Enable FRED with KVM VMX
Subsystems (12)
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerv8 cover Enable FRED with KVM VMX
This patch set enables the Intel flexible return and event delivery (FRED) architecture with KVM VMX to allow guests to utilize FRED.
The FRED architecture defines simple new transitions that change privilege level (ring transitions). The FRED architecture was designed with the following goals:
1) Improve overall performance and response time by replacing event delivery through the interrupt descriptor table (IDT event delivery) and event return by the IRET instruction with lower latency transitions.
2) Improve software robustness by ensuring that event delivery establishes the full supervisor context and that event return establishes the full user context.
The new transitions defined by the FRED architecture are FRED event delivery and, for returning from events, two FRED return instructions. FRED event delivery can effect a transition from ring 3 to ring 0, but it is used also to deliver events incident to ring 0. One FRED instruction (ERETU) effects a return from ring 0 to ring 3, while the other (ERETS) returns while remaining in ring 0. Collectively, FRED event delivery and the FRED return instructions are FRED transitions.
Intel VMX architecture is extended to run FRED guests, and the major changes are:
1) New VMCS fields for FRED context management, which includes two new event data VMCS fields, eight new guest FRED context VMCS fields and eight new host FRED context VMCS fields.
2) VMX nested-exception support for proper virtualization of stack levels introduced with FRED architecture.
Search for the latest FRED spec in most search engines with this search pattern:
site:intel.com FRED (flexible return and event delivery) specification
Although FRED and CET supervisor shadow stacks are independent CPU features, FRED unconditionally includes FRED shadow stack pointer MSRs IA32_FRED_SSP[0123], and IA32_FRED_SSP0 is just an alias of the CET MSR IA32_PL0_SSP. IOW, the state management of MSR IA32_PL0_SSP becomes an overlap area, and Sean requested that FRED virtualization to land after CET virtualization [1].
Since CET virtualization has landed with the release of v6.18-rc1, I'm submitting v8 of FRED virtualization.
Changes in v8:
* Rebased on v6.18-rc1.
* Relocate secondary_vm_exit_controls to the last u64 padding field in vmcs12 (Isaku).
* Make the newly added FRED fields 64-bit aligned in vmcs12 (Isaku).
* Remove changes to Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst.
* Update KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG, as the number used in v7 is occupied by another new cap.
Following is the link to v7 of this patch set:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
Xin Li (18):
KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields
KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0
KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs
KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU
KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved
KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED
KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling
KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks
KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros
KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls
Xin Li (Intel) (3):
x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 21 +- arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c | 4 +- arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 75 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 48 +++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 14 +- arch/x86/kernel/fred.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 15 ++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 25 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 338 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 22 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 19 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 40 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h | 37 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 54 +++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 131 +++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 37 ++- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 29 files changed, 1036 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-)
base-commit: 3a8660878839faadb4f1a6dd72c3179c1df56787
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 1/21 KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Always load the secondary VM exit controls to prepare for FRED enabling.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Changes in v4:
* Fix clearing VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS (Chao Gao).
* Check VM exit/entry consistency based on the new macro from Sean Christopherson.
Change in v3:
* Do FRED controls consistency checks in the VM exit/entry consistency check framework (Sean Christopherson).
Change in v2:
* Always load the secondary VM exit controls (Sean Christopherson).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 9 ++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 7 ++++++- 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
@@ -1225,6 +1225,7 @@#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000490#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x00000491#define MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 0x00000492 +#define MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2 0x00000493/* Resctrl MSRs: */ /* - Intel: */
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +3 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@#define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x10000000 +#define VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS 0x80000000#define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff
@@ -262,6 +263,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {SHARED_EPT_POINTER =0x0000203C ,PID_POINTER_TABLE =0x00002042 ,PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH =0x00002043 , +SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS =0x00002044 , +SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS_HIGH =0x00002045 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS =0x00002400 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x00002401 , VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +8 -1
@@ -55,8 +55,9 @@ struct vmcs_config {u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl;u32 cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;u64 cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; -u32 vmexit_ctrl;u32 vmentry_ctrl; +u32 vmexit_ctrl; +u64 vmexit_2nd_ctrl;u64 misc;struct nested_vmx_msrs nested; };
@@ -141,6 +142,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls(void)CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ; } +static inline bool cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & +VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; +} +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses (void ) { return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct vmcs_host_state {struct vmcs_controls_shadow {u32 vm_entry;u32 vm_exit; +u64 secondary_vm_exit;u32 pin;u32 exec;u32 secondary_exec;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +27 -2
@@ -2595,8 +2595,9 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,u32 _cpu_based_exec_control =0 ;u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control =0 ;u64 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control =0 ; -u32 _vmexit_control =0 ;u32 _vmentry_control =0 ; +u32 _vmexit_control =0 ; +u64 _vmexit2_control =0 ;u64 basic_msr;u64 misc_msr;
@@ -2617,6 +2618,12 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE }, }; +struct { +u32 entry_control; +u64 exit_control; + }const vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs[] = { + }; +memset (vmcs_conf,0 ,sizeof (*vmcs_conf)); if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
@@ -2703,10 +2710,19 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, &_vmentry_control))return -EIO ; +if (_vmexit_control &VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ) + _vmexit2_control = +adjust_vmx_controls64 (KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS , +MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2 ); +if (vmx_check_entry_exit_pairs (vmcs_entry_exit_pairs, _vmentry_control, _vmexit_control))return -EIO ; +if (vmx_check_entry_exit_pairs (vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs, + _vmentry_control, _vmexit2_control)) +return -EIO ; +/* * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they * can't be used due to an errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear
@@ -2755,8 +2771,9 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control; - vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control; + vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control; + vmcs_conf->vmexit_2nd_ctrl = _vmexit2_control; vmcs_conf->misc = misc_msr;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV )
@@ -4410,6 +4427,11 @@ static u32 vmx_get_initial_vmexit_ctrl(void) ~(VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER ); } +static u64 vmx_secondary_vmexit_ctrl (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.vmexit_2nd_ctrl; +} +void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =to_vmx (vcpu);
@@ -4752,6 +4774,9 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vm_exit_controls_set (vmx,vmx_get_initial_vmexit_ctrl ()); +if (cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls ()) +secondary_vm_exit_controls_set (vmx,vmx_secondary_vmexit_ctrl ()); +/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */ vm_entry_controls_set (vmx,vmx_get_initial_vmentry_ctrl ());
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +6 -1
@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void) VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS | \ VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | \ VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL | \ - VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE) + VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE | \ + VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) + +#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0) +#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0)#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \ (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | \
@@ -624,6 +628,7 @@ static __always_inline void lname##_controls_changebit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u## } BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_entry, VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(secondary_vm_exit, SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 64) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32)BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (secondary_exec,SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,32 )
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 2/21 KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Setup VM entry/exit FRED controls in the global vmcs_config for proper FRED VMCS fields management:
1) load guest FRED state upon VM entry.
