futex: don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
PATCH RESEND v5 1/1 futex: don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access() to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the target process.
During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information after the target becomes privileged.
A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a privileged state via exec().
For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a now-privileged process.
This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a potential security risk.
Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list. This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of credentials.
---
Resending to correct Darren Hart's email. No changes since v5. changed in v5:
- added futex_ prefix to function names
- changed data type of ret to int
- struct task_struct *p initialized at declaration changed in v4:
- added task_robust_list() function
changed in v3:
- replaced RCU with scoped_guard(rcu)
- corrected error return type cast
- added IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) for ensuring compatability
- removed stray newlines and unnecessary line breaks changed in v2:
- improved changelog
- helper function for common part of compat and native syscalls
kernel/futex/syscalls.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
kernel/futex/syscalls.c +56 -50
@@ -39,6 +39,56 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,return 0 ; } +static inline void __user *futex_task_robust_list (struct task_struct *p,bool compat) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +if (compat) +return p->compat_robust_list; +#endif +return p->robust_list; +} + +static void __user *futex_get_robust_list_common (int pid,bool compat) +{ +struct task_struct *p = current; +void __user *head; +int ret; + +scoped_guard (rcu) { +if (pid) { + p =find_task_by_vpid (pid); +if (!p) +return (void __user *)ERR_PTR (-ESRCH ); + } +get_task_struct (p); + } + +/* +* Hold exec_update_lock to serialize with concurrent exec() +* so ptrace_may_access() is checked against stable credentials +*/ + ret =down_read_killable (&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +if (ret) + goto err_put; + + ret = -EPERM ; +if (!ptrace_may_access (p,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) + goto err_unlock; + + head =futex_task_robust_list (p, compat); + +up_read (&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +put_task_struct (p); + +return head; + +err_unlock: +up_read (&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +err_put: +put_task_struct (p); +return (void __user *)ERR_PTR (ret); +} +/** * sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task * @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
@@ -49,36 +99,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid, struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr, size_t __user *, len_ptr) { - struct robust_list_head __user *head; -unsigned long ret; -struct task_struct *p; - -rcu_read_lock (); - - ret = -ESRCH ; -if (!pid) - p = current; -else { - p =find_task_by_vpid (pid); -if (!p) - goto err_unlock; - } - - ret = -EPERM ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (p,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) - goto err_unlock; + struct robust_list_head __user *head = futex_get_robust_list_common(pid, false); - head = p->robust_list; -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (IS_ERR (head)) +return PTR_ERR (head);if (put_user (sizeof (*head), len_ptr))return -EFAULT ;return put_user (head, head_ptr); - -err_unlock: -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; } long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
@@ -455,36 +483,14 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid, compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr, compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr) { -struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head; -unsigned long ret; -struct task_struct *p; - -rcu_read_lock (); - - ret = -ESRCH ; -if (!pid) - p = current; -else { - p =find_task_by_vpid (pid); -if (!p) - goto err_unlock; - } - - ret = -EPERM ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (p,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) - goto err_unlock; +struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head =futex_get_robust_list_common (pid, true); - head = p->compat_robust_list; -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (IS_ERR (head)) +return PTR_ERR (head);if (put_user (sizeof (*head), len_ptr))return -EFAULT ;return put_user (ptr_to_compat (head), head_ptr); - -err_unlock: -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; }#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
[tip: locking/futex] futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
The following commit has been merged into the locking/futex branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the locking/futex branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 6b54082c3ed4dc9821cdf0edb17302355cc5bb45 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/6b54082c3ed4dc9821cdf0edb17302355cc5bb45 Author: Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 23:51:54 +05:30 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Sat, 20 Sep 2025 17:54:01 +02:00
futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access() to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the target process.
During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information after the target becomes privileged.
A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a privileged state via exec().
For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a now-privileged process.
This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a potential security risk.
Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list. This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of credentials.
--- kernel/futex/syscalls.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
kernel/futex/syscalls.c +56 -50
@@ -39,6 +39,56 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,return 0 ; } +static inline void __user *futex_task_robust_list (struct task_struct *p,bool compat) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +if (compat) +return p->compat_robust_list; +#endif +return p->robust_list; +} + +static void __user *futex_get_robust_list_common (int pid,bool compat) +{ +struct task_struct *p = current; +void __user *head; +int ret; + +scoped_guard (rcu) { +if (pid) { + p =find_task_by_vpid (pid); +if (!p) +return (void __user *)ERR_PTR (-ESRCH ); + } +get_task_struct (p); + } + +/* +* Hold exec_update_lock to serialize with concurrent exec() +* so ptrace_may_access() is checked against stable credentials +*/ + ret =down_read_killable (&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +if (ret) + goto err_put; + + ret = -EPERM ; +if (!ptrace_may_access (p,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) + goto err_unlock; + + head =futex_task_robust_list (p, compat); + +up_read (&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +put_task_struct (p); + +return head; + +err_unlock: +up_read (&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +err_put: +put_task_struct (p); +return (void __user *)ERR_PTR (ret); +} +/** * sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task * @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
@@ -49,36 +99,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid, struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr, size_t __user *, len_ptr) { - struct robust_list_head __user *head; -unsigned long ret; -struct task_struct *p; - -rcu_read_lock (); - - ret = -ESRCH ; -if (!pid) - p = current; -else { - p =find_task_by_vpid (pid); -if (!p) - goto err_unlock; - } - - ret = -EPERM ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (p,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) - goto err_unlock; + struct robust_list_head __user *head = futex_get_robust_list_common(pid, false); - head = p->robust_list; -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (IS_ERR (head)) +return PTR_ERR (head);if (put_user (sizeof (*head), len_ptr))return -EFAULT ;return put_user (head, head_ptr); - -err_unlock: -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; } long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
@@ -455,36 +483,14 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid, compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr, compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr) { -struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head; -unsigned long ret; -struct task_struct *p; - -rcu_read_lock (); - - ret = -ESRCH ; -if (!pid) - p = current; -else { - p =find_task_by_vpid (pid); -if (!p) - goto err_unlock; - } - - ret = -EPERM ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (p,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) - goto err_unlock; +struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head =futex_get_robust_list_common (pid, true); - head = p->compat_robust_list; -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (IS_ERR (head)) +return PTR_ERR (head);if (put_user (sizeof (*head), len_ptr))return -EFAULT ;return put_user (ptr_to_compat (head), head_ptr); - -err_unlock: -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; }#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */