_free_orders[3]. Then, mb_optimize_scan is disabled via remount, block allocations occur, updating largest free order to 2. Finally, mb_optimize_scan is re-enabled via remount, more block allocations update largest free order to 1.
At this point, the group would be removed from s_mb_largest_free_orders[3] under the protection of s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[2]. This lock mismatch can lead to list corruption.
To fix this, whenever grp->bb_largest_free_order changes, we now always attempt to remove the group from its old order list. However, we only insert the group into the new order list if mb_optimize_scan is enabled. This approach helps prevent lock inconsistencies and ensures the data in the order lists remains reliable.
--- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/mballoc.c +14 -19
@@ -1082,33 +1082,28 @@ static void mb_set_largest_free_order(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_group_info *grp) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); -int i; +int new, old = grp->bb_largest_free_order; -for (i =MB_NUM_ORDERS (sb) -1 ; i >=0 ; i--) -if (grp->bb_counters[i] >0 ) +for (new =MB_NUM_ORDERS (sb) -1 ; new >=0 ; new--) +if (grp->bb_counters[new] >0 )break ; +/* No need to move between order lists? */ -if (!test_opt2 (sb,MB_OPTIMIZE_SCAN ) || - i == grp->bb_largest_free_order) { - grp->bb_largest_free_order = i; +if (new == old)return ; - } -if (grp->bb_largest_free_order >=0 ) { -write_lock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[ - grp->bb_largest_free_order]); +if (old >=0 && !list_empty (&grp->bb_largest_free_order_node)) { +write_lock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[old]);list_del_init (&grp->bb_largest_free_order_node); -write_unlock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[ - grp->bb_largest_free_order]); +write_unlock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[old]); } - grp->bb_largest_free_order = i; -if (grp->bb_largest_free_order >=0 && grp->bb_free) { -write_lock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[ - grp->bb_largest_free_order]); + + grp->bb_largest_free_order = new; +if (test_opt2 (sb,MB_OPTIMIZE_SCAN ) && new >=0 && grp->bb_free) { +write_lock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[new]);list_add_tail (&grp->bb_largest_free_order_node, - &sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders[grp->bb_largest_free_order]); -write_unlock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[ - grp->bb_largest_free_order]); + &sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders[new]); +write_unlock (&sbi->s_mb_largest_free_orders_locks[new]); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 441/644 usb: core: config: Prevent OOB read in SS endpoint companion parsing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xinyu Liu <[email protected]>
commit cf16f408364efd8a68f39011a3b073c83a03612d upstream.
usb_parse_ss_endpoint_companion() checks descriptor type before length, enabling a potentially odd read outside of the buffer size.
Fix this up by checking the size first before looking at any of the fields in the descriptor.
--- drivers/usb/core/config.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/config.c +8 -2
@@ -81,8 +81,14 @@ static void usb_parse_ss_endpoint_compan*/ desc = (struct usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor *) buffer; -if (desc->bDescriptorType !=USB_DT_SS_ENDPOINT_COMP || - size <USB_DT_SS_EP_COMP_SIZE ) { +if (size <USB_DT_SS_EP_COMP_SIZE ) { +dev_notice (ddev, +"invalid SuperSpeed endpoint companion descriptor " +"of length %d, skipping\n" , size); +return ; + } + +if (desc->bDescriptorType !=USB_DT_SS_ENDPOINT_COMP ) { dev_notice(ddev, "No SuperSpeed endpoint companion for config %d " " interface %d altsetting %d ep %d: " "using minimum values\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 442/644 misc: rtsx: usb: Ensure mmc child device is active when card is present
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricky Wu <[email protected]>
commit 966c5cd72be8989c8a559ddef8e8ff07a37c5eb0 upstream.
When a card is present in the reader, the driver currently defers autosuspend by returning -EAGAIN during the suspend callback to trigger USB remote wakeup signaling. However, this does not guarantee that the mmc child device has been resumed, which may cause issues if it remains suspended while the card is accessible.
This patch ensures that all child devices, including the mmc host controller, are explicitly resumed before returning -EAGAIN. This fixes a corner case introduced by earlier remote wakeup handling, improving reliability of runtime PM when a card is inserted.
--- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +9 -7
@@ -698,6 +698,12 @@ static void rtsx_usb_disconnect(struct u }#ifdef CONFIG_PM +static int rtsx_usb_resume_child (struct device *dev,void *data) +{ +pm_request_resume (dev); +return 0 ; +} +static int rtsx_usb_suspend (struct usb_interface *intf,pm_message_t message) { struct rtsx_ucr *ucr =
@@ -713,8 +719,10 @@ static int rtsx_usb_suspend(struct usb_imutex_unlock (&ucr->dev_mutex);/* Defer the autosuspend if card exists */ -if (val & (SD_CD |MS_CD )) +if (val & (SD_CD |MS_CD )) { +device_for_each_child (&intf->dev,NULL , rtsx_usb_resume_child);return -EAGAIN ; + } }else {/* There is an ongoing operation*/ return -EAGAIN ;
@@ -724,12 +732,6 @@ static int rtsx_usb_suspend(struct usb_ireturn 0 ; } -static int rtsx_usb_resume_child (struct device *dev,void *data) -{ -pm_request_resume (dev); -return 0 ; -} -static int rtsx_usb_resume (struct usb_interface *intf) {device_for_each_child (&intf->dev,NULL , rtsx_usb_resume_child);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 443/644 usb: typec: ucsi: Update power_supply on power role change
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myrrh Periwinkle <[email protected]>
commit 7616f006db07017ef5d4ae410fca99279aaca7aa upstream.
The current power direction of an USB-C port also influences the power_supply's online status, so a power role change should also update the power_supply.
Fixes an issue on some systems where plugging in a normal USB device in for the first time after a reboot will cause upower to erroneously consider the system to be connected to AC power.
--- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +1 -0
@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ static void ucsi_handle_connector_changeif (con->status.change &UCSI_CONSTAT_CONNECT_CHANGE ) {typec_set_pwr_role (con->port, role); +ucsi_port_psy_changed (con);switch (UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE (con->status.flags)) {case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_UFP :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 444/644 comedi: fix race between polling and detaching
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
commit 35b6fc51c666fc96355be5cd633ed0fe4ccf68b2 upstream.
syzbot reports a use-after-free in comedi in the below link, which is due to comedi gladly removing the allocated async area even though poll requests are still active on the wait_queue_head inside of it. This can cause a use-after-free when the poll entries are later triggered or removed, as the memory for the wait_queue_head has been freed. We need to check there are no tasks queued on any of the subdevices' wait queues before allowing the device to be detached by the COMEDI_DEVCONFIG ioctl.
Tasks will read-lock dev->attach_lock before adding themselves to the subdevice wait queue, so fix the problem in the COMEDI_DEVCONFIG ioctl handler by write-locking dev->attach_lock before checking that all of the subdevices are safe to be deleted. This includes testing for any sleepers on the subdevices' wait queues. It remains locked until the device has been detached. This requires the comedi_device_detach() function to be refactored slightly, moving the bulk of it into new function comedi_device_detach_locked().
Note that the refactor of comedi_device_detach() results in comedi_device_cancel_all() now being called while dev->attach_lock is write-locked, which wasn't the case previously, but that does not matter.
Thanks to Jens Axboe for diagnosing the problem and co-developing this patch.
--- drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- drivers/comedi/comedi_internal.h | 1 + drivers/comedi/drivers.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c +25 -8
@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ static int is_device_busy(struct comedi_struct comedi_subdevice *s;int i; +lockdep_assert_held_write (&dev->attach_lock);lockdep_assert_held (&dev->mutex);if (!dev->attached)return 0 ;
@@ -791,7 +792,16 @@ static int is_device_busy(struct comedi_ s = &dev->subdevices[i];if (s->busy)return 1 ; -if (s->async &&comedi_buf_is_mmapped (s)) +if (!s->async) +continue ; +if (comedi_buf_is_mmapped (s)) +return 1 ; +/* +* There may be tasks still waiting on the subdevice's wait +* queue, although they should already be about to be removed +* from it since the subdevice has no active async command. +*/ +if (wq_has_sleeper (&s->async->wait_head))return 1 ; }
@@ -821,15 +831,22 @@ static int do_devconfig_ioctl(struct comreturn -EPERM ;if (!arg) { -if (is_device_busy (dev)) -return -EBUSY ; -if (dev->attached) { -struct module *driver_module = dev->driver->module; +int rc =0 ; -comedi_device_detach (dev); -module_put (driver_module); +if (dev->attached) { +down_write (&dev->attach_lock); +if (is_device_busy (dev)) { + rc = -EBUSY ; + }else { +struct module *driver_module = + dev->driver->module; + +comedi_device_detach_locked (dev); +module_put (driver_module); + } +up_write (&dev->attach_lock); } -return 0 ; +return rc; }if (copy_from_user (&it, arg,sizeof (it)))
drivers/comedi/comedi_internal.h +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ extern struct mutex comedi_drivers_list_int insn_inval (struct comedi_device *dev,struct comedi_subdevice *s,struct comedi_insn *insn,unsigned int *data); +void comedi_device_detach_locked (struct comedi_device *dev);void comedi_device_detach (struct comedi_device *dev);int comedi_device_attach (struct comedi_device *dev,struct comedi_devconfig *it);
drivers/comedi/drivers.c +10 -3
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void comedi_device_detach_cleanupint i;struct comedi_subdevice *s; -lockdep_assert_held (&dev->attach_lock); +lockdep_assert_held_write (&dev->attach_lock);lockdep_assert_held (&dev->mutex);if (dev->subdevices) {for (i =0 ; i < dev->n_subdevices; i++) {
@@ -196,16 +196,23 @@ static void comedi_device_detach_cleanupcomedi_clear_hw_dev (dev); } -void comedi_device_detach (struct comedi_device *dev) +void comedi_device_detach_locked (struct comedi_device *dev) { +lockdep_assert_held_write (&dev->attach_lock);lockdep_assert_held (&dev->mutex);comedi_device_cancel_all (dev); -down_write (&dev->attach_lock); dev->attached = false; dev->detach_count++;if (dev->driver) dev->driver->detach (dev);comedi_device_detach_cleanup (dev); +} + +void comedi_device_detach (struct comedi_device *dev) +{ +lockdep_assert_held (&dev->mutex); +down_write (&dev->attach_lock); +comedi_device_detach_locked (dev);up_write (&dev->attach_lock); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 445/644 thunderbolt: Fix copy+paste error in match_service_id()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 5cc1f66cb23cccc704e3def27ad31ed479e934a5 upstream.
The second instance of TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_VERSION seems to have been intended to be TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_REVISION.
--- drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static bool match_service_id(const strucreturn false; } -if (id->match_flags &TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_VERSION ) { +if (id->match_flags &TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_REVISION ) {if (id->protocol_revision != svc->prtcrevs)return false; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 446/644 cdc-acm: fix race between initial clearing halt and open
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
commit 64690a90cd7c6db16d3af8616be1f4bf8d492850 upstream.
On the devices that need their endpoints to get an initial clear_halt, this needs to be done before the devices can be opened. That means it needs to be before the devices are registered.
--- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +6 -5
@@ -1500,6 +1500,12 @@ skip_countries: goto err_remove_files; } +if (quirks &CLEAR_HALT_CONDITIONS ) { +/* errors intentionally ignored */ +usb_clear_halt (usb_dev, acm->in); +usb_clear_halt (usb_dev, acm->out); + } + tty_dev =tty_port_register_device (&acm->port, acm_tty_driver, minor, &control_interface->dev);if (IS_ERR (tty_dev)) {
@@ -1507,11 +1513,6 @@ skip_countries: goto err_release_data_interface; } -if (quirks &CLEAR_HALT_CONDITIONS ) { -usb_clear_halt (usb_dev, acm->in); -usb_clear_halt (usb_dev, acm->out); - } -dev_info (&intf->dev,"ttyACM%d: USB ACM device\n" , minor);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 447/644 btrfs: fix log tree replay failure due to file with 0 links and extents
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 0a32e4f0025a74c70dcab4478e9b29c22f5ecf2f upstream.
If we log a new inode (not persisted in a past transaction) that has 0 links and extents, then log another inode with an higher inode number, we end up with failing to replay the log tree with -EINVAL. The steps for this are:
1) create new file A
2) write some data to file A
3) open an fd on file A
4) unlink file A
5) fsync file A using the previously open fd
6) create file B (has higher inode number than file A)
7) fsync file B
8) power fail before current transaction commits
Now when attempting to mount the fs, the log replay will fail with -ENOENT at replay_one_extent() when attempting to replay the first extent of file A. The failure comes when trying to open the inode for file A in the subvolume tree, since it doesn't exist.
Before commit 5f61b961599a ("btrfs: fix inode lookup error handling during log replay"), the returned error was -EIO instead of -ENOENT, since we converted any errors when attempting to read an inode during log replay to -EIO.
The reason for this is that the log replay procedure fails to ignore the current inode when we are at the stage LOG_WALK_REPLAY_ALL, our current inode has 0 links and last inode we processed in the previous stage has a non 0 link count. In other words, the issue is that at replay_one_extent() we only update wc->ignore_cur_inode if the current replay stage is LOG_WALK_REPLAY_INODES.
Fix this by updating wc->ignore_cur_inode whenever we find an inode item regardless of the current replay stage. This is a simple solution and easy to backport, but later we can do other alternatives like avoid logging extents or inode items other than the inode item for inodes with a link count of 0.
The problem with the wc->ignore_cur_inode logic has been around since commit f2d72f42d5fa ("Btrfs: fix warning when replaying log after fsync of a tmpfile") but it only became frequent to hit since the more recent commit 5e85262e542d ("btrfs: fix fsync of files with no hard links not persisting deletion"), because we stopped skipping inodes with a link count of 0 when logging, while before the problem would only be triggered if trying to replay a log tree created with an older kernel which has a logged inode with 0 links.
A test case for fstests will be submitted soon.
--- fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/tree-log.c +30 -18
@@ -313,8 +313,7 @@ struct walk_control {/* * Ignore any items from the inode currently being processed. Needs -* to be set every time we find a BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY and we are in -* the LOG_WALK_REPLAY_INODES stage. +* to be set every time we find a BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY. */ bool ignore_cur_inode;
@@ -2581,23 +2580,30 @@ static int replay_one_buffer(struct btrf nritems =btrfs_header_nritems (eb);for (i =0 ; i < nritems; i++) { -btrfs_item_key_to_cpu (eb, &key, i); +struct btrfs_inode_item *inode_item; -/* inode keys are done during the first stage */ -if (key.type ==BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY && - wc->stage ==LOG_WALK_REPLAY_INODES ) { -struct btrfs_inode_item *inode_item; -u32 mode; +btrfs_item_key_to_cpu (eb, &key, i); - inode_item =btrfs_item_ptr (eb, i, - struct btrfs_inode_item); +if (key.type ==BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY ) { + inode_item = btrfs_item_ptr(eb, i, struct btrfs_inode_item);/* -* If we have a tmpfile (O_TMPFILE) that got fsync'ed -* and never got linked before the fsync, skip it, as -* replaying it is pointless since it would be deleted -* later. We skip logging tmpfiles, but it's always -* possible we are replaying a log created with a kernel -* that used to log tmpfiles. +* An inode with no links is either: +* +* 1) A tmpfile (O_TMPFILE) that got fsync'ed and never +* got linked before the fsync, skip it, as replaying +* it is pointless since it would be deleted later. +* We skip logging tmpfiles, but it's always possible +* we are replaying a log created with a kernel that +* used to log tmpfiles; +* +* 2) A non-tmpfile which got its last link deleted +* while holding an open fd on it and later got +* fsynced through that fd. We always log the +* parent inodes when inode->last_unlink_trans is +* set to the current transaction, so ignore all the +* inode items for this inode. We will delete the +* inode when processing the parent directory with +* replay_dir_deletes(). */ if (btrfs_inode_nlink (eb, inode_item) ==0 ) { wc->ignore_cur_inode = true;
@@ -2605,8 +2611,14 @@ static int replay_one_buffer(struct btrf }else { wc->ignore_cur_inode = false; } - ret =replay_xattr_deletes (wc->trans, root, log, - path, key.objectid); + } + +/* Inode keys are done during the first stage. */ +if (key.type ==BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY && + wc->stage ==LOG_WALK_REPLAY_INODES ) { +u32 mode; + + ret =replay_xattr_deletes (wc->trans, root, log, path, key.objectid);if (ret)break ; mode =btrfs_inode_mode (eb, inode_item);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 448/644 btrfs: do not allow relocation of partially dropped subvolumes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
commit 4289b494ac553e74e86fed1c66b2bf9530bc1082 upstream.
[BUG]
There is an internal report that balance triggered transaction abort, with the following call trace:
item 85 key (594509824 169 0) itemoff 12599 itemsize 33
extent refs 1 gen 197740 flags 2
ref#0: tree block backref root 7
item 86 key (594558976 169 0) itemoff 12566 itemsize 33
extent refs 1 gen 197522 flags 2
ref#0: tree block backref root 7
...
BTRFS error (device loop0): extent item not found for insert, bytenr 594526208 num_bytes 16384 parent 449921024 root_objectid 934 owner 1 offset 0 BTRFS error (device loop0): failed to run delayed ref for logical 594526208 num_bytes 16384 type 182 action 1 ref_mod 1: -117
------------[ cut here ]------------ BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -117) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6963 at ../fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2168 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xfa/0x110 [btrfs]
And btrfs check doesn't report anything wrong related to the extent tree.
[CAUSE]
The cause is a little complex, firstly the extent tree indeed doesn't have the backref for 594526208.
The extent tree only have the following two backrefs around that bytenr on-disk:
item 65 key (594509824 METADATA_ITEM 0) itemoff 13880 itemsize 33
refs 1 gen 197740 flags TREE_BLOCK
tree block skinny level 0
(176 0x7) tree block backref root CSUM_TREE
item 66 key (594558976 METADATA_ITEM 0) itemoff 13847 itemsize 33
refs 1 gen 197522 flags TREE_BLOCK
tree block skinny level 0
(176 0x7) tree block backref root CSUM_TREE
But the such missing backref item is not an corruption on disk, as the offending delayed ref belongs to subvolume 934, and that subvolume is being dropped:
item 0 key (934 ROOT_ITEM 198229) itemoff 15844 itemsize 439
generation 198229 root_dirid 256 bytenr 10741039104 byte_limit 0 bytes_used 345571328
last_snapshot 198229 flags 0x1000000000001(RDONLY) refs 0
drop_progress key (206324 EXTENT_DATA 2711650304) drop_level 2
level 2 generation_v2 198229And that offending tree block 594526208 is inside the dropped range of that subvolume. That explains why there is no backref item for that bytenr and why btrfs check is not reporting anything wrong.
But this also shows another problem, as btrfs will do all the orphan subvolume cleanup at a read-write mount.
So half-dropped subvolume should not exist after an RW mount, and balance itself is also exclusive to subvolume cleanup, meaning we shouldn't hit a subvolume half-dropped during relocation.
The root cause is, there is no orphan item for this subvolume. In fact there are 5 subvolumes from around 2021 that have the same problem.
It looks like the original report has some older kernels running, and caused those zombie subvolumes.
Thankfully upstream commit 8d488a8c7ba2 ("btrfs: fix subvolume/snapshot deletion not triggered on mount") has long fixed the bug.
[ENHANCEMENT]
For repairing such old fs, btrfs-progs will be enhanced.
Considering how delayed the problem will show up (at run delayed ref time) and at that time we have to abort transaction already, it is too late.
Instead here we reject any half-dropped subvolume for reloc tree at the earliest time, preventing confusion and extra time wasted on debugging similar bugs.
--- fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/relocation.c +19 -0
@@ -749,6 +749,25 @@ static struct btrfs_root *create_reloc_rif (root->root_key.objectid == objectid) {u64 commit_root_gen; +/* +* Relocation will wait for cleaner thread, and any half-dropped +* subvolume will be fully cleaned up at mount time. +* So here we shouldn't hit a subvolume with non-zero drop_progress. +* +* If this isn't the case, error out since it can make us attempt to +* drop references for extents that were already dropped before. +*/ +if (unlikely (btrfs_disk_key_objectid (&root->root_item.drop_progress))) { +struct btrfs_key cpu_key; + +btrfs_disk_key_to_cpu (&cpu_key, &root->root_item.drop_progress); +btrfs_err (fs_info, +"cannot relocate partially dropped subvolume %llu, drop progress key (%llu %u %llu)" , + objectid, cpu_key.objectid, cpu_key.type, cpu_key.offset); + ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto fail; + } +/* called by btrfs_init_reloc_root */ ret =btrfs_copy_root (trans, root, root->commit_root, &eb,BTRFS_TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 449/644 fbdev: Fix vmalloc out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sravan Kumar Gundu <[email protected]>
commit af0db3c1f898144846d4c172531a199bb3ca375d upstream.
This issue triggers when a userspace program does an ioctl FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP by passing console number and frame buffer number. Ideally this maps console to frame buffer and updates the screen if console is visible.
As part of mapping it has to do resize of console according to frame buffer info. if this resize fails and returns from vc_do_resize() and continues further. At this point console and new frame buffer are mapped and sets display vars. Despite failure still it continue to proceed updating the screen at later stages where vc_data is related to previous frame buffer and frame buffer info and display vars are mapped to new frame buffer and eventully leading to out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit(). This bheviour is excepted only when fg_console is equal to requested console which is a visible console and updates screen with invalid struct references in fbcon_putcs().
--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +5 -4
@@ -804,7 +804,8 @@ static void con2fb_init_display(struct v fg_vc->vc_rows); } -update_screen (vc_cons[fg_console].d); +if (fg_console != unit) +update_screen (vc_cons[fg_console].d); }/**
@@ -1342,6 +1343,7 @@ static void fbcon_set_disp(struct fb_infstruct vc_data *svc;struct fbcon_ops *ops = info->fbcon_par;int rows, cols; +unsigned long ret =0 ; p = &fb_display[unit];
@@ -1392,11 +1394,10 @@ static void fbcon_set_disp(struct fb_inf rows =FBCON_SWAP (ops->rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres); cols /= vc->vc_font.width; rows /= vc->vc_font.height; -vc_resize (vc, cols, rows); + ret =vc_resize (vc, cols, rows); -if (con_is_visible (vc)) { +if (con_is_visible (vc) && !ret)update_screen (vc); - } }static __inline__void ywrap_up (struct vc_data *vc,int count)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 450/644 parisc: Makefile: fix a typo in palo.conf
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
commit 963f1b20a8d2a098954606b9725cd54336a2a86c upstream.
Correct "objree" to "objtree". "objree" is not defined.
--- arch/parisc/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ palo lifimage: vmlinuz fi @if test ! -f "$(PALOCONF)"; then \ cp $(srctree)/arch/parisc/defpalo.conf $(objtree)/palo.conf; \ - echo 'A generic palo config file ($(objree)/palo.conf) has been created for you.'; \ + echo 'A generic palo config file ($(objtree)/palo.conf) has been created for you.'; \ echo 'You should check it and re-run "make palo".'; \ echo 'WARNING: the "lifimage" file is now placed in this directory by default!'; \ false; \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 451/644 mm/kmemleak: avoid soft lockup in __kmemleak_do_cleanup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
commit d1534ae23c2b6be350c8ab060803fbf6e9682adc upstream.
A soft lockup warning was observed on a relative small system x86-64 system with 16 GB of memory when running a debug kernel with kmemleak enabled.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#8 stuck for 33s! [kworker/8:1:134]
The test system was running a workload with hot unplug happening in parallel. Then kemleak decided to disable itself due to its inability to allocate more kmemleak objects. The debug kernel has its CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_MEM_POOL_SIZE set to 40,000.
The soft lockup happened in kmemleak_do_cleanup() when the existing kmemleak objects were being removed and deleted one-by-one in a loop via a workqueue. In this particular case, there are at least 40,000 objects that need to be processed and given the slowness of a debug kernel and the fact that a raw_spinlock has to be acquired and released in __delete_object(), it could take a while to properly handle all these objects.
As kmemleak has been disabled in this case, the object removal and deletion process can be further optimized as locking isn't really needed. However, it is probably not worth the effort to optimize for such an edge case that should rarely happen. So the simple solution is to call cond_resched() at periodic interval in the iteration loop to avoid soft lockup.
--- mm/kmemleak.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
mm/kmemleak.c +5 -0
@@ -1859,6 +1859,7 @@ static const struct file_operations kmemstatic void __kmemleak_do_cleanup (void ) {struct kmemleak_object *object, *tmp; +unsigned int cnt =0 ;/* * Kmemleak has already been disabled, no need for RCU list traversal
@@ -1867,6 +1868,10 @@ static void __kmemleak_do_cleanup(void)list_for_each_entry_safe (object, tmp, &object_list, object_list) {__remove_object (object);__delete_object (object); + +/* Call cond_resched() once per 64 iterations to avoid soft lockup */ +if (!(++cnt &0x3f )) +cond_resched (); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 452/644 mm/kmemleak: avoid deadlock by moving pr_warn() outside kmemleak_lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
commit 47b0f6d8f0d2be4d311a49e13d2fd5f152f492b2 upstream.
When netpoll is enabled, calling pr_warn_once() while holding kmemleak_lock in mem_pool_alloc() can cause a deadlock due to lock inversion with the netconsole subsystem. This occurs because pr_warn_once() may trigger netpoll, which eventually leads to __alloc_skb() and back into kmemleak code, attempting to reacquire kmemleak_lock.
This is the path for the deadlock.
mem_pool_alloc()
-> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kmemleak_lock, flags);
-> pr_warn_once()
-> netconsole subsystem
-> netpoll
-> __alloc_skb
-> __create_object
-> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kmemleak_lock, flags);Fix this by setting a flag and issuing the pr_warn_once() after kmemleak_lock is released.
--- mm/kmemleak.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kmemleak.c +4 -1
@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static struct kmemleak_object *mem_pool_ {unsigned long flags;struct kmemleak_object *object; +bool warn = false;/* try the slab allocator first */ if (object_cache) {
@@ -436,8 +437,10 @@ static struct kmemleak_object *mem_pool_else if (mem_pool_free_count) object = &mem_pool[--mem_pool_free_count];else -pr_warn_once ("Memory pool empty, consider increasing CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_MEM_POOL_SIZE\n" ); + warn = true;raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&kmemleak_lock, flags); +if (warn) +pr_warn_once ("Memory pool empty, consider increasing CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_MEM_POOL_SIZE\n" );return object; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 453/644 media: uvcvideo: Fix 1-byte out-of-bounds read in uvc_parse_format()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Youngjun Lee <[email protected]>
commit 782b6a718651eda3478b1824b37a8b3185d2740c upstream.
The buffer length check before calling uvc_parse_format() only ensured that the buffer has at least 3 bytes (buflen > 2), buf the function accesses buffer[3], requiring at least 4 bytes.
This can lead to an out-of-bounds read if the buffer has exactly 3 bytes.
Fix it by checking that the buffer has at least 4 bytes in uvc_parse_format().
--- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c +3 -0
@@ -512,6 +512,9 @@ static int uvc_parse_format(struct uvc_dunsigned int i, n;u8 ftype; +if (buflen <4 ) +return -EINVAL ; + format->type = buffer[2 ]; format->index = buffer[3 ];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 454/644 media: uvcvideo: Do not mark valid metadata as invalid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
commit bda2859bff0b9596a19648f3740c697ce4c71496 upstream.
Currently, the driver performs a length check of the metadata buffer before the actual metadata size is known and before the metadata is decided to be copied. This results in valid metadata buffers being incorrectly marked as invalid.
Move the length check to occur after the metadata size is determined and is decided to be copied.
--- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +6 -6
@@ -1335,12 +1335,6 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_meta(structif (!meta_buf || length ==2 )return ; -if (meta_buf->length - meta_buf->bytesused < - length +sizeof (meta->ns) +sizeof (meta->sof)) { - meta_buf->error =1 ; -return ; - } - has_pts = mem[1 ] &UVC_STREAM_PTS ; has_scr = mem[1 ] &UVC_STREAM_SCR ;
@@ -1361,6 +1355,12 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_meta(struct !memcmp(scr, stream->clock.last_scr, 6)))return ; +if (meta_buf->length - meta_buf->bytesused < + length +sizeof (meta->ns) +sizeof (meta->sof)) { + meta_buf->error =1 ; +return ; + } + meta = (struct uvc_meta_buf *)((u8 *)meta_buf->mem + meta_buf->bytesused);local_irq_save (flags); time =uvc_video_get_time ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 455/644 HID: magicmouse: avoid setting up battery timer when not needed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
commit 9bdc30e35cbc1aa78ccf01040354209f1e11ca22 upstream.
Currently, the battery timer is set up for all devices using hid-magicmouse, irrespective of whether they actually need it or not.
The current implementation requires the battery timer for Magic Mouse 2 and Magic Trackpad 2 when connected via USB only. Add checks to ensure that the battery timer is only set up when they are connected via USB.
--- drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c +37 -16
@@ -741,15 +741,29 @@ static void magicmouse_enable_mt_work(sthid_err (msc->hdev,"unable to request touch data (%d)\n" , ret); } +static bool is_usb_magicmouse2 (__u32 vendor,__u32 product) +{ +if (vendor !=USB_VENDOR_ID_APPLE ) +return false; +return product ==USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE2 ; +} + +static bool is_usb_magictrackpad2 (__u32 vendor,__u32 product) +{ +if (vendor !=USB_VENDOR_ID_APPLE ) +return false; +return product ==USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD2 ; +} +static int magicmouse_fetch_battery (struct hid_device *hdev) {#ifdef CONFIG_HID_BATTERY_STRENGTH struct hid_report_enum *report_enum;struct hid_report *report; -if (!hdev->battery || hdev->vendor !=USB_VENDOR_ID_APPLE || - (hdev->product !=USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE2 && - hdev->product !=USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD2 )) +if (!hdev->battery || + (!is_usb_magicmouse2 (hdev->vendor, hdev->product) && + !is_usb_magictrackpad2 (hdev->vendor, hdev->product)))return -1 ; report_enum = &hdev->report_enum[hdev->battery_report_type];
@@ -811,14 +825,17 @@ static int magicmouse_probe(struct hid_dreturn ret; } -timer_setup (&msc->battery_timer, magicmouse_battery_timer_tick,0 ); -mod_timer (&msc->battery_timer, - jiffies +msecs_to_jiffies (USB_BATTERY_TIMEOUT_MS )); -magicmouse_fetch_battery (hdev); - -if (id->vendor ==USB_VENDOR_ID_APPLE && - (id->product ==USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE2 || - (id->product ==USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD2 && hdev->type !=HID_TYPE_USBMOUSE ))) +if (is_usb_magicmouse2 (id->vendor, id->product) || +is_usb_magictrackpad2 (id->vendor, id->product)) { +timer_setup (&msc->battery_timer, magicmouse_battery_timer_tick,0 ); +mod_timer (&msc->battery_timer, + jiffies +msecs_to_jiffies (USB_BATTERY_TIMEOUT_MS )); +magicmouse_fetch_battery (hdev); + } + +if (is_usb_magicmouse2 (id->vendor, id->product) || + (is_usb_magictrackpad2 (id->vendor, id->product) && + hdev->type !=HID_TYPE_USBMOUSE ))return 0 ;if (!msc->input) {
@@ -873,7 +890,10 @@ static int magicmouse_probe(struct hid_dreturn 0 ; err_stop_hw: -del_timer_sync (&msc->battery_timer); +if (is_usb_magicmouse2 (id->vendor, id->product) || +is_usb_magictrackpad2 (id->vendor, id->product)) +del_timer_sync (&msc->battery_timer); +hid_hw_stop (hdev);return ret; }
@@ -884,7 +904,9 @@ static void magicmouse_remove(struct hidif (msc) {cancel_delayed_work_sync (&msc->work); -del_timer_sync (&msc->battery_timer); +if (is_usb_magicmouse2 (hdev->vendor, hdev->product) || +is_usb_magictrackpad2 (hdev->vendor, hdev->product)) +del_timer_sync (&msc->battery_timer); }hid_hw_stop (hdev);
@@ -901,9 +923,8 @@ static __u8 *magicmouse_report_fixup(str* 0x05, 0x01, // Usage Page (Generic Desktop) 0 * 0x09, 0x02, // Usage (Mouse) 2 */ -if (hdev->vendor ==USB_VENDOR_ID_APPLE && - (hdev->product ==USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE2 || - hdev->product ==USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD2 ) && +if ((is_usb_magicmouse2 (hdev->vendor, hdev->product) || +is_usb_magictrackpad2 (hdev->vendor, hdev->product)) && *rsize ==83 && rdesc[46 ] ==0x84 && rdesc[58 ] ==0x85 ) {hid_info (hdev,"fixing up magicmouse battery report descriptor\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 456/644 serial: 8250: fix panic due to PSLVERR
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yunhui Cui <[email protected]>
commit 7f8fdd4dbffc05982b96caf586f77a014b2a9353 upstream.
When the PSLVERR_RESP_EN parameter is set to 1, the device generates an error response if an attempt is made to read an empty RBR (Receive Buffer Register) while the FIFO is enabled.
In serial8250_do_startup(), calling serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR, UART_LCR_WLEN8) triggers dw8250_check_lcr(), which invokes dw8250_force_idle() and serial8250_clear_and_reinit_fifos(). The latter function enables the FIFO via serial_out(p, UART_FCR, p->fcr). Execution proceeds to the serial_port_in(port, UART_RX). This satisfies the PSLVERR trigger condition.
When another CPU (e.g., using printk()) is accessing the UART (UART is busy), the current CPU fails the check (value & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) == (lcr & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) in dw8250_check_lcr(), causing it to enter dw8250_force_idle().
Put serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR, UART_LCR_WLEN8) under the port->lock to fix this issue.
Panic backtrace:
[ 0.442336] Oops - unknown exception [#1] [ 0.442343] epc : dw8250_serial_in32+0x1e/0x4a [ 0.442351] ra : serial8250_do_startup+0x2c8/0x88e ... [ 0.442416] console_on_rootfs+0x26/0x70
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +1 -2
@@ -2332,9 +2332,8 @@ int serial8250_do_startup(struct uart_po/* * Now, initialize the UART */ -serial_port_out (port,UART_LCR ,UART_LCR_WLEN8 ); -spin_lock_irqsave (&port->lock, flags); +serial_port_out (port,UART_LCR ,UART_LCR_WLEN8 );if (up->port.flags &UPF_FOURPORT ) {if (!up->port.irq) up->port.mctrl |=TIOCM_OUT1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 457/644 cpufreq: armada-8k: Fix off by one in armada_8k_cpufreq_free_table()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 4a26df233266a628157d7f0285451d8655defdfc upstream.
The freq_tables[] array has num_possible_cpus() elements so, to avoid an out of bounds access, this loop should be capped at "< nb_cpus" instead of "<= nb_cpus". The freq_tables[] array is allocated in armada_8k_cpufreq_init().
--- drivers/cpufreq/armada-8k-cpufreq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/cpufreq/armada-8k-cpufreq.c +1 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void armada_8k_cpufreq_free_table {int opps_index, nb_cpus =num_possible_cpus (); -for (opps_index =0 ; opps_index <= nb_cpus; opps_index++) { +for (opps_index =0 ; opps_index < nb_cpus; opps_index++) {int i;/* If cpu_dev is NULL then we reached the end of the array */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 458/644 m68k: Fix lost column on framebuffer debug console
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Finn Thain <[email protected]>
commit 210a1ce8ed4391b64a888b3fb4b5611a13f5ccc7 upstream.
Move the cursor position rightward after rendering the character, not before. This avoids complications that arise when the recursive console_putc call has to wrap the line and/or scroll the display. This also fixes the linewrap bug that crops off the rightmost column.
When the cursor is at the bottom of the display, a linefeed will not move the cursor position further downward. Instead, the display scrolls upward. Avoid the repeated add/subtract sequence by way of a single subtraction at the initialization of console_struct_num_rows.
--- arch/m68k/kernel/head.S | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/m68k/kernel/head.S +21 -10
@@ -3379,6 +3379,7 @@ L(console_clear_loop): movel %d4,%d1 /* screen height in pixels */ divul %a0@(FONT_DESC_HEIGHT),%d1 /* d1 = max num rows */ + subql #1,%d1 /* row range is 0 to num - 1 */ movel %d0,%a2@(Lconsole_struct_num_columns) movel %d1,%a2@(Lconsole_struct_num_rows)
@@ -3525,15 +3526,14 @@ func_start console_putc,%a0/%a1/%d0-%d7 cmpib #10,%d7 jne L(console_not_lf) movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_row),%d0 - addil #1,%d0 - movel %d0,%a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_row) movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_num_rows),%d1 cmpl %d1,%d0 jcs 1f - subil #1,%d0 - movel %d0,%a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_row) console_scroll + jra L(console_exit) 1: + addql #1,%d0 + movel %d0,%a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_row) jra L(console_exit) L(console_not_lf):
@@ -3560,12 +3560,6 @@ L(console_not_cr): */ L(console_not_home): movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_column),%d0 - addql #1,%a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_column) - movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_num_columns),%d1 - cmpl %d1,%d0 - jcs 1f - console_putc #'\n' /* recursion is OK! */ -1: movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_row),%d1 /*
@@ -3612,6 +3606,23 @@ L(console_do_font_scanline): addq #1,%d1 dbra %d7,L(console_read_char_scanline) + /* + * Register usage in the code below: + * a0 = pointer to console globals + * d0 = cursor column + * d1 = cursor column limit + */ + + lea %pc@(L(console_globals)),%a0 + + movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_column),%d0 + addql #1,%d0 + movel %d0,%a0@(Lconsole_struct_cur_column) /* Update cursor pos */ + movel %a0@(Lconsole_struct_num_columns),%d1 + cmpl %d1,%d0 + jcs L(console_exit) + console_putc #'\n' /* Line wrap using tail recursion */ + L(console_exit): func_return console_putc
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 459/644 usb: atm: cxacru: Merge cxacru_upload_firmware() into cxacru_heavy_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 8d1b02e5d7e3a6d2acffb1f4c094678fda9e3456 upstream.
After a recent change in clang to expose uninitialized warnings from const variables [1], there is a warning in cxacru_heavy_init():
drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1104:6: error: variable 'bp' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
1104 | if (instance->modem_type->boot_rom_patch) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1113:39: note: uninitialized use occurs here
1113 | cxacru_upload_firmware(instance, fw, bp);
| ^~
drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1104:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true
1104 | if (instance->modem_type->boot_rom_patch) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1095:32: note: initialize the variable 'bp' to silence this warning
1095 | const struct firmware *fw, *bp;
| ^
| = NULLWhile the warning is technically correct that bp is conditionally passed uninitialized to cxacru_upload_firmware(), it is ultimately a false positive warning on the uninitialized use of bp because the same condition that initializes bp, instance->modem_type->boot_rom_patch, is the same one that gates the use of bp within cxacru_upload_firmware(). As this warning occurs in clang's frontend before inlining occurs, it cannot know that these conditions are indentical to avoid the warning.
Manually inline cxacru_upload_firmware() into cxacru_heavy_init(), as that is its only callsite, so that clang can see that bp is initialized and used under the same condition, clearing up the warning without any functional changes to the code (LLVM was already doing this inlining later).
--- drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c +49 -57
@@ -980,25 +980,60 @@ cleanup:return ret; } -static void cxacru_upload_firmware (struct cxacru_data *instance, -const struct firmware *fw, -const struct firmware *bp) + +static int cxacru_find_firmware (struct cxacru_data *instance, +char *phase,const struct firmware **fw_p) { -int ret; +struct usbatm_data *usbatm = instance->usbatm; +struct device *dev = &usbatm->usb_intf->dev; +char buf[16 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"cxacru-%s.bin" , phase); +usb_dbg (usbatm,"cxacru_find_firmware: looking for %s\n" , buf); + +if (request_firmware (fw_p, buf, dev)) { +usb_dbg (usbatm,"no stage %s firmware found\n" , phase); +return -ENOENT ; + } + +usb_info (usbatm,"found firmware %s\n" , buf); + +return 0 ; +} + +static int cxacru_heavy_init (struct usbatm_data *usbatm_instance, +struct usb_interface *usb_intf) +{ +const struct firmware *fw, *bp; +struct cxacru_data *instance = usbatm_instance->driver_data;struct usbatm_data *usbatm = instance->usbatm;struct usb_device *usb_dev = usbatm->usb_dev;__le16 signature[] = { usb_dev->descriptor.idVendor, usb_dev->descriptor.idProduct };__le32 val; +int ret; + + ret =cxacru_find_firmware (instance,"fw" , &fw); +if (ret) { +usb_warn (usbatm_instance,"firmware (cxacru-fw.bin) unavailable (system misconfigured?)\n" ); +return ret; + } -usb_dbg (usbatm,"%s\n" , __func__); +if (instance->modem_type->boot_rom_patch) { + ret =cxacru_find_firmware (instance,"bp" , &bp); +if (ret) { +usb_warn (usbatm_instance,"boot ROM patch (cxacru-bp.bin) unavailable (system misconfigured?)\n" ); +release_firmware (fw); +return ret; + } + }/* FirmwarePllFClkValue */ val =cpu_to_le32 (instance->modem_type->pll_f_clk); ret =cxacru_fw (usb_dev,FW_WRITE_MEM ,0x2 ,0x0 ,PLLFCLK_ADDR , (u8 *) &val,4 );if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"FirmwarePllFClkValue failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; }/* FirmwarePllBClkValue */
@@ -1006,7 +1041,7 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc ret =cxacru_fw (usb_dev,FW_WRITE_MEM ,0x2 ,0x0 ,PLLBCLK_ADDR , (u8 *) &val,4 );if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"FirmwarePllBClkValue failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; }/* Enable SDRAM */
@@ -1014,7 +1049,7 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc ret =cxacru_fw (usb_dev,FW_WRITE_MEM ,0x2 ,0x0 ,SDRAMEN_ADDR , (u8 *) &val,4 );if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"Enable SDRAM failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; }/* Firmware */
@@ -1022,7 +1057,7 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc ret =cxacru_fw (usb_dev,FW_WRITE_MEM ,0x2 ,0x0 ,FW_ADDR , fw->data, fw->size);if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"Firmware upload failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; }/* Boot ROM patch */
@@ -1031,7 +1066,7 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc ret =cxacru_fw (usb_dev,FW_WRITE_MEM ,0x2 ,0x0 ,BR_ADDR , bp->data, bp->size);if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"Boot ROM patching failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; } }
@@ -1039,7 +1074,7 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc ret =cxacru_fw (usb_dev,FW_WRITE_MEM ,0x2 ,0x0 ,SIG_ADDR , (u8 *) signature,4 );if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"Signature storing failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; }usb_info (usbatm,"starting device\n" );
@@ -1051,7 +1086,7 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc }if (ret) {usb_err (usbatm,"Passing control to firmware failed: %d\n" , ret); -return ; + goto done; }/* Delay to allow firmware to start up. */
@@ -1065,53 +1100,10 @@ static void cxacru_upload_firmware(struc ret =cxacru_cm (instance,CM_REQUEST_CARD_GET_STATUS ,NULL ,0 ,NULL ,0 );if (ret <0 ) {usb_err (usbatm,"modem failed to initialize: %d\n" , ret); -return ; - } -} - -static int cxacru_find_firmware (struct cxacru_data *instance, -char *phase,const struct firmware **fw_p) -{ -struct usbatm_data *usbatm = instance->usbatm; -struct device *dev = &usbatm->usb_intf->dev; -char buf[16 ]; - -sprintf (buf,"cxacru-%s.bin" , phase); -usb_dbg (usbatm,"cxacru_find_firmware: looking for %s\n" , buf); - -if (request_firmware (fw_p, buf, dev)) { -usb_dbg (usbatm,"no stage %s firmware found\n" , phase); -return -ENOENT ; + goto done; } -usb_info (usbatm,"found firmware %s\n" , buf); - -return 0 ; -} - -static int cxacru_heavy_init (struct usbatm_data *usbatm_instance, -struct usb_interface *usb_intf) -{ -const struct firmware *fw, *bp; -struct cxacru_data *instance = usbatm_instance->driver_data; -int ret =cxacru_find_firmware (instance,"fw" , &fw); - -if (ret) { -usb_warn (usbatm_instance,"firmware (cxacru-fw.bin) unavailable (system misconfigured?)\n" ); -return ret; - } - -if (instance->modem_type->boot_rom_patch) { - ret =cxacru_find_firmware (instance,"bp" , &bp); -if (ret) { -usb_warn (usbatm_instance,"boot ROM patch (cxacru-bp.bin) unavailable (system misconfigured?)\n" ); -release_firmware (fw); -return ret; - } - } - -cxacru_upload_firmware (instance, fw, bp); - +done:if (instance->modem_type->boot_rom_patch)release_firmware (bp);release_firmware (fw);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 460/644 usb: gadget: udc: renesas_usb3: fix device leak at unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 868837b0a94c6b1b1fdbc04d3ba218ca83432393 upstream.
Make sure to drop the reference to the companion device taken during probe when the driver is unbound.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/renesas_usb3.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/renesas_usb3.c +1 -0
@@ -2566,6 +2566,7 @@ static int renesas_usb3_remove(struct plstruct renesas_usb3 *usb3 =platform_get_drvdata (pdev);debugfs_remove_recursive (usb3->dentry); +put_device (usb3->host_dev);device_remove_file (&pdev->dev, &dev_attr_role);cancel_work_sync (&usb3->role_work);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 461/644 usb: dwc3: meson-g12a: fix device leaks at unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 93b400f4951404d040197943a25d6fef9f8ccabb upstream.
Make sure to drop the references taken to the child devices by of_find_device_by_node() during probe on driver unbind.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c +3 -0
@@ -847,6 +847,9 @@ static int dwc3_meson_g12a_remove(structif (priv->drvdata->otg_switch_supported)usb_role_switch_unregister (priv->role_switch); +put_device (priv->switch_desc.udc); +put_device (priv->switch_desc.usb2_port); +of_platform_depopulate (dev);for (i =0 ; i <PHY_COUNT ; ++i) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 462/644 bus: mhi: host: Fix endianness of BHI vector table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Wilhelm <[email protected]>
commit f471578e8b1a90623674433a01a8845110bc76ce upstream.
On big endian platform like PowerPC, the MHI bus (which is little endian) does not start properly. The following example shows the error messages by using QCN9274 WLAN device with ath12k driver:
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: BAR 0: assigned [mem 0xc00000000-0xc001fffff 64bit]
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: MSI vectors: 1
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: Hardware name: qcn9274 hw2.0
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: failed to set mhi state: POWER_ON(2)
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: failed to start mhi: -110
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: failed to power up :-110
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: failed to create soc core: -110
ath12k_pci 0001:01:00.0: failed to init core: -110
ath12k_pci: probe of 0001:01:00.0 failed with error -110The issue seems to be with the incorrect DMA address/size used for transferring the firmware image over BHI. So fix it by converting the DMA address and size of the BHI vector table to little endian format before sending them to the device.
--- drivers/bus/mhi/host/boot.c | 8 ++++---- drivers/bus/mhi/host/internal.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/bus/mhi/host/boot.c +4 -4
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ void mhi_rddm_prepare(struct mhi_controlunsigned int i;for (i =0 ; i < img_info->entries -1 ; i++, mhi_buf++, bhi_vec++) { - bhi_vec->dma_addr = mhi_buf->dma_addr; - bhi_vec->size = mhi_buf->len; + bhi_vec->dma_addr =cpu_to_le64 (mhi_buf->dma_addr); + bhi_vec->size =cpu_to_le64 (mhi_buf->len); }dev_dbg (dev,"BHIe programming for RDDM\n" );
@@ -376,8 +376,8 @@ static void mhi_firmware_copy(struct mhiwhile (remainder) { to_cpy =min (remainder, mhi_buf->len);memcpy (mhi_buf->buf, buf, to_cpy); - bhi_vec->dma_addr = mhi_buf->dma_addr; - bhi_vec->size = to_cpy; + bhi_vec->dma_addr =cpu_to_le64 (mhi_buf->dma_addr); + bhi_vec->size =cpu_to_le64 (to_cpy); buf += to_cpy; remainder -= to_cpy;
drivers/bus/mhi/host/internal.h +2 -2
@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ struct mhi_ring_element { };struct bhi_vec_entry { -u64 dma_addr; -u64 size; +__le64 dma_addr; +__le64 size; };enum mhi_cmd_type {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 463/644 vt: keyboard: Dont process Unicode characters in K_OFF mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myrrh Periwinkle <[email protected]>
commit b1cc2092ea7a52e2c435aee6d2b1bcb773202663 upstream.
We don't process Unicode characters if the virtual terminal is in raw mode, so there's no reason why we shouldn't do the same for K_OFF (especially since people would expect K_OFF to actually turn off all VT key processing).
--- drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c +1 -1
@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ static void kbd_keycode(unsigned int key rc =atomic_notifier_call_chain (&keyboard_notifier_list,KBD_UNICODE , ¶m);if (rc !=NOTIFY_STOP ) -if (down && !raw_mode) +if (down && !(raw_mode || kbd->kbdmode ==VC_OFF ))k_unicode (vc, keysym, !down);return ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 464/644 vt: defkeymap: Map keycodes above 127 to K_HOLE
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myrrh Periwinkle <[email protected]>
commit b43cb4ff85da5cf29c4cd351ef1d7dd8210780f7 upstream.
The maximum number of keycodes got bumped to 256 a very long time ago, but the default keymaps were never adjusted to match. This is causing the kernel to interpret keycodes above 127 as U+0000 if the shipped generated keymap is used.
Fix this by mapping all keycodes above 127 to K_HOLE so the kernel ignores them.
The contents of this patche were generated by rerunning loadkeys --mktable --unicode and only including the changes to map keycodes above 127 to K_HOLE.
--- drivers/tty/vt/defkeymap.c_shipped | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/vt/defkeymap.c_shipped +112 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ unsigned short plain_map[NR_KEYS] = { 0xf118, 0xf601, 0xf602, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf119, 0xf115, 0xf116, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; static unsigned short shift_map[NR_KEYS] = {
@@ -42,6 +58,22 @@ static unsigned short shift_map[NR_KEYS] 0xf20b, 0xf601, 0xf602, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf20a, 0xf115, 0xf116, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; static unsigned short altgr_map[NR_KEYS] = {
@@ -61,6 +93,22 @@ static unsigned short altgr_map[NR_KEYS] 0xf118, 0xf601, 0xf602, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf119, 0xf115, 0xf116, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; static unsigned short ctrl_map[NR_KEYS] = {
@@ -80,6 +128,22 @@ static unsigned short ctrl_map[NR_KEYS] 0xf118, 0xf601, 0xf602, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf119, 0xf115, 0xf116, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; static unsigned short shift_ctrl_map[NR_KEYS] = {
@@ -99,6 +163,22 @@ static unsigned short shift_ctrl_map[NR_ 0xf118, 0xf601, 0xf602, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf119, 0xf115, 0xf116, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; static unsigned short alt_map[NR_KEYS] = {
@@ -118,6 +198,22 @@ static unsigned short alt_map[NR_KEYS] = 0xf118, 0xf210, 0xf211, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf119, 0xf115, 0xf116, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; static unsigned short ctrl_alt_map[NR_KEYS] = {
@@ -137,6 +233,22 @@ static unsigned short ctrl_alt_map[NR_KE 0xf118, 0xf601, 0xf602, 0xf117, 0xf600, 0xf119, 0xf115, 0xf20c, 0xf11a, 0xf10c, 0xf10d, 0xf11b, 0xf11c, 0xf110, 0xf311, 0xf11d, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, + 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, 0xf200, }; ushort *key_maps[MAX_NR_KEYMAPS] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 465/644 lib/crypto: mips/chacha: Fix clang build and remove unneeded byteswap
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 22375adaa0d9fbba9646c8e2b099c6e87c97bfae upstream.
The MIPS32r2 ChaCha code has never been buildable with the clang assembler. First, clang doesn't support the 'rotl' pseudo-instruction:
error: unknown instruction, did you mean: rol, rotr?
Second, clang requires that both operands of the 'wsbh' instruction be explicitly given:
error: too few operands for instruction
To fix this, align the code with the real instruction set by (1) using the real instruction 'rotr' instead of the nonstandard pseudo- instruction 'rotl', and (2) explicitly giving both operands to 'wsbh'.
To make removing the use of 'rotl' a bit easier, also remove the unnecessary special-casing for big endian CPUs at .Lchacha_mips_xor_bytes. The tail handling is actually endian-independent since it processes one byte at a time. On big endian CPUs the old code byte-swapped SAVED_X, then iterated through it in reverse order. But the byteswap and reverse iteration canceled out.
Tested with chacha20poly1305-selftest in QEMU using "-M malta" with both little endian and big endian mips32r2 kernels.
--- arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S | 20 +++++++------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S +7 -13
@@ -55,17 +55,13 @@ #if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ #define MSB 0 #define LSB 3 -#define ROTx rotl -#define ROTR(n) rotr n, 24 #define CPU_TO_LE32(n) \ - wsbh n; \ + wsbh n, n; \ rotr n, 16; #else #define MSB 3 #define LSB 0 -#define ROTx rotr #define CPU_TO_LE32(n) -#define ROTR(n) #endif #define FOR_EACH_WORD(x) \
@@ -192,10 +188,10 @@ CONCAT3(.Lchacha_mips_xor_aligned_, PLUS xor X(W), X(B); \ xor X(Y), X(C); \ xor X(Z), X(D); \ - rotl X(V), S; \ - rotl X(W), S; \ - rotl X(Y), S; \ - rotl X(Z), S; + rotr X(V), 32 - S; \ + rotr X(W), 32 - S; \ + rotr X(Y), 32 - S; \ + rotr X(Z), 32 - S; .text .set reorder
@@ -372,21 +368,19 @@ chacha_crypt_arch: /* First byte */ lbu T1, 0(IN) addiu $at, BYTES, 1 - CPU_TO_LE32(SAVED_X) - ROTR(SAVED_X) xor T1, SAVED_X sb T1, 0(OUT) beqz $at, .Lchacha_mips_xor_done /* Second byte */ lbu T1, 1(IN) addiu $at, BYTES, 2 - ROTx SAVED_X, 8 + rotr SAVED_X, 8 xor T1, SAVED_X sb T1, 1(OUT) beqz $at, .Lchacha_mips_xor_done /* Third byte */ lbu T1, 2(IN) - ROTx SAVED_X, 8 + rotr SAVED_X, 8 xor T1, SAVED_X sb T1, 2(OUT) b .Lchacha_mips_xor_done
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 466/644 Revert "vgacon: Add check for vc_origin address range in vgacon_scroll()"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit e4fc307d8e24f122402907ebf585248cad52841d upstream.
This reverts commit 864f9963ec6b4b76d104d595ba28110b87158003.
The patch is wrong as it checks vc_origin against vc_screenbuf, while in text mode it should compare against vga_vram_base.
As such it broke VGA text scrolling, which can be reproduced like this:
(1) boot a kernel that is configured to use text mode VGA-console
(2) type commands: ls -l /usr/bin | less -S
(3) scroll up/down with cursor-down/up keys
--- drivers/video/console/vgacon.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/console/vgacon.c +1 -1
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ static bool vgacon_scroll(struct vc_data c->vc_screenbuf_size - delta); c->vc_origin = vga_vram_end - c->vc_screenbuf_size; vga_rolled_over =0 ; - }else if (oldo - delta >= (unsigned long )c->vc_screenbuf) + }else c->vc_origin -= delta; c->vc_scr_end = c->vc_origin + c->vc_screenbuf_size; scr_memsetw((u16 *) (c->vc_origin), c->vc_video_erase_char,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 467/644 ext4: check fast symlink for ea_inode correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
commit b4cc4a4077268522e3d0d34de4b2dc144e2330fa upstream.
The check for a fast symlink in the presence of only an external xattr inode is incorrect. If a fast symlink does not have an xattr block (i_file_acl == 0), but does have an external xattr inode that increases inode i_blocks, then the check for a fast symlink will incorrectly fail and __ext4_iget()->ext4_ind_check_inode() will report the inode is corrupt when it "validates" i_data[] on the next read:
# ln -s foo /mnt/tmp/bar
# setfattr -h -n trusted.test \
-v "$(yes | head -n 4000)" /mnt/tmp/bar
# umount /mnt/tmp
# mount /mnt/tmp
# ls -l /mnt/tmp
ls: cannot access '/mnt/tmp/bar': Structure needs cleaning
total 4
? l?????????? ? ? ? ? ? bar
# dmesg | tail -1
EXT4-fs error (device dm-8): __ext4_iget:5098:
inode #24578: block 7303014: comm ls: invalid block(note that "block 7303014" = 0x6f6f66 = "foo" in LE order).
ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink() should check the superblock EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_EA_INODE feature flag, not the inode EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, since the latter is only set on the xattr inode itself, and not on the inode that uses this xattr.
Reviewed-on: https://review.whamcloud.com/59879
Lustre-bug-id: https://jira.whamcloud.com/browse/LU-19121
--- fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static int ext4_meta_trans_blocks(struct*/ int ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink (struct inode *inode) { -if (!(EXT4_I (inode)->i_flags &EXT4_EA_INODE_FL )) { +if (!ext4_has_feature_ea_inode (inode->i_sb)) {int ea_blocks =EXT4_I (inode)->i_file_acl ?EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE (inode->i_sb) >>9 :0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 468/644 ext4: fix fsmap end of range reporting with bigalloc
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ojaswin Mujoo <[email protected]>
commit bae76c035bf0852844151e68098c9b7cd63ef238 upstream.
With bigalloc enabled, the logic to report last extent has a bug since we try to use cluster units instead of block units. This can cause an issue where extra incorrect entries might be returned back to the user. This was flagged by generic/365 with 64k bs and -O bigalloc.
** Details of issue **
The issue was noticed on 5G 64k blocksize FS with -O bigalloc which has only 1 bg.
$ xfs_io -c "fsmap -d" /mnt/scratch
0: 253:48 [0..127]: static fs metadata 128 /* sb */
1: 253:48 [128..255]: special 102:1 128 /* gdt */ 3: 253:48 [256..383]: special 102:3 128 /* block bitmap */ 4: 253:48 [384..2303]: unknown 1920 /* flex bg empty space */
5: 253:48 [2304..2431]: special 102:4 128 /* inode bitmap */
6: 253:48 [2432..4351]: unknown 1920 /* flex bg empty space */
7: 253:48 [4352..6911]: inodes 2560
8: 253:48 [6912..538623]: unknown 531712 9: 253:48 [538624..10485759]: free space 9947136
The issue can be seen with:
$ xfs_io -c "fsmap -d 0 3" /mnt/scratch
0: 253:48 [0..127]: static fs metadata 128
1: 253:48 [384..2047]: unknown 1664
Only the first entry was expected to be returned but we get 2. This is because:
ext4_getfsmap_datadev()
first_cluster, last_cluster = 0
...
info->gfi_last = true;
ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(sb, end_ag, last_cluster + 1, 0, info);
fsb = C2B(1) = 16
fslen = 0
...
/* Merge in any relevant extents from the meta_list */
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &info->gfi_meta_list, fmr_list) {
...
// since fsb = 16, considers all metadata which starts before 16 blockno
iter 1: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = sb (0,1), nop
info->gfi_next_fsblk = 1
iter 2: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = gdt (1,2), nop
info->gfi_next_fsblk = 2
iter 3: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = blk bitmap (2,3), nop
info->gfi_next_fsblk = 3
iter 4: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = ino bitmap (18,19)
if (rec_blk > info->gfi_next_fsblk) { // (18 > 3)
// emits an extra entry ** BUG **
}
}Fix this by directly calling ext4_getfsmap_datadev() with a dummy record that has fmr_physical set to (end_fsb + 1) instead of last_cluster + 1. By using the block instead of cluster we get the correct behavior.
Replacing ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper() with ext4_getfsmap_helper() is okay since the gfi_lastfree and metadata checks in ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper() are anyways redundant when we only want to emit the last allocated block of the range, as we have already taken care of emitting metadata and any last free blocks.
--- fs/ext4/fsmap.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/fsmap.c +12 -3
@@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ static int ext4_getfsmap_datadev(structext4_group_t end_ag;ext4_grpblk_t first_cluster;ext4_grpblk_t last_cluster; +struct ext4_fsmap irec;int error =0 ; bofs =le32_to_cpu (sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
@@ -609,10 +610,18 @@ static int ext4_getfsmap_datadev(struct goto err; } -/* Report any gaps at the end of the bg */ +/* +* The dummy record below will cause ext4_getfsmap_helper() to report +* any allocated blocks at the end of the range. +*/ + irec.fmr_device =0 ; + irec.fmr_physical = end_fsb +1 ; + irec.fmr_length =0 ; + irec.fmr_owner =EXT4_FMR_OWN_FREE ; + irec.fmr_flags =0 ; + info->gfi_last = true; - error =ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper (sb, end_ag, last_cluster +1 , -0 , info); + error =ext4_getfsmap_helper (sb, info, &irec);if (error) goto err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 469/644 ext4: fix reserved gdt blocks handling in fsmap
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ojaswin Mujoo <[email protected]>
commit 3ffbdd1f1165f1b2d6a94d1b1aabef57120deaf7 upstream.
In some cases like small FSes with no meta_bg and where the resize doesn't need extra gdt blocks as it can fit in the current one, s_reserved_gdt_blocks is set as 0, which causes fsmap to emit a 0 length entry, which is incorrect.
$ mkfs.ext4 -b 65536 -O bigalloc /dev/sda 5G $ mount /dev/sda /mnt/scratch $ xfs_io -c "fsmap -d" /mnt/scartch
0: 253:48 [0..127]: static fs metadata 128
1: 253:48 [128..255]: special 102:1 128
2: 253:48 [256..255]: special 102:2 0 <---- 0 len entry
3: 253:48 [256..383]: special 102:3 128Fix this by adding a check for this case.
--- fs/ext4/fsmap.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/fsmap.c +8 -0
@@ -393,6 +393,14 @@ static unsigned int ext4_getfsmap_find_s/* Reserved GDT blocks */ if (!ext4_has_feature_meta_bg (sb) || metagroup < first_meta_bg) { len =le16_to_cpu (sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks); + +/* +* mkfs.ext4 can set s_reserved_gdt_blocks as 0 in some cases, +* check for that. +*/ +if (!len) +return 0 ; + error =ext4_getfsmap_fill (meta_list, fsb, len,EXT4_FMR_OWN_RESV_GDT );if (error)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 470/644 ext4: dont try to clear the orphan_present feature block device is r/o
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit c5e104a91e7b6fa12c1dc2d8bf84abb7ef9b89ad upstream.
When the file system is frozen in preparation for taking an LVM snapshot, the journal is checkpointed and if the orphan_file feature is enabled, and the orphan file is empty, we clear the orphan_present feature flag. But if there are pending inodes that need to be removed the orphan_present feature flag can't be cleared.
The problem comes if the block device is read-only. In that case, we can't process the orphan inode list, so it is skipped in ext4_orphan_cleanup(). But then in ext4_mark_recovery_complete(), this results in the ext4 error "Orphan file not empty on read-only fs" firing and the file system mount is aborted.
Fix this by clearing the needs_recovery flag in the block device is read-only. We do this after the call to ext4_load_and_init-journal() since there are some error checks need to be done in case the journal needs to be replayed and the block device is read-only, or if the block device containing the externa journal is read-only, etc.
--- fs/ext4/super.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/super.c +2 -0
@@ -4669,6 +4669,8 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_ err =ext4_load_journal (sb, es, parsed_opts.journal_devnum);if (err) goto failed_mount3a; +if (bdev_read_only (sb->s_bdev)) + needs_recovery =0 ; }else if (test_opt (sb,NOLOAD ) && !sb_rdonly (sb) &&ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery (sb)) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 471/644 ext4: use kmalloc_array() for array space allocation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Liao Yuanhong <[email protected]>
commit 76dba1fe277f6befd6ef650e1946f626c547387a upstream.
Replace kmalloc(size * sizeof) with kmalloc_array() for safer memory allocation and overflow prevention.
--- fs/ext4/orphan.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/orphan.c +3 -2
@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ int ext4_init_orphan_info(struct super_b } oi->of_blocks = inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits; oi->of_csum_seed =EXT4_I (inode)->i_csum_seed; - oi->of_binfo =kmalloc (oi->of_blocks*sizeof (struct ext4_orphan_block ), -GFP_KERNEL ); + oi->of_binfo =kmalloc_array (oi->of_blocks, +sizeof (struct ext4_orphan_block ), +GFP_KERNEL );if (!oi->of_binfo) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out_put;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 472/644 ext4: fix hole length calculation overflow in non-extent inodes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
commit 02c7f7219ac0e2277b3379a3a0e9841ef464b6d4 upstream.
In a filesystem with a block size larger than 4KB, the hole length calculation for a non-extent inode in ext4_ind_map_blocks() can easily exceed INT_MAX. Then it could return a zero length hole and trigger the following waring and infinite in the iomap infrastructure.
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 434101 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter_done+0x148/0x190 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 434101 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7+ #128 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : iomap_iter_done+0x148/0x190 lr : iomap_iter+0x174/0x230 sp : ffff8000880af740 x29: ffff8000880af740 x28: ffff0000db8e6840 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000880af830 x24: 0000004000000000 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: 000001bfdbfa8000 x21: ffffa6a41c002e48 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff8000880af808 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa6a495ee6cd0 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 00000000000003d4 x13: 00000000fa83b2da x12: 0000b236fc95f18c x11: ffffa6a4978b9c08 x10: 0000000000001da0 x9 : ffffa6a41c1a2a44 x8 : ffff8000880af5c8 x7 : 0000000001000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000004 x4 : 000001bfdbfa8000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000004004030000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: iomap_iter_done+0x148/0x190 (P) iomap_iter+0x174/0x230 iomap_fiemap+0x154/0x1d8 ext4_fiemap+0x110/0x140 [ext4] do_vfs_ioctl+0x4b8/0xbc0 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x8c/0x120 invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x38/0x120 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- fs/ext4/indirect.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/indirect.c +2 -2
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ int ext4_ind_map_blocks(handle_t *handleint indirect_blks;int blocks_to_boundary =0 ;int depth; -int count =0 ; +u64 count =0 ;ext4_fsblk_t first_block =0 ;trace_ext4_ind_map_blocks_enter (inode, map->m_lblk, map->m_len, flags);
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ int ext4_ind_map_blocks(handle_t *handle count++;/* Fill in size of a hole we found */ map->m_pblk =0 ; - map->m_len = min_t(unsigned int, map->m_len, count); + map->m_len =umin (map->m_len, count); goto cleanup; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 473/644 scsi: mpi3mr: Fix race between config read submit and interrupt completion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ranjan Kumar <[email protected]>
commit e6327c4acf925bb6d6d387d76fc3bd94471e10d8 upstream.
The "is_waiting" flag was updated after calling complete(), which could lead to a race where the waiting thread wakes up before the flag is cleared. This may cause a missed wakeup or stale state check.
Reorder the operations to update "is_waiting" before signaling completion to ensure consistent state.
--- drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_fw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_fw.c +1 -1
@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static void mpi3mr_process_admin_reply_d mrioc->facts.reply_sz); }if (cmdptr->is_waiting) { -complete (&cmdptr->done); cmdptr->is_waiting =0 ; +complete (&cmdptr->done); }else if (cmdptr->callback) cmdptr->callback (mrioc, cmdptr); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 474/644 ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit cf3fc037623c54de48d2ec1a1ee686e2d1de2d45 upstream.
Commit 8ae720449fca ("libata: whitespace fixes in ata_to_sense_error()") inadvertantly added the entry 0x40 (ATA_DRDY) to the stat_table array in the function ata_to_sense_error(). This entry ties a failed qc which has a status filed equal to ATA_DRDY to the sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST with the additional sense code UNALIGNED WRITE COMMAND. This entry will be used to generate a failed qc sense key and sense code when the qc is missing sense data and there is no match for the qc error field in the sense_table array of ata_to_sense_error().
As a result, for a failed qc for which we failed to get sense data (e.g. read log 10h failed if qc is an NCQ command, or REQUEST SENSE EXT command failed for the non-ncq case, the user very often end up seeing the completely misleading "unaligned write command" error, even if qc was not a write command. E.g.:
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#12 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_OK cmd_age=0s sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#12 Sense Key : Illegal Request [current]
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#12 Add. Sense: Unaligned write command
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#12 CDB: Read(10) 28 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 08 00
I/O error, dev sda, sector 4096 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x80700 phys_seg 1 prio class 0
Fix this by removing the ATA_DRDY entry from the stat_table array so that we default to always returning ABORTED COMMAND without any additional sense code, since we do not know any better. The entry 0x08 (ATA_DRQ) is also removed since signaling ABORTED COMMAND with a parity error is also misleading (as a parity error would likely be signaled through a bus error). So for this case, also default to returning ABORTED COMMAND without any additional sense code. With this, the previous example error case becomes:
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#17 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_OK cmd_age=0s sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#17 Sense Key : Aborted Command [current]
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#17 Add. Sense: No additional sense information
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#17 CDB: Read(10) 28 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 08 00
I/O error, dev sda, sector 4096 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x80700 phys_seg 1 prio class 0
Together with these fixes, refactor stat_table to make it more readable by putting the entries comments in front of the entries and using the defined status bits macros instead of hardcoded values.
--- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 20 ++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +8 -12
@@ -770,18 +770,14 @@ static void ata_to_sense_error(unsigned {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, // END mark };static const unsigned char stat_table[][4 ] = { -/* Must be first because BUSY means no other bits valid */ - {0x80 ,ABORTED_COMMAND ,0x47 ,0x00 }, -// Busy, fake parity for now - {0x40 ,ILLEGAL_REQUEST ,0x21 ,0x04 }, -// Device ready, unaligned write command - {0x20 ,HARDWARE_ERROR ,0x44 ,0x00 }, -// Device fault, internal target failure - {0x08 ,ABORTED_COMMAND ,0x47 ,0x00 }, -// Timed out in xfer, fake parity for now - {0x04 ,RECOVERED_ERROR ,0x11 ,0x00 }, -// Recovered ECC error Medium error, recovered - {0xFF ,0xFF ,0xFF ,0xFF },// END mark +/* Busy: must be first because BUSY means no other bits valid */ + {ATA_BUSY ,ABORTED_COMMAND ,0x00 ,0x00 }, +/* Device fault: INTERNAL TARGET FAILURE */ + {ATA_DF ,HARDWARE_ERROR ,0x44 ,0x00 }, +/* Corrected data error */ + {ATA_CORR ,RECOVERED_ERROR ,0x00 ,0x00 }, + + {0xFF ,0xFF ,0xFF ,0xFF },/* END mark */ };/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 475/644 zynq_fpga: use sgtable-based scatterlist wrappers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
commit 37e00703228ab44d0aacc32a97809a4f6f58df1b upstream.
Use common wrappers operating directly on the struct sg_table objects to fix incorrect use of statterlists related calls. dma_unmap_sg() function has to be called with the number of elements originally passed to the dma_map_sg() function, not the one returned in sgtable's nents.
--- drivers/fpga/zynq-fpga.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/fpga/zynq-fpga.c +2 -2
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int zynq_fpga_ops_write(struct fp } priv->dma_nelms = -dma_map_sg (mgr->dev.parent, sgt->sgl, sgt->nents,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +dma_map_sgtable (mgr->dev.parent, sgt,DMA_TO_DEVICE ,0 );if (priv->dma_nelms ==0 ) {dev_err (&mgr->dev,"Unable to DMA map (TO_DEVICE)\n" );return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ out_clk:clk_disable (priv->clk); out_free: -dma_unmap_sg (mgr->dev.parent, sgt->sgl, sgt->nents,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +dma_unmap_sgtable (mgr->dev.parent, sgt,DMA_TO_DEVICE ,0 );return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 476/644 wifi: brcmsmac: Remove const from tbl_ptr parameter in wlc_lcnphy_common_read_table()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 81284e86bf8849f8e98e8ead3ff5811926b2107f upstream.
A new warning in clang [1] complains that diq_start in wlc_lcnphy_tx_iqlo_cal() is passed uninitialized as a const pointer to wlc_lcnphy_common_read_table():
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c:2728:13: error: variable 'diq_start' is uninitialized when passed as a const pointer argument here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized-const-pointer]
2728 | &diq_start, 1, 16, 69);
| ^~~~~~~~~
The table pointer passed to wlc_lcnphy_common_read_table() should not be considered constant, as wlc_phy_read_table() is ultimately going to update it. Remove the const qualifier from the tbl_ptr to clear up the warning.
--- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c +1 -1
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ void wlc_lcnphy_read_table(struct brcms_static void wlc_lcnphy_common_read_table (struct brcms_phy *pi,u32 tbl_id, -const u16 *tbl_ptr,u32 tbl_len, +u16 *tbl_ptr,u32 tbl_len,u32 tbl_width,u32 tbl_offset) {struct phytbl_info tab;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 477/644 wifi: ath11k: fix source ring-buffer corruption
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 6efa0df54022c6c9fd4d294b87622c7fcdc418c8 upstream.
Add the missing memory barrier to make sure that LMAC source ring descriptors are written before updating the head pointer to avoid passing stale data to the firmware on weakly ordered architectures like aarch64.
Note that non-LMAC rings use MMIO write accessors which have the required write memory barrier.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.1 WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.41
--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/hal.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/hal.c +9 -1
@@ -797,7 +797,11 @@ void ath11k_hal_srng_access_end(struct aif (srng->ring_dir ==HAL_SRNG_DIR_SRC ) { srng->u.src_ring.last_tp = *(volatile u32 *)srng->u.src_ring.tp_addr; - *srng->u.src_ring.hp_addr = srng->u.src_ring.hp; +/* Make sure descriptor is written before updating the +* head pointer. +*/ +dma_wmb (); +WRITE_ONCE (*srng->u.src_ring.hp_addr, srng->u.src_ring.hp); }else { srng->u.dst_ring.last_hp = *srng->u.dst_ring.hp_addr; *srng->u.dst_ring.tp_addr = srng->u.dst_ring.tp;
@@ -806,6 +810,10 @@ void ath11k_hal_srng_access_end(struct aif (srng->ring_dir ==HAL_SRNG_DIR_SRC ) { srng->u.src_ring.last_tp = *(volatile u32 *)srng->u.src_ring.tp_addr; +/* Assume implementation use an MMIO write accessor +* which has the required wmb() so that the descriptor +* is written before the updating the head pointer. +*/ ath11k_hif_write32(ab, (unsigned long)srng->u.src_ring.hp_addr - (unsigned long)ab->mem,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 478/644 pwm: imx-tpm: Reset counter if CMOD is 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Laurentiu Mihalcea <[email protected]>
commit 65c6f742ab14ab1a2679fba72b82dcc0289d96f1 upstream.
As per the i.MX93 TRM, section 67.3.2.1 "MOD register update", the value of the TPM counter does NOT get updated when writing MOD.MOD unless SC.CMOD != 0. Therefore, with the current code, assuming the following sequence:
1) pwm_disable()
2) pwm_apply_might_sleep() /* period is changed here */
3) pwm_enable()
and assuming only one channel is active, if CNT.COUNT is higher than the MOD.MOD value written during the pwm_apply_might_sleep() call then, when re-enabling the PWM during pwm_enable(), the counter will end up resetting after UINT32_MAX - CNT.COUNT + MOD.MOD cycles instead of MOD.MOD cycles as normally expected.
Fix this problem by forcing a reset of the TPM counter before MOD.MOD is written.
--- drivers/pwm/pwm-imx-tpm.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/pwm/pwm-imx-tpm.c +9 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,15 @@ static int pwm_imx_tpm_apply_hw(struct pwritel (val, tpm->base +PWM_IMX_TPM_SC );/* +* if the counter is disabled (CMOD == 0), programming the new +* period length (MOD) will not reset the counter (CNT). If +* CNT.COUNT happens to be bigger than the new MOD value then +* the counter will end up being reset way too late. Therefore, +* manually reset it to 0. +*/ +if (!cmod) +writel (0x0 , tpm->base +PWM_IMX_TPM_CNT ); +/* * set period count: * if the PWM is disabled (CMOD[1:0] = 2b00), then MOD register * is updated when MOD register is written.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 479/644 hwmon: (gsc-hwmon) fix fan pwm setpoint show functions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
commit 9c62e2282900332c8b711d9f9e37af369a8ef71b upstream.
The Linux hwmon sysfs API values for pwmX_auto_pointY_pwm represent an integer value between 0 (0%) to 255 (100%) and the pwmX_auto_pointY_temp represent millidegrees Celcius.
Commit a6d80df47ee2 ("hwmon: (gsc-hwmon) fix fan pwm temperature scaling") properly addressed the incorrect scaling in the pwm_auto_point_temp_store implementation but erroneously scaled the pwm_auto_point_pwm_show (pwm value) instead of the pwm_auto_point_temp_show (temp value) resulting in:
# cat /sys/class/hwmon/hwmon0/pwm1_auto_point6_pwm 25500 # cat /sys/class/hwmon/hwmon0/pwm1_auto_point6_temp 4500
Fix the scaling of these attributes:
# cat /sys/class/hwmon/hwmon0/pwm1_auto_point6_pwm 255 # cat /sys/class/hwmon/hwmon0/pwm1_auto_point6_temp 45000
--- drivers/hwmon/gsc-hwmon.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/gsc-hwmon.c +2 -2
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static ssize_t pwm_auto_point_temp_show(return ret; ret = regs[0 ] | regs[1 ] <<8 ; -return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , ret *10 ); +return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , ret *100 ); } static ssize_t pwm_auto_point_temp_store(struct device *dev,
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static ssize_t pwm_auto_point_pwm_show(s {struct sensor_device_attribute *attr =to_sensor_dev_attr (devattr); -return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" ,255 * (50 + (attr->index *10 ))); +return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" ,255 * (50 + (attr->index *10 )) /100 ); } static SENSOR_DEVICE_ATTR_RO(pwm1_auto_point1_pwm, pwm_auto_point_pwm, 0);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 480/644 mtd: spinand: propagate spinand_wait() errors from spinand_write_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gabor Juhos <[email protected]>
commit 091d9e35b85b0f8f7e1c73535299f91364a5c73a upstream.
Since commit 3d1f08b032dc ("mtd: spinand: Use the external ECC engine logic") the spinand_write_page() function ignores the errors returned by spinand_wait(). Change the code to propagate those up to the stack as it was done before the offending change.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c +4 -1
@@ -618,7 +618,10 @@ static int spinand_write_page(struct spiSPINAND_WRITE_INITIAL_DELAY_US ,SPINAND_WRITE_POLL_DELAY_US , &status); -if (!ret && (status &STATUS_PROG_FAILED )) +if (ret) +return ret; + +if (status &STATUS_PROG_FAILED )return -EIO ;return nand_ecc_finish_io_req (nand, (struct nand_page_io_req *)req);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 481/644 mtd: rawnand: fsmc: Add missing check after DMA map
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
commit 6c4dab38431fee3d39a841d66ba6f2890b31b005 upstream.
The DMA map functions can fail and should be tested for errors.
Rule: add
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/fsmc_nand.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/fsmc_nand.c +2 -0
@@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ static int dma_xfer(struct fsmc_nand_dat dma_dev = chan->device; dma_addr =dma_map_single (dma_dev->dev, buffer, len, direction); +if (dma_mapping_error (dma_dev->dev, dma_addr)) +return -EINVAL ;if (direction ==DMA_TO_DEVICE ) { dma_src = dma_addr;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 482/644 PCI: endpoint: Fix configfs group list head handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit d79123d79a8154b4318529b7b2ff7e15806f480b upstream.
Doing a list_del() on the epf_group field of struct pci_epf_driver in pci_epf_remove_cfs() is not correct as this field is a list head, not a list entry. This list_del() call triggers a KASAN warning when an endpoint function driver which has a configfs attribute group is torn down:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198 Write of size 8 at addr ffff00010f4a0d80 by task rmmod/319 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2 #1 NONE Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x84 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98 print_report+0x17c/0x538 kasan_report+0xb8/0x190 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198 pci_epf_unregister_driver+0x18/0x30 nvmet_pci_epf_cleanup_module+0x24/0x30 [nvmet_pci_epf] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x264/0x424 invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230 do_el0_svc+0x40/0x58 el0_svc+0x48/0xdc el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
...
Remove this incorrect list_del() call from pci_epf_remove_cfs().
--- drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c +0 -1
@@ -343,7 +343,6 @@ static void pci_epf_remove_cfs(struct pcmutex_lock (&pci_epf_mutex);list_for_each_entry_safe (group, tmp, &driver->epf_group, group_entry)pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group (group); -list_del (&driver->epf_group);mutex_unlock (&pci_epf_mutex); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 483/644 PCI: endpoint: Fix configfs group removal on driver teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit 910bdb8197f9322790c738bb32feaa11dba26909 upstream.
An endpoint driver configfs attributes group is added to the epf_group list of struct pci_epf_driver by pci_epf_add_cfs() but an added group is not removed from this list when the attribute group is unregistered with pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group().
Add the missing list_del() call in pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group() to correctly remove the attribute group from the driver list.
With this change, once the loop over all attribute groups in pci_epf_remove_cfs() completes, the driver epf_group list should be empty. Add a WARN_ON() to make sure of that.
--- drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c | 1 + drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c +1 -0
@@ -658,6 +658,7 @@ void pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group(structif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (group))return ; +list_del (&group->group_entry);configfs_unregister_default_group (group); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group);
drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c +1 -0
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static void pci_epf_remove_cfs(struct pcmutex_lock (&pci_epf_mutex);list_for_each_entry_safe (group, tmp, &driver->epf_group, group_entry)pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group (group); +WARN_ON (!list_empty (&driver->epf_group));mutex_unlock (&pci_epf_mutex); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 484/644 jbd2: prevent softlockup in jbd2_log_do_checkpoint()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
commit 9d98cf4632258720f18265a058e62fde120c0151 upstream.
Both jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() and jbd2_journal_shrink_checkpoint_list() periodically release j_list_lock after processing a batch of buffers to avoid long hold times on the j_list_lock. However, since both functions contend for j_list_lock, the combined time spent waiting and processing can be significant.
jbd2_journal_shrink_checkpoint_list() explicitly calls cond_resched() when need_resched() is true to avoid softlockups during prolonged operations. But jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() only exits its loop when need_resched() is true, relying on potentially sleeping functions like __flush_batch() or wait_on_buffer() to trigger rescheduling. If those functions do not sleep, the kernel may hit a softlockup.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 156s! [kworker/u129:2:373] CPU: 3 PID: 373 Comm: kworker/u129:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.6.0+ #10 Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.27 06/13/2017 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:2) pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x358/0x418 lr : jbd2_log_do_checkpoint+0x31c/0x438 [jbd2] Call trace: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x358/0x418 jbd2_log_do_checkpoint+0x31c/0x438 [jbd2] __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0xfc/0x2f8 [jbd2] add_transaction_credits+0x3bc/0x418 [jbd2] start_this_handle+0xf8/0x560 [jbd2] jbd2__journal_start+0x118/0x228 [jbd2] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x110/0x188 [ext4] ext4_do_writepages+0x3dc/0x740 [ext4] ext4_writepages+0xa4/0x190 [ext4] do_writepages+0x94/0x228 __writeback_single_inode+0x48/0x318 writeback_sb_inodes+0x204/0x590 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x54/0xf8 wb_writeback+0x2cc/0x3d8 wb_do_writeback+0x2e0/0x2f8 wb_workfn+0x80/0x2a8 process_one_work+0x178/0x3e8 worker_thread+0x234/0x3b8 kthread+0xf0/0x108 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
So explicitly call cond_resched() in jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() to avoid softlockup.
--- fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c +1 -0
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ restart: retry:if (batch_count)__flush_batch (journal, &batch_count); +cond_resched ();spin_lock (&journal->j_list_lock); goto restart; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 485/644 soc/tegra: pmc: Ensure power-domains are in a known state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
commit b6bcbce3359619d05bf387d4f5cc3af63668dbaa upstream.
After commit 13a4b7fb6260 ("pmdomain: core: Leave powered-on genpds on until late_initcall_sync") was applied, the Tegra210 Jetson TX1 board failed to boot. Looking into this issue, before this commit was applied, if any of the Tegra power-domains were in 'on' state when the kernel booted, they were being turned off by the genpd core before any driver had chance to request them. This was purely by luck and a consequence of the power-domains being turned off earlier during boot. After this commit was applied, any power-domains in the 'on' state are kept on for longer during boot and therefore, may never transitioned to the off state before they are requested/used. The hang on the Tegra210 Jetson TX1 is caused because devices in some power-domains are accessed without the power-domain being turned off and on, indicating that the power-domain is not in a completely on state.
Quoted 1 line
From reviewing the Tegra PMC driver code, if a power-domain is in the
'on' state there is no guarantee that all the necessary clocks associated with the power-domain are on and even if they are they would not have been requested via the clock framework and so could be turned off later. Some power-domains also have a 'clamping' register that needs to be configured as well. In short, if a power-domain is already 'on' it is difficult to know if it has been configured correctly. Given that the power-domains happened to be switched off during boot previously, to ensure that they are in a good known state on boot, fix this by switching off any power-domains that are on initially when registering the power-domains with the genpd framework.
Note that commit 05cfb988a4d0 ("soc/tegra: pmc: Initialise resets associated with a power partition") updated the tegra_powergate_of_get_resets() function to pass the 'off' to ensure that the resets for the power-domain are in the correct state on boot. However, now that we may power off a domain on boot, if it is on, it is better to move this logic into the tegra_powergate_add() function so that there is a single place where we are handling the initial state of the power-domain.
--- drivers/soc/tegra/pmc.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/tegra/pmc.c +29 -22
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ err: }static int tegra_powergate_of_get_resets (struct tegra_powergate *pg, -struct device_node *np,bool off) +struct device_node *np) {struct device *dev = pg->pmc->dev;int err;
@@ -1189,22 +1189,6 @@ static int tegra_powergate_of_get_resets err =reset_control_acquire (pg->reset);if (err <0 ) {pr_err ("failed to acquire resets: %d\n" , err); - goto out; - } - -if (off) { - err =reset_control_assert (pg->reset); - }else { - err =reset_control_deassert (pg->reset); -if (err <0 ) - goto out; - -reset_control_release (pg->reset); - } - -out: -if (err) { -reset_control_release (pg->reset);reset_control_put (pg->reset); }
@@ -1249,20 +1233,43 @@ static int tegra_powergate_add(struct te goto set_available; } - err =tegra_powergate_of_get_resets (pg, np, off); + err =tegra_powergate_of_get_resets (pg, np);if (err <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"failed to get resets for %pOFn: %d\n" , np, err); goto remove_clks; } -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PM_GENERIC_DOMAINS )) { -if (off) -WARN_ON (tegra_powergate_power_up (pg, true)); +/* +* If the power-domain is off, then ensure the resets are asserted. +* If the power-domain is on, then power down to ensure that when is +* it turned on the power-domain, clocks and resets are all in the +* expected state. +*/ +if (off) { + err =reset_control_assert (pg->reset); +if (err) { +pr_err ("failed to assert resets: %d\n" , err); + goto remove_resets; + } + }else { + err =tegra_powergate_power_down (pg); +if (err) { +dev_err (dev,"failed to turn off PM domain %s: %d\n" , + pg->genpd.name, err); + goto remove_resets; + } + } +/* +* If PM_GENERIC_DOMAINS is not enabled, power-on +* the domain and skip the genpd registration. +*/ +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PM_GENERIC_DOMAINS )) { +WARN_ON (tegra_powergate_power_up (pg, true)); goto remove_resets; } - err =pm_genpd_init (&pg->genpd,NULL , off); + err =pm_genpd_init (&pg->genpd,NULL , true);if (err <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"failed to initialise PM domain %pOFn: %d\n" , np, err);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 486/644 media: gspca: Add bounds checking to firmware parser
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit aef89c0b2417da79cb2062a95476288f9f203ab0 upstream.
This sd_init() function reads the firmware. The firmware data holds a series of records and the function reads each record and sends the data to the device. The request_ihex_firmware() function
calls ihex_validate_fw() which ensures that the total length of all the records won't read out of bounds of the fw->data[].
However, a potential issue is if there is a single very large record (larger than PAGE_SIZE) and that would result in memory corruption. Generally we trust the firmware, but it's always better to double check.
--- drivers/media/usb/gspca/vicam.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/gspca/vicam.c +8 -2
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ static int sd_init(struct gspca_dev *gspconst struct ihex_binrec *rec;const struct firmware *fw;u8 *firmware_buf; +int len; ret =request_ihex_firmware (&fw,VICAM_FIRMWARE , &gspca_dev->dev->dev);
@@ -241,9 +242,14 @@ static int sd_init(struct gspca_dev *gsp goto exit; }for (rec = (void *)fw->data; rec; rec =ihex_next_binrec (rec)) { -memcpy (firmware_buf, rec->data,be16_to_cpu (rec->len)); + len =be16_to_cpu (rec->len); +if (len >PAGE_SIZE ) { + ret = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } +memcpy (firmware_buf, rec->data, len); ret =vicam_control_msg (gspca_dev,0xff ,0 ,0 , firmware_buf, -be16_to_cpu (rec->len)); + len);if (ret <0 )break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 487/644 media: hi556: correct the test pattern configuration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bingbu Cao <[email protected]>
commit 020f602b068c9ce18d5056d02c8302199377d98d upstream.
Hynix hi556 support 8 test pattern modes:
hi556_test_pattern_menu[] = {
{
"Disabled",
"Solid Colour",
"100% Colour Bars",
"Fade To Grey Colour Bars",
"PN9",
"Gradient Horizontal",
"Gradient Vertical",
"Check Board",
"Slant Pattern",
}The test pattern is set by a 8-bit register according to the specification.
+--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[0] | Solid color | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[1] | Color bar | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[2] | Fade to grey color bar | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[3] | PN9 | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[4] | Gradient horizontal | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[5] | Gradient vertical | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[6] | Check board | +--------+-------------------------------+ | BIT[7] | Slant pattern | +--------+-------------------------------+
Based on function above, current test pattern programming is wrong. This patch fixes it by 'BIT(pattern - 1)'. If pattern is 0, driver will disable the test pattern generation and set the pattern to 0.
--- drivers/media/i2c/hi556.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/media/i2c/hi556.c +15 -13
@@ -602,21 +602,23 @@ static int hi556_test_pattern(struct hi5int ret;u32 val; -if (pattern) { - ret =hi556_read_reg (hi556,HI556_REG_ISP , -HI556_REG_VALUE_08BIT , &val); -if (ret) -return ret; - - ret =hi556_write_reg (hi556,HI556_REG_ISP , -HI556_REG_VALUE_08BIT , - val |HI556_REG_ISP_TPG_EN ); -if (ret) -return ret; - } + ret =hi556_read_reg (hi556,HI556_REG_ISP , +HI556_REG_VALUE_08BIT , &val); +if (ret) +return ret; + + val = pattern ? (val |HI556_REG_ISP_TPG_EN ) : + (val & ~HI556_REG_ISP_TPG_EN ); + + ret =hi556_write_reg (hi556,HI556_REG_ISP , +HI556_REG_VALUE_08BIT , val); +if (ret) +return ret; + + val = pattern ?BIT (pattern -1 ) :0 ;return hi556_write_reg (hi556,HI556_REG_TEST_PATTERN , -HI556_REG_VALUE_08BIT , pattern); +HI556_REG_VALUE_08BIT , val); }static int hi556_set_ctrl (struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 488/644 media: imx: fix a potential memory leak in imx_media_csc_scaler_device_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
commit fc5f8aec77704373ee804b5dba0e0e5029c0f180 upstream.
Add video_device_release() in label 'err_m2m' to release the memory allocated by video_device_alloc() and prevent potential memory leaks. Remove the reduntant code in label 'err_m2m'.
--- drivers/staging/media/imx/imx-media-csc-scaler.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/media/imx/imx-media-csc-scaler.c +1 -1
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ imx_media_csc_scaler_device_init(structreturn &priv->vdev; err_m2m: -video_set_drvdata (vfd,NULL ); +video_device_release (vfd); err_vfd:kfree (priv);return ERR_PTR (ret);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 489/644 media: v4l2-ctrls: Dont reset handlers error in v4l2_ctrl_handler_free()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>
commit 5a0400aca5fa7c6b8ba456c311a460e733571c88 upstream.
It's a common pattern in drivers to free the control handler's resources and then return the handler's error code on drivers' error handling paths. Alas, the v4l2_ctrl_handler_free() function also zeroes the error field, effectively indicating successful return to the caller.
There's no apparent need to touch the error field while releasing the control handler's resources and cleaning up stale pointers. Not touching the handler's error field is a more certain way to address this problem than changing all the users, in which case the pattern would be likely to re-emerge in new drivers.
Do just that, don't touch the control handler's error field in v4l2_ctrl_handler_free().
--- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c +0 -1
@@ -992,7 +992,6 @@ void v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(struct v4l2_kvfree (hdl->buckets); hdl->buckets =NULL ; hdl->cached =NULL ; - hdl->error =0 ;mutex_unlock (hdl->lock);mutex_destroy (&hdl->_lock); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 490/644 media: usbtv: Lock resolution while streaming
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ludwig Disterhof <[email protected]>
commit 7e40e0bb778907b2441bff68d73c3eb6b6cd319f upstream.
When an program is streaming (ffplay) and another program (qv4l2) changes the TV standard from NTSC to PAL, the kernel crashes due to trying to copy to unmapped memory.
Changing from NTSC to PAL increases the resolution in the usbtv struct, but the video plane buffer isn't adjusted, so it overflows.
--- drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-video.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-video.c +4 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ static int usbtv_configure_for_norm(stru }if (params) { +if (vb2_is_busy (&usbtv->vb2q) && + (usbtv->width != params->cap_width || + usbtv->height != params->cap_height)) +return -EBUSY ; usbtv->width = params->cap_width; usbtv->height = params->cap_height; usbtv->n_chunks = usbtv->width * usbtv->height
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 491/644 media: rainshadow-cec: fix TOCTOU race condition in rain_interrupt()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gui-Dong Han <[email protected]>
commit 7af160aea26c7dc9e6734d19306128cce156ec40 upstream.
In the interrupt handler rain_interrupt(), the buffer full check on rain->buf_len is performed before acquiring rain->buf_lock. This creates a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, as rain->buf_len is concurrently accessed and modified in the work handler rain_irq_work_handler() under the same lock.
Multiple interrupt invocations can race, with each reading buf_len before it becomes full and then proceeding. This can lead to both interrupts attempting to write to the buffer, incrementing buf_len beyond its capacity (DATA_SIZE) and causing a buffer overflow.
Fix this bug by moving the spin_lock() to before the buffer full check. This ensures that the check and the subsequent buffer modification are performed atomically, preventing the race condition. An corresponding spin_unlock() is added to the overflow path to correctly release the lock.
This possible bug was found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team.
--- drivers/media/cec/usb/rainshadow/rainshadow-cec.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/cec/usb/rainshadow/rainshadow-cec.c +2 -1
@@ -171,11 +171,12 @@ static irqreturn_t rain_interrupt(struct {struct rain *rain =serio_get_drvdata (serio); +spin_lock (&rain->buf_lock);if (rain->buf_len ==DATA_SIZE ) { +spin_unlock (&rain->buf_lock);dev_warn_once (rain->dev,"buffer overflow\n" );return IRQ_HANDLED ; } -spin_lock (&rain->buf_lock); rain->buf_len++; rain->buf[rain->buf_wr_idx] = data; rain->buf_wr_idx = (rain->buf_wr_idx +1 ) &0xff ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 492/644 media: ov2659: Fix memory leaks in ov2659_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>
commit 76142b137b968d47b35cdd8d1dc924677d319c8b upstream.
ov2659_probe() doesn't properly free control handler resources in failure paths, causing memory leaks. Add v4l2_ctrl_handler_free() to prevent these memory leaks and reorder the ctrl_handler assignment for better code flow.
--- drivers/media/i2c/ov2659.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/i2c/ov2659.c +2 -1
@@ -1479,14 +1479,15 @@ static int ov2659_probe(struct i2c_clienV4L2_CID_TEST_PATTERN ,ARRAY_SIZE (ov2659_test_pattern_menu) -1 , 0, 0, ov2659_test_pattern_menu); - ov2659->sd.ctrl_handler = &ov2659->ctrls;if (ov2659->ctrls.error) {dev_err (&client->dev,"%s: control initialization error %d\n" , __func__, ov2659->ctrls.error); +v4l2_ctrl_handler_free (&ov2659->ctrls);return ov2659->ctrls.error; } + ov2659->sd.ctrl_handler = &ov2659->ctrls; sd = &ov2659->sd; client->flags |=I2C_CLIENT_SCCB ;#ifdef CONFIG_VIDEO_V4L2_SUBDEV_API
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 493/644 media: venus: Add a check for packet size after reading from shared memory
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vedang Nagar <[email protected]>
commit 49befc830daa743e051a65468c05c2ff9e8580e6 upstream.
Add a check to ensure that the packet size does not exceed the number of available words after reading the packet header from shared memory. This ensures that the size provided by the firmware is safe to process and prevent potential out-of-bounds memory access.
--- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c +4 -0
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static int venus_write_queue(struct venustatic int venus_read_queue (struct venus_hfi_device *hdev,struct iface_queue *queue,void *pkt,u32 *tx_req) { +struct hfi_pkt_hdr *pkt_hdr =NULL ;struct hfi_queue_header *qhdr;u32 dwords, new_rd_idx;u32 rd_idx, wr_idx, type, qsize;
@@ -304,6 +305,9 @@ static int venus_read_queue(struct venusmemcpy (pkt, rd_ptr, len);memcpy (pkt + len, queue->qmem.kva, new_rd_idx <<2 ); } + pkt_hdr = (struct hfi_pkt_hdr *)(pkt); +if ((pkt_hdr->size >>2 ) != dwords) +return -EINVAL ; }else {/* bad packet received, dropping */ new_rd_idx = qhdr->write_idx;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 494/644 media: venus: hfi: explicitly release IRQ during teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <[email protected]>
commit 640803003cd903cea73dc6a86bf6963e238e2b3f upstream.
Ensure the IRQ is disabled - and all pending handlers completed - before dismantling the interrupt routing and clearing related pointers.
This prevents any possibility of the interrupt triggering after the handler context has been invalidated.
--- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c +1 -0
@@ -1679,6 +1679,7 @@ void venus_hfi_destroy(struct venus_corevenus_interface_queues_release (hdev);mutex_destroy (&hdev->lock);kfree (hdev); +disable_irq (core->irq); core->ops =NULL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 495/644 media: venus: vdec: Clamp param smaller than 1fps and bigger than 240.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
commit 377dc500d253f0b26732b2cb062e89668aef890a upstream.
The driver uses "whole" fps in all its calculations (e.g. in load_per_instance()). Those calculation expect an fps bigger than 1, and not big enough to overflow.
Clamp the value if the user provides a param that will result in an invalid fps.
--- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.h | 2 ++ drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/vdec.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.h +2 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#define VIDC_PMDOMAINS_NUM_MAX 3#define VIDC_RESETS_NUM_MAX 2 +#define VENUS_MAX_FPS 240 +extern int venus_fw_debug;struct freq_tbl {
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/vdec.c +2 -3
@@ -430,11 +430,10 @@ static int vdec_s_parm(struct file *file us_per_frame = timeperframe->numerator * (u64 )USEC_PER_SEC ;do_div (us_per_frame, timeperframe->denominator); -if (!us_per_frame) -return -EINVAL ; - + us_per_frame =clamp (us_per_frame,1 ,USEC_PER_SEC ); fps = (u64 )USEC_PER_SEC ;do_div (fps, us_per_frame); + fps =min (VENUS_MAX_FPS , fps); inst->fps = fps; inst->timeperframe = *timeperframe;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 496/644 media: venus: venc: Clamp param smaller than 1fps and bigger than 240
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
commit 417c01b92ec278a1118a05c6ad8a796eaa0c9c52 upstream.
The driver uses "whole" fps in all its calculations (e.g. in load_per_instance()). Those calculation expect an fps bigger than 1, and not big enough to overflow.
Clamp the param if the user provides a value that will result in an invalid fps.
--- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/venc.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/venc.c +2 -3
@@ -408,11 +408,10 @@ static int venc_s_parm(struct file *file us_per_frame = timeperframe->numerator * (u64 )USEC_PER_SEC ;do_div (us_per_frame, timeperframe->denominator); -if (!us_per_frame) -return -EINVAL ; - + us_per_frame =clamp (us_per_frame,1 ,USEC_PER_SEC ); fps = (u64 )USEC_PER_SEC ;do_div (fps, us_per_frame); + fps =min (VENUS_MAX_FPS , fps); inst->timeperframe = *timeperframe; inst->fps = fps;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 497/644 drm/amd: Restore cached power limit during resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
commit ed4efe426a49729952b3dc05d20e33b94409bdd1 upstream.
The power limit will be cached in smu->current_power_limit but if the ASIC goes into S3 this value won't be restored.
Restore the value during SMU resume.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/amdgpu_smu.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/amdgpu_smu.c +6 -0
@@ -1573,6 +1573,12 @@ static int smu_resume(void *handle) adev->pm.dpm_enabled = true; +if (smu->current_power_limit) { + ret =smu_set_power_limit (smu, smu->current_power_limit); +if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return ret; + } +dev_info (adev->dev,"SMU is resumed successfully!\n" );return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 498/644 drm/amd/display: Dont overwrite dce60_clk_mgr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit 4db9cd554883e051df1840d4d58d636043101034 upstream.
dc_clk_mgr_create accidentally overwrites the dce60_clk_mgr with the dce_clk_mgr, causing incorrect behaviour on DCE6. Fix it by removing the extra dce_clk_mgr_construct.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/clk_mgr.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/clk_mgr.c +0 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,6 @@ struct clk_mgr *dc_clk_mgr_create(struct return NULL; }dce60_clk_mgr_construct (ctx, clk_mgr); -dce_clk_mgr_construct (ctx, clk_mgr);return &clk_mgr->base; }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 499/644 net, hsr: reject HSR frame if skb cant hold tag
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Acs <[email protected]>
commit 7af76e9d18a9fd6f8611b3313c86c190f9b6a5a7 upstream.
Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb can result in a crash (kernel BUG):
[ 45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1 [ 45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211! [ 45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI [ 45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(undef) [ 45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0
<snip registers, remove unreliable trace>
[ 45.402911] Call Trace: [ 45.403105] <IRQ> [ 45.404470] skb_push+0xcd/0xf0 [ 45.404726] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0 [ 45.406513] br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260 [ 45.408483] __br_forward+0x42d/0x590 [ 45.409464] maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420 [ 45.409763] br_flood+0x174/0x4a0 [ 45.410030] br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0 [ 45.411618] br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230 [ 45.413674] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0 [ 45.422966] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0 [ 45.424478] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170 [ 45.424806] process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0 [ 45.425116] __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630 [ 45.425394] net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0 [ 45.427613] handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580 [ 45.427926] do_softirq+0x74/0x90 [ 45.428196] </IRQ>
This issue was found by syzkaller.
The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and skb_push() panics.
The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG).
Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to contain both ethernet and hsr headers.
Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push() in br_dev_queue_push_xmit().
In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network.
Further Details:
In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up:
┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
│ veth0_to_hsr ├───┤ hsr_slave0 ┼───┐
└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
│ ┌──────┐
├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐
│ └──────┘ │
┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │┌────────┐
│ veth1_to_hsr ┼───┤ hsr_slave1 ├───┘ └┤ │
└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ ┌┼ bridge │
││ │
│└────────┘
│
┌───────┐ │
│ ... ├──────┘
└───────┘To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'.
The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the
protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly, pointing after the end of the linear buffer.
I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the hsr path as follows.
hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequencehsr_forward_skb()
fill_frame_info()
hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info()
hsr_fill_frame_info()hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the check passes and the execution continues back in the hsr_forward_skb():
hsr_forward_skb()
hsr_forward_do()
hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame()
hsr_get_untagged_frame()
create_stripped_skb_hsr()In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a call to __pskb_copy().
The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy:
gdb) p skb->len
$10 = 12
(gdb) p skb->data
$11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373", (gdb) p skb->head
$12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 ""
It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2
*I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I missed something here.*
Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this point).
*The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header pull.*
hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics.
--- net/hsr/hsr_slave.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/hsr/hsr_slave.c +7 -1
@@ -62,8 +62,14 @@ static rx_handler_result_t hsr_handle_frskb_push (skb,ETH_HLEN );skb_reset_mac_header (skb);if ((!hsr->prot_version && protocol ==htons (ETH_P_PRP )) || - protocol ==htons (ETH_P_HSR )) + protocol ==htons (ETH_P_HSR )) { +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,ETH_HLEN +HSR_HLEN )) { +kfree_skb (skb); + goto finish_consume; + } +skb_set_network_header (skb,ETH_HLEN +HSR_HLEN ); + }skb_reset_mac_len (skb);hsr_forward_skb (skb, port);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 500/644 ipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa upstream.
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this.
--- net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +2 -1
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <net/xfrm.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <net/seg6.h> #include <net/genetlink.h> #include <net/seg6_hmac.h>
@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buif (seg6_hmac_compute (hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr, hmac_output))return false; -if (memcmp (hmac_output, tlv->hmac,SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN ) !=0 ) +if (crypto_memneq (hmac_output, tlv->hmac,SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN ))return false;return true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 501/644 mptcp: drop skb if MPTCP skb extension allocation fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
commit ccab044697980c6c01ab51f43f48f13b8a3e5c33 upstream.
When skb_ext_add(skb, SKB_EXT_MPTCP) fails in mptcp_incoming_options(), we used to return true, letting the segment proceed through the TCP receive path without a DSS mapping. Such segments can leave inconsistent mapping state and trigger a mid-stream fallback to TCP, which in testing collapsed (by artificially forcing failures in skb_ext_add) throughput to zero.
Return false instead so the TCP input path drops the skb (see tcp_data_queue() and step-7 processing). This is the safer choice under memory pressure: it preserves MPTCP correctness and provides backpressure to the sender.
Control packets remain unaffected: ACK updates and DATA_FIN handling happen before attempting the extension allocation, and tcp_reset() continues to ignore the return value.
With this change, MPTCP continues to work at high throughput if we artificially inject failures into skb_ext_add.
--- net/mptcp/options.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/options.c +4 -2
@@ -1074,7 +1074,9 @@ static bool add_addr_hmac_valid(struct mreturn hmac == mp_opt->ahmac; } -/* Return false if a subflow has been reset, else return true */ +/* Return false in case of error (or subflow has been reset), +* else return true. +*/ bool mptcp_incoming_options (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow =mptcp_subflow_ctx (sk);
@@ -1170,7 +1172,7 @@ bool mptcp_incoming_options(struct sock mpext =skb_ext_add (skb,SKB_EXT_MPTCP );if (!mpext) -return true; +return false;memset (mpext,0 ,sizeof (*mpext));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 502/644 mptcp: pm: kernel: flush: do not reset ADD_ADDR limit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
commit 68fc0f4b0d25692940cdc85c68e366cae63e1757 upstream.
A flush of the MPTCP endpoints should not affect the MPTCP limits. In other words, 'ip mptcp endpoint flush' should not change 'ip mptcp limits'.
But it was the case: the MPTCP_PM_ATTR_RCV_ADD_ADDRS (add_addr_accepted) limit was reset by accident. Removing the reset of this counter during a flush fixes this issue.
--- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +0 -1
@@ -1582,7 +1582,6 @@ static void __flush_addrs(struct list_hestatic void __reset_counters (struct pm_nl_pernet *pernet) {WRITE_ONCE (pernet->add_addr_signal_max,0 ); -WRITE_ONCE (pernet->add_addr_accept_max,0 );WRITE_ONCE (pernet->local_addr_max,0 ); pernet->addrs =0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 503/644 sch_htb: make htb_qlen_notify() idempotent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
commit 5ba8b837b522d7051ef81bacf3d95383ff8edce5 upstream.
htb_qlen_notify() always deactivates the HTB class and in fact could trigger a warning if it is already deactivated. Therefore, it is not idempotent and not friendly to its callers, like fq_codel_dequeue().
Let's make it idempotent to ease qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() callers' life.
--- net/sched/sch_htb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/sched/sch_htb.c +2 -0
@@ -1506,6 +1506,8 @@ static void htb_qlen_notify(struct Qdisc {struct htb_class *cl = (struct htb_class *)arg; +if (!cl->prio_activity) +return ;htb_deactivate (qdisc_priv (sch), cl); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 504/644 sch_hfsc: make hfsc_qlen_notify() idempotent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
commit 51eb3b65544c9efd6a1026889ee5fb5aa62da3bb upstream.
hfsc_qlen_notify() is not idempotent either and not friendly to its callers, like fq_codel_dequeue(). Let's make it idempotent to ease qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() callers' life:
1. update_vf() decreases cl->cl_nactive, so we can check whether it is non-zero before calling it.
2. eltree_remove() always removes RB node cl->el_node, but we can use RB_EMPTY_NODE() + RB_CLEAR_NODE() to make it safe.
--- net/sched/sch_hfsc.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +6 -2
@@ -209,7 +209,10 @@ eltree_insert(struct hfsc_class *cl)static inline void eltree_remove (struct hfsc_class *cl) { -rb_erase (&cl->el_node, &cl->sched->eligible); +if (!RB_EMPTY_NODE (&cl->el_node)) { +rb_erase (&cl->el_node, &cl->sched->eligible); +RB_CLEAR_NODE (&cl->el_node); + } } static inline void
@@ -1231,7 +1234,8 @@ hfsc_qlen_notify(struct Qdisc *sch, unsi/* vttree is now handled in update_vf() so that update_vf(cl, 0, 0) * needs to be called explicitly to remove a class from vttree. */ -update_vf (cl,0 ,0 ); +if (cl->cl_nactive) +update_vf (cl,0 ,0 );if (cl->cl_flags &HFSC_RSC )eltree_remove (cl); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 505/644 sch_qfq: make qfq_qlen_notify() idempotent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
commit 55f9eca4bfe30a15d8656f915922e8c98b7f0728 upstream.
qfq_qlen_notify() always deletes its class from its active list with list_del_init() _and_ calls qfq_deactivate_agg() when the whole list becomes empty.
To make it idempotent, just skip everything when it is not in the active list.
Also change other list_del()'s to list_del_init() just to be extra safe.
--- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_qfq.c +5 -2
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static void qfq_deactivate_class(structstruct qfq_aggregate *agg = cl->agg; -list_del (&cl->alist);/* remove from RR queue of the aggregate */ +list_del_init (&cl->alist);/* remove from RR queue of the aggregate */ if (list_empty (&agg->active))/* agg is now inactive */ qfq_deactivate_agg (q, agg); }
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static int qfq_change_class(struct Qdisc cl->common.classid = classid; cl->deficit = lmax; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cl->alist); cl->qdisc =qdisc_create_dflt (sch->dev_queue, &pfifo_qdisc_ops, classid,NULL );
@@ -1006,7 +1007,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *agg_dequeue(struc cl->deficit -= (int ) len;if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen ==0 )/* no more packets, remove from list */ -list_del (&cl->alist); +list_del_init (&cl->alist);else if (cl->deficit <qdisc_pkt_len (cl->qdisc->ops->peek (cl->qdisc))) { cl->deficit += agg->lmax;list_move_tail (&cl->alist, &agg->active);
@@ -1438,6 +1439,8 @@ static void qfq_qlen_notify(struct Qdiscstruct qfq_sched *q =qdisc_priv (sch);struct qfq_class *cl = (struct qfq_class *)arg; +if (list_empty (&cl->alist)) +return ;qfq_deactivate_class (q, cl); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 506/644 mm: drop the assumption that VM_SHARED always implies writable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e8e17ee90eaf650c855adb0a3e5e965fd6692ff1 ]
Patch series "permit write-sealed memfd read-only shared mappings", v4.
The man page for fcntl() describing memfd file seals states the following about F_SEAL_WRITE:-
Furthermore, trying to create new shared, writable memory-mappings via mmap(2) will also fail with EPERM.
With emphasis on 'writable'. In turns out in fact that currently the kernel simply disallows all new shared memory mappings for a memfd with F_SEAL_WRITE applied, rendering this documentation inaccurate.
This matters because users are therefore unable to obtain a shared mapping to a memfd after write sealing altogether, which limits their usefulness. This was reported in the discussion thread [1] originating from a bug report [2].
This is a product of both using the struct address_space->i_mmap_writable atomic counter to determine whether writing may be permitted, and the kernel adjusting this counter when any VM_SHARED mapping is performed and more generally implicitly assuming VM_SHARED implies writable.
It seems sensible that we should only update this mapping if VM_MAYWRITE is specified, i.e. whether it is possible that this mapping could at any point be written to.
If we do so then all we need to do to permit write seals to function as documented is to clear VM_MAYWRITE when mapping read-only. It turns out this functionality already exists for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE - we can therefore simply adapt this logic to do the same for F_SEAL_WRITE.
We then hit a chicken and egg situation in mmap_region() where the check for VM_MAYWRITE occurs before we are able to clear this flag. To work around this, perform this check after we invoke call_mmap(), with careful consideration of error paths.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion!
[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ [2]:https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217238
This patch (of 3):
There is a general assumption that VMAs with the VM_SHARED flag set are writable. If the VM_MAYWRITE flag is not set, then this is simply not the case.
Update those checks which affect the struct address_space->i_mmap_writable field to explicitly test for this by introducing [vma_]is_shared_maywrite() helper functions.
This remains entirely conservative, as the lack of VM_MAYWRITE guarantees that the VMA cannot be written to.
[isaacmanjarres: resolved merge conflicts due to
due to refactoring that happened in upstream commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour")]
--- include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/mm.h | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 2 +- mm/filemap.c | 2 +- mm/madvise.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/fs.h +2 -2
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ int pagecache_write_end(struct file *, s* It is also used to block modification of page cache contents through * memory mappings. * @gfp_mask: Memory allocation flags to use for allocating pages. -* @i_mmap_writable: Number of VM_SHARED mappings. +* @i_mmap_writable: Number of VM_SHARED, VM_MAYWRITE mappings. * @nr_thps: Number of THPs in the pagecache (non-shmem only). * @i_mmap: Tree of private and shared mappings. * @i_mmap_rwsem: Protects @i_mmap and @i_mmap_writable.
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static inline int mapping_mapped(struct/* * Might pages of this file have been modified in userspace? -* Note that i_mmap_writable counts all VM_SHARED vmas: do_mmap +* Note that i_mmap_writable counts all VM_SHARED, VM_MAYWRITE vmas: do_mmap * marks vma as VM_SHARED if it is shared, and the file was opened for * writing i.e. vma may be mprotected writable even if now readonly. *
include/linux/mm.h +11 -0
@@ -706,6 +706,17 @@ static inline bool vma_is_accessible(strreturn vma->vm_flags &VM_ACCESS_FLAGS ; } +static inline bool is_shared_maywrite (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return (vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYWRITE )) == + (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYWRITE ); +} + +static inline bool vma_is_shared_maywrite (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return is_shared_maywrite (vma->vm_flags); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM /* * The vma_is_shmem is not inline because it is used only by slow
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(strget_file (file);i_mmap_lock_write (mapping); -if (tmp->vm_flags &VM_SHARED ) +if (vma_is_shared_maywrite (tmp))mapping_allow_writable (mapping);flush_dcache_mmap_lock (mapping);/* insert tmp into the share list, just after mpnt */
mm/filemap.c +1 -1
@@ -3408,7 +3408,7 @@ int generic_file_mmap(struct file *file,*/ int generic_file_readonly_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -if ((vma->vm_flags &VM_SHARED ) && (vma->vm_flags &VM_MAYWRITE )) +if (vma_is_shared_maywrite (vma))return -EINVAL ;return generic_file_mmap (file, vma); }
mm/madvise.c +1 -1
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static long madvise_remove(struct vm_arereturn -EINVAL ; } -if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_WRITE )) != (VM_SHARED |VM_WRITE )) +if (!vma_is_shared_maywrite (vma))return -EACCES ; offset = (loff_t)(start - vma->vm_start)
mm/mmap.c +3 -3
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ void vma_set_page_prot(struct vm_area_ststatic void __remove_shared_vm_struct (struct vm_area_struct *vma,struct file *file,struct address_space *mapping) { -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHARED ) +if (vma_is_shared_maywrite (vma))mapping_unmap_writable (mapping);flush_dcache_mmap_lock (mapping);
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static void __vma_link_file(struct vm_arif (file) {struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHARED ) +if (vma_is_shared_maywrite (vma))mapping_allow_writable (mapping);flush_dcache_mmap_lock (mapping);
@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *freturn -EINVAL ;/* Map writable and ensure this isn't a sealed memfd. */ -if (file && (vm_flags &VM_SHARED )) { +if (file &&is_shared_maywrite (vm_flags)) {int error =mapping_map_writable (file->f_mapping);if (error)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 507/644 mm: update memfd seal write check to include F_SEAL_WRITE
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 28464bbb2ddc199433383994bcb9600c8034afa1 ]
The seal_check_future_write() function is called by shmem_mmap() or hugetlbfs_file_mmap() to disallow any future writable mappings of an memfd sealed this way.
The F_SEAL_WRITE flag is not checked here, as that is handled via the mapping->i_mmap_writable mechanism and so any attempt at a mapping would fail before this could be run.
However we intend to change this, meaning this check can be performed for F_SEAL_WRITE mappings also.
The logic here is equally applicable to both flags, so update this function to accommodate both and rename it accordingly.
--- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 15 ++++++++------- mm/shmem.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct fi vma->vm_flags |=VM_HUGETLB |VM_DONTEXPAND ; vma->vm_ops = &hugetlb_vm_ops; - ret =seal_check_future_write (info->seals, vma); + ret =seal_check_write (info->seals, vma);if (ret)return ret;
include/linux/mm.h +8 -7
@@ -3287,25 +3287,26 @@ static inline void mem_dump_obj(void *ob#endif /** -* seal_check_future_write - Check for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE flag and handle it +* seal_check_write - Check for F_SEAL_WRITE or F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE flags and +* handle them. * @seals: the seals to check * @vma: the vma to operate on * -* Check whether F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is set; if so, do proper check/handling on -* the vma flags. Return 0 if check pass, or <0 for errors. +* Check whether F_SEAL_WRITE or F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE are set; if so, do proper +* check/handling on the vma flags. Return 0 if check pass, or <0 for errors. */ -static inline int seal_check_future_write (int seals,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static inline int seal_check_write (int seals,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -if (seals &F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE ) { +if (seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE |F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE )) {/* * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when -* "future write" seal active. +* write seals are active. */ if ((vma->vm_flags &VM_SHARED ) && (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ))return -EPERM ;/* -* Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as +* Since an F_SEAL_[FUTURE_]WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask
mm/shmem.c +1 -1
@@ -2262,7 +2262,7 @@ static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file,struct shmem_inode_info *info =SHMEM_I (file_inode (file));int ret; - ret =seal_check_future_write (info->seals, vma); + ret =seal_check_write (info->seals, vma);if (ret)return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 508/644 mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd mappings read-only
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ec396d05d1b737c87311fb7311f753b02c2a6b1 ]
Patch series "mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd mappings read-only".
In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked, thereby regressing this change.
This series reworks how we both permit write-sealed mappings being mapped read-only and disallow mprotect() from undoing the write-seal, fixing this regression.
We also add a regression test to ensure that we do not accidentally regress this in future.
Thanks to Julian Orth for reporting this regression.
This patch (of 2):
In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
This was previously unnecessarily disallowed, despite the man page documentation indicating that it would be, thereby limiting the usefulness of F_SEAL_WRITE logic.
We fixed this by adapting logic that existed for the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal (one which disallows future writes to the memfd) to also be used for F_SEAL_WRITE.
For background - the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal clears VM_MAYWRITE for a read-only mapping to disallow mprotect() from overriding the seal - an operation performed by seal_check_write(), invoked from shmem_mmap(), the f_op->mmap() hook used by shmem mappings.
By extending this to F_SEAL_WRITE and critically - checking mapping_map_writable() to determine if we may map the memfd AFTER we invoke shmem_mmap() - the desired logic becomes possible. This is because mapping_map_writable() explicitly checks for VM_MAYWRITE, which we will have cleared.
Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked, thereby regressing this change.
We reinstate this functionality by moving the check out of shmem_mmap() and instead performing it in do_mmap() at the point at which VMA flags are being determined, which seems in any case to be a more appropriate place in which to make this determination.
In order to achieve this we rework memfd seal logic to allow us access to this information using existing logic and eliminate the clearing of VM_MAYWRITE from seal_check_write() which we are performing in do_mmap() instead.
--- include/linux/memfd.h | 14 ++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- mm/memfd.c | 2 - mm/mmap.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
include/linux/memfd.h +14 -0
@@ -6,11 +6,25 @@#ifdef CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE extern long memfd_fcntl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg); +unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr (struct file *file);#else static inline long memfd_fcntl (struct file *f,unsigned int c,unsigned long a) {return -EINVAL ; } + +static inline unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr (struct file *file) +{ +return NULL ; +}#endif +/* Retrieve memfd seals associated with the file, if any. */ +static inline unsigned int memfd_file_seals (struct file *file) +{ +unsigned int *sealsp =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); + +return sealsp ? *sealsp :0 ; +} +#endif /* __LINUX_MEMFD_H */
include/linux/mm.h +40 -18
70 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/memfd.c +1 -1
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int memfd_wait_for_pins(struct adreturn error; } -static unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr (struct file *file) +unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr (struct file *file) {if (shmem_file (file))return &SHMEM_I (file_inode (file))->seals;
mm/mmap.c +4 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@#include <linux/pkeys.h> #include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/memfd.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -1486,6 +1487,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,if (file) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +unsigned int seals =memfd_file_seals (file);unsigned long flags_mask;if (!file_mmap_ok (file, inode, pgoff, len))
@@ -1524,6 +1526,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, vm_flags |=VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE ;if (!(file->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE )) vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE |VM_SHARED ); +else if (is_readonly_sealed (seals, vm_flags)) + vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE ; fallthrough;case MAP_PRIVATE :if (!(file->f_mode &FMODE_READ ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 509/644 selftests/memfd: add test for mapping write-sealed memfd read-only
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ea0916e01d0b0f2cce1369ac1494239a79827270 ]
Now we have reinstated the ability to map F_SEAL_WRITE mappings read-only, assert that we are able to do this in a test to ensure that we do not regress this again.
--- tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c +43 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,24 @@ static void *mfd_assert_mmap_shared(intreturn p; } +static void *mfd_assert_mmap_read_shared (int fd) +{ +void *p; + + p =mmap (NULL , + mfd_def_size, +PROT_READ , +MAP_SHARED , + fd, +0 ); +if (p ==MAP_FAILED ) { +printf ("mmap() failed: %m\n" ); +abort (); + } + +return p; +} +static void *mfd_assert_mmap_private (int fd) {void *p;
@@ -802,6 +820,30 @@ static void test_seal_future_write(void)close (fd); } +static void test_seal_write_map_read_shared (void ) +{ +int fd; +void *p; + +printf ("%s SEAL-WRITE-MAP-READ\n" , memfd_str); + + fd =mfd_assert_new ("kern_memfd_seal_write_map_read" , + mfd_def_size, +MFD_CLOEXEC |MFD_ALLOW_SEALING ); + +mfd_assert_add_seals (fd,F_SEAL_WRITE ); +mfd_assert_has_seals (fd,F_SEAL_WRITE ); + + p =mfd_assert_mmap_read_shared (fd); + +mfd_assert_read (fd); +mfd_assert_read_shared (fd); +mfd_fail_write (fd); + +munmap (p, mfd_def_size); +close (fd); +} +/* * Test SEAL_SHRINK * Test whether SEAL_SHRINK actually prevents shrinking
@@ -1056,6 +1098,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)test_seal_write ();test_seal_future_write (); +test_seal_write_map_read_shared ();test_seal_shrink ();test_seal_grow ();test_seal_resize ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 510/644 ice: Fix a null pointer dereference in ice_copy_and_init_pkg()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36 ]
Add check for the return value of devm_kmemdup()
to prevent potential null pointer dereference.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_flex_pipe.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_flex_pipe.c +2 -0
@@ -1448,6 +1448,8 @@ enum ice_status ice_copy_and_init_pkg(streturn ICE_ERR_PARAM ; buf_copy =devm_kmemdup (ice_hw_to_dev (hw), buf, len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buf_copy) +return ICE_ERR_NO_MEMORY ; status =ice_init_pkg (hw, buf_copy, len);if (status) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 511/644 drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing dependent jobs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Lin.Cao" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 ]
When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after processing each job. However, the optimization in drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears dependencies without waking up the scheduler.
When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler, causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang.
Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are cleared.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c | 27 ++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +4 -23
@@ -317,21 +317,8 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drmEXPORT_SYMBOL (drm_sched_entity_destroy);/* -* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency -*/ -static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep (struct dma_fence *f, -struct dma_fence_cb *cb) -{ -struct drm_sched_entity *entity = - container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); - - entity->dependency =NULL ; -dma_fence_put (f); -} - -/* -* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency and -* wake up scheduler +* drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and +* wake up the scheduler */ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup (struct dma_fence *f,struct dma_fence_cb *cb)
@@ -339,7 +326,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(strustruct drm_sched_entity *entity = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); -drm_sched_entity_clear_dep (f, cb); + entity->dependency =NULL ; +dma_fence_put (f);drm_sched_wakeup (entity->rq->sched); }
@@ -395,13 +383,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_depende fence =dma_fence_get (&s_fence->scheduled);dma_fence_put (entity->dependency); entity->dependency = fence; -if (!dma_fence_add_callback (fence, &entity->cb, - drm_sched_entity_clear_dep)) -return true; - -/* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */ -dma_fence_put (fence); -return false; } if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 512/644 arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ada Couprie Diaz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb ]
cpu_switch_to() and call_on_irq_stack() manipulate SP to change to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled. Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely, is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.
In cpu_switch_to(), it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task, but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0), clobbering it.
In call_on_irq_stack(), it can happen when switching from the task stack to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack, calls call_on_irq_stack() and clobbers the task SCS pointer with the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !
This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS, or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK or FPAC if enabled.
This is possible on a default config, but unlikely.
However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU should receive based on priority.
Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU even in cpu_switch_to() and call_on_irq_stack(), possibly *very* frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading to unpredictable kernel panics.
Completely mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to() and restore it when returning. Do the same in call_on_irq_stack(), but restore and mask around the branch.
Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency of behaviour between all configurations.
Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF, as the existing one saves but only masks IF.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +6 -0
@@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) * */ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to) + save_and_disable_daif x11 mov x10, #THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT add x8, x0, x10 mov x9, sp
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to) ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 scs_save x0 scs_load_current + restore_irq x11 ret SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
@@ -882,6 +884,7 @@ NOKPROBE(ret_from_fork) * Calls func(regs) using this CPU's irq stack and shadow irq stack. */ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) + save_and_disable_daif x9 #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK get_current_task x16 scs_save x16
@@ -896,8 +899,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) /* Move to the new stack and call the function there */ add sp, x16, #IRQ_STACK_SIZE + restore_irq x9 blr x1 + save_and_disable_daif x9 /* * Restore the SP from the FP, and restore the FP and LR from the frame * record.
@@ -905,6 +910,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) mov sp, x29 ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 scs_load_current + restore_irq x9 ret SYM_FUNC_END(call_on_irq_stack) NOKPROBE(call_on_irq_stack)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 513/644 ARM: 9448/1: Use an absolute path to unified.h in KBUILD_AFLAGS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 87c4e1459e80bf65066f864c762ef4dc932fad4b ]
After commit d5c8d6e0fa61 ("kbuild: Update assembler calls to use proper flags and language target"), which updated as-instr to use the 'assembler-with-cpp' language option, the Kbuild version of as-instr always fails internally for arch/arm with
<command-line>: fatal error: asm/unified.h: No such file or directory compilation terminated.
because '-include' flags are now taken into account by the compiler driver and as-instr does not have '$(LINUXINCLUDE)', so unified.h is not found.
This went unnoticed at the time of the Kbuild change because the last use of as-instr in Kbuild that arch/arm could reach was removed in 5.7 by commit 541ad0150ca4 ("arm: Remove 32bit KVM host support") but a stable backport of the Kbuild change to before that point exposed this potential issue if one were to be reintroduced.
Follow the general pattern of '-include' paths throughout the tree and make unified.h absolute using '$(srctree)' to ensure KBUILD_AFLAGS can be used independently.
--- arch/arm/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ endif # Need -Uarm for gcc < 3.x KBUILD_CFLAGS +=$(CFLAGS_ABI) $(CFLAGS_ISA) $(arch-y) $(tune-y) $(call cc-option,-mshort-load-bytes,$(call cc-option,-malignment-traps,)) -msoft-float -Uarm -KBUILD_AFLAGS +=$(CFLAGS_ABI) $(AFLAGS_ISA) $(arch-y) $(tune-y) -include asm/unified.h -msoft-float +KBUILD_AFLAGS +=$(CFLAGS_ABI) $(AFLAGS_ISA) $(arch-y) $(tune-y) -include $(srctree)/arch/arm/include/asm/unified.h -msoft-float CHECKFLAGS += -D__arm__
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 514/644 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 ]
syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:
INFO: task syz-executor140:5308 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-syzkaller-00069-g81e4f8d68c66 #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor140 state:D stack:24016 pid:5308 tgid:5308 ppid:5306 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00000006
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5378 [inline]
__schedule+0x190e/0x4c90 kernel/sched/core.c:6765
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6842 [inline]
schedule+0x14b/0x320 kernel/sched/core.c:6857
io_schedule+0x8d/0x110 kernel/sched/core.c:7690
folio_wait_bit_common+0x839/0xee0 mm/filemap.c:1317
__folio_lock mm/filemap.c:1664 [inline]
folio_lock include/linux/pagemap.h:1163 [inline]
__filemap_get_folio+0x147/0xb40 mm/filemap.c:1917
pagecache_get_page+0x2c/0x130 mm/folio-compat.c:87
find_get_page_flags include/linux/pagemap.h:842 [inline]
f2fs_grab_cache_page+0x2b/0x320 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776
__get_node_page+0x131/0x11b0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1463
read_xattr_block+0xfb/0x190 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:306
lookup_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:355 [inline]
f2fs_getxattr+0x676/0xf70 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:533
__f2fs_get_acl+0x52/0x870 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179
f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:375 [inline]
f2fs_init_acl+0xd7/0x9b0 fs/f2fs/acl.c:418
f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0xa0f/0x1050 fs/f2fs/dir.c:539
f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x448/0x860 fs/f2fs/inline.c:666
f2fs_add_dentry+0xba/0x1e0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:765
f2fs_do_add_link+0x28c/0x3a0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:808
f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3616 [inline]
f2fs_mknod+0x2e8/0x5b0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:766
vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4191
unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1286 [inline]
unix_bind+0x563/0xe30 net/unix/af_unix.c:1379
__sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1817 [inline]
__sys_bind+0x1e4/0x290 net/socket.c:1848
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1853 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1851
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7fLet's dump and check metadata of corrupted inode, it shows its xattr_nid is the same to its i_ino.
dump.f2fs -i 3 chaseyu.img.rawi_xattr_nid [0x 3 : 3]
So that, during mknod in the corrupted directory, it tries to get and lock inode page twice, result in deadlock.
- f2fs_mknod
- f2fs_add_inline_entry
- f2fs_get_inode_page --- lock dir's inode page
- f2fs_init_acl
- f2fs_acl_create(dir,..)
- __f2fs_get_acl
- f2fs_getxattr
- lookup_all_xattrs
- __get_node_page --- try to lock dir's inode page
In order to fix this, let's add sanity check on ino and xnid.
--- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +7 -0
@@ -226,6 +226,13 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inreturn false; } +if (ino_of_node (node_page) == fi->i_xattr_nid) { +set_sbi_flag (sbi,SBI_NEED_FSCK ); +f2fs_warn (sbi,"%s: corrupted inode i_ino=%lx, xnid=%x, run fsck to fix." , + __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid); +return false; + } +if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr (sbi) && !f2fs_has_extra_attr (inode)) {set_sbi_flag (sbi,SBI_NEED_FSCK );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 515/644 iio: hid-sensor-prox: Restore lost scale assignments
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Lixu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 83ded7cfaccccd2f4041769c313b58b4c9e265ad ]
The variables scale_pre_decml, scale_post_decml, and scale_precision were assigned in commit d68c592e02f6 ("iio: hid-sensor-prox: Fix scale not correct issue"), but due to a merge conflict in
commit 9c15db92a8e5 ("Merge tag 'iio-for-5.13a' of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jic23/iio into staging-next"), these assignments were lost.
Add back lost assignments and replace st->prox_attr with st->prox_attr[0] because commit 596ef5cf654b ("iio: hid-sensor-prox: Add support for more channels") changed prox_attr to an array.
--- drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c +5 -0
@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ static int prox_parse_report(struct platdev_dbg (&pdev->dev,"prox %x:%x\n" , st->prox_attr.index, st->prox_attr.report_id); + st->scale_precision =hid_sensor_format_scale (hsdev->usage, + &st->prox_attr, + &st->scale_pre_decml, + &st->scale_post_decml); +return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 516/644 iio: hid-sensor-prox: Fix incorrect OFFSET calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Lixu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 79dabbd505210e41c88060806c92c052496dd61c ]
The OFFSET calculation in the prox_read_raw() was incorrectly using the unit exponent, which is intended for SCALE calculations.
Remove the incorrect OFFSET calculation and set it to a fixed value of 0.
--- drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c +1 -2
@@ -103,8 +103,7 @@ static int prox_read_raw(struct iio_dev ret_type = prox_state->scale_precision;break ;case IIO_CHAN_INFO_OFFSET : - *val =hid_sensor_convert_exponent ( - prox_state->prox_attr.unit_expo); + *val =0 ; ret_type =IIO_VAL_INT ;break ;case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SAMP_FREQ :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 517/644 x86/mce/amd: Add default names for MCA banks and blocks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d66e1e90b16055d2f0ee76e5384e3f119c3c2773 ]
Ensure that sysfs init doesn't fail for new/unrecognized bank types or if a bank has additional blocks available.
Most MCA banks have a single thresholding block, so the block takes the same name as the bank.
Unified Memory Controllers (UMCs) are a special case where there are two blocks and each has a unique name.
However, the microarchitecture allows for five blocks. Any new MCA bank types with more than one block will be missing names for the extra blocks. The MCE sysfs will fail to initialize in this case.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c +10 -3
@@ -1228,13 +1228,20 @@ static const char *get_name(unsigned int } bank_type =smca_get_bank_type (bank); -if (bank_type >=N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES ) -return NULL ;if (b && bank_type ==SMCA_UMC ) {if (b->block <ARRAY_SIZE (smca_umc_block_names))return smca_umc_block_names[b->block]; -return NULL ; + } + +if (b && b->block) { +snprintf (buf_mcatype,MAX_MCATYPE_NAME_LEN ,"th_block_%u" , b->block); +return buf_mcatype; + } + +if (bank_type >=N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES ) { +snprintf (buf_mcatype,MAX_MCATYPE_NAME_LEN ,"th_bank_%u" , bank); +return buf_mcatype; }if (smca_banks[bank].hwid->count ==1 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 518/644 usb: hub: avoid warm port reset during USB3 disconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f59f93cd1d720809466c7fd5aa16a236156c672b ]
During disconnect USB-3 ports often go via SS.Inactive link error state before the missing terminations are noticed, and link finally goes to RxDetect state
Avoid immediately warm-resetting ports in SS.Inactive state. Let ports settle for a while and re-read the link status a few times 20ms apart to see if the ports transitions out of SS.Inactive.
According to USB 3.x spec 7.5.2, a port in SS.Inactive should automatically check for missing far-end receiver termination every 12 ms (SSInactiveQuietTimeout)
The futile multiple warm reset retries of a disconnected device takes a lot of time, also the resetting of a removed devices has caused cases where the reset bit got stuck for a long time on xHCI roothub. This lead to issues in detecting new devices connected to the same port shortly after.
Stable-dep-of: 2521106fc732 ("usb: hub: Don't try to recover devices lost during warm reset.")
--- drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/hub.c +20 -6
@@ -2857,6 +2857,8 @@ static unsigned hub_is_wusb(struct usb_h#define PORT_INIT_TRIES 4#endif /* CONFIG_USB_FEW_INIT_RETRIES */ +#define DETECT_DISCONNECT_TRIES 5 +#define HUB_ROOT_RESET_TIME 60/* times are in msec */ #define HUB_SHORT_RESET_TIME 10#define HUB_BH_RESET_TIME 50
@@ -5681,6 +5683,7 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *hstruct usb_device *udev = port_dev->child;struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;u16 portstatus, portchange; +int i =0 ; connect_change =test_bit (port1, hub->change_bits);clear_bit (port1, hub->event_bits);
@@ -5757,17 +5760,27 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *h connect_change =1 ;/* -* Warm reset a USB3 protocol port if it's in -* SS.Inactive state. -*/ -if (hub_port_warm_reset_required (hub, port1, portstatus)) { -dev_dbg (&port_dev->dev,"do warm reset\n" ); -if (!udev || !(portstatus &USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION ) +* Avoid trying to recover a USB3 SS.Inactive port with a warm reset if +* the device was disconnected. A 12ms disconnect detect timer in +* SS.Inactive state transitions the port to RxDetect automatically. +* SS.Inactive link error state is common during device disconnect. +*/ +while (hub_port_warm_reset_required (hub, port1, portstatus)) { +if ((i++ <DETECT_DISCONNECT_TRIES ) && udev) { +u16 unused; + +msleep (20 ); +hub_port_status (hub, port1, &portstatus, &unused); +dev_dbg (&port_dev->dev,"Wait for inactive link disconnect detect\n" ); +continue ; + }else if (!udev || !(portstatus &USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION ) || udev->state ==USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED ) { +dev_dbg (&port_dev->dev,"do warm reset, port only\n" );if (hub_port_reset (hub, port1,NULL ,HUB_BH_RESET_TIME , true) <0 )hub_port_disable (hub, port1,1 ); }else { +dev_dbg (&port_dev->dev,"do warm reset, full device\n" );usb_unlock_port (port_dev);usb_lock_device (udev);usb_reset_device (udev);
@@ -5775,6 +5788,7 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *husb_lock_port (port_dev); connect_change =0 ; } +break ; }if (connect_change)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 519/644 usb: hub: Dont try to recover devices lost during warm reset.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2521106fc732b0b75fd3555c689b1ed1d29d273c ]
Hub driver warm-resets ports in SS.Inactive or Compliance mode to recover a possible connected device. The port reset code correctly detects if a connection is lost during reset, but hub driver port_event() fails to take this into account in some cases. port_event() ends up using stale values and assumes there is a connected device, and will try all means to recover it, including power-cycling the port.
Details:
This case was triggered when xHC host was suspended with DbC (Debug Capability) enabled and connected. DbC turns one xHC port into a simple usb debug device, allowing debugging a system with an A-to-A USB debug cable.
xhci DbC code disables DbC when xHC is system suspended to D3, and enables it back during resume.
We essentially end up with two hosts connected to each other during suspend, and, for a short while during resume, until DbC is enabled back. The suspended xHC host notices some activity on the roothub port, but can't train the link due to being suspended, so xHC hardware sets a CAS (Cold Attach Status) flag for this port to inform xhci host driver that the port needs to be warm reset once xHC resumes.
CAS is xHCI specific, and not part of USB specification, so xhci driver tells usb core that the port has a connection and link is in compliance mode. Recovery from complinace mode is similar to CAS recovery.
xhci CAS driver support that fakes a compliance mode connection was added in commit 8bea2bd37df0 ("usb: Add support for root hub port status CAS")
Once xHCI resumes and DbC is enabled back, all activity on the xHC roothub host side port disappears. The hub driver will anyway think port has a connection and link is in compliance mode, and hub driver will try to recover it.
The port power-cycle during recovery seems to cause issues to the active DbC connection.
Fix this by clearing connect_change flag if hub_port_reset() returns -ENOTCONN, thus avoiding the whole unnecessary port recovery and initialization attempt.
--- drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/hub.c +6 -2
@@ -5684,6 +5684,7 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *hstruct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;u16 portstatus, portchange;int i =0 ; +int err; connect_change =test_bit (port1, hub->change_bits);clear_bit (port1, hub->event_bits);
@@ -5776,8 +5777,11 @@ static void port_event(struct usb_hub *h }else if (!udev || !(portstatus &USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION ) || udev->state ==USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED ) {dev_dbg (&port_dev->dev,"do warm reset, port only\n" ); -if (hub_port_reset (hub, port1,NULL , -HUB_BH_RESET_TIME , true) <0 ) + err =hub_port_reset (hub, port1,NULL , +HUB_BH_RESET_TIME , true); +if (!udev && err == -ENOTCONN ) + connect_change =0 ; +else if (err <0 )hub_port_disable (hub, port1,1 ); }else {dev_dbg (&port_dev->dev,"do warm reset, full device\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 520/644 smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6 ]
The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous. However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause use-after-free crashes:
crypt_message()
// Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);
// Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
// Free creq while async operation is still in progress
kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS, the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(), the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes when the driver later accesses the freed memory.
This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.
The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask, async implementations can be selected.
Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion
This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the CVE-2024-50047 fix.
--- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +6 -1
@@ -4552,6 +4552,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *seu8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE ];struct aead_request *req;u8 *iv; +DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT (wait);unsigned int crypt_len =le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);void *creq;
@@ -4600,7 +4601,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *seaead_request_set_crypt (req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);aead_request_set_ad (req, assoc_data_len); - rc = enc ?crypto_aead_encrypt (req) :crypto_aead_decrypt (req); +aead_request_set_callback (req,CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG , + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + rc =crypto_wait_req (enc ?crypto_aead_encrypt (req) + :crypto_aead_decrypt (req), &wait);if (!rc && enc)memcpy (&tr_hdr->Signature, sign,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 521/644 x86/fpu: Delay instruction pointer fixup until after warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1cec9ac2d071cfd2da562241aab0ef701355762a ]
Right now, if XRSTOR fails a console message like this is be printed:
Bad FPU state detected at restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x9a/0x170, reinitializing FPU registers.
However, the text location (...+0x9a in this case) is the instruction *AFTER* the XRSTOR. The highlighted instruction in the "Code:" dump also points one instruction late.
The reason is that the "fixup" moves RIP up to pass the bad XRSTOR and keep on running after returning from the #GP handler. But it does this fixup before warning.
The resulting warning output is nonsensical because it looks like the non-FPU-related instruction is #GP'ing.
Do not fix up RIP until after printing the warning. Do this by using the more generic and standard ex_handler_default().
--- arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/extable.c +2 -3
@@ -60,13 +60,12 @@ static bool ex_handler_fault(const strucstatic bool ex_handler_fprestore (const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,struct pt_regs *regs) { - regs->ip =ex_fixup_addr (fixup); -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Bad FPU state detected at %pB, reinitializing FPU registers." , (void *)instruction_pointer (regs));__restore_fpregs_from_fpstate (&init_fpstate,xfeatures_mask_fpstate ()); -return true; + +return ex_handler_default (fixup, regs); } static bool ex_handler_uaccess(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 522/644 ALSA: scarlett2: Add retry on -EPROTO from scarlett2_usb_tx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8a15ca0ca51399b652b1bbb23b590b220cf03d62 ]
During communication with Focusrite Scarlett Gen 2/3/4 USB audio interfaces, -EPROTO is sometimes returned from scarlett2_usb_tx(), snd_usb_ctl_msg() which can cause initialisation and control operations to fail intermittently.
This patch adds up to 5 retries in scarlett2_usb(), with a delay starting at 5ms and doubling each time. This follows the same approach as the fix for usb_set_interface() in endpoint.c (commit f406005e162b ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add retry on -EPROTO from usb_set_interface()")), which resolved similar -EPROTO issues during device initialisation, and is the same approach as in fcp.c:fcp_usb().
--- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +8 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/usb.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> #include <sound/control.h> #include <sound/tlv.h>
@@ -1064,6 +1065,8 @@ static int scarlett2_usb(u16 req_buf_size =sizeof (struct scarlett2_usb_packet ) + req_size;u16 resp_buf_size =sizeof (struct scarlett2_usb_packet ) + resp_size;struct scarlett2_usb_packet *req, *resp =NULL ; +int retries =0 ; +const int max_retries =5 ;int err; req =kmalloc (req_buf_size,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -1087,10 +1090,15 @@ static int scarlett2_usb(if (req_size)memcpy (req->data, req_data, req_size); +retry: err =scarlett2_usb_tx (dev, private->bInterfaceNumber, req, req_buf_size);if (err != req_buf_size) { +if (err == -EPROTO && ++retries <= max_retries) { +msleep (5 * (1 << (retries -1 ))); + goto retry; + } usb_audio_err( mixer->chip, "Scarlett Gen 2/3 USB request result cmd %x was %d\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 523/644 smb: server: Fix extension string in ksmbd_extract_shortname()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e7d178d06e8937454b6d2f2811fa6a15656a214 ]
In ksmbd_extract_shortname(), strscpy() is incorrectly called with the length of the source string (excluding the NUL terminator) rather than the size of the destination buffer. This results in "__" being copied to 'extension' rather than "___" (two underscores instead of three).
Use the destination buffer size instead to ensure that the string "___" (three underscores) is copied correctly.
--- fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c +1 -1
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ int ksmbd_extract_shortname(struct ksmbd p =strrchr (longname,'.' );if (p == longname) {/*name starts with a dot*/ -strscpy (extension,"___" ,strlen ("___" )); +strscpy (extension,"___" ,sizeof (extension)); }else {if (p) { p++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 524/644 hv_netvsc: Fix panic during namespace deletion with VF
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 33caa208dba6fa639e8a92fd0c8320b652e5550c ]
The existing code move the VF NIC to new namespace when NETDEV_REGISTER is received on netvsc NIC. During deletion of the namespace, default_device_exit_batch() >> default_device_exit_net() is called. When netvsc NIC is moved back and registered to the default namespace, it automatically brings VF NIC back to the default namespace. This will cause the default_device_exit_net() >> for_each_netdev_safe loop unable to detect the list end, and hit NULL ptr:
[ 231.449420] mana 7870:00:00.0 enP30832s1: Moved VF to namespace with: eth0 [ 231.449656] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 231.450246] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 231.450579] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 231.450916] PGD 17b8a8067 P4D 0 [ 231.451163] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 231.451450] CPU: 82 UID: 0 PID: 1394 Comm: kworker/u768:1 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4+ #3 VOLUNTARY [ 231.452042] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024 [ 231.452692] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 231.452947] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit_batch+0x16c/0x3f0 [ 231.453326] Code: c0 0c f5 b3 e8 d5 db fe ff 48 85 c0 74 15 48 c7 c2 f8 fd ca b2 be 10 00 00 00 48 8d 7d c0 e8 7b 77 25 00 49 8b 86 28 01 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 4c 8b 2a 4c 8d 62 f0 49 83 ed 10 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d6 00 [ 231.454294] RSP: 0018:ff75fc7c9bf9fd00 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 231.454610] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 61c8864680b583eb [ 231.455094] RDX: ff1fa9f71462d800 RSI: ff75fc7c9bf9fd38 RDI: 0000000030766564 [ 231.455686] RBP: ff75fc7c9bf9fd78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 231.456126] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ff1fa9f70088e340 [ 231.456621] R13: ff1fa9f70088e340 R14: ffffffffb3f50c20 R15: ff1fa9f7103e6340 [ 231.457161] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1faa6783a08000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 231.457707] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 231.458031] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000179ab2006 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0 [ 231.458434] Call Trace: [ 231.458600] <TASK> [ 231.458777] ops_undo_list+0x100/0x220 [ 231.459015] cleanup_net+0x1b8/0x300 [ 231.459285] process_one_work+0x184/0x340
To fix it, move the ns change to a workqueue, and take rtnl_lock to avoid changing the netdev list when default_device_exit_net() is using it.
--- drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 3 +++ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h +3 -0
@@ -1032,6 +1032,7 @@ struct net_device_context {struct net_device __rcu *vf_netdev;struct netvsc_vf_pcpu_stats __percpu *vf_stats;struct delayed_work vf_takeover; +struct delayed_work vfns_work;/* 1: allocated, serial number is valid. 0: not allocated */ u32 vf_alloc;
@@ -1046,6 +1047,8 @@ struct net_device_context {struct netvsc_device_info *saved_netvsc_dev_info; }; +void netvsc_vfns_work (struct work_struct *w); +/* Per channel data */ struct netvsc_channel {struct vmbus_channel *channel;
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +28 -1
@@ -2565,6 +2565,7 @@ static int netvsc_probe(struct hv_devicespin_lock_init (&net_device_ctx->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&net_device_ctx->reconfig_events);INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&net_device_ctx->vf_takeover, netvsc_vf_setup); +INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&net_device_ctx->vfns_work, netvsc_vfns_work); net_device_ctx->vf_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct netvsc_vf_pcpu_stats);
@@ -2703,6 +2704,8 @@ static int netvsc_remove(struct hv_deviccancel_delayed_work_sync (&ndev_ctx->dwork);rtnl_lock (); +cancel_delayed_work_sync (&ndev_ctx->vfns_work); + nvdev =rtnl_dereference (ndev_ctx->nvdev);if (nvdev) {cancel_work_sync (&nvdev->subchan_work);
@@ -2745,6 +2748,7 @@ static int netvsc_suspend(struct hv_devicancel_delayed_work_sync (&ndev_ctx->dwork);rtnl_lock (); +cancel_delayed_work_sync (&ndev_ctx->vfns_work); nvdev =rtnl_dereference (ndev_ctx->nvdev);if (nvdev ==NULL ) {
@@ -2838,6 +2842,27 @@ static void netvsc_event_set_vf_ns(struc } } +void netvsc_vfns_work (struct work_struct *w) +{ +struct net_device_context *ndev_ctx = + container_of(w, struct net_device_context, vfns_work.work); +struct net_device *ndev; + +if (!rtnl_trylock ()) { +schedule_delayed_work (&ndev_ctx->vfns_work,1 ); +return ; + } + + ndev =hv_get_drvdata (ndev_ctx->device_ctx); +if (!ndev) + goto out; + +netvsc_event_set_vf_ns (ndev); + +out: +rtnl_unlock (); +} +/* * On Hyper-V, every VF interface is matched with a corresponding * synthetic interface. The synthetic interface is presented first
@@ -2848,10 +2873,12 @@ static int netvsc_netdev_event(struct no unsigned long event, void *ptr) { struct net_device *event_dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); +struct net_device_context *ndev_ctx;int ret =0 ;if (event_dev->netdev_ops == &device_ops && event ==NETDEV_REGISTER ) { -netvsc_event_set_vf_ns (event_dev); + ndev_ctx =netdev_priv (event_dev); +schedule_delayed_work (&ndev_ctx->vfns_work,0 );return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 525/644 usb: typec: fusb302: cache PD RX state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1e61f6ab08786d66a11cfc51e13d6f08a6b06c56 ]
This patch fixes a race condition communication error, which ends up in PD hard resets when losing the race. Some systems, like the Radxa ROCK 5B are powered through USB-C without any backup power source and use a FUSB302 chip to do the PD negotiation. This means it is quite important to avoid hard resets, since that effectively kills the system's power-supply.
I've found the following race condition while debugging unplanned power loss during booting the board every now and then:
1. lots of TCPM/FUSB302/PD initialization stuff
2. TCPM ends up in SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES (tcpm_set_pd_rx is enabled here)
3. the remote PD source does not send anything, so TCPM does a SOFT RESET
4. TCPM ends up in SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES for the second time (tcpm_set_pd_rx is enabled again, even though it is still on)
At this point I've seen broken CRC good messages being send by the FUSB302 with a logic analyzer sniffing the CC lines. Also it looks like messages are being lost and things generally going haywire with one of the two sides doing a hard reset once a broken CRC good message was send to the bus.
I think the system is running into a race condition, that the FIFOs are being cleared and/or the automatic good CRC message generation flag is being updated while a message is already arriving.
Let's avoid this by caching the PD RX enabled state, as we have already processed anything in the FIFOs and are in a good state. As a side effect that this also optimizes I2C bus usage :)
As far as I can tell the problem theoretically also exists when TCPM enters SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES the first time, but I believe this is less critical for the following reason:
On devices like the ROCK 5B, which are powered through a TCPM backed USB-C port, the bootloader must have done some prior PD communication (initial communication must happen within 5 seconds after plugging the USB-C plug). This means the first time the kernel TCPM state machine reaches SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES, the remote side is not sending messages actively. On other devices a hard reset simply adds some extra delay and things should be good afterwards.
--- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/fusb302.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/fusb302.c +8 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ struct fusb302_chip {bool vconn_on;bool vbus_on;bool charge_on; +bool pd_rx_on;bool vbus_present;enum typec_cc_polarity cc_polarity;enum typec_cc_status cc1;
@@ -841,6 +842,11 @@ static int tcpm_set_pd_rx(struct tcpc_deint ret =0 ;mutex_lock (&chip->lock); +if (chip->pd_rx_on == on) { +fusb302_log (chip,"pd is already %s" , on ?"on" :"off" ); + goto done; + } + ret =fusb302_pd_rx_flush (chip);if (ret <0 ) {fusb302_log (chip,"cannot flush pd rx buffer, ret=%d" , ret);
@@ -863,6 +869,8 @@ static int tcpm_set_pd_rx(struct tcpc_de on ? "on" : "off", ret); goto done; } + + chip->pd_rx_on = on;fusb302_log (chip,"pd := %s" , on ?"on" :"off" ); done:mutex_unlock (&chip->lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 526/644 PCI/ACPI: Fix runtime PM ref imbalance on Hot-Plug Capable ports
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6cff20ce3b92ffbf2fc5eb9e5a030b3672aa414a ]
pci_bridge_d3_possible() is called from both pcie_portdrv_probe() and pcie_portdrv_remove() to determine whether runtime power management shall be enabled (on probe) or disabled (on remove) on a PCIe port.
The underlying assumption is that pci_bridge_d3_possible() always returns the same value, else a runtime PM reference imbalance would occur. That assumption is not given if the PCIe port is inaccessible on remove due to
hot-unplug: pci_bridge_d3_possible() calls pciehp_is_native(), which accesses Config Space to determine whether the port is Hot-Plug Capable. An inaccessible port returns "all ones", which is converted to "all zeroes" by pcie_capability_read_dword(). Hence the port no longer seems Hot-Plug Capable on remove even though it was on probe.
The resulting runtime PM ref imbalance causes warning messages such as:
pcieport 0000:02:04.0: Runtime PM usage count underflow!
Avoid the Config Space access (and thus the runtime PM ref imbalance) by caching the Hot-Plug Capable bit in struct pci_dev.
The struct already contains an "is_hotplug_bridge" flag, which however is not only set on Hot-Plug Capable PCIe ports, but also Conventional PCI Hot-Plug bridges and ACPI slots. The flag identifies bridges which are allocated additional MMIO and bus number resources to allow for hierarchy expansion.
The kernel is somewhat sloppily using "is_hotplug_bridge" in a number of places to identify Hot-Plug Capable PCIe ports, even though the flag encompasses other devices. Subsequent commits replace these occurrences with the new flag to clearly delineate Hot-Plug Capable PCIe ports from other kinds of hotplug bridges.
Document the existing "is_hotplug_bridge" and the new "is_pciehp" flag and document the (non-obvious) requirement that pci_bridge_d3_possible() always returns the same value across the entire lifetime of a bridge, including its hot-removal.
--- drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c | 4 +--- drivers/pci/pci.c | 8 ++++++-- drivers/pci/probe.c | 2 +- include/linux/pci.h | 10 +++++++++- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c +1 -3
@@ -792,13 +792,11 @@ int pci_acpi_program_hp_params(struct pcbool pciehp_is_native (struct pci_dev *bridge) {const struct pci_host_bridge *host; -u32 slot_cap;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_PCIE ))return false; -pcie_capability_read_dword (bridge,PCI_EXP_SLTCAP , &slot_cap); -if (!(slot_cap &PCI_EXP_SLTCAP_HPC )) +if (!bridge->is_pciehp)return false;if (pcie_ports_native)
drivers/pci/pci.c +6 -2
@@ -2921,8 +2921,12 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id bridge* pci_bridge_d3_possible - Is it possible to put the bridge into D3 * @bridge: Bridge to check * -* This function checks if it is possible to move the bridge to D3. -* Currently we only allow D3 for recent enough PCIe ports and Thunderbolt. +* Currently we only allow D3 for some PCIe ports and for Thunderbolt. +* +* Return: Whether it is possible to move the bridge to D3. +* +* The return value is guaranteed to be constant across the entire lifetime +* of the bridge, including its hot-removal. */ bool pci_bridge_d3_possible (struct pci_dev *bridge) {
drivers/pci/probe.c +1 -1
@@ -1590,7 +1590,7 @@ void set_pcie_hotplug_bridge(struct pci_pcie_capability_read_dword (pdev,PCI_EXP_SLTCAP , ®32);if (reg32 &PCI_EXP_SLTCAP_HPC ) - pdev->is_hotplug_bridge =1 ; + pdev->is_hotplug_bridge = pdev->is_pciehp =1 ; }static void set_pcie_thunderbolt (struct pci_dev *dev)
include/linux/pci.h +9 -1
@@ -317,7 +317,14 @@ struct pci_sriov;struct pci_p2pdma ;struct rcec_ea ; -/* The pci_dev structure describes PCI devices */ +/* struct pci_dev - describes a PCI device +* +* @is_hotplug_bridge: Hotplug bridge of any kind (e.g. PCIe Hot-Plug Capable, +* Conventional PCI Hot-Plug, ACPI slot). +* Such bridges are allocated additional MMIO and bus +* number resources to allow for hierarchy expansion. +* @is_pciehp: PCIe Hot-Plug Capable bridge. +*/ struct pci_dev {struct list_head bus_list;/* Node in per-bus list */ struct pci_bus *bus;/* Bus this device is on */
@@ -440,6 +447,7 @@ struct pci_dev { unsigned int is_physfn:1; unsigned int is_virtfn:1; unsigned int is_hotplug_bridge:1; + unsigned int is_pciehp:1; unsigned int shpc_managed:1; /* SHPC owned by shpchp */ unsigned int is_thunderbolt:1; /* Thunderbolt controller *//*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 527/644 block: Make REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH a write operation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f66ccbaaef3a0c5bd844eab04e3207b4061c546 ]
REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH is defined as "12", which makes op_is_write(REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH) return false, despite the fact that a zone finish operation is an operation that modifies a zone (transition it to full) and so should be considered as a write operation (albeit one that does not transfer any data to the device).
Fix this by redefining REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH to be an odd number (13), and redefine REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET and REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL using sequential odd numbers from that new value.
--- include/linux/blk_types.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/blk_types.h +4 -4
@@ -341,13 +341,13 @@ enum req_opf {/* Close a zone */ REQ_OP_ZONE_CLOSE =11 ,/* Transition a zone to full */ -REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH =12 , +REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH =13 ,/* write data at the current zone write pointer */ -REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND =13 , +REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND =15 ,/* reset a zone write pointer */ -REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET =15 , +REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET =17 ,/* reset all the zone present on the device */ -REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL =17 , +REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL =19 ,/* Driver private requests */ REQ_OP_DRV_IN = 34,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 528/644 net: enetc: fix device and OF node leak at probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 70458f8a6b44daf3ad39f0d9b6d1097c8a7780ed ]
Make sure to drop the references to the IERB OF node and platform device taken by of_parse_phandle() and of_find_device_by_node() during probe.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c +12 -2
@@ -1206,6 +1206,7 @@ static int enetc_pf_register_with_ierb(sstruct device_node *node = pdev->dev.of_node;struct platform_device *ierb_pdev;struct device_node *ierb_node; +int ret;/* Don't register with the IERB if the PF itself is disabled */ if (!node || !of_device_is_available (node))
@@ -1213,16 +1214,25 @@ static int enetc_pf_register_with_ierb(s ierb_node =of_find_compatible_node (NULL ,NULL ,"fsl,ls1028a-enetc-ierb" ); -if (!ierb_node || !of_device_is_available (ierb_node)) +if (!ierb_node)return -ENODEV ; +if (!of_device_is_available (ierb_node)) { +of_node_put (ierb_node); +return -ENODEV ; + } + ierb_pdev =of_find_device_by_node (ierb_node);of_node_put (ierb_node);if (!ierb_pdev)return -EPROBE_DEFER ; -return enetc_ierb_register_pf (ierb_pdev, pdev); + ret =enetc_ierb_register_pf (ierb_pdev, pdev); + +put_device (&ierb_pdev->dev); + +return ret; } static int enetc_pf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 529/644 NFS: Create an nfs4_server_set_init_caps() function
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01dde76e471229e3437a2686c572f4980b2c483e ]
And call it before doing an FSINFO probe to reset to the baseline capabilities before probing.
Stable-dep-of: b01f21cacde9 ("NFS: Fix the setting of capabilities when automounting a new filesystem")
--- fs/nfs/internal.h | 1 + fs/nfs/nfs4client.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/internal.h +1 -0
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ extern struct nfs_client * nfs4_find_client_sessionid(struct net *, const struct sockaddr *, struct nfs4_sessionid *, u32);extern struct nfs_server *nfs_create_server (struct fs_context *); +extern void nfs4_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *);extern struct nfs_server *nfs4_create_server (struct fs_context *);extern struct nfs_server *nfs4_create_referral_server (struct fs_context *); extern int nfs4_update_server(struct nfs_server *server, const char *hostname,
fs/nfs/nfs4client.c +19 -14
@@ -1065,6 +1065,24 @@ static void nfs4_session_limit_xasize(st#endif } +void nfs4_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *server) +{ +/* Set the basic capabilities */ + server->caps |= server->nfs_client->cl_mvops->init_caps; +if (server->flags &NFS_MOUNT_NORDIRPLUS ) + server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READDIRPLUS ; +if (server->nfs_client->cl_proto ==XPRT_TRANSPORT_RDMA ) + server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READ_PLUS ; + +/* +* Don't use NFS uid/gid mapping if we're using AUTH_SYS or lower +* authentication. +*/ +if (nfs4_disable_idmapping && + server->client->cl_auth->au_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) + server->caps |=NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP ; +} +static int nfs4_server_common_setup (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs_fh *mntfh,bool auth_probe) {
@@ -1084,20 +1102,7 @@ static int nfs4_server_common_setup(struif (error <0 ) goto out; -/* Set the basic capabilities */ - server->caps |= server->nfs_client->cl_mvops->init_caps; -if (server->flags &NFS_MOUNT_NORDIRPLUS ) - server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READDIRPLUS ; -if (server->nfs_client->cl_proto ==XPRT_TRANSPORT_RDMA ) - server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READ_PLUS ; -/* -* Don't use NFS uid/gid mapping if we're using AUTH_SYS or lower -* authentication. -*/ -if (nfs4_disable_idmapping && - server->client->cl_auth->au_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) - server->caps |=NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP ; - +nfs4_server_set_init_caps (server);/* Probe the root fh to retrieve its FSID and filehandle */ error =nfs4_get_rootfh (server, mntfh, auth_probe);
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +2 -0
@@ -3968,6 +3968,8 @@ int nfs4_server_capabilities(struct nfs_ .interruptible = true, };int err; + +nfs4_server_set_init_caps (server); do { err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, _nfs4_server_capabilities(server, fhandle),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 530/644 NFS: Fix the setting of capabilities when automounting a new filesystem
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b01f21cacde9f2878492cf318fee61bf4ccad323 ]
Capabilities cannot be inherited when we cross into a new filesystem. They need to be reset to the minimal defaults, and then probed for again.
--- fs/nfs/client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/nfs/internal.h | 2 +- fs/nfs/nfs4client.c | 20 +------------------- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/client.c +42 -2
@@ -661,6 +661,44 @@ struct nfs_client *nfs_init_client(struc }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nfs_init_client); +static void nfs4_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *server) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NFS_V4 ) +/* Set the basic capabilities */ + server->caps = server->nfs_client->cl_mvops->init_caps; +if (server->flags &NFS_MOUNT_NORDIRPLUS ) + server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READDIRPLUS ; +if (server->nfs_client->cl_proto ==XPRT_TRANSPORT_RDMA ) + server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READ_PLUS ; + +/* +* Don't use NFS uid/gid mapping if we're using AUTH_SYS or lower +* authentication. +*/ +if (nfs4_disable_idmapping && + server->client->cl_auth->au_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) + server->caps |=NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP ; +#endif +} + +void nfs_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *server) +{ +switch (server->nfs_client->rpc_ops->version) { +case 2 : + server->caps =NFS_CAP_HARDLINKS |NFS_CAP_SYMLINKS ; +break ; +case 3 : + server->caps =NFS_CAP_HARDLINKS |NFS_CAP_SYMLINKS ; +if (!(server->flags &NFS_MOUNT_NORDIRPLUS )) + server->caps |=NFS_CAP_READDIRPLUS ; +break ; +default : +nfs4_server_set_init_caps (server); +break ; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nfs_server_set_init_caps); +/* * Create a version 2 or 3 client */
@@ -699,7 +737,6 @@ static int nfs_init_server(struct nfs_se/* Initialise the client representation from the mount data */ server->flags = ctx->flags; server->options = ctx->options; - server->caps |=NFS_CAP_HARDLINKS |NFS_CAP_SYMLINKS ;switch (clp->rpc_ops->version) {case 2 :
@@ -735,6 +772,8 @@ static int nfs_init_server(struct nfs_seif (error <0 ) goto error; +nfs_server_set_init_caps (server); +/* Preserve the values of mount_server-related mount options */ if (ctx->mount_server.addrlen) { memcpy(&server->mountd_address, &ctx->mount_server.address,
@@ -884,7 +923,6 @@ void nfs_server_copy_userdata(struct nfs target->acregmax = source->acregmax; target->acdirmin = source->acdirmin; target->acdirmax = source->acdirmax; - target->caps = source->caps; target->options = source->options; target->auth_info = source->auth_info; target->port = source->port;
@@ -1095,6 +1133,8 @@ struct nfs_server *nfs_clone_server(struif (error <0 ) goto out_free_server; +nfs_server_set_init_caps (server); +/* probe the filesystem info for this server filesystem */ error =nfs_probe_fsinfo (server, fh, fattr_fsinfo);if (error <0 )
fs/nfs/internal.h +1 -1
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ extern struct nfs_client * nfs4_find_client_sessionid(struct net *, const struct sockaddr *, struct nfs4_sessionid *, u32);extern struct nfs_server *nfs_create_server (struct fs_context *); -extern void nfs4_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *); +extern void nfs_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *);extern struct nfs_server *nfs4_create_server (struct fs_context *);extern struct nfs_server *nfs4_create_referral_server (struct fs_context *); extern int nfs4_update_server(struct nfs_server *server, const char *hostname,
fs/nfs/nfs4client.c +1 -19
@@ -1065,24 +1065,6 @@ static void nfs4_session_limit_xasize(st#endif } -void nfs4_server_set_init_caps (struct nfs_server *server) -{ -/* Set the basic capabilities */ - server->caps |= server->nfs_client->cl_mvops->init_caps; -if (server->flags &NFS_MOUNT_NORDIRPLUS ) - server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READDIRPLUS ; -if (server->nfs_client->cl_proto ==XPRT_TRANSPORT_RDMA ) - server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_READ_PLUS ; - -/* -* Don't use NFS uid/gid mapping if we're using AUTH_SYS or lower -* authentication. -*/ -if (nfs4_disable_idmapping && - server->client->cl_auth->au_flavor ==RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) - server->caps |=NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP ; -} -static int nfs4_server_common_setup (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs_fh *mntfh,bool auth_probe) {
@@ -1102,7 +1084,7 @@ static int nfs4_server_common_setup(struif (error <0 ) goto out; -nfs4_server_set_init_caps (server); +nfs_server_set_init_caps (server);/* Probe the root fh to retrieve its FSID and filehandle */ error =nfs4_get_rootfh (server, mntfh, auth_probe);
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +1 -1
@@ -3969,7 +3969,7 @@ int nfs4_server_capabilities(struct nfs_ };int err; -nfs4_server_set_init_caps (server); +nfs_server_set_init_caps (server); do { err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, _nfs4_server_capabilities(server, fhandle),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 531/644 mm/ptdump: take the memory hotplug lock inside ptdump_walk_pgd()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 59305202c67fea50378dcad0cc199dbc13a0e99a ]
Memory hot remove unmaps and tears down various kernel page table regions as required. The ptdump code can race with concurrent modifications of the kernel page tables. When leaf entries are modified concurrently, the dump code may log stale or inconsistent information for a VA range, but this is otherwise not harmful.
But when intermediate levels of kernel page table are freed, the dump code will continue to use memory that has been freed and potentially reallocated for another purpose. In such cases, the ptdump code may dereference bogus addresses, leading to a number of potential problems.
To avoid the above mentioned race condition, platforms such as arm64, riscv and s390 take memory hotplug lock, while dumping kernel page table via the sysfs interface /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables.
Similar race condition exists while checking for pages that might have been marked W+X via /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables/check_wx_pages which in turn calls ptdump_check_wx(). Instead of solving this race condition again, let's just move the memory hotplug lock inside generic ptdump_check_wx() which will benefit both the scenarios.
Drop get_online_mems() and put_online_mems() combination from all existing platform ptdump code paths.
--- arch/arm64/mm/ptdump_debugfs.c | 3 --- arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c | 2 -- mm/ptdump.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/ptdump_debugfs.c +0 -3
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/debugfs.h> -#include <linux/memory_hotplug.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <asm/ptdump.h>
@@ -9,9 +8,7 @@ static int ptdump_show(struct seq_file * {struct ptdump_info *info = m->private; -get_online_mems ();ptdump_walk (m, info); -put_online_mems ();return 0 ; }DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE (ptdump);
arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c +0 -2
@@ -227,11 +227,9 @@ static int ptdump_show(struct seq_file * .marker = address_markers, }; -get_online_mems ();mutex_lock (&cpa_mutex);ptdump_walk_pgd (&st.ptdump, &init_mm,NULL );mutex_unlock (&cpa_mutex); -put_online_mems ();return 0 ; }DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE (ptdump);
mm/ptdump.c +2 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd(struct ptdump_state {const struct ptdump_range *range = st->range; +get_online_mems ();mmap_write_lock (mm);while (range->start != range->end) { walk_page_range_novma(mm, range->start, range->end,
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd(struct ptdump_state range++; }mmap_write_unlock (mm); +put_online_mems ();/* Flush out the last page */ st->note_page (st,0 ,-1 ,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 532/644 usb: musb: omap2430: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cb020bf52253327fe382e10bcae02a4f1da33c04 ]
The .remove() callback for a platform driver returns an int which makes many driver authors wrongly assume it's possible to do error handling by returning an error code. However the value returned is (mostly) ignored and this typically results in resource leaks. To improve here there is a quest to make the remove callback return void. In the first step of this quest all drivers are converted to .remove_new() which already returns void.
Trivially convert this driver from always returning zero in the remove callback to the void returning variant.
Stable-dep-of: 1473e9e7679b ("usb: musb: omap2430: fix device leak at unbind")
--- drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c +2 -4
@@ -435,14 +435,12 @@ err0:return ret; } -static int omap2430_remove (struct platform_device *pdev) +static void omap2430_remove (struct platform_device *pdev) {struct omap2430_glue *glue =platform_get_drvdata (pdev);platform_device_unregister (glue->musb);pm_runtime_disable (glue->dev); - -return 0 ; }#ifdef CONFIG_PM
@@ -574,7 +572,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, omap2430_id_tablstatic struct platform_driver omap2430_driver = { .probe = omap2430_probe, - .remove = omap2430_remove, + .remove_new = omap2430_remove, .driver = { .name ="musb-omap2430" , .pm =DEV_PM_OPS ,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 533/644 usb: musb: omap2430: fix device leak at unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1473e9e7679bd4f5a62d1abccae894fb86de280f ]
Make sure to drop the reference to the control device taken by of_find_device_by_node() during probe when the driver is unbound.
--- drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c +7 -3
@@ -406,13 +406,13 @@ static int omap2430_probe(struct platfor ARRAY_SIZE(musb_resources));if (ret) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"failed to add resources\n" ); - goto err2; + goto err_put_control_otghs; } ret =platform_device_add_data (musb, pdata,sizeof (*pdata));if (ret) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"failed to add platform_data\n" ); - goto err2; + goto err_put_control_otghs; }pm_runtime_enable (glue->dev);
@@ -427,7 +427,9 @@ static int omap2430_probe(struct platfor err3:pm_runtime_disable (glue->dev); - +err_put_control_otghs: +if (!IS_ERR (glue->control_otghs)) +put_device (glue->control_otghs); err2:platform_device_put (musb);
@@ -441,6 +443,8 @@ static void omap2430_remove(struct platfplatform_device_unregister (glue->musb);pm_runtime_disable (glue->dev); +if (!IS_ERR (glue->control_otghs)) +put_device (glue->control_otghs); }#ifdef CONFIG_PM
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 534/644 ata: Fix SATA_MOBILE_LPM_POLICY description in Kconfig
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ed62a62a18bc144f73eadf866ae46842e8f6606e ]
Improve the description of the possible default SATA link power management policies and add the missing description for policy 5. No functional changes.
--- drivers/ata/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/Kconfig +25 -8
@@ -117,22 +117,39 @@ config SATA_AHCI config SATA_MOBILE_LPM_POLICY int "Default SATA Link Power Management policy for mobile chipsets" - range 0 4 + range 0 5 default 0 depends on SATA_AHCI help Select the Default SATA Link Power Management (LPM) policy to use for mobile / laptop variants of chipsets / "South Bridges". - The value set has the following meanings: + Each policy combines power saving states and features: + - Partial: The Phy logic is powered but is in a reduced power + state. The exit latency from this state is no longer than + 10us). + - Slumber: The Phy logic is powered but is in an even lower power + state. The exit latency from this state is potentially + longer, but no longer than 10ms. + - DevSleep: The Phy logic may be powered down. The exit latency from + this state is no longer than 20 ms, unless otherwise + specified by DETO in the device Identify Device Data log. + - HIPM: Host Initiated Power Management (host automatically + transitions to partial and slumber). + - DIPM: Device Initiated Power Management (device automatically + transitions to partial and slumber). + + The possible values for the default SATA link power management + policies are: 0 => Keep firmware settings - 1 => Maximum performance - 2 => Medium power - 3 => Medium power with Device Initiated PM enabled - 4 => Minimum power + 1 => No power savings (maximum performance) + 2 => HIPM (Partial) + 3 => HIPM (Partial) and DIPM (Partial and Slumber) + 4 => HIPM (Partial and DevSleep) and DIPM (Partial and Slumber) + 5 => HIPM (Slumber and DevSleep) and DIPM (Partial and Slumber) - Note "Minimum power" is known to cause issues, including disk - corruption, with some disks and should not be used. + Excluding the value 0, higher values represent policies with higher + power savings. config SATA_AHCI_PLATFORM tristate "Platform AHCI SATA support"
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 535/644 bus: mhi: host: Detect events pointing to unexpected TREs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Youssef Samir <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5bd398e20f0833ae8a1267d4f343591a2dd20185 ]
When a remote device sends a completion event to the host, it contains a pointer to the consumed TRE. The host uses this pointer to process all of the TREs between it and the host's local copy of the ring's read pointer. This works when processing completion for chained transactions, but can lead to nasty results if the device sends an event for a single-element transaction with a read pointer that is multiple elements ahead of the host's read pointer.
For instance, if the host accesses an event ring while the device is updating it, the pointer inside of the event might still point to an old TRE. If the host uses the channel's xfer_cb() to directly free the buffer pointed to by the TRE, the buffer will be double-freed.
This behavior was observed on an ep that used upstream EP stack without 'commit 6f18d174b73d ("bus: mhi: ep: Update read pointer only after buffer is written")'. Where the device updated the events ring pointer before updating the event contents, so it left a window where the host was able to access the stale data the event pointed to, before the device had the chance to update them. The usual pattern was that the host received an event pointing to a TRE that is not immediately after the last processed one, so it got treated as if it was a chained transaction, processing all of the TREs in between the two read pointers.
This commit aims to harden the host by ensuring transactions where the event points to a TRE that isn't local_rp + 1 are chained.
--- drivers/bus/mhi/host/main.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/bus/mhi/host/main.c +14 -1
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static int parse_xfer_event(struct mhi_c {dma_addr_t ptr =MHI_TRE_GET_EV_PTR (event);struct mhi_ring_element *local_rp, *ev_tre; -void *dev_rp; +void *dev_rp, *next_rp;struct mhi_buf_info *buf_info;u16 xfer_len;
@@ -613,6 +613,19 @@ static int parse_xfer_event(struct mhi_c result.dir = mhi_chan->dir; local_rp = tre_ring->rp; + + next_rp = local_rp +1 ; +if (next_rp >= tre_ring->base + tre_ring->len) + next_rp = tre_ring->base; +/* Check if the event points to an unexpected TRE. +* Chain flag is bit 0 of dword[1] in the TRE. +*/ +if (dev_rp != next_rp && !(le32_to_cpu (local_rp->dword[1 ]) &0x1 )) { +dev_err (&mhi_cntrl->mhi_dev->dev, +"Event element points to an unexpected TRE\n" ); +break ; + } +while (local_rp != dev_rp) { buf_info = buf_ring->rp;/* If it's the last TRE, get length from the event */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 536/644 usb: dwc3: imx8mp: fix device leak at unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 086a0e516f7b3844e6328a5c69e2708b66b0ce18 ]
Make sure to drop the reference to the dwc3 device taken by of_find_device_by_node() on probe errors and on driver unbind.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-imx8mp.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-imx8mp.c +5 -1
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int dwc3_imx8mp_probe(struct plat IRQF_ONESHOT, dev_name(dev), dwc3_imx);if (err) {dev_err (dev,"failed to request IRQ #%d --> %d\n" , irq, err); - goto depopulate; + goto put_dwc3; }device_set_wakeup_capable (dev, true);
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ static int dwc3_imx8mp_probe(struct platreturn 0 ; +put_dwc3: +put_device (&dwc3_imx->dwc3->dev); depopulate:of_platform_depopulate (dev); err_node_put:
@@ -211,6 +213,8 @@ static int dwc3_imx8mp_remove(struct plastruct dwc3_imx8mp *dwc3_imx =platform_get_drvdata (pdev);struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; +put_device (&dwc3_imx->dwc3->dev); +pm_runtime_get_sync (dev);of_platform_depopulate (dev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 537/644 platform/chrome: cros_ec: Make cros_ec_unregister() return void
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit afb0a80e63d67e957b5d0eb4ade301aff6e13c8c ]
Up to now cros_ec_unregister() returns zero unconditionally. Make it return void instead which makes it easier to see in the callers that there is no error to handle.
Also the return value of i2c, platform and spi remove callbacks is ignored anyway.
Stable-dep-of: e23749534619 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec: Unregister notifier in cros_ec_unregister()")
--- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c | 4 +--- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.h | 2 +- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_i2c.c | 4 +++- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c | 4 +++- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_spi.c | 4 +++- 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c +1 -3
@@ -306,13 +306,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cros_ec_register);* * Return: 0 on success or negative error code. */ -int cros_ec_unregister (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev) +void cros_ec_unregister (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev) {if (ec_dev->pd)platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->ec); - -return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (cros_ec_unregister);
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.h +1 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@#include <linux/interrupt.h> int cros_ec_register (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev); -int cros_ec_unregister (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev); +void cros_ec_unregister (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev);int cros_ec_suspend (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev);int cros_ec_resume (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev);
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_i2c.c +3 -1
@@ -313,7 +313,9 @@ static int cros_ec_i2c_remove(struct i2c {struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev =i2c_get_clientdata (client); -return cros_ec_unregister (ec_dev); +cros_ec_unregister (ec_dev); + +return 0 ; }#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c +3 -1
@@ -439,7 +439,9 @@ static int cros_ec_lpc_remove(struct plaacpi_remove_notify_handler (adev->handle,ACPI_ALL_NOTIFY , cros_ec_lpc_acpi_notify); -return cros_ec_unregister (ec_dev); +cros_ec_unregister (ec_dev); + +return 0 ; }static const struct acpi_device_id cros_ec_lpc_acpi_device_ids[] = {
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_spi.c +3 -1
@@ -790,7 +790,9 @@ static int cros_ec_spi_remove(struct spi {struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev =spi_get_drvdata (spi); -return cros_ec_unregister (ec_dev); +cros_ec_unregister (ec_dev); + +return 0 ; }#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 538/644 platform/chrome: cros_ec: Use per-device lockdep key
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 961a325becd9a142ae5c8b258e5c2f221f8bfac8 ]
Lockdep reports a bogus possible deadlock on MT8192 Chromebooks due to the following lock sequences:
1. lock(i2c_register_adapter) [1]; lock(&ec_dev->lock)
2. lock(&ec_dev->lock); lock(prepare_lock);
The actual dependency chains are much longer. The shortened version looks somewhat like:
1. cros-ec-rpmsg on mtk-scp
ec_dev->lock -> prepare_lock
2. In rt5682_i2c_probe() on native I2C bus:
prepare_lock -> regmap->lock -> (possibly) i2c_adapter->bus_lock
3. In rt5682_i2c_probe() on native I2C bus:
regmap->lock -> i2c_adapter->bus_lock
4. In sbs_probe() on i2c-cros-ec-tunnel I2C bus attached on cros-ec:
i2c_adapter->bus_lock -> ec_dev->lock
While lockdep is correct that the shared lockdep classes have a circular dependency, it is bogus because
a) 2+3 happen on a native I2C bus
b) 4 happens on the actual EC on ChromeOS devices
c) 1 happens on the SCP coprocessor on MediaTek Chromebooks that just happens to expose a cros-ec interface, but does not have an i2c-cros-ec-tunnel I2C bus
In short, the "dependencies" are actually on different devices.
Setup a per-device lockdep key for cros_ec devices so lockdep can tell the two instances apart. This helps with getting rid of the bogus lockdep warning. For ChromeOS devices that only have one cros-ec instance this doesn't change anything.
Also add a missing mutex_destroy, just to make the teardown complete.
[1] This is likely the per I2C bus lock with shared lockdep class
Stable-dep-of: e23749534619 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec: Unregister notifier in cros_ec_unregister()")
--- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c | 14 +++++++++++--- include/linux/platform_data/cros_ec_proto.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c +11 -3
@@ -200,12 +200,14 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_deviif (!ec_dev->dout)return -ENOMEM ; +lockdep_register_key (&ec_dev->lockdep_key);mutex_init (&ec_dev->lock); +lockdep_set_class (&ec_dev->lock, &ec_dev->lockdep_key); err =cros_ec_query_all (ec_dev);if (err) {dev_err (dev,"Cannot identify the EC: error %d\n" , err); -return err; + goto destroy_mutex; }if (ec_dev->irq >0 ) {
@@ -217,7 +219,7 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_deviif (err) {dev_err (dev,"Failed to request IRQ %d: %d" , ec_dev->irq, err); -return err; + goto destroy_mutex; } }
@@ -228,7 +230,8 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_deviif (IS_ERR (ec_dev->ec)) {dev_err (ec_dev->dev,"Failed to create CrOS EC platform device\n" ); -return PTR_ERR (ec_dev->ec); + err =PTR_ERR (ec_dev->ec); + goto destroy_mutex; }if (ec_dev->max_passthru) {
@@ -294,6 +297,9 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_devi exit:platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->ec);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd); +destroy_mutex: +mutex_destroy (&ec_dev->lock); +lockdep_unregister_key (&ec_dev->lockdep_key);return err; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (cros_ec_register);
@@ -311,6 +317,8 @@ void cros_ec_unregister(struct cros_ec_dif (ec_dev->pd)platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->ec); +mutex_destroy (&ec_dev->lock); +lockdep_unregister_key (&ec_dev->lockdep_key); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (cros_ec_unregister);
include/linux/platform_data/cros_ec_proto.h +4 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#define __LINUX_CROS_EC_PROTO_H#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/lockdep_types.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/notifier.h>
@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ struct cros_ec_command {* command. The caller should check msg.result for the EC's result * code. * @pkt_xfer: Send packet to EC and get response. +* @lockdep_key: Lockdep class for each instance. Unused if CONFIG_LOCKDEP is +* not enabled. * @lock: One transaction at a time. * @mkbp_event_supported: 0 if MKBP not supported. Otherwise its value is * the maximum supported version of the MKBP host event
@@ -159,6 +162,7 @@ struct cros_ec_device { struct cros_ec_command *msg);int (*pkt_xfer)(struct cros_ec_device *ec,struct cros_ec_command *msg); +struct lock_class_key lockdep_key;struct mutex lock;u8 mkbp_event_supported;bool host_sleep_v1;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 539/644 platform/chrome: cros_ec: remove unneeded label and if-condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 554ec02c97254962bbb0a8776c3160d294fc7e51 ]
Both ec_dev->ec and ec_dev->pd are initialized to NULL at the beginning of cros_ec_register(). Also, platform_device_unregister() takes care if the given platform_device is NULL.
Remove the unneeded goto-label and if-condition.
Stable-dep-of: e23749534619 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec: Unregister notifier in cros_ec_unregister()")
--- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c +4 -6
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_devi err =cros_ec_query_all (ec_dev);if (err) {dev_err (dev,"Cannot identify the EC: error %d\n" , err); - goto destroy_mutex; + goto exit; }if (ec_dev->irq >0 ) {
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_deviif (err) {dev_err (dev,"Failed to request IRQ %d: %d" , ec_dev->irq, err); - goto destroy_mutex; + goto exit; } }
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_devidev_err (ec_dev->dev,"Failed to create CrOS EC platform device\n" ); err =PTR_ERR (ec_dev->ec); - goto destroy_mutex; + goto exit; }if (ec_dev->max_passthru) {
@@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ int cros_ec_register(struct cros_ec_devi exit:platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->ec);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd); -destroy_mutex:mutex_destroy (&ec_dev->lock);lockdep_unregister_key (&ec_dev->lockdep_key);return err;
@@ -314,8 +313,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cros_ec_register);*/ void cros_ec_unregister (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev) { -if (ec_dev->pd) -platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd); +platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->ec);mutex_destroy (&ec_dev->lock);lockdep_unregister_key (&ec_dev->lockdep_key);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 540/644 platform/chrome: cros_ec: Unregister notifier in cros_ec_unregister()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e2374953461947eee49f69b3e3204ff080ef31b1 ]
The blocking notifier is registered in cros_ec_register(); however, it isn't unregistered in cros_ec_unregister().
Fix it.
--- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c +3 -0
@@ -313,6 +313,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cros_ec_register);*/ void cros_ec_unregister (struct cros_ec_device *ec_dev) { +if (ec_dev->mkbp_event_supported) +blocking_notifier_chain_unregister (&ec_dev->event_notifier, + &ec_dev->notifier_ready);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->pd);platform_device_unregister (ec_dev->ec);mutex_destroy (&ec_dev->lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 541/644 net/sched: sch_ets: properly init all active DRR list handles
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 454d3e1ae057a1e09a15905b06b860f60d6c14d0 ]
leaf classes of ETS qdiscs are served in strict priority or deficit round robin (DRR), depending on the value of 'nstrict'. Since this value can be changed while traffic is running, we need to be sure that the active list of DRR classes can be updated at any time, so:
1) call INIT_LIST_HEAD(&alist) on all leaf classes in .init(), before the first packet hits any of them.
2) ensure that 'alist' is not overwritten with zeros when a leaf class is no more strict priority nor DRR (i.e. array elements beyond 'nbands').
Stable-dep-of: 87c6efc5ce9c ("net/sched: ets: use old 'nbands' while purging unused classes")
--- net/sched/sch_ets.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_ets.c +9 -3
@@ -666,7 +666,6 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisc q->nbands = nbands;for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) { -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&q->classes[i].alist);if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) {list_add_tail (&q->classes[i].alist, &q->active); q->classes[i].deficit = quanta[i];
@@ -694,7 +693,11 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdiscets_offload_change (sch);for (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) {qdisc_put (q->classes[i].qdisc); -memset (&q->classes[i],0 ,sizeof (q->classes[i])); + q->classes[i].qdisc =NULL ; + q->classes[i].quantum =0 ; + q->classes[i].deficit =0 ; +memset (&q->classes[i].bstats,0 ,sizeof (q->classes[i].bstats)); +memset (&q->classes[i].qstats,0 ,sizeof (q->classes[i].qstats)); }return 0 ; }
@@ -703,7 +706,7 @@ static int ets_qdisc_init(struct Qdisc * struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) {struct ets_sched *q =qdisc_priv (sch); -int err; +int err, i;if (!opt)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -713,6 +716,9 @@ static int ets_qdisc_init(struct Qdisc *return err;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&q->active); +for (i =0 ; i <TCQ_ETS_MAX_BANDS ; i++) +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&q->classes[i].alist); +return ets_qdisc_change (sch, opt, extack); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 542/644 net_sched: sch_ets: implement lockless ets_dump()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5f1dde7f731e7bf2e7c169ca42cb4989fc2f8b9 ]
Instead of relying on RTNL, ets_dump() can use READ_ONCE() annotations, paired with WRITE_ONCE() ones in ets_change().
Stable-dep-of: 87c6efc5ce9c ("net/sched: ets: use old 'nbands' while purging unused classes")
--- net/sched/sch_ets.c | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_ets.c +14 -11
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdiscsch_tree_lock (sch); - q->nbands = nbands; +WRITE_ONCE (q->nbands, nbands);for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) {if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) {list_add_tail (&q->classes[i].alist, &q->active);
@@ -676,11 +676,11 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisclist_del_init (&q->classes[i].alist);qdisc_purge_queue (q->classes[i].qdisc); } - q->nstrict = nstrict; +WRITE_ONCE (q->nstrict, nstrict);memcpy (q->prio2band, priomap,sizeof (priomap));for (i =0 ; i < q->nbands; i++) - q->classes[i].quantum = quanta[i]; +WRITE_ONCE (q->classes[i].quantum, quanta[i]);for (i = oldbands; i < q->nbands; i++) { q->classes[i].qdisc = queues[i];
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdiscfor (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) {qdisc_put (q->classes[i].qdisc); q->classes[i].qdisc =NULL ; - q->classes[i].quantum =0 ; +WRITE_ONCE (q->classes[i].quantum,0 ); q->classes[i].deficit =0 ;memset (&q->classes[i].bstats,0 ,sizeof (q->classes[i].bstats));memset (&q->classes[i].qstats,0 ,sizeof (q->classes[i].qstats));
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static int ets_qdisc_dump(struct Qdisc *struct ets_sched *q =qdisc_priv (sch);struct nlattr *opts;struct nlattr *nest; +u8 nbands, nstrict;int band;int prio;int err;
@@ -763,21 +764,22 @@ static int ets_qdisc_dump(struct Qdisc *if (!opts) goto nla_err; -if (nla_put_u8 (skb,TCA_ETS_NBANDS , q->nbands)) + nbands =READ_ONCE (q->nbands); +if (nla_put_u8 (skb,TCA_ETS_NBANDS , nbands)) goto nla_err; -if (q->nstrict && -nla_put_u8 (skb,TCA_ETS_NSTRICT , q->nstrict)) + nstrict =READ_ONCE (q->nstrict); +if (nstrict &&nla_put_u8 (skb,TCA_ETS_NSTRICT , nstrict)) goto nla_err; -if (q->nbands > q->nstrict) { +if (nbands > nstrict) { nest =nla_nest_start (skb,TCA_ETS_QUANTA );if (!nest) goto nla_err; -for (band = q->nstrict; band < q->nbands; band++) { +for (band = nstrict; band < nbands; band++) {if (nla_put_u32 (skb,TCA_ETS_QUANTA_BAND , - q->classes[band].quantum)) +READ_ONCE (q->classes[band].quantum))) goto nla_err; }
@@ -789,7 +791,8 @@ static int ets_qdisc_dump(struct Qdisc * goto nla_err;for (prio =0 ; prio <=TC_PRIO_MAX ; prio++) { -if (nla_put_u8 (skb,TCA_ETS_PRIOMAP_BAND , q->prio2band[prio])) +if (nla_put_u8 (skb,TCA_ETS_PRIOMAP_BAND , +READ_ONCE (q->prio2band[prio]))) goto nla_err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 543/644 net/sched: ets: use old nbands while purging unused classes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 87c6efc5ce9c126ae4a781bc04504b83780e3650 ]
Shuang reported sch_ets test-case [1] crashing in ets_class_qlen_notify() after recent changes from Lion [2]. The problem is: in ets_qdisc_change() we purge unused DWRR queues; the value of 'q->nbands' is the new one, and the cleanup should be done with the old one. The problem is here since my first attempts to fix ets_qdisc_change(), but it surfaced again after the recent qdisc len accounting fixes. Fix it purging idle DWRR queues before assigning a new value of 'q->nbands', so that all purge operations find a consistent configuration:
- old 'q->nbands' because it's needed by ets_class_find()
- old 'q->nstrict' because it's needed by ets_class_is_strict()
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 62 UID: 0 PID: 39457 Comm: tc Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-116.el10.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/06DKY5, BIOS 2.12.2 07/09/2021 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x4/0x80 Code: ff 4c 39 c7 0f 84 39 19 8e ff b8 01 00 00 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa <48> 8b 17 48 8b 4f 08 48 85 d2 0f 84 56 19 8e ff 48 85 c9 0f 84 ab RSP: 0018:ffffba186009f400 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000d6 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: ffff9f0fa29b69c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffffffc12c2400 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9f0f8cfe0000 R14: 0000000000100005 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f2154f37480(0000) GS:ffff9f269c1c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001530be001 CR4: 00000000007726f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ets_class_qlen_notify+0x65/0x90 [sch_ets] qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog+0x74/0x110 ets_qdisc_change+0x630/0xa40 [sch_ets] __tc_modify_qdisc.constprop.0+0x216/0x7f0 tc_modify_qdisc+0x7c/0x120 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x145/0x3f0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x245/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21b/0x470 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39d/0x3d0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x9a/0xe0 __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f2155114084 Code: 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bb 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 25 f0 0c 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fff1fd7a988 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000560ec063e5e0 RCX: 00007f2155114084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff1fd7a9f0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff1fd7aa60 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 000000000000003f R10: 0000560ee9b3a010 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff1fd7aae0 R13: 000000006891ccde R14: 0000560ec063e5e0 R15: 00007fff1fd7aad0 </TASK>
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e08c7f4a6882f260011909a868311c6e9b54f3e4.1639153474.git.dcaratti@redhat.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
--- net/sched/sch_ets.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_ets.c +6 -5
@@ -664,6 +664,12 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdiscsch_tree_lock (sch); +for (i = nbands; i < oldbands; i++) { +if (i >= q->nstrict && q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) +list_del_init (&q->classes[i].alist); +qdisc_purge_queue (q->classes[i].qdisc); + } +WRITE_ONCE (q->nbands, nbands);for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) {if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) {
@@ -671,11 +677,6 @@ static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisc q->classes[i].deficit = quanta[i]; } } -for (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) { -if (i >= q->nstrict && q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) -list_del_init (&q->classes[i].alist); -qdisc_purge_queue (q->classes[i].qdisc); - }WRITE_ONCE (q->nstrict, nstrict);memcpy (q->prio2band, priomap,sizeof (priomap));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 544/644 KVM: VMX: Flush shadow VMCS on emergency reboot
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852 ]
Ensure the shadow VMCS cache is evicted during an emergency reboot to prevent potential memory corruption if the cache is evicted after reboot.
This issue was identified through code inspection, as __loaded_vmcs_clear() flushes both the normal VMCS and the shadow VMCS.
Avoid checking the "launched" state during an emergency reboot, unlike the behavior in __loaded_vmcs_clear(). This is important because reboot NMIs can interfere with operations like copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(), where shadow VMCSes are loaded directly using VMPTRLD. In such cases, if NMIs occur right after the VMCS load, the shadow VMCSes will be active but the "launched" state may not be set.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +4 -1
@@ -681,8 +681,11 @@ static void crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vstruct loaded_vmcs *v;list_for_each_entry (v, &per_cpu (loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu), - loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) + loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) {vmcs_clear (v->vmcs); +if (v->shadow_vmcs) +vmcs_clear (v->shadow_vmcs); + } }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 545/644 btrfs: populate otime when logging an inode item
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1ef94169db0958d6de39f9ea6e063ce887342e2d ]
[TEST FAILURE WITH EXPERIMENTAL FEATURES]
When running test case generic/508, the test case will fail with the new btrfs shutdown support:
generic/508 - output mismatch (see /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/508.out.bad)
# --- tests/generic/508.out 2022-05-11 11:25:30.806666664 +0930 # +++ /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/508.out.bad 2025-07-02 14:53:22.401824212 +0930 # @@ -1,2 +1,6 @@ # QA output created by 508 # Silence is golden # +Before: # +After : stat.btime = Thu Jan 1 09:30:00 1970 # +Before: # +After : stat.btime = Wed Jul 2 14:53:22 2025 # ... # (Run 'diff -u /home/adam/xfstests/tests/generic/508.out /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/508.out.bad' to see the entire diff)
Ran: generic/508
Failures: generic/508
Failed 1 of 1 tests
Please note that the test case requires shutdown support, thus the test case will be skipped using the current upstream kernel, as it doesn't have shutdown ioctl support.
[CAUSE]
The direct cause the 0 time stamp in the log tree:
leaf 30507008 items 2 free space 16057 generation 9 owner TREE_LOG leaf 30507008 flags 0x1(WRITTEN) backref revision 1 checksum stored e522548d
checksum calced e522548d
fs uuid 57d45451-481e-43e4-aa93-289ad707a3a0
chunk uuid d52bd3fd-5163-4337-98a7-7986993ad398
item 0 key (257 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 9 transid 9 size 0 nbytes 0 block group 0 mode 100644 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 1 flags 0x0(none) atime 1751432947.492000000 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) ctime 1751432947.492000000 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) mtime 1751432947.492000000 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) otime 0.0 (1970-01-01 09:30:00) <<<
But the old fs tree has all the correct time stamp:
btrfs-progs v6.12
fs tree key (FS_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0)
leaf 30425088 items 2 free space 16061 generation 5 owner FS_TREE leaf 30425088 flags 0x1(WRITTEN) backref revision 1 checksum stored 48f6c57e
checksum calced 48f6c57e
fs uuid 57d45451-481e-43e4-aa93-289ad707a3a0
chunk uuid d52bd3fd-5163-4337-98a7-7986993ad398
item 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 3 transid 0 size 0 nbytes 16384 block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 0 flags 0x0(none) atime 1751432947.0 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) ctime 1751432947.0 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) mtime 1751432947.0 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) otime 1751432947.0 (2025-07-02 14:39:07) <<<
The root cause is that fill_inode_item() in tree-log.c is only populating a/c/m time, not the otime (or btime in statx output).
Part of the reason is that, the vfs inode only has a/c/m time, no native btime support yet.
[FIX]
Thankfully btrfs has its otime stored in btrfs_inode::i_otime_sec and btrfs_inode::i_otime_nsec.
So what we really need is just fill the otime time stamp in fill_inode_item() of tree-log.c
There is another fill_inode_item() in inode.c, which is doing the proper otime population.
--- fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/tree-log.c +5 -0
@@ -4000,6 +4000,11 @@ static void fill_inode_item(struct btrfsbtrfs_set_token_timespec_nsec (&token, &item->ctime, inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec); +btrfs_set_token_timespec_sec (&token, &item->otime, +BTRFS_I (inode)->i_otime.tv_sec); +btrfs_set_token_timespec_nsec (&token, &item->otime, +BTRFS_I (inode)->i_otime.tv_nsec); +/* * We do not need to set the nbytes field, in fact during a fast fsync * its value may not even be correct, since a fast fsync does not wait
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 546/644 sch_drr: make drr_qlen_notify() idempotent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
commit df008598b3a00be02a8051fde89ca0fbc416bd55 upstream.
drr_qlen_notify() always deletes the DRR class from its active list with list_del(), therefore, it is not idempotent and not friendly to its callers, like fq_codel_dequeue().
Let's make it idempotent to ease qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() callers' life. Also change other list_del()'s to list_del_init() just to be extra safe.
--- net/sched/sch_drr.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_drr.c +4 -3
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static int drr_change_class(struct Qdiscif (cl ==NULL )return -ENOBUFS ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cl->alist); cl->common.classid = classid; cl->quantum = quantum; cl->qdisc = qdisc_create_dflt(sch->dev_queue,
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ static void drr_qlen_notify(struct Qdisc {struct drr_class *cl = (struct drr_class *)arg; -list_del (&cl->alist); +list_del_init (&cl->alist); } static int drr_dump_class(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long arg,
@@ -402,7 +403,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *drr_dequeue(strucif (unlikely (skb ==NULL )) goto out;if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen ==0 ) -list_del (&cl->alist); +list_del_init (&cl->alist);bstats_update (&cl->bstats, skb);qdisc_bstats_update (sch, skb);
@@ -443,7 +444,7 @@ static void drr_reset_qdisc(struct Qdiscfor (i =0 ; i < q->clhash.hashsize; i++) {hlist_for_each_entry (cl, &q->clhash.hash[i], common.hnode) {if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen) -list_del (&cl->alist); +list_del_init (&cl->alist);qdisc_reset (cl->qdisc); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 547/644 codel: remove sch->q.qlen check before qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
commit 342debc12183b51773b3345ba267e9263bdfaaef upstream.
After making all ->qlen_notify() callbacks idempotent, now it is safe to remove the check of qlen!=0 from both fq_codel_dequeue() and codel_qdisc_dequeue().
--- net/sched/sch_codel.c | 5 +---- net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_codel.c +1 -4
@@ -95,10 +95,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *codel_qdisc_deque &q->stats, qdisc_pkt_len, codel_get_enqueue_time, drop_func, dequeue_func); -/* We cant call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() if our qlen is 0, -* or HTB crashes. Defer it for next round. -*/ -if (q->stats.drop_count && sch->q.qlen) { +if (q->stats.drop_count) {qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (sch, q->stats.drop_count, q->stats.drop_len); q->stats.drop_count =0 ; q->stats.drop_len =0 ;
net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c +2 -4
@@ -314,10 +314,8 @@ begin: }qdisc_bstats_update (sch, skb); flow->deficit -=qdisc_pkt_len (skb); -/* We cant call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() if our qlen is 0, -* or HTB crashes. Defer it for next round. -*/ -if (q->cstats.drop_count && sch->q.qlen) { + +if (q->cstats.drop_count) {qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (sch, q->cstats.drop_count, q->cstats.drop_len); q->cstats.drop_count =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 548/644 sch_htb: make htb_deactivate() idempotent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
commit 3769478610135e82b262640252d90f6efb05be71 upstream.
Alan reported a NULL pointer dereference in htb_next_rb_node() after we made htb_qlen_notify() idempotent.
It turns out in the following case it introduced some regression:
htb_dequeue_tree():
|-> fq_codel_dequeue()
|-> qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|-> htb_qlen_notify()
|-> htb_deactivate() |-> htb_next_rb_node()
|-> htb_deactivate()
For htb_next_rb_node(), after calling the 1st htb_deactivate(), the clprio[prio]->ptr could be already set to NULL, which means htb_next_rb_node() is vulnerable here.
For htb_deactivate(), although we checked qlen before calling it, in case of qlen==0 after qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(), we may call it again which triggers the warning inside.
To fix the issues here, we need to:
1) Make htb_deactivate() idempotent, that is, simply return if we already call it before.
2) Make htb_next_rb_node() safe against ptr==NULL.
Many thanks to Alan for testing and for the reproducer.
--- net/sched/sch_htb.c | 15 ++++++--------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_htb.c +6 -9
@@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ static void htb_add_to_wait_tree(struct*/ static inline void htb_next_rb_node (struct rb_node **n) { - *n =rb_next (*n); +if (*n) + *n =rb_next (*n); }/**
@@ -606,8 +607,8 @@ static inline void htb_activate(struct h*/ static inline void htb_deactivate (struct htb_sched *q,struct htb_class *cl) { -WARN_ON (!cl->prio_activity); - +if (!cl->prio_activity) +return ;htb_deactivate_prios (q, cl); cl->prio_activity =0 ; }
@@ -1506,8 +1507,6 @@ static void htb_qlen_notify(struct Qdisc {struct htb_class *cl = (struct htb_class *)arg; -if (!cl->prio_activity) -return ;htb_deactivate (qdisc_priv (sch), cl); }
@@ -1762,8 +1761,7 @@ static int htb_delete(struct Qdisc *sch,if (cl->parent) cl->parent->children--; -if (cl->prio_activity) -htb_deactivate (q, cl); +htb_deactivate (q, cl);if (cl->cmode !=HTB_CAN_SEND ) htb_safe_rb_erase(&cl->pq_node,
@@ -1975,8 +1973,7 @@ static int htb_change_class(struct Qdisc/* turn parent into inner node */ qdisc_purge_queue (parent->leaf.q); parent_qdisc = parent->leaf.q; -if (parent->prio_activity) -htb_deactivate (q, parent); +htb_deactivate (q, parent);/* remove from evt list because of level change */ if (parent->cmode !=HTB_CAN_SEND ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 549/644 PCI: vmd: Assign VMD IRQ domain before enumeration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nirmal Patel <[email protected]>
commit 886e67100b904cb1b106ed1dfa8a60696aff519a upstream.
During the boot process all the PCI devices are assigned default PCI-MSI IRQ domain including VMD endpoint devices. If interrupt-remapping is enabled by IOMMU, the PCI devices except VMD get new INTEL-IR-MSI IRQ domain. And VMD is supposed to create and assign a separate VMD-MSI IRQ domain for its child devices in order to support MSI-X remapping capabilities.
Now when MSI-X remapping in VMD is disabled in order to improve performance, VMD skips VMD-MSI IRQ domain assignment process to its child devices. Thus the devices behind VMD get default PCI-MSI IRQ domain instead of INTEL-IR-MSI IRQ domain when VMD creates root bus and configures child devices.
As a result host OS fails to boot and DMAR errors were observed when interrupt remapping was enabled on Intel Icelake CPUs. For instance:
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 2
DMAR: [INTR-REMAP] Request device [0xe2:0x00.0] fault index 0xa00 [fault reason 0x25] Blocked a compatibility format interrupt request
To fix this issue, dev_msi_info struct in dev struct maintains correct value of IRQ domain. VMD will use this information to assign proper IRQ domain to its child devices when it doesn't create a separate IRQ domain.
[ This patch has already been backported to the Ubuntu 5.15 kernel
and fixes boot issues on Intel platforms with VMD rev 04, confirmed on version 5.15.189. ]
--- drivers/pci/controller/vmd.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/controller/vmd.c +3 -0
@@ -799,6 +799,9 @@ static int vmd_enable_domain(struct vmd_vmd_attach_resources (vmd);if (vmd->irq_domain)dev_set_msi_domain (&vmd->bus->dev, vmd->irq_domain); +else +dev_set_msi_domain (&vmd->bus->dev, +dev_get_msi_domain (&vmd->dev->dev));WARN (sysfs_create_link (&vmd->dev->dev.kobj, &vmd->bus->dev.kobj,"domain" ),"Can't create symlink to domain\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 550/644 ACPI: processor: idle: Check acpi_fetch_acpi_dev() return value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Zhong <[email protected]>
commit 2437513a814b3e93bd02879740a8a06e52e2cf7d upstream.
The return value of acpi_fetch_acpi_dev() could be NULL, which would cause a NULL pointer dereference to occur in acpi_device_hid().
--- drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c +3 -1
@@ -1125,7 +1125,9 @@ static int acpi_processor_get_lpi_info(s status =acpi_get_parent (handle, &pr_ahandle);while (ACPI_SUCCESS (status)) { -acpi_bus_get_device (pr_ahandle, &d); +if (acpi_bus_get_device (pr_ahandle, &d)) +break ; + handle = pr_ahandle;if (strcmp (acpi_device_hid (d),ACPI_PROCESSOR_CONTAINER_HID ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 551/644 kbuild: userprogs: use correct linker when mixing clang and GNU ld
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
commit 936599ca514973d44a766b7376c6bbdc96b6a8cc upstream.
The userprogs infrastructure does not expect clang being used with GNU ld and in that case uses /usr/bin/ld for linking, not the configured $(LD). This fallback is problematic as it will break when cross-compiling. Mixing clang and GNU ld is used for example when building for SPARC64, as ld.lld is not sufficient; see Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst.
Relax the check around --ld-path so it gets used for all linkers.
[nathan: Work around wrapping '--ld-path' in cc-option in older stable
branches due to older minimum LLVM version]
--- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Makefile +1 -1
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ KBUILD_USERCFLAGS += $(filter -m32 -m64 KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS += $(filter -m32 -m64 --target=%, $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) # userspace programs are linked via the compiler, use the correct linker -ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG)$(CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD),yy) +ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS += $(call cc-option, --ld-path=$(LD)) endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 552/644 selftests: mptcp: make sendfile selftest work
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
commit df9e03aec3b14970df05b72d54f8ac9da3ab29e1 upstream.
When the selftest got added, sendfile() on mptcp sockets returned -EOPNOTSUPP, so running 'mptcp_connect.sh -m sendfile' failed immediately.
This is no longer the case, but the script fails anyway due to timeout. Let the receiver know once the sender has sent all data, just like with '-m mmap' mode.
v2: need to respect cfg_wait too, as pm_userspace.sh relied on -m sendfile to keep the connection open (Mat Martineau)
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.c +17 -9
@@ -451,6 +451,18 @@ static void set_nonblock(int fd)fcntl (fd,F_SETFL , flags |O_NONBLOCK ); } +static void shut_wr (int fd) +{ +/* Close our write side, ev. give some time +* for address notification and/or checking +* the current status +*/ +if (cfg_wait) +usleep (cfg_wait); + +shutdown (fd,SHUT_WR ); +} +static int copyfd_io_poll (int infd,int peerfd,int outfd,bool *in_closed_after_out) {struct pollfd fds = {
@@ -528,14 +540,7 @@ static int copyfd_io_poll(int infd, int/* ... and peer also closed already */ break ; -/* ... but we still receive. -* Close our write side, ev. give some time -* for address notification and/or checking -* the current status -*/ -if (cfg_wait) -usleep (cfg_wait); -shutdown (peerfd,SHUT_WR ); +shut_wr (peerfd); }else {if (errno ==EINTR )continue ;
@@ -666,7 +671,7 @@ static int copyfd_io_mmap(int infd, intif (err)return err; -shutdown (peerfd,SHUT_WR ); +shut_wr (peerfd); err =do_recvfile (peerfd, outfd); *in_closed_after_out = true;
@@ -690,6 +695,9 @@ static int copyfd_io_sendfile(int infd, err =do_sendfile (infd, peerfd, size);if (err)return err; + +shut_wr (peerfd); + err =do_recvfile (peerfd, outfd); *in_closed_after_out = true; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 553/644 selftests: mptcp: connect: also cover alt modes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 37848a456fc38c191aedfe41f662cc24db8c23d9 ]
The "mmap" and "sendfile" alternate modes for mptcp_connect.sh/.c are available from the beginning, but only tested when mptcp_connect.sh is manually launched with "-m mmap" or "-m sendfile", not via the kselftests helpers.
The MPTCP CI was manually running "mptcp_connect.sh -m mmap", but not "-m sendfile". Plus other CIs, especially the ones validating the stable releases, were not validating these alternate modes.
To make sure these modes are validated by these CIs, add two new test programs executing mptcp_connect.sh with the alternate modes.
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_mmap.sh | 5 +++++ tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_sendfile.sh | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_mmap.sh create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_sendfile.sh
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ KSFT_KHDR_INSTALL := 1 CFLAGS = -Wall -Wl,--no-as-needed -O2 -g -I$(top_srcdir)/usr/include -TEST_PROGS := mptcp_connect.sh pm_netlink.sh mptcp_join.sh diag.sh \ +TEST_PROGS := mptcp_connect.sh mptcp_connect_mmap.sh mptcp_connect_sendfile.sh \ + pm_netlink.sh mptcp_join.sh diag.sh \ simult_flows.sh mptcp_sockopt.sh TEST_GEN_FILES = mptcp_connect pm_nl_ctl
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_mmap.sh new file +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +MPTCP_LIB_KSFT_TEST="$(basename "${0}" .sh)" \ + "$(dirname "${0}")/mptcp_connect.sh" -m mmap "${@}"
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_sendfile.sh new file +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +MPTCP_LIB_KSFT_TEST="$(basename "${0}" .sh)" \ + "$(dirname "${0}")/mptcp_connect.sh" -m sendfile "${@}"
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 554/644 selftests: mptcp: connect: also cover checksum
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <[email protected]>
commit fdf0f60a2bb02ba581d9e71d583e69dd0714a521 upstream.
The checksum mode has been added a while ago, but it is only validated when manually launching mptcp_connect.sh with "-C".
The different CIs were then not validating these MPTCP Connect tests with checksum enabled. To make sure they do, add a new test program executing mptcp_connect.sh with the checksum mode.
[ Conflict in Makefile, in the context, because userspace_pm.sh test
has been introduced later, in commit 3ddabc433670 ("selftests: mptcp:
validate userspace PM tests by default"), which is not in this version. ]
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_checksum.sh | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_checksum.sh
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ KSFT_KHDR_INSTALL := 1 CFLAGS = -Wall -Wl,--no-as-needed -O2 -g -I$(top_srcdir)/usr/include TEST_PROGS := mptcp_connect.sh mptcp_connect_mmap.sh mptcp_connect_sendfile.sh \ - pm_netlink.sh mptcp_join.sh diag.sh \ + mptcp_connect_checksum.sh pm_netlink.sh mptcp_join.sh diag.sh \ simult_flows.sh mptcp_sockopt.sh TEST_GEN_FILES = mptcp_connect pm_nl_ctl
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect_checksum.sh new file +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +MPTCP_LIB_KSFT_TEST="$(basename "${0}" .sh)" \ + "$(dirname "${0}")/mptcp_connect.sh" -C "${@}"
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 555/644 selftests: mptcp: add missing join check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]>
commit 857898eb4b28daf3faca3ae334c78b2bb141475e upstream.
This function also writes the name of the test with its ID, making clear a new test has been executed.
Without that, the ADD_ADDR results from this test was appended at the end of the previous test causing confusions. Especially when the second test was failing, we had:
17 signal invalid addresses syn[ ok ] - synack[ ok ] - ack[ ok ]
add[ ok ] - echo [ ok ] add[fail] got 2 ADD_ADDR[s] expected 3
In fact, this 17th test was OK but not the 18th one.
Now we have:
17 signal invalid addresses syn[ ok ] - synack[ ok ] - ack[ ok ]
add[ ok ] - echo [ ok ]
18 signal addresses race test syn[fail] got 2 JOIN[s] syn expected 3
- synack[fail] got 2 JOIN[s] synack expected
- ack[fail] got 2 JOIN[s] ack expected 3
add[fail] got 2 ADD_ADDR[s] expected 3
[ Conflict in mptcp_join.sh, because commit 86e39e04482b ("mptcp: keep
track of local endpoint still available for each msk") is not in this version and changed the context. The same line can still be applied at the same place. ]
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh +1 -0
@@ -1138,6 +1138,7 @@ signal_address_tests() ip netns exec $ns2 ./pm_nl_ctl add 10.0.3.2 flags signal ip netns exec $ns2 ./pm_nl_ctl add 10.0.4.2 flags signal run_tests $ns1 $ns2 10.0.1.1 + chk_join_nr "signal addresses race test" 3 3 3 chk_add_nr 4 4 }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 556/644 mptcp: fix error mibs accounting
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit 0c1f78a49af721490a5ad70b73e8b4d382465dae upstream.
The current accounting for MP_FAIL and FASTCLOSE is not very
accurate: both can be increased even when the related option is not really sent. Move the accounting into the correct place.
[ Conflicts, because commit f284c0c77321 ("mptcp: implement fastclose
xmit path") is not in this version. That's OK, the new helper added by this commit doesn't need to be modified. ]
--- net/mptcp/options.c | 1 + net/mptcp/subflow.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/options.c +1 -0
@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_mp opts->fail_seq = subflow->map_seq;pr_debug ("MP_FAIL fail_seq=%llu\n" , opts->fail_seq); +MPTCP_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),MPTCP_MIB_MPFAILTX );return true; }
net/mptcp/subflow.c +1 -3
@@ -963,10 +963,8 @@ static enum mapping_status validate_data subflow->map_data_csum);if (unlikely (csum)) {MPTCP_INC_STATS (sock_net (ssk),MPTCP_MIB_DATACSUMERR ); -if (subflow->mp_join || subflow->valid_csum_seen) { +if (subflow->mp_join || subflow->valid_csum_seen) subflow->send_mp_fail =1 ; -MPTCP_INC_STATS (sock_net (ssk),MPTCP_MIB_MPFAILTX ); - }return subflow->mp_join ?MAPPING_INVALID :MAPPING_DUMMY ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 557/644 mptcp: introduce MAPPING_BAD_CSUM
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit 31bf11de146c3f8892093ff39f8f9b3069d6a852 upstream.
This allow moving a couple of conditional out of the fast path, making the code more easy to follow and will simplify the next patch.
[ Conflicts in subflow.c, because commit 0348c690ed37 ("mptcp: add the
fallback check") is not in this version. This commit is linked to a new feature, changing the context around. The new condition can still be added at the same place. ]
--- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/subflow.c +9 -9
@@ -848,7 +848,8 @@ enum mapping_status {MAPPING_INVALID ,MAPPING_EMPTY ,MAPPING_DATA_FIN , - MAPPING_DUMMY +MAPPING_DUMMY , + MAPPING_BAD_CSUM };static void dbg_bad_map (struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow,u32 ssn)
@@ -963,9 +964,7 @@ static enum mapping_status validate_data subflow->map_data_csum);if (unlikely (csum)) {MPTCP_INC_STATS (sock_net (ssk),MPTCP_MIB_DATACSUMERR ); -if (subflow->mp_join || subflow->valid_csum_seen) - subflow->send_mp_fail =1 ; -return subflow->mp_join ?MAPPING_INVALID :MAPPING_DUMMY ; +return MAPPING_BAD_CSUM ; } subflow->valid_csum_seen =1 ;
@@ -1188,10 +1187,8 @@ static bool subflow_check_data_avail(str status =get_mapping_status (ssk, msk);trace_subflow_check_data_avail (status,skb_peek (&ssk->sk_receive_queue)); -if (unlikely (status ==MAPPING_INVALID )) - goto fallback; - -if (unlikely (status ==MAPPING_DUMMY )) +if (unlikely (status ==MAPPING_INVALID || status ==MAPPING_DUMMY || + status ==MAPPING_BAD_CSUM )) goto fallback;if (status !=MAPPING_OK )
@@ -1232,7 +1229,10 @@ no_data: fallback:/* RFC 8684 section 3.7. */ -if (subflow->send_mp_fail) { +if (status ==MAPPING_BAD_CSUM && + (subflow->mp_join || subflow->valid_csum_seen)) { + subflow->send_mp_fail =1 ; +if (mptcp_has_another_subflow (ssk) || !READ_ONCE (msk->allow_infinite_fallback)) {while ((skb =skb_peek (&ssk->sk_receive_queue)))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 558/644 selftests: mptcp: Initialize variables to quiet gcc 12 warnings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mat Martineau <[email protected]>
commit fd37c2ecb21f7aee04ccca5f561469f07d00063c upstream.
In a few MPTCP selftest tools, gcc 12 complains that the 'sock' variable might be used uninitialized. This is a false positive because the only code path that could lead to uninitialized access is where getaddrinfo() fails, but the local xgetaddrinfo() wrapper exits if such a failure occurs.
Initialize the 'sock' variable anyway to allow the tools to build with gcc 12.
[ mptcp_inq.c and mptcp_sockopt.c are not in this version. The fix can
still be applied in mptcp_connect.c without conflicts. ]
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.c +1 -1
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static void set_mark(int fd, uint32_t mastatic int sock_listen_mptcp (const char *const listenaddr,const char *const port) { -int sock; +int sock =-1 ;struct addrinfo hints = { .ai_protocol =IPPROTO_TCP , .ai_socktype =SOCK_STREAM ,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 559/644 mptcp: drop unused sk in mptcp_push_release
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
commit b8e0def397d7753206b1290e32f73b299a59984c upstream.
Since mptcp_set_timeout() had removed from mptcp_push_release() in commit 33d41c9cd74c5 ("mptcp: more accurate timeout"), the argument sk in mptcp_push_release() became useless. Let's drop it.
Stable-dep-of: c886d70286bf ("mptcp: do not queue data on closed subflows")
--- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/protocol.c +4 -5
@@ -1568,8 +1568,7 @@ static struct sock *mptcp_subflow_get_sereturn NULL ; } -static void mptcp_push_release (struct sock *sk,struct sock *ssk, -struct mptcp_sendmsg_info *info) +static void mptcp_push_release (struct sock *ssk,struct mptcp_sendmsg_info *info) {tcp_push (ssk,0 , info->mss_now,tcp_sk (ssk)->nonagle, info->size_goal);release_sock (ssk);
@@ -1626,7 +1625,7 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *s* the last round, release prev_ssk */ if (ssk != prev_ssk && prev_ssk) -mptcp_push_release (sk, prev_ssk, &info); +mptcp_push_release (prev_ssk, &info);if (!ssk) goto out;
@@ -1639,7 +1638,7 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *s ret =mptcp_sendmsg_frag (sk, ssk, dfrag, &info);if (ret <=0 ) { -mptcp_push_release (sk, ssk, &info); +mptcp_push_release (ssk, &info); goto out; }
@@ -1654,7 +1653,7 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *s/* at this point we held the socket lock for the last subflow we used */ if (ssk) -mptcp_push_release (sk, ssk, &info); +mptcp_push_release (ssk, &info); out:/* ensure the rtx timer is running */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 560/644 mptcp: do not queue data on closed subflows
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit c886d70286bf3ad411eb3d689328a67f7102c6ae upstream.
Dipanjan reported a syzbot splat at close time:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 10818 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:153 inet_sock_destruct+0x6d0/0x8e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:153 Modules linked in: uio_ivshmem(OE) uio(E) CPU: 1 PID: 10818 Comm: kworker/1:16 Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-rc6-g2eae0556bb9d #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x6d0/0x8e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:153 Code: 21 02 00 00 41 8b 9c 24 28 02 00 00 e9 07 ff ff ff e8 34 4d 91 f9 89 ee 4c 89 e7 e8 4a 47 60 ff e9 a6 fc ff ff e8 20 4d 91 f9 <0f> 0b e9 84 fe ff ff e8 14 4d 91 f9 0f 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff e8 08 4d RSP: 0018:ffffc9001b35fa78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000002879d0 RCX: ffff8881326f3b00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8881326f3b00 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: ffff888179662674 R08: ffffffff87e983a0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 00000000000004ea R12: ffff888179662400 R13: ffff888179662428 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88817e38e258 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f5f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020007bc0 CR3: 0000000179592000 CR4: 0000000000150ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> __sk_destruct+0x4f/0x8e0 net/core/sock.c:2067 sk_destruct+0xbd/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:2112 __sk_free+0xef/0x3d0 net/core/sock.c:2123 sk_free+0x78/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2134 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1927 [inline] __mptcp_close_ssk+0x50f/0x780 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2351 __mptcp_destroy_sock+0x332/0x760 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2828 mptcp_worker+0x5d2/0xc90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2586 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x623/0x1070 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302 </TASK>
The root cause of the problem is that an mptcp-level (re)transmit can race with mptcp_close() and the packet scheduler checks the subflow state before acquiring the socket lock: we can try to (re)transmit on an already closed ssk.
Fix the issue checking again the subflow socket status under the subflow socket lock protection. Additionally add the missing check for the fallback-to-tcp case.
--- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 8 +++++++- net/mptcp/protocol.h | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/protocol.c +7 -1
@@ -1350,6 +1350,9 @@ static int mptcp_sendmsg_frag(struct soc info->limit > dfrag->data_len))return 0 ; +if (unlikely (!__tcp_can_send (ssk))) +return -EAGAIN ; +/* compute send limit */ info->mss_now =tcp_send_mss (ssk, &info->size_goal, info->flags); copy = info->size_goal;
@@ -1512,7 +1515,8 @@ static struct sock *mptcp_subflow_get_seif (__mptcp_check_fallback (msk)) {if (!msk->first)return NULL ; -return sk_stream_memory_free (msk->first) ? msk->first :NULL ; +return __tcp_can_send (msk->first) && +sk_stream_memory_free (msk->first) ? msk->first :NULL ; }/* re-use last subflow, if the burst allow that */
@@ -1638,6 +1642,8 @@ void __mptcp_push_pending(struct sock *s ret =mptcp_sendmsg_frag (sk, ssk, dfrag, &info);if (ret <=0 ) { +if (ret == -EAGAIN ) +continue ;mptcp_push_release (ssk, &info); goto out; }
net/mptcp/protocol.h +7 -4
@@ -599,16 +599,19 @@ void mptcp_info2sockaddr(const struct mpstruct sockaddr_storage *addr, unsigned short family); -static inline bool __mptcp_subflow_active (struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow) +static inline bool __tcp_can_send (const struct sock *ssk) { -struct sock *ssk =mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock (subflow); +/* only send if our side has not closed yet */ +return ((1 <<inet_sk_state_load (ssk)) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED |TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT )); +} +static inline bool __mptcp_subflow_active (struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow) +{/* can't send if JOIN hasn't completed yet (i.e. is usable for mptcp) */ if (subflow->request_join && !subflow->fully_established)return false; -/* only send if our side has not closed yet */ -return ((1 << ssk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED |TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT )); +return __tcp_can_send (mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock (subflow)); }void mptcp_subflow_set_active (struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 561/644 scsi: ufs: ufs-pci: Fix hibernate state transition for Intel MTL-like host controllers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Archana Patni <[email protected]>
commit 4428ddea832cfdb63e476eb2e5c8feb5d36057fe upstream.
UFSHCD core disables the UIC completion interrupt when issuing UIC hibernation commands, and re-enables it afterwards if it was enabled to start with, refer ufshcd_uic_pwr_ctrl(). For Intel MTL-like host controllers, accessing the register to re-enable the interrupt disrupts the state transition.
Use hibern8_notify variant operation to disable the interrupt during the entire hibernation, thereby preventing the disruption.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c +27 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,32 @@ out:return ret; } +static void ufs_intel_ctrl_uic_compl (struct ufs_hba *hba,bool enable) +{ +u32 set =ufshcd_readl (hba,REG_INTERRUPT_ENABLE ); + +if (enable) + set |=UIC_COMMAND_COMPL ; +else + set &= ~UIC_COMMAND_COMPL ; +ufshcd_writel (hba, set,REG_INTERRUPT_ENABLE ); +} + +static void ufs_intel_mtl_h8_notify (struct ufs_hba *hba, +enum uic_cmd_dme cmd, +enum ufs_notify_change_status status) +{ +/* +* Disable UIC COMPL INTR to prevent access to UFSHCI after +* checking HCS.UPMCRS +*/ +if (status ==PRE_CHANGE && cmd ==UIC_CMD_DME_HIBER_ENTER ) +ufs_intel_ctrl_uic_compl (hba, false); + +if (status ==POST_CHANGE && cmd ==UIC_CMD_DME_HIBER_EXIT ) +ufs_intel_ctrl_uic_compl (hba, true); +} +#define INTEL_ACTIVELTR 0x804#define INTEL_IDLELTR 0x808
@@ -476,6 +502,7 @@ static struct ufs_hba_variant_ops ufs_in .init = ufs_intel_mtl_init, .exit = ufs_intel_common_exit, .hce_enable_notify = ufs_intel_hce_enable_notify, + .hibern8_notify = ufs_intel_mtl_h8_notify, .link_startup_notify = ufs_intel_link_startup_notify, .resume = ufs_intel_resume, .device_reset = ufs_intel_device_reset,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 562/644 scsi: ufs: ufs-pci: Fix default runtime and system PM levels
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
commit 6de7435e6b81fe52c0ab4c7e181f6b5decd18eb1 upstream.
Intel MTL-like host controllers support auto-hibernate. Using auto-hibernate with manual (driver initiated) hibernate produces more complex operation. For example, the host controller will have to exit auto-hibernate simply to allow the driver to enter hibernate state manually. That is not recommended.
The default rpm_lvl and spm_lvl is 3, which includes manual hibernate.
Change the default values to 2, which does not.
Note, to be simpler to backport to stable kernels, utilize the UFS PCI driver's ->late_init() call back. Recent commits have made it possible to set up a controller-specific default in the regular ->init() call back, but not all stable kernels have those changes.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c +14 -1
@@ -454,10 +454,23 @@ static int ufs_intel_adl_init(struct ufsreturn ufs_intel_common_init (hba); } +static void ufs_intel_mtl_late_init (struct ufs_hba *hba) +{ + hba->rpm_lvl =UFS_PM_LVL_2 ; + hba->spm_lvl =UFS_PM_LVL_2 ; +} +static int ufs_intel_mtl_init (struct ufs_hba *hba) { +struct ufs_host *ufs_host; +int err; + hba->caps |=UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO |UFSHCD_CAP_WB_EN ; -return ufs_intel_common_init (hba); + err =ufs_intel_common_init (hba); +/* Get variant after it is set in ufs_intel_common_init() */ + ufs_host =ufshcd_get_variant (hba); + ufs_host->late_init = ufs_intel_mtl_late_init; +return err; }static struct ufs_hba_variant_ops ufs_intel_cnl_hba_vops = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 563/644 KVM: arm64: Fix kernel BUG() due to bad backport of FPSIMD/SVE/SME fix
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Upstream commit fbc7e61195e2 ("KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state") relies on interrupts being disabled during fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() so that a softirq cannot be taken while the host floating point context is being saved and potentially try to use kernel-mode NEON.
Unfortunately, stable kernels without 9b19700e623f ("arm64: fpsimd: Drop unneeded 'busy' flag") leave interrupts enabled in fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() and so the BUG_ON(!may_use_simd()) in kernel_neon_begin() has been observed to trigger in real-world usage:
| kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:1904! | Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | | Call trace: | kernel_neon_begin+0xdc/0x12c | ... | crypto_aead_decrypt+0x5c/0x6c | seqiv_aead_decrypt+0x88/0x9c | crypto_aead_decrypt+0x5c/0x6c | esp_input+0x280/0x364 | xfrm_input+0x6ac/0x16f8 | ... | net_rx_action+0x13c/0x31c | handle_softirqs+0x124/0x3d0 | __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 | ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20 | call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x74 | do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c | __irq_exit_rcu+0x54/0xb4 | irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x1c | el1_interrupt+0x38/0x58 | el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 | el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c | fpsimd_save+0xe4/0x130 | kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp+0x2c/0x58 | kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x88/0x26c | kvm_sched_in+0x2c/0x3c
Given that 9b19700e623f ("arm64: fpsimd: Drop unneeded 'busy' flag") is not a fix in its own right, has non-trivial dependencies and is a reasonably invasive change to the in-kernel use of fpsimd, opt instead for a simple fix to use the softirq-safe {get,put}_cpu_fpsimd_context() helpers in fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state().
--- arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +2 -2
@@ -1303,10 +1303,10 @@ void fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state(voiif (!system_supports_fpsimd ())return ;WARN_ON (preemptible ()); -__get_cpu_fpsimd_context (); +get_cpu_fpsimd_context ();fpsimd_save ();fpsimd_flush_cpu_state (); -__put_cpu_fpsimd_context (); +put_cpu_fpsimd_context (); }#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 564/644 memstick: Fix deadlock by moving removing flag earlier
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayi Li <[email protected]>
commit 99d7ab8db9d8230b243f5ed20ba0229e54cc0dfa upstream.
The existing memstick core patch: commit 62c59a8786e6 ("memstick: Skip allocating card when removing host") sets host->removing in memstick_remove_host(),but still exists a critical time window where memstick_check can run after host->eject is set but before removing is set.
In the rtsx_usb_ms driver, the problematic sequence is:
rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove: memstick_check:
host->eject = true
cancel_work_sync(handle_req) if(!host->removing)
... memstick_alloc_card()
memstick_set_rw_addr()
memstick_new_req()
rtsx_usb_ms_request()
if(!host->eject)
skip schedule_work
wait_for_completion()
memstick_remove_host: [blocks indefinitely]
host->removing = true
flush_workqueue()
[block]1. rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove sets host->eject = true
2. cancel_work_sync(&host->handle_req) runs
3. memstick_check work may be executed here <-- danger window
4. memstick_remove_host sets removing = 1
During this window (step 3), memstick_check calls memstick_alloc_card, which may indefinitely waiting for mrq_complete completion that will never occur because rtsx_usb_ms_request sees eject=true and skips scheduling work, memstick_set_rw_addr waits forever for completion.
This causes a deadlock when memstick_remove_host tries to flush_workqueue, waiting for memstick_check to complete, while memstick_check is blocked waiting for mrq_complete completion.
Fix this by setting removing=true at the start of rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove, before any work cancellation. This ensures memstick_check will see the removing flag immediately and exit early, avoiding the deadlock.
--- drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c | 1 - drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c +0 -1
@@ -548,7 +548,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memstick_add_host);*/ void memstick_remove_host (struct memstick_host *host) { - host->removing =1 ;flush_workqueue (workqueue);mutex_lock (&host->lock);if (host->card)
drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c +1 -0
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ static int rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove(structint err; host->eject = true; + msh->removing = true;cancel_work_sync (&host->handle_req);cancel_delayed_work_sync (&host->poll_card);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 565/644 mmc: sdhci-pci-gli: GL9763e: Rename the gli_set_gl9763e() for consistency
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Victor Shih <[email protected]>
commit 293ed0f5f34e1e9df888456af4b0a021f57b5f54 upstream.
In preparation to fix replay timer timeout, rename the gli_set_gl9763e() to gl9763e_hw_setting() for consistency.
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-gli.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-gli.c +2 -2
@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void sdhci_gl9763e_reset(struct ssdhci_reset (host, mask); } -static void gli_set_gl9763e (struct sdhci_pci_slot *slot) +static void gl9763e_hw_setting (struct sdhci_pci_slot *slot) {struct pci_dev *pdev = slot->chip->pdev;u32 value;
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static int gli_probe_slot_gl9763e(structgli_pcie_enable_msi (slot); host->mmc_host_ops.hs400_enhanced_strobe = gl9763e_hs400_enhanced_strobe; -gli_set_gl9763e (slot); +gl9763e_hw_setting (slot);sdhci_enable_v4_mode (host);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 566/644 squashfs: fix memory leak in squashfs_fill_super
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
commit b64700d41bdc4e9f82f1346c15a3678ebb91a89c upstream.
If sb_min_blocksize returns 0, squashfs_fill_super exits without freeing allocated memory (sb->s_fs_info).
Fix this by moving the call to sb_min_blocksize to before memory is allocated.
--- fs/squashfs/super.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/squashfs/super.c +7 -7
@@ -122,10 +122,15 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct suunsigned short flags;unsigned int fragments;u64 lookup_table_start, xattr_id_table_start, next_table; -int err; +int err, devblksize =sb_min_blocksize (sb,SQUASHFS_DEVBLK_SIZE );TRACE ("Entered squashfs_fill_superblock\n" ); +if (!devblksize) { +errorf (fc,"squashfs: unable to set blocksize\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + sb->s_fs_info =kzalloc (sizeof (*msblk),GFP_KERNEL );if (sb->s_fs_info ==NULL ) {ERROR ("Failed to allocate squashfs_sb_info\n" );
@@ -135,12 +140,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct su msblk->panic_on_errors = (opts->errors == Opt_errors_panic); - msblk->devblksize =sb_min_blocksize (sb,SQUASHFS_DEVBLK_SIZE ); -if (!msblk->devblksize) { -errorf (fc,"squashfs: unable to set blocksize\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } - + msblk->devblksize = devblksize; msblk->devblksize_log2 =ffz (~msblk->devblksize);mutex_init (&msblk->meta_index_mutex);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 567/644 mm/debug_vm_pgtable: clear page table entries at destroy_args()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herton R. Krzesinski <[email protected]>
commit dde30854bddfb5d69f30022b53c5955a41088b33 upstream.
The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct. That in itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those entries with the *_clear functions.
The problem is that leaves stale entries. If another process allocates an mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the stale entry. This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function):
[ 2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000 [ 2.539366] kmem_cache info [ 2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508 [ 2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e (...) [ 2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.552816] Modules linked in: [ 2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY [ 2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries [ 2.552872] NIP: c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90 [ 2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug) [ 2.552899] MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002822 XER: 0000000a [ 2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0 [ 2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff [ 2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000 [ 2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb [ 2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0 [ 2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000 [ 2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760 [ 2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 [ 2.553199] Call Trace: [ 2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable) [ 2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0 [ 2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570 [ 2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650 [ 2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290 [ 2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0 [ 2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870 [ 2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150 [ 2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50 [ 2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0 [ 2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec (...) [ 2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1 [ 2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144
Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test. That is not a problem, since the mm_struct is initialized again etc., however, if it ends up using the same pgd table, it bumps into the old stale entry when clearing/freeing the page table entries, so it tries to free an entry already gone (that one which was allocated by the debug_vm_pgtable test), which also explains the negative pgtables_bytes since it's accounting for not allocated entries in the current process.
As far as I looked pgd_{alloc,free} etc. does not clear entries, and clearing of the entries is explicitly done in the free_pgtables-> free_pgd_range->free_p4d_range->free_pud_range->free_pmd_range-> free_pte_range path. However, the debug_vm_pgtable test does not call free_pgtables, since it allocates mm_struct and entries manually for its test and eg. not goes through page faults. So it also should clear manually the entries before exit at destroy_args().
This problem was noticed on a reboot X number of times test being done on a powerpc host, with a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE enabled. Depends on the system, but on a 100 times reboot loop the problem could manifest once or twice, if a process ends up getting the right mm->pgd entry with the stale entries used by mm/debug_vm_pagetable. After using this patch, I couldn't reproduce/experience the problems anymore. I was able to reproduce the problem as well on latest upstream kernel (6.16).
I also modified destroy_args() to use mmput() instead of mmdrop(), there is no reason to hold mm_users reference and not release the mm_struct entirely, and in the output above with my debugging prints I already had patched it to use mmput, it did not fix the problem, but helped in the debugging as well.
--- mm/debug_vm_pgtable.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/debug_vm_pgtable.c +7 -2
@@ -1050,29 +1050,34 @@ static void __init destroy_args(struct p/* Free page table entries */ if (args->start_ptep) { +pmd_clear (args->pmdp);pte_free (args->mm, args->start_ptep);mm_dec_nr_ptes (args->mm); }if (args->start_pmdp) { +pud_clear (args->pudp);pmd_free (args->mm, args->start_pmdp);mm_dec_nr_pmds (args->mm); }if (args->start_pudp) { +p4d_clear (args->p4dp);pud_free (args->mm, args->start_pudp);mm_dec_nr_puds (args->mm); } -if (args->start_p4dp) +if (args->start_p4dp) { +pgd_clear (args->pgdp);p4d_free (args->mm, args->start_p4dp); + }/* Free vma and mm struct */ if (args->vma)vm_area_free (args->vma);if (args->mm) -mmdrop (args->mm); +mmput (args->mm); } static struct page * __init
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 568/644 ALSA: hda/realtek: Add support for HP EliteBook x360 830 G6 and EliteBook 830 G6
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Evgeniy Harchenko <[email protected]>
commit eafae0fdd115a71b3a200ef1a31f86da04bac77f upstream.
The HP EliteBook x360 830 G6 and HP EliteBook 830 G6 have Realtek HDA codec ALC215. It needs the ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED quirk to enable the mute LED.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +2 -0
@@ -9319,6 +9319,8 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x84e7 ,"HP Pavilion 15" ,ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC3 ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8519 ,"HP Spectre x360 15-df0xxx" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_SPECTRE_X360 ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8537 ,"HP ProBook 440 G6" ,ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MICMUTE_VREF ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8548 ,"HP EliteBook x360 830 G6" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x854a ,"HP EliteBook 830 G6" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x85c6 ,"HP Pavilion x360 Convertible 14-dy1xxx" ,ALC295_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_COEFBIT11 ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x85de ,"HP Envy x360 13-ar0xxx" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_ENVY_X360 ), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x860f, "HP ZBook 15 G6", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_AMP_INIT),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 569/644 drm/amd/display: Avoid a NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
commit 07b93a5704b0b72002f0c4bd1076214af67dc661 upstream.
[WHY]
Although unlikely drm_atomic_get_new_connector_state() or drm_atomic_get_old_connector_state() can return NULL.
[HOW]
Check returns before dereference.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +3 -0
@@ -7105,6 +7105,9 @@ amdgpu_dm_connector_atomic_check(structstruct drm_crtc_state *new_crtc_state;int ret; +if (WARN_ON (unlikely (!old_con_state || !new_con_state))) +return -EINVAL ; +trace_amdgpu_dm_connector_atomic_check (new_con_state);if (!crtc)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 570/644 drm/amd/display: Fix fractional fb divider in set_pixel_clock_v3
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit 10507478468f165ea681605d133991ed05cdff62 upstream.
For later VBIOS versions, the fractional feedback divider is calculated as the remainder of dividing the feedback divider by a factor, which is set to 1000000. For reference, see:
- calculate_fb_and_fractional_fb_divider
- calc_pll_max_vco_construct
However, in case of old VBIOS versions that have set_pixel_clock_v3, they only have 1 byte available for the fractional feedback divider, and it's expected to be set to the remainder from dividing the feedback divider by 10. For reference see the legacy display code:
- amdgpu_pll_compute
- amdgpu_atombios_crtc_program_pll
This commit fixes set_pixel_clock_v3 by dividing the fractional feedback divider passed to the function by 100000.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/command_table.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/command_table.c +1 -1
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ static enum bp_result set_pixel_clock_v3 allocation.sPCLKInput.usFbDiv =cpu_to_le16 ((uint16_t )bp_params->feedback_divider); allocation.sPCLKInput.ucFracFbDiv = - (uint8_t )bp_params->fractional_feedback_divider; + (uint8_t )(bp_params->fractional_feedback_divider /100000 ); allocation.sPCLKInput.ucPostDiv = (uint8_t )bp_params->pixel_clock_post_divider;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 571/644 drm/amd/display: Fix DP audio DTO1 clock source on DCE 6.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit 297a4833a68aac3316eb808b4123eb016ef242d7 upstream.
On DCE 6, DP audio was not working. However, it worked when an HDMI monitor was also plugged in.
Looking at dce_aud_wall_dto_setup it seems that the main difference is that we use DTO1 when only DP is plugged in.
When programming DTO1, it uses audio_dto_source_clock_in_khz which is set from get_dp_ref_freq_khz
The dce60_get_dp_ref_freq_khz implementation looks incorrect, because DENTIST_DISPCLK_CNTL seems to be always zero on DCE 6, so it isn't usable.
I compared dce60_get_dp_ref_freq_khz to the legacy display code, specifically dce_v6_0_audio_set_dto, and it turns out that in case of DCE 6, it needs to use the display clock. With that, DP audio started working on Pitcairn, Oland and Cape Verde.
However, it still didn't work on Tahiti. Despite having the same DCE version, Tahiti seems to have a different audio device. After some trial and error I realized that it works with the default display clock as reported by the VBIOS, not the current display clock.
The patch was tested on all four SI GPUs:
* Pitcairn (DCE 6.0)
* Oland (DCE 6.4)
* Cape Verde (DCE 6.0)
* Tahiti (DCE 6.0 but different)
The testing was done on Samsung Odyssey G7 LS28BG700EPXEN on each of the above GPUs, at the following settings:
* 4K 60 Hz
* 1080p 60 Hz
* 1080p 144 Hz
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce60/dce60_clk_mgr.c | 21 +++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce60/dce60_clk_mgr.c +6 -15
@@ -83,22 +83,13 @@ static const struct state_dependent_clocstatic int dce60_get_dp_ref_freq_khz (struct clk_mgr *clk_mgr_base) {struct clk_mgr_internal *clk_mgr =TO_CLK_MGR_INTERNAL (clk_mgr_base); -int dprefclk_wdivider; -int dp_ref_clk_khz; -int target_div; +struct dc_context *ctx = clk_mgr_base->ctx; +int dp_ref_clk_khz =0 ; -/* DCE6 has no DPREFCLK_CNTL to read DP Reference Clock source */ - -/* Read the mmDENTIST_DISPCLK_CNTL to get the currently -* programmed DID DENTIST_DPREFCLK_WDIVIDER*/ -REG_GET (DENTIST_DISPCLK_CNTL ,DENTIST_DPREFCLK_WDIVIDER , &dprefclk_wdivider); - -/* Convert DENTIST_DPREFCLK_WDIVIDERto actual divider*/ - target_div =dentist_get_divider_from_did (dprefclk_wdivider); - -/* Calculate the current DFS clock, in kHz.*/ - dp_ref_clk_khz = (DENTIST_DIVIDER_RANGE_SCALE_FACTOR - * clk_mgr->base.dentist_vco_freq_khz) / target_div; +if (ASIC_REV_IS_TAHITI_P (ctx->asic_id.hw_internal_rev)) + dp_ref_clk_khz = ctx->dc_bios->fw_info.default_display_engine_pll_frequency; +else + dp_ref_clk_khz = clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz;return dce_adjust_dp_ref_freq_for_ss (clk_mgr, dp_ref_clk_khz); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 572/644 drm/amd/display: Find first CRTC and its line time in dce110_fill_display_configs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit 669f73a26f6112eedbadac53a2f2707ac6d0b9c8 upstream.
dce110_fill_display_configs is shared between DCE 6-11, and finding the first CRTC and its line time is relevant to DCE 6 too. Move the code to find it from DCE 11 specific code.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c | 30 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c +20 -10
@@ -120,9 +120,12 @@ void dce110_fill_display_configs(const struct dc_state *context, struct dm_pp_display_configuration *pp_display_cfg) { + struct dc *dc = context->clk_mgr->ctx->dc;int j;int num_cfgs =0 ; + pp_display_cfg->crtc_index = dc->res_pool->res_cap->num_timing_generator; +for (j =0 ; j < context->stream_count; j++) {int k;
@@ -164,6 +167,23 @@ void dce110_fill_display_configs( cfg->v_refresh /= stream->timing.h_total; cfg->v_refresh = (cfg->v_refresh + stream->timing.v_total /2 ) / stream->timing.v_total; + +/* Find first CRTC index and calculate its line time. +* This is necessary for DPM on SI GPUs. +*/ +if (cfg->pipe_idx < pp_display_cfg->crtc_index) { +const struct dc_crtc_timing *timing = + &context->streams[0 ]->timing; + + pp_display_cfg->crtc_index = cfg->pipe_idx; + pp_display_cfg->line_time_in_us = + timing->h_total *10000 / timing->pix_clk_100hz; + } + } + +if (!num_cfgs) { + pp_display_cfg->crtc_index =0 ; + pp_display_cfg->line_time_in_us =0 ; } pp_display_cfg->display_count = num_cfgs;
@@ -232,16 +252,6 @@ void dce11_pplib_apply_display_requiremedce110_fill_display_configs (context, pp_display_cfg); -/* TODO: is this still applicable?*/ -if (pp_display_cfg->display_count ==1 ) { -const struct dc_crtc_timing *timing = - &context->streams[0 ]->timing; - - pp_display_cfg->crtc_index = - pp_display_cfg->disp_configs[0 ].pipe_idx; - pp_display_cfg->line_time_in_us = timing->h_total *10000 / timing->pix_clk_100hz; - } -if (memcmp (&dc->current_state->pp_display_cfg, pp_display_cfg,sizeof (*pp_display_cfg)) !=0 )dm_pp_apply_display_requirements (dc->ctx, pp_display_cfg); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 573/644 drm/amd/display: Fill display clock and vblank time in dce110_fill_display_configs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit 7d07140d37f792f01cfdb8ca9a6a792ab1d29126 upstream.
Also needed by DCE 6.
This way the code that gathers this info can be shared between different DCE versions and doesn't have to be repeated.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce100/dce_clk_mgr.c | 2 -- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c | 10 +++------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce60/dce60_clk_mgr.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce100/dce_clk_mgr.c +0 -2
@@ -384,8 +384,6 @@ static void dce_pplib_apply_display_requ {struct dm_pp_display_configuration *pp_display_cfg = &context->pp_display_cfg; - pp_display_cfg->avail_mclk_switch_time_us =dce110_get_min_vblank_time_us (context); -dce110_fill_display_configs (context, pp_display_cfg);if (memcmp (&dc->current_state->pp_display_cfg, pp_display_cfg,sizeof (*pp_display_cfg)) !=0 )
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c +3 -7
@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ void dce110_fill_display_configs(int j;int num_cfgs =0 ; + pp_display_cfg->avail_mclk_switch_time_us =dce110_get_min_vblank_time_us (context); + pp_display_cfg->disp_clk_khz = dc->clk_mgr->clks.dispclk_khz; + pp_display_cfg->avail_mclk_switch_time_in_disp_active_us =0 ; pp_display_cfg->crtc_index = dc->res_pool->res_cap->num_timing_generator;for (j =0 ; j < context->stream_count; j++) {
@@ -243,13 +246,6 @@ void dce11_pplib_apply_display_requireme pp_display_cfg->min_engine_clock_deep_sleep_khz = context->bw_ctx.bw.dce.sclk_deep_sleep_khz; - pp_display_cfg->avail_mclk_switch_time_us = -dce110_get_min_vblank_time_us (context); -/* TODO: dce11.2*/ - pp_display_cfg->avail_mclk_switch_time_in_disp_active_us =0 ; - - pp_display_cfg->disp_clk_khz = dc->clk_mgr->clks.dispclk_khz; -dce110_fill_display_configs (context, pp_display_cfg);if (memcmp (&dc->current_state->pp_display_cfg, pp_display_cfg,sizeof (*pp_display_cfg)) !=0 )
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce60/dce60_clk_mgr.c +0 -2
@@ -100,8 +100,6 @@ static void dce60_pplib_apply_display_re {struct dm_pp_display_configuration *pp_display_cfg = &context->pp_display_cfg; - pp_display_cfg->avail_mclk_switch_time_us =dce110_get_min_vblank_time_us (context); -dce110_fill_display_configs (context, pp_display_cfg);if (memcmp (&dc->current_state->pp_display_cfg, pp_display_cfg,sizeof (*pp_display_cfg)) !=0 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 574/644 fs/buffer: fix use-after-free when call bh_read() helper
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7375f22495e7cd1c5b3b5af9dcc4f6dffe34ce49 ]
There's issue as follows:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in end_buffer_read_sync+0xe3/0x110 Read of size 8 at addr ffffc9000168f7f8 by task swapper/3/0 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.16.0-862.14.0.6.x86_64 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390 print_report+0xb4/0x270 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 end_buffer_read_sync+0xe3/0x110 end_bio_bh_io_sync+0x56/0x80 blk_update_request+0x30a/0x720 scsi_end_request+0x51/0x2b0 scsi_io_completion+0xe3/0x480 ? scsi_device_unbusy+0x11e/0x160 blk_complete_reqs+0x7b/0x90 handle_softirqs+0xef/0x370 irq_exit_rcu+0xa5/0xd0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 </IRQ>
Above issue happens when do ntfs3 filesystem mount, issue may happens as follows:
mount IRQntfs_fill_super
read_cache_page
do_read_cache_folio
filemap_read_folio
mpage_read_folio
do_mpage_readpage
ntfs_get_block_vbo
bh_read
submit_bh
wait_on_buffer(bh);
blk_complete_reqs
scsi_io_completion
scsi_end_request
blk_update_request
end_bio_bh_io_sync
end_buffer_read_sync
__end_buffer_read_notouch
unlock_buffer
wait_on_buffer(bh);--> return will return to caller
put_bh
--> trigger stack-out-of-boundsIn the mpage_read_folio() function, the stack variable 'map_bh' is passed to ntfs_get_block_vbo(). Once unlock_buffer() unlocks and wait_on_buffer() returns to continue processing, the stack variable is likely to be reclaimed. Consequently, during the end_buffer_read_sync() process, calling put_bh() may result in stack overrun.
If the bh is not allocated on the stack, it belongs to a folio. Freeing a buffer head which belongs to a folio is done by drop_buffers() which will fail to free buffers which are still locked. So it is safe to call put_bh() before __end_buffer_read_notouch().
--- fs/buffer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/buffer.c +1 -1
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ static void __end_buffer_read_notouch(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate)*/ void end_buffer_read_sync (struct buffer_head *bh,int uptodate) { -__end_buffer_read_notouch (bh, uptodate);put_bh (bh); +__end_buffer_read_notouch (bh, uptodate); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (end_buffer_read_sync);
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 575/644 use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cffd0441872e7f6b1fce5e78fb1c99187a291330 ]
do_change_type() and do_set_group() are operating on different aspects of the same thing - propagation graph. The latter asks for mounts involved to be mounted in namespace(s) the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN for. The former is a mess - originally it didn't even check that mount *is* mounted. That got fixed, but the resulting check turns out to be too strict for userland - in effect, we check that mount is in our namespace, having already checked that we have CAP_SYS_ADMIN there.
What we really need (in both cases) is
* only touch mounts that are mounted. That's a must-have
constraint - data corruption happens if it get violated.
* don't allow to mess with a namespace unless you already
have enough permissions to do so (i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its userns).
That's an equivalent of what do_set_group() does; let's extract that into a helper (may_change_propagation()) and use it in both do_set_group() and do_change_type().
--- fs/namespace.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +20 -14
@@ -2296,6 +2296,19 @@ static int graft_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *p, struct mountpoint *mp)return attach_recursive_mnt (mnt, p, mp, false); } +static int may_change_propagation (const struct mount *m) +{ +struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns; + +// it must be mounted in some namespace +if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (ns))// is_mounted() +return -EINVAL ; +// and the caller must be admin in userns of that namespace +if (!ns_capable (ns->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; +return 0 ; +} +/* * Sanity check the flags to change_mnt_propagation. */
@@ -2332,10 +2345,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags)return -EINVAL ;namespace_lock (); -if (!check_mnt (mnt)) { - err = -EINVAL ; + err =may_change_propagation (mnt); +if (err) goto out_unlock; - } +if (type ==MS_SHARED ) { err =invent_group_ids (mnt, recurse);if (err)
@@ -2730,18 +2743,11 @@ static int do_set_group(struct path *from_path, struct path *to_path)namespace_lock (); - err = -EINVAL ; -/* To and From must be mounted */ -if (!is_mounted (&from->mnt)) - goto out; -if (!is_mounted (&to->mnt)) - goto out; - - err = -EPERM ; -/* We should be allowed to modify mount namespaces of both mounts */ -if (!ns_capable (from->mnt_ns->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) + err =may_change_propagation (from); +if (err) goto out; -if (!ns_capable (to->mnt_ns->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) + err =may_change_propagation (to); +if (err) goto out; err = -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 576/644 fpga: zynq_fpga: Fix the wrong usage of dma_map_sgtable()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xu Yilun <[email protected]>
commit 1ca61060de92a4320d73adfe5dc8d335653907ac upstream.
dma_map_sgtable() returns only 0 or the error code. Read sgt->nents to get the number of mapped segments.
--- drivers/fpga/zynq-fpga.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/fpga/zynq-fpga.c +4 -4
@@ -405,12 +405,12 @@ static int zynq_fpga_ops_write(struct fp } } - priv->dma_nelms = -dma_map_sgtable (mgr->dev.parent, sgt,DMA_TO_DEVICE ,0 ); -if (priv->dma_nelms ==0 ) { + err =dma_map_sgtable (mgr->dev.parent, sgt,DMA_TO_DEVICE ,0 ); +if (err) {dev_err (&mgr->dev,"Unable to DMA map (TO_DEVICE)\n" ); -return -ENOMEM ; +return err; } + priv->dma_nelms = sgt->nents;/* enable clock */ err =clk_enable (priv->clk);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 577/644 ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
commit bfb336cf97df7b37b2b2edec0f69773e06d11955 upstream.
Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.
Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the iterator's hash between writers and readers.
--- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/ftrace.c +10 -9
@@ -3825,13 +3825,17 @@ ftrace_regex_open(struct ftrace_ops *ops }else { iter->hash =alloc_and_copy_ftrace_hash (size_bits, hash); } + }else { +if (hash) + iter->hash =alloc_and_copy_ftrace_hash (hash->size_bits, hash); +else + iter->hash =EMPTY_HASH ; + } -if (!iter->hash) { -trace_parser_put (&iter->parser); - goto out_unlock; - } - }else - iter->hash = hash; +if (!iter->hash) { +trace_parser_put (&iter->parser); + goto out_unlock; + } ret =0 ;
@@ -5700,9 +5704,6 @@ int ftrace_regex_release(struct inode *iftrace_hash_move_and_update_ops (iter->ops, orig_hash, iter->hash, filter_hash);mutex_unlock (&ftrace_lock); - }else { -/* For read only, the hash is the ops hash */ - iter->hash =NULL ; }mutex_unlock (&iter->ops->func_hash->regex_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 578/644 iio: pressure: bmp280: Use IS_ERR() in bmp280_common_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Salah Triki <[email protected]>
commit 43c0f6456f801181a80b73d95def0e0fd134e1cc upstream.
devm_gpiod_get_optional() may return non-NULL error pointer on failure. Check its return value using IS_ERR() and propagate the error if necessary.
--- drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c +5 -4
@@ -1064,11 +1064,12 @@ int bmp280_common_probe(struct device *d/* Bring chip out of reset if there is an assigned GPIO line */ gpiod =devm_gpiod_get_optional (dev,"reset" ,GPIOD_OUT_HIGH ); +if (IS_ERR (gpiod)) +return dev_err_probe (dev,PTR_ERR (gpiod),"failed to get reset GPIO\n" ); +/* Deassert the signal */ -if (gpiod) { -dev_info (dev,"release reset\n" ); -gpiod_set_value (gpiod,0 ); - } +dev_info (dev,"release reset\n" ); +gpiod_set_value (gpiod,0 ); data->regmap = regmap; ret =regmap_read (regmap,BMP280_REG_ID , &chip_id);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 579/644 iio: proximity: isl29501: fix buffered read on big-endian systems
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Lechner <[email protected]>
commit de18e978d0cda23e4c102e18092b63a5b0b3a800 upstream.
Fix passing a u32 value as a u16 buffer scan item. This works on little- endian systems, but not on big-endian systems.
A new local variable is introduced for getting the register value and the array is changed to a struct to make the data layout more explicit rather than just changing the type and having to recalculate the proper length needed for the timestamp.
--- drivers/iio/proximity/isl29501.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/proximity/isl29501.c +10 -4
@@ -938,12 +938,18 @@ static irqreturn_t isl29501_trigger_handstruct iio_dev *indio_dev = pf->indio_dev;struct isl29501_private *isl29501 =iio_priv (indio_dev);const unsigned long *active_mask = indio_dev->active_scan_mask; -u32 buffer[4 ]__aligned(8) = {};/* 1x16-bit + naturally aligned ts */ +u32 value; +struct { +u16 data; +aligned_s64 ts; + } scan = { }; -if (test_bit (ISL29501_DISTANCE_SCAN_INDEX , active_mask)) -isl29501_register_read (isl29501,REG_DISTANCE , buffer); +if (test_bit (ISL29501_DISTANCE_SCAN_INDEX , active_mask)) { +isl29501_register_read (isl29501,REG_DISTANCE , &value); + scan.data = value; + } -iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp (indio_dev, buffer, pf->timestamp); +iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp (indio_dev, &scan, pf->timestamp);iio_trigger_notify_done (indio_dev->trig);return IRQ_HANDLED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 580/644 most: core: Drop device reference after usage in get_channel()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
commit b47b493d6387ae437098112936f32be27f73516c upstream.
In get_channel(), the reference obtained by bus_find_device_by_name() was dropped via put_device() before accessing the device's driver data Move put_device() after usage to avoid potential issues.
--- drivers/most/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/most/core.c +1 -1
@@ -538,8 +538,8 @@ static struct most_channel *get_channel( dev =bus_find_device_by_name (&mostbus,NULL , mdev);if (!dev)return NULL ; -put_device (dev); iface =dev_get_drvdata (dev); +put_device (dev);list_for_each_entry_safe (c, tmp, &iface->p->channel_list, list) {if (!strcmp (dev_name (&c->dev), mdev_ch))return c;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 581/644 usb: quirks: Add DELAY_INIT quick for another SanDisk 3.2Gen1 Flash Drive
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miao Li <[email protected]>
commit e664036cf36480414936cd91f4cfa2179a3d8367 upstream.
Another SanDisk 3.2Gen1 Flash Drive also need DELAY_INIT quick, or it will randomly work incorrectly on Huawei hisi platforms when doing reboot test.
--- drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +1 -0
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_qu { USB_DEVICE(0x0781, 0x5591), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, /* SanDisk Corp. SanDisk 3.2Gen1 */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0781, 0x5596), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0781, 0x55a3), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT },/* SanDisk Extreme 55AE */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 582/644 comedi: Make insn_rw_emulate_bits() do insn->n samples
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
commit 7afba9221f70d4cbce0f417c558879cba0eb5e66 upstream.
The insn_rw_emulate_bits() function is used as a default handler for INSN_READ instructions for subdevices that have a handler for INSN_BITS but not for INSN_READ. Similarly, it is used as a default handler for INSN_WRITE instructions for subdevices that have a handler for INSN_BITS but not for INSN_WRITE. It works by emulating the INSN_READ or INSN_WRITE instruction handling with a constructed INSN_BITS instruction. However, INSN_READ and INSN_WRITE instructions are supposed to be able read or write multiple samples, indicated by the insn->n value, but insn_rw_emulate_bits() currently only handles a single sample. For INSN_READ, the comedi core will copy insn->n samples back to user-space. (That triggered KASAN kernel-infoleak errors when insn->n was greater than 1, but that is being fixed more generally elsewhere in the comedi core.)
Make insn_rw_emulate_bits() either handle insn->n samples, or return an error, to conform to the general expectation for INSN_READ and INSN_WRITE handlers.
--- drivers/comedi/drivers.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/comedi/drivers.c +13 -12
@@ -620,11 +620,9 @@ static int insn_rw_emulate_bits(struct cunsigned int chan =CR_CHAN (insn->chanspec);unsigned int base_chan = (chan <32 ) ?0 : chan;unsigned int _data[2 ]; +unsigned int i;int ret; -if (insn->n ==0 ) -return 0 ; -memset (_data,0 ,sizeof (_data));memset (&_insn,0 ,sizeof (_insn)); _insn.insn =INSN_BITS ;
@@ -635,18 +633,21 @@ static int insn_rw_emulate_bits(struct cif (insn->insn ==INSN_WRITE ) {if (!(s->subdev_flags &SDF_WRITABLE ))return -EINVAL ; - _data[0 ] =1U << (chan - base_chan);/* mask */ - _data[1 ] = data[0 ] ? (1U << (chan - base_chan)) :0 ;/* bits */ + _data[0 ] =1U << (chan - base_chan);/* mask */ } +for (i =0 ; i < insn->n; i++) { +if (insn->insn ==INSN_WRITE ) + _data[1 ] = data[i] ? _data[0 ] :0 ;/* bits */ + + ret = s->insn_bits (dev, s, &_insn, _data); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; - ret = s->insn_bits (dev, s, &_insn, _data); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; - -if (insn->insn ==INSN_READ ) - data[0 ] = (_data[1 ] >> (chan - base_chan)) &1 ; +if (insn->insn ==INSN_READ ) + data[i] = (_data[1 ] >> (chan - base_chan)) &1 ; + } -return 1 ; +return insn->n; } static int __comedi_device_postconfig_async(struct comedi_device *dev,