2) save guest FRED state during VM exit.
3) load host FRED state during VM exit.
Also add FRED control consistency checks to the existing VM entry/exit consistency check framework.
---
Change in v5:
* Remove the pair VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED/VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS, since the secondary VM exit controls are unconditionally enabled anyway, and there are features other than FRED needing it (Chao Gao).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Do VM exit/entry consistency checks using the new macro from Sean Christopherson.
Changes in v3:
* Add FRED control consistency checks to the existing VM entry/exit consistency check framework (Sean Christopherson).
* Just do the unnecessary FRED state load/store on every VM entry/exit (Sean Christopherson).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +4 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x10000000#define VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS 0x80000000 +#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED BIT_ULL(0) +#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED BIT_ULL(1) +#define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS 0x00000004
@@ -122,6 +125,7 @@#define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x00100000 +#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED 0x00800000#define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2 -0
@@ -2622,6 +2622,8 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,u32 entry_control;u64 exit_control; } const vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs[] = { + {VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED , +SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED }, };memset (vmcs_conf,0 ,sizeof (*vmcs_conf));
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +5 -2
@@ -488,7 +488,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void) VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS | \ VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | \ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL | \ - VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE) + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE | \ + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)#define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS \ (VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | \
@@ -515,7 +516,9 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void) VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0) -#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0) +#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS \ + (SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED | \ + SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED)#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \ (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | \
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 3/21 KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Do not virtualize FRED if FRED consistency checks fail.
Either on broken hardware, or when run KVM on top of another hypervisor before the underlying hypervisor implements nested FRED correctly.
---
Changes in v5:
* Drop the cpu_feature_enabled() in cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Call out the reason why not check FRED VM-exit controls in cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Chao Gao).
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 10 ++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +10 -0
@@ -405,6 +405,16 @@ static inline bool vmx_pebs_supported(void)return boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PEBS ) && kvm_pmu_cap.pebs_ept; } +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_fred (void ) +{ +/* +* setup_vmcs_config() guarantees FRED VM-entry/exit controls +* are either all set or none. So, no need to check FRED VM-exit +* controls. +*/ +return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl &VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED ); +} +static inline bool cpu_has_notify_vmexit (void ) { return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3 -0
@@ -8001,6 +8001,9 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set (X86_FEATURE_DTES64 ); } +if (!cpu_has_vmx_fred ()) +kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_FRED ); +if (!enable_pmu)kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_PDCM ); kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap =vmx_get_perf_capabilities ();
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 4/21 x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)Add the ESTACK_ prefix to event stack names to improve clarity and readability. Without the prefix, names like DF, NMI, and DB are too brief and potentially ambiguous.
This renaming also prepares for converting __this_cpu_ist_top_va from a macro into a function that accepts an enum exception_stack_ordering argument, without requiring changes to existing callsites.
---
Changes in v7:
* Move rename code to this patch (Dave Hansen).
* Fix a vertical alignment (Dave Hansen).
--- arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 26 +++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 14 +++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/fred.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 12 ++++++------ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c +2 -2
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)if (ip_within_syscall_gap (regs))return false; -return ((sp >=__this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (VC )) && (sp <__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC ))); +return ((sp >=__this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (ESTACK_VC )) && (sp <__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_VC ))); }/*
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void)/* Read IST entry */ ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]); -if (WARN_ON (ist ==__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC ))) +if (WARN_ON (ist ==__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_VC )))return ;/* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c +1 -1
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, static __always_inline bool is_vc2_stack(unsigned long sp) { -return (sp >=__this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (VC2 ) && sp <__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC2 )); +return (sp >=__this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (ESTACK_VC2 ) && sp <__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_VC2 )); } static __always_inline bool vc_from_invalid_context(struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +13 -13
@@ -18,19 +18,19 @@/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */ #define ESTACKS_MEMBERS (guardsize, optional_stack_size) \ - char DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ - char NMI_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char NMI_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ - char DB_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char DB_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ - char MCE_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ - char VC_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ - char VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ - char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ + char ESTACK_NMI_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_NMI_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ + char ESTACK_DB_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_DB_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ + char ESTACK_MCE_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ + char ESTACK_VC_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ + char ESTACK_VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ + char ESTACK_VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ + char ESTACK_IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \/* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */ struct exception_stacks {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +5 -5
@@ -2332,12 +2332,12 @@ static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu)static inline void tss_setup_ist (struct tss_struct *tss) {/* Set up the per-CPU TSS IST stacks */ - tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (DF ); - tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (NMI ); - tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (DB ); - tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (MCE ); + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DF ); + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_NMI ); + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DB ); + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_MCE );/* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */ - tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC ); + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_VC ); }#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ static inline void tss_setup_ist (struct tss_struct *tss) { }
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c +7 -7
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct estack_pages { PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st) - 1)] = { \ .offs = CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st), \ .size = CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st), \ - .type = STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_ ##st, } + .type = STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + st, }/* * Array of exception stack page descriptors. If the stack is larger than
@@ -83,12 +83,12 @@ struct estack_pages {*/ static const struct estack_pages estack_pages[CEA_ESTACK_PAGES ]____cacheline_aligned = { -EPAGERANGE (DF ), -EPAGERANGE (NMI ), -EPAGERANGE (DB ), -EPAGERANGE (MCE ), -EPAGERANGE (VC ), -EPAGERANGE (VC2 ), +EPAGERANGE (ESTACK_DF ), +EPAGERANGE (ESTACK_NMI ), +EPAGERANGE (ESTACK_DB ), +EPAGERANGE (ESTACK_MCE ), +EPAGERANGE (ESTACK_VC ), +EPAGERANGE (ESTACK_VC2 ), }; static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
arch/x86/kernel/fred.c +3 -3
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void cpu_init_fred_rsps(void) FRED_STKLVL(X86_TRAP_DF, FRED_DF_STACK_LEVEL));/* The FRED equivalents to IST stacks... */ -wrmsrq (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (DB )); -wrmsrq (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (NMI )); -wrmsrq (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (DF )); +wrmsrq (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DB )); +wrmsrq (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_NMI )); +wrmsrq (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DF )); }
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *rif (!get_stack_info_noinstr (stack, current, &info) || info.type ==STACK_TYPE_ENTRY || info.type >STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST ) - sp =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC2 ); + sp =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_VC2 ); sync:/*
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +6 -6
@@ -151,15 +151,15 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)* by guard pages so each stack must be mapped separately. DB2 is * not mapped; it just exists to catch triple nesting of #DB. */ -cea_map_stack (DF ); -cea_map_stack (NMI ); -cea_map_stack (DB ); -cea_map_stack (MCE ); +cea_map_stack (ESTACK_DF ); +cea_map_stack (ESTACK_NMI ); +cea_map_stack (ESTACK_DB ); +cea_map_stack (ESTACK_MCE );if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT )) {if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT )) { -cea_map_stack (VC ); -cea_map_stack (VC2 ); +cea_map_stack (ESTACK_VC ); +cea_map_stack (ESTACK_VC2 ); } } }
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -1
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ page_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,* and then double-fault, though, because we're likely to * break the console driver and lose most of the stack dump. */ -call_on_stack (__this_cpu_ist_top_va (DF ) -sizeof (void *), +call_on_stack (__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DF ) -sizeof (void *), handle_stack_overflow,ASM_CALL_ARG3 , , [arg1] "r" (regs), [arg2] "r" (address), [arg3] "r" (&info));
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Re: [PATCH v8 04/21] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_
Quoted 7 lines · Xin Li (Intel)
Add the
ESTACK_prefix to event stack names to improve clarity and readability. Without the prefix, names like DF, NMI, and DB are too brief and potentially ambiguous.This renaming also prepares for converting
__this_cpu_ist_top_vafrom a macro into a function that accepts an enumexception_stack_orderingargument, without requiring changes to existing callsites.
Yup, the rename looks good.
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 5/21 x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)Convert the __this_cpu_ist_{top,bottom}_va() macros into proper functions, and export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to allow KVM to retrieve the top of the per-CPU exception stack.
FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
To simplify access to the exception stacks in struct cea_exception_stacks, a union is used to create an array alias, enabling array-style indexing of the stack entries.
---
Change in v7:
* Remove Suggested-bys (Dave Hansen).
* Move rename code in a separate patch (Dave Hansen).
* Access cea_exception_stacks using array indexing (Dave Hansen).
* Use BUILD_BUG_ON(ESTACK_DF != 0) to ensure the starting index is 0 (Dave Hansen).
Change in v5:
* Export accessor instead of data (Christoph Hellwig).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Rewrite the change log and add comments to the export (Dave Hansen).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 51 +++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 25 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +25 -26
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ 0#endif +/* +* The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks +*/ +enum exception_stack_ordering { +ESTACK_DF , +ESTACK_NMI , +ESTACK_DB , +ESTACK_MCE , +ESTACK_VC , +ESTACK_VC2 , +N_EXCEPTION_STACKS +}; +/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */ #define ESTACKS_MEMBERS (guardsize, optional_stack_size) \ char ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
@@ -39,37 +52,29 @@ struct exception_stacks {/* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */ struct cea_exception_stacks { - ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ) -}; - -/* -* The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks -*/ -enum exception_stack_ordering { -ESTACK_DF , -ESTACK_NMI , -ESTACK_DB , -ESTACK_MCE , -ESTACK_VC , -ESTACK_VC2 , -N_EXCEPTION_STACKS +union { +struct { + ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ) + }; +struct { +char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE ]; +char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ ]; + } event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS ]; + }; };#define CEA_ESTACK_SIZE (st) \ sizeof(((struct cea_exception_stacks *)0)->st## _stack) -#define CEA_ESTACK_BOT (ceastp, st) \ - ((unsigned long)&(ceastp)->st## _stack) - -#define CEA_ESTACK_TOP (ceastp, st) \ - (CEA_ESTACK_BOT(ceastp, st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st)) -#define CEA_ESTACK_OFFS (st) \ offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack)#define CEA_ESTACK_PAGES \ (sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE) +extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack); +extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -144,10 +149,4 @@ static __always_inline struct entry_stack *cpu_entry_stack(int cpu) return &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_stack_page.stack; } -#define __this_cpu_ist_top_va (name) \ - CEA_ESTACK_TOP(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name) - -#define __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (name) \ - CEA_ESTACK_BOT(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name) -#endif
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +25 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,31 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage) static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct exception_stacks, exception_stacks);DEFINE_PER_CPU (struct cea_exception_stacks *, cea_exception_stacks); +/* +* FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for +* stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively +* corresponding to per CPU stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must +* populate these each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU. +* +* Called from entry code, so must be noinstr. +*/ +noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ +struct cea_exception_stacks *s; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (ESTACK_DF !=0 ); + + s =__this_cpu_read (cea_exception_stacks); + +return (unsigned long )&s->event_stacks[stack].stack; +} + +noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ +return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (stack) +EXCEPTION_STKSZ ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__this_cpu_ist_top_va); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long, _cea_offset); static __always_inline unsigned int cea_offset(unsigned int cpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
Quoted 10 lines
Convert the __this_cpu_ist_{top,bottom}_va() macros into proper functions, and export
__this_cpu_ist_top_va()to allow KVM to retrieve the top of the per-CPU exception stack.FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
Quoted 5 lines
To simplify access to the exception stacks in struct
cea_exception_stacks, a union is used to create an array alias, enabling array-style indexing of the stack entries.Signed-off-by Xin Li (Intel) <[email protected]>
Dave, can you please help to review patch 4 & 5?
Thanks!
Xin
Quoted 145 lines
---
Change in v7:
* Remove Suggested-bys (Dave Hansen).
* Move rename code in a separate patch (Dave Hansen).
* Accesscea_exception_stacksusing array indexing (Dave Hansen).
* UseBUILD_BUG_ON(ESTACK_DF != 0)to ensure the starting index is 0 (Dave Hansen).Change in v5:
* Export accessor instead of data (Christoph Hellwig).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.Change in v4:
* Rewrite the change log and add comments to the export (Dave Hansen).
---arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h| 51 +++++++++++++--------------arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c| 25 +++++++++++++2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +25
-26@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ 0#endif +/* +* The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks +*/ +enum exception_stack_ordering { +ESTACK_DF , +ESTACK_NMI , +ESTACK_DB , +ESTACK_MCE , +ESTACK_VC , +ESTACK_VC2 , +N_EXCEPTION_STACKS +}; +/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */ #define ESTACKS_MEMBERS (guardsize, optional_stack_size) \ char ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \@@ -39,37 +52,29 @@ struct exception_stacks {/* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */ struct cea_exception_stacks { - ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ) -}; - -/* -* The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks -*/ -enum exception_stack_ordering { -ESTACK_DF , -ESTACK_NMI , -ESTACK_DB , -ESTACK_MCE , -ESTACK_VC , -ESTACK_VC2 , -N_EXCEPTION_STACKS +union { +struct { + ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ) + }; +struct { +char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE ]; +char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ ]; + } event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS ]; + }; };#define CEA_ESTACK_SIZE (st) \ sizeof(((struct cea_exception_stacks *)0)->st## _stack) -#define CEA_ESTACK_BOT (ceastp, st) \ - ((unsigned long)&(ceastp)->st## _stack) - -#define CEA_ESTACK_TOP (ceastp, st) \ - (CEA_ESTACK_BOT(ceastp, st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st)) -#define CEA_ESTACK_OFFS (st) \ offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack)#define CEA_ESTACK_PAGES \ (sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE) +extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack); +extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -144,10 +149,4 @@ static __always_inline struct entry_stack *cpu_entry_stack(int cpu) return &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_stack_page.stack; } -#define __this_cpu_ist_top_va (name) \ - CEA_ESTACK_TOP(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name) - -#define __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (name) \ - CEA_ESTACK_BOT(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name) -#endif arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +25
-1@@ -18,6 +18,31 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage) static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct exception_stacks, exception_stacks);DEFINE_PER_CPU (struct cea_exception_stacks *, cea_exception_stacks); +/* +* FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for +* stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively +* corresponding to per CPU stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must +* populate these each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU. +* +* Called from entry code, so must be noinstr. +*/ +noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ +struct cea_exception_stacks *s; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (ESTACK_DF !=0 ); + + s =__this_cpu_read (cea_exception_stacks); + +return (unsigned long )&s->event_stacks[stack].stack; +} + +noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ +return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (stack) +EXCEPTION_STKSZ ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__this_cpu_ist_top_va); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long, _cea_offset); static __always_inline unsigned int cea_offset(unsigned int cpu) --2.51.0
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage) · line 44
Quoted 10 lines · Xin Li (Intel)
FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +5
-0+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ +return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (stack) +EXCEPTION_STKSZ ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__this_cpu_ist_top_va);
This has no business being a !GPL export. But please use:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(__this_cpu_ist_top_val, "kvm");
(or "kvm-intel", depending on which actual module ends up needing this symbol).
Xin Li
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage) · line 44
Quoted 11 lines
FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +5
-0+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va (enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ +return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (stack) +EXCEPTION_STKSZ ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__this_cpu_ist_top_va);This has no business being a !GPL export. But please use:
Quoted 4 lines
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(__this_cpu_ist_top_val, "kvm");(or "kvm-intel", depending on which actual module ends up needing this symbol).
Will do “kvm-intel” because that is the only module uses the APIs.
Re: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
Quoted 14 lines · Xin Li
Quoted 14 lines
Review
Quoted 11 lines
FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
(quoted diff) +5
-0+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ + return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(stack) + EXCEPTION_STKSZ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__this_cpu_ist_top_va);This has no business being a !GPL export. But please use:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(__this_cpu_ist_top_val, "kvm");(or "kvm-intel", depending on which actual module ends up needing this symbol).
Will do “kvm-intel” because that is the only module uses the APIs.
Alternatively, what about a slightly more automated approach, at the cost of some precision? The below adds EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM and only generates exports for pieces of KVM that will be build as a module. The loss of precision is that a symbol that's used by one KVM module would get exported for all KVM modules, but IMO the ease of maintenance would be worth a few "unnecessary" exports. We could also add e.g. EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_{AMD,INTEL}, but I don't think that adds much value over having just EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM().
Originally from https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected],
a refreshed version without hunting for new exports (which I can do before posting if we want to go this direction):
--
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 10:42:38 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86: Restrict KVM-induced symbol exports to KVM modules where
obvious/possible
Extend KVM's export macro framework to provide EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(), and use the helper macro to export symbols for KVM throughout x86 if and only if KVM will build one or more modules, and only for those modules.
To avoid unnecessary exports when CONFIG_KVM=m but kvm.ko will not be built (because no vendor modules are selected), let arch code #define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM to suppress/override the exports.
Note, the set of symbols to restrict to KVM was generated by manual search and audit; any "misses" are due to human error, not some grand plan.
--- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 7 ++-- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S | 3 +- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/events/core.c | 7 ++-- arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c | 3 +- arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c | 7 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_types.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_common.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bus_lock.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 7 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 21 +++++----- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 7 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 5 +-- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 5 +-- arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 1 + arch/x86/lib/cache-smp.c | 9 ++-- arch/x86/lib/msr.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 3 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 67 +++++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/kvm_types.h | 14 +++++++ 31 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry.S +3 -4
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h>
@@ -29,8 +30,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(write_ibpb) FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET RET SYM_FUNC_END(write_ibpb) -/* For KVM */ -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(write_ibpb); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(write_ibpb); .popsection
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(x86_verw_sel) .word __KERNEL_DS .align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc SYM_CODE_END(x86_verw_sel); -/* For KVM */ -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_verw_sel); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(x86_verw_sel); .popsection
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S +2 -1
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/fred.h>
@@ -146,5 +147,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(asm_fred_entry_from_kvm) RET SYM_FUNC_END(asm_fred_entry_from_kvm) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asm_fred_entry_from_kvm); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(asm_fred_entry_from_kvm); #endif
arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +3 -2
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#include <linux/perf_event.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1569,7 +1570,7 @@ void amd_pmu_enable_virt(void)/* Reload all events */ amd_pmu_reload_virt (); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (amd_pmu_enable_virt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (amd_pmu_enable_virt);void amd_pmu_disable_virt (void ) {
@@ -1586,4 +1587,4 @@ void amd_pmu_disable_virt(void)/* Reload all events */ amd_pmu_reload_virt (); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (amd_pmu_disable_virt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (amd_pmu_disable_virt);
arch/x86/events/core.c +4 -3
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kdebug.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ struct perf_guest_switch_msr *perf_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data) {return static_call (x86_pmu_guest_get_msrs)(nr, data); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (perf_guest_get_msrs); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (perf_guest_get_msrs);/* * There may be PMI landing after enabled=0. The PMI hitting could be before or
@@ -3106,7 +3107,7 @@ void perf_get_x86_pmu_capability(struct x86_pmu_capability *cap) cap->events_mask_len = x86_pmu.events_mask_len; cap->pebs_ept = x86_pmu.pebs_ept; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (perf_get_x86_pmu_capability); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (perf_get_x86_pmu_capability);u64 perf_get_hw_event_config (int hw_event) {
@@ -3117,4 +3118,4 @@ u64 perf_get_hw_event_config(int hw_event)return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (perf_get_hw_event_config); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (perf_get_hw_event_config);
arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c +2 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> #include <linux/types.h>
@@ -1705,7 +1706,7 @@ void x86_perf_get_lbr(struct x86_pmu_lbr *lbr) lbr->info = x86_pmu.lbr_info; lbr->has_callstack =x86_pmu_has_lbr_callstack (); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (x86_perf_get_lbr); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (x86_perf_get_lbr);struct event_constraint vlbr_constraint = __EVENT_CONSTRAINT(INTEL_FIXED_VLBR_EVENT, (1ULL << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR),
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +4 -3
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/limits.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/cpuid/api.h> #include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -82,13 +83,13 @@ u32 intel_pt_validate_cap(u32 *caps, enum pt_capabilities capability)return (c & cd->mask) >> shift; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (intel_pt_validate_cap); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (intel_pt_validate_cap);u32 intel_pt_validate_hw_cap (enum pt_capabilities cap) {return intel_pt_validate_cap (pt_pmu.caps, cap); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (intel_pt_validate_hw_cap); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (intel_pt_validate_hw_cap); static ssize_t pt_cap_show(struct device *cdev, struct device_attribute *attr,
@@ -1590,7 +1591,7 @@ void intel_pt_handle_vmx(int on)local_irq_restore (flags); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (intel_pt_handle_vmx); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (intel_pt_handle_vmx);/* * PMU callbacks
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_types.h +5 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@#define KVM_SUB_MODULES kvm-intel#else #undef KVM_SUB_MODULES +/* +* Don't export symbols for KVM without vendor modules, as kvm.ko is built iff +* at least one vendor module is enabled. +*/ +#define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (symbol)#endif #define KVM_ARCH_NR_OBJS_PER_MEMORY_CACHE 40
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +2 -1
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/dmi.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <xen/xen.h>
@@ -2316,7 +2317,7 @@ u32 x86_msi_msg_get_destid(struct msi_msg *msg, bool extid) dest |= msg->arch_addr_hi.destid_8_31 <<8 ;return dest; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (x86_msi_msg_get_destid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (x86_msi_msg_get_destid);static void __init apic_bsp_up_setup (void ) {
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_common.c +2 -1
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include "local.h"
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ u32 default_cpu_present_to_apicid(int mps_cpu)else return BAD_APICID ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (default_cpu_present_to_apicid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (default_cpu_present_to_apicid);/* * Set up the logical destination ID when the APIC operates in logical
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +2 -2
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/mm.h> - +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
@@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ unsigned long amd_get_dr_addr_mask(unsigned int dr)return per_cpu (amd_dr_addr_mask[dr],smp_processor_id ()); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (amd_get_dr_addr_mask); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (amd_get_dr_addr_mask);static void zenbleed_check_cpu (void *unused) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +8 -9
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/sched/smt.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);/* Control IBPB on vCPU load */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (switch_vcpu_ibpb); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (switch_vcpu_ibpb); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (switch_vcpu_ibpb);/* Control CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (cpu_buf_idle_clear);
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);* mitigation is required. */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (cpu_buf_vm_clear); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cpu_buf_vm_clear); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (cpu_buf_vm_clear);#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "mitigations: " fmt
@@ -366,7 +367,7 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)speculation_ctrl_update (tif); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (x86_virt_spec_ctrl); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (x86_virt_spec_ctrl);static void x86_amd_ssb_disable (void ) {
@@ -1032,7 +1033,7 @@ bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)return (gds_mitigation ==GDS_MITIGATION_FULL || gds_mitigation ==GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED ); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gds_ucode_mitigated); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (gds_ucode_mitigated);void update_gds_msr (void ) {
@@ -2864,7 +2865,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) }bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
@@ -2872,11 +2873,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */ enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF ) ?L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO :L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF ; -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_INTEL ) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (l1tf_mitigation); -#endif +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (l1tf_mitigation);enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO ; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (l1tf_vmx_mitigation); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (l1tf_vmx_mitigation);/* * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bus_lock.c +2 -1
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -289,7 +290,7 @@ bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip)force_sig_fault (SIGBUS ,BUS_ADRALN ,NULL );return false; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (handle_guest_split_lock); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (handle_guest_split_lock);void bus_lock_init (void ) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +4 -3
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/ctype.h>
@@ -460,14 +461,14 @@ void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear)__write_cr4 (newval); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (cr4_update_irqsoff); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (cr4_update_irqsoff);/* Read the CR4 shadow. */ unsigned long cr4_read_shadow (void ) {return this_cpu_read (cpu_tlbstate.cr4); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cr4_read_shadow); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (cr4_read_shadow);void cr4_init (void ) {
@@ -722,7 +723,7 @@ void load_direct_gdt(int cpu) gdt_descr.size =GDT_SIZE -1 ;load_gdt (&gdt_descr); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (load_direct_gdt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (load_direct_gdt);/* Load a fixmap remapping of the per-cpu GDT */ void load_fixmap_gdt (int cpu)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2 -1
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/node.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h>
@@ -915,7 +916,7 @@ int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes, *allowed_attributes |=SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY ;return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sgx_set_attribute); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (sgx_set_attribute);static int __init sgx_init (void ) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +3 -2
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@* Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation. */ +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,WARN_ON_ONCE (ret);return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sgx_virt_ecreate); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (sgx_virt_ecreate);static int __sgx_virt_einit (void __user *sigstruct,void __user *token,void __user *secs)
@@ -432,4 +433,4 @@ int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sgx_virt_einit); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (sgx_virt_einit);
arch/x86/kernel/e820.c +2 -1
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/firmware-map.h> #include <linux/sort.h> #include <linux/memory_hotplug.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ bool e820__mapped_raw_any(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type type) {return _e820__mapped_any (e820_table_firmware, start, end, type); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (e820__mapped_raw_any); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (e820__mapped_raw_any);bool e820__mapped_any (u64 start,u64 end,enum e820_type type) {
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +11 -10
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <uapi/asm/kvm.h> #include <linux/hardirq.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/pkeys.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -276,7 +277,7 @@ bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate);void fpu_free_guest_fpstate (struct fpu_guest *gfpu) {
@@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu) gfpu->fpstate =NULL ;vfree (fpstate); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_free_guest_fpstate); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_free_guest_fpstate);/* * fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features - Check xfeatures against guest perm and enable
@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures)return __xfd_enable_feature (xfeatures, guest_fpu); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features);#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 void fpu_update_guest_xfd (struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu,u64 xfd)
@@ -324,7 +325,7 @@ void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd)xfd_update_state (guest_fpu->fpstate);fpregs_unlock (); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_update_guest_xfd); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_update_guest_xfd);/** * fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state - Synchronize XFD MSR and software state
@@ -348,7 +349,7 @@ void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void) __this_cpu_write(xfd_state, fpstate->xfd); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state);#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate (struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu,bool enter_guest)
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, bool enter_guest)fpregs_unlock ();return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate);void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi (struct fpu_guest *gfpu,void *buf,unsigned int size,u64 xfeatures,u32 pkru)
@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf, ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures =XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE ; } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi);int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate (struct fpu_guest *gfpu,const void *buf,u64 xcr0,u32 *vpkru)
@@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, return copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(kstate, ustate, vpkru); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate);#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ void kernel_fpu_begin_mask (unsigned int kfpu_mask)
@@ -854,7 +855,7 @@ void switch_fpu_return(void)fpregs_restore_userregs (); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (switch_fpu_return); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (switch_fpu_return);void fpregs_lock_and_load (void ) {
@@ -889,7 +890,7 @@ void fpregs_assert_state_consistent(void) WARN_ON_FPU(!fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpregs_assert_state_consistent); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpregs_assert_state_consistent);#endif void fpregs_mark_activate (void )
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +4 -3
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/pkeys.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h>
@@ -1058,7 +1059,7 @@ void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr)return __raw_xsave_addr (xsave, xfeature_nr); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (get_xsave_addr); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (get_xsave_addr);/* * Given an xstate feature nr, calculate where in the xsave buffer the state is.
@@ -1482,7 +1483,7 @@ void fpstate_clear_xstate_component(struct fpstate *fpstate, unsigned int xfeatuif (addr) memset(addr, 0, xstate_sizes[xfeature]); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpstate_clear_xstate_component); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpstate_clear_xstate_component);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -1818,7 +1819,7 @@ u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void) {return xstate_get_group_perm (true); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xstate_get_guest_group_perm); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (xstate_get_guest_group_perm);/** * fpu_xstate_prctl - xstate permission operations
arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +2 -1
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/smp.h>
@@ -489,7 +490,7 @@ void hw_breakpoint_restore(void)set_debugreg (DR6_RESERVED ,6 );set_debugreg (__this_cpu_read (cpu_dr7),7 ); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hw_breakpoint_restore); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (hw_breakpoint_restore);/* * Handle debug exception notifications.
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c +2 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/irq_stack.h> #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -361,7 +362,7 @@ void kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(void (*handler)(void))synchronize_rcu (); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler);/* * Handler for POSTED_INTERRUPT_VECTOR.
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +3 -2
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/timer.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ void kvm_async_pf_task_wait_schedule(u32 token) }finish_swait (&n.wq, &wait); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_async_pf_task_wait_schedule); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (kvm_async_pf_task_wait_schedule);static void apf_task_wake_one (struct kvm_task_sleep_node *n) {
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ noinstr u32 kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags(void)return flags; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags); noinstr bool __kvm_handle_async_pf(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 token) {
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c +2 -3
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -613,9 +614,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi_kvm_vmx) {exc_nmi (regs); } -#if IS_MODULE (CONFIG_KVM_INTEL ) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (asm_exc_nmi_kvm_vmx); -#endif +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (asm_exc_nmi_kvm_vmx);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_NMI_CHECK_CPU
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +2 -3
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/notifier.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h>
@@ -303,9 +304,7 @@ void current_save_fsgs(void)save_fsgs (current);local_irq_restore (flags); } -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM ) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (current_save_fsgs); -#endif +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (current_save_fsgs); static __always_inline void loadseg(enum which_selector which,unsigned short sel)
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c +3 -2
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <acpi/reboot.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -541,7 +542,7 @@ void cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback)rcu_assign_pointer (cpu_emergency_virt_callback, callback); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback);void cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback (cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback) {
@@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ void cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback)rcu_assign_pointer (cpu_emergency_virt_callback,NULL );synchronize_rcu (); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback);/* * Disable virtualization, i.e. VMX or SVM, to ensure INIT is recognized during
arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/cpufreq.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/clocksource.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/timex.h> #include <linux/static_key.h>
arch/x86/lib/cache-smp.c +5 -4
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#include <asm/paravirt.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> static void __wbinvd (void *dummy) {
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ void wbinvd_on_cpu(int cpu) {smp_call_function_single (cpu, __wbinvd,NULL ,1 ); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (wbinvd_on_cpu); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (wbinvd_on_cpu);void wbinvd_on_all_cpus (void ) {
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ void wbinvd_on_cpus_mask(struct cpumask *cpus) {on_each_cpu_mask (cpus, __wbinvd,NULL ,1 ); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (wbinvd_on_cpus_mask); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (wbinvd_on_cpus_mask);static void __wbnoinvd (void *dummy) {
@@ -35,10 +36,10 @@ void wbnoinvd_on_all_cpus(void) {on_each_cpu (__wbnoinvd,NULL ,1 ); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (wbnoinvd_on_all_cpus); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (wbnoinvd_on_all_cpus);void wbnoinvd_on_cpus_mask (struct cpumask *cpus) {on_each_cpu_mask (cpus, __wbnoinvd,NULL ,1 ); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (wbnoinvd_on_cpus_mask); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (wbnoinvd_on_cpus_mask);
arch/x86/lib/msr.c +3 -2
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> #include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit) {return __flip_bit (msr, bit, true); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (msr_set_bit); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (msr_set_bit);/** * msr_clear_bit - Clear @bit in a MSR @msr.
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ int msr_clear_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit) {return __flip_bit (msr, bit, false); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (msr_clear_bit); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (msr_clear_bit);#ifdef CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS void do_trace_write_msr (u32 msr,u64 val,int failed)
arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +2 -1
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@#include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/rbtree.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -697,7 +698,7 @@ bool pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr(unsigned long pfn) cm == _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS || cm == _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WC; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr);/** * memtype_reserve_io - Request a memory type mapping for a region of memory
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +3 -2
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/task_work.h> #include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> #include <linux/mmu_context.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -1582,7 +1583,7 @@ unsigned long __get_current_cr3_fast(void)VM_BUG_ON (cr3 !=__read_cr3 ());return cr3; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__get_current_cr3_fast); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (__get_current_cr3_fast);/* * Flush one page in the kernel mapping
@@ -1723,7 +1724,7 @@ void __flush_tlb_all(void)flush_tlb_local (); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__flush_tlb_all); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (__flush_tlb_all);void arch_tlbbatch_flush (struct arch_tlbflush_unmap_batch *batch) {
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +34 -33
267 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/kvm_types.h +14 -0
@@ -11,8 +11,22 @@#ifdef KVM_SUB_MODULES #define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL (symbol) \ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(symbol, __stringify(KVM_SUB_MODULES)) +#define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (symbol) \ + EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(symbol, "kvm," __stringify(KVM_SUB_MODULES))#else #define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL (symbol) +/* +* Allow architectures to provide a custom EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM, but only +* if there are no submodules, e.g. to allow suppressing exports if KVM=m, but +* kvm.ko won't actually be built (due to lack of at least one submodule). +*/ +#ifndef EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM +#if IS_MODULE (CONFIG_KVM ) +#define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (symbol) EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(symbol, "kvm") +#else +#define EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (symbol) +#endif /* IS_MODULE(CONFIG_KVM) */ +#endif /* EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM */ #endif #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
base-commit: 211ddde0823f1442e4ad052a2f30f050145ccada --
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
Quoted 22 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Xin Li
Quoted 14 lines
Review
Quoted 11 lines
FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
(quoted diff) +5
-0+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack) +{ + return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(stack) + EXCEPTION_STKSZ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__this_cpu_ist_top_va);This has no business being a !GPL export. But please use:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(__this_cpu_ist_top_val, "kvm");(or "kvm-intel", depending on which actual module ends up needing this symbol).
Will do “kvm-intel” because that is the only module uses the APIs.
Quoted 7 lines
Alternatively, what about a slightly more automated approach, at the cost of some precision? The below adds
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVMand only generates exports for pieces of KVM that will be build as a module. The loss of precision is that a symbol that's used by one KVM module would get exported for all KVM modules, but IMO the ease of maintenance would be worth a few "unnecessary" exports. We could also add e.g. EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_{AMD,INTEL}, but I don't think that adds much value over having justEXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM().
Works for me.
Re: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)A couple of nits:
The subject here isn't super helpful. This is doing a *LOT* more than just exporting something. In a perfect world, you'd probably even do the refactoring first and export in a separate patch.
Quoted 3 lines · Xin Li (Intel)
Convert the __this_cpu_ist_{top,bottom}_va() macros into proper functions, and export
__this_cpu_ist_top_va()to allow KVM to retrieve the top of the per-CPU exception stack.
The key thing this does is create a data structure and move away from open-coded size calculations to using the compiler for it. The macro=>function conversion is barely worth mentioning, IMNHO.
Quoted 8 lines
FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
To simplify access to the exception stacks in struct
cea_exception_stacks, a union is used to create an array alias, enabling array-style indexing of the stack entries.
Super nit here, but please use imperative voice for stuff like this.
"To simplify access to" => "Simplify access to"
and/or
"a union is used" => "use a union"
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +2
-0@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ 0#endif +/* +* The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h line 30
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +10
-0+*/ +enum exception_stack_ordering { +ESTACK_DF , +ESTACK_NMI , +ESTACK_DB , +ESTACK_MCE , +ESTACK_VC , +ESTACK_VC2 , +N_EXCEPTION_STACKS +};
This creates some new duplicated logic. There's already a list in the same order in ESTACKS_MEMBERS() of all the stacks.
Ideally, everyone would move over to the enum and wouldn't need to use the ESTACKS_MEMBERS() route. What's preventing that?
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 6/21 KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Initialize host VMCS FRED fields with host FRED MSRs' value and guest VMCS FRED fields to 0.
FRED CPU state is managed in 9 new FRED MSRs:
IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
IA32_FRED_RSP0,
IA32_FRED_RSP1,
IA32_FRED_RSP2,
IA32_FRED_RSP3,
IA32_FRED_SSP1,
IA32_FRED_SSP2,
IA32_FRED_SSP3,
as well as a few existing CPU registers and MSRs:
CR4.FRED,
IA32_STAR,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
IA32_PL0_SSP (also known as IA32_FRED_SSP0).CR4, IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE and IA32_STAR are already well managed. Except IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_FRED_SSP0, all other FRED CPU state MSRs have corresponding VMCS fields in both the host-state and guest-state areas. So KVM just needs to initialize them, and with proper VM entry/exit FRED controls, a FRED CPU will keep tracking host and guest FRED CPU state in VMCS automatically.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Initialize host SSP[1-3] to 0s in vmx_set_constant_host_state() because Linux doesn't support kernel shadow stacks (Chao Gao).
Change in v3:
* Use structure kvm_host_values to keep host fred config & stack levels (Sean Christopherson).
Changes in v2:
* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() to decouple KVM's capability to virtualize a feature and host's enabling of a feature (Chao Gao).
* Move guest FRED state init into __vmx_vcpu_reset() (Chao Gao).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +32 -0
@@ -293,12 +293,44 @@ enum vmcs_field {GUEST_BNDCFGS_HIGH =0x00002813 ,GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL =0x00002814 ,GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL_HIGH =0x00002815 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG =0x0000281a , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG_HIGH =0x0000281b , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 =0x0000281c , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1_HIGH =0x0000281d , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 =0x0000281e , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2_HIGH =0x0000281f , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 =0x00002820 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3_HIGH =0x00002821 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS =0x00002822 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS_HIGH =0x00002823 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 =0x00002824 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1_HIGH =0x00002825 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 =0x00002826 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2_HIGH =0x00002827 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 =0x00002828 , +GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3_HIGH =0x00002829 ,HOST_IA32_PAT =0x00002c00 ,HOST_IA32_PAT_HIGH =0x00002c01 ,HOST_IA32_EFER =0x00002c02 ,HOST_IA32_EFER_HIGH =0x00002c03 ,HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL =0x00002c04 ,HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL_HIGH =0x00002c05 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG =0x00002c08 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG_HIGH =0x00002c09 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 =0x00002c0a , +HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1_HIGH =0x00002c0b , +HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 =0x00002c0c , +HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2_HIGH =0x00002c0d , +HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 =0x00002c0e , +HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3_HIGH =0x00002c0f , +HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS =0x00002c10 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS_HIGH =0x00002c11 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 =0x00002c12 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP1_HIGH =0x00002c13 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 =0x00002c14 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP2_HIGH =0x00002c15 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 =0x00002c16 , +HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP3_HIGH =0x00002c17 ,PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL =0x00004000 ,CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL =0x00004002 , EXCEPTION_BITMAP = 0x00004004,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +36 -0
@@ -1459,6 +1459,15 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1)); } +/* Per-CPU FRED MSRs */ +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED )) { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DB )); +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_NMI )); +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ,__this_cpu_ist_top_va (ESTACK_DF )); +#endif + } + vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu; } }
@@ -4311,6 +4320,17 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)*/ vmcs_write16 (HOST_DS_SELECTOR ,0 );vmcs_write16 (HOST_ES_SELECTOR ,0 ); + +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED )) { +/* FRED CONFIG and STKLVLS are the same on all CPUs */ +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG , kvm_host.fred_config); +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS , kvm_host.fred_stklvls); + +/* Linux doesn't support kernel shadow stacks, thus SSPs are 0s */ +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 ,0 ); + }#else vmcs_write16 (HOST_DS_SELECTOR , __KERNEL_DS);/* 22.2.4 */ vmcs_write16 (HOST_ES_SELECTOR , __KERNEL_DS);/* 22.2.4 */
@@ -4822,6 +4842,17 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) }vmx_setup_uret_msrs (vmx); + +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED )) { +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 ,0 ); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 ,0 ); + } }static void __vmx_vcpu_reset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -8698,6 +8729,11 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void) kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT ; +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED )) { +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG , kvm_host.fred_config); +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS , kvm_host.fred_stklvls); + } +return r; }
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +3 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ struct kvm_host_values {u64 xss;u64 s_cet;u64 arch_capabilities; + +u64 fred_config; +u64 fred_stklvls; };void kvm_spurious_fault (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 7/21 KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
On a userspace MSR filter change, set FRED MSR intercepts.
The eight FRED MSRs, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP[123], MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP[123] and MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, are all safe to passthrough, because each has a corresponding host and guest field in VMCS.
Both MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0 (aka MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP) are dedicated for userspace event delivery, IOW they are NOT used in any kernel event delivery and the execution of ERETS. Thus KVM can run safely with guest values in the two MSRs. As a result, save and restore of their guest values are deferred until vCPU context switch, Host MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 is restored upon returning to userspace, and Host MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP is managed with XRSTORS/XSAVES.
Note, FRED SSP MSRs, including MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, are available on any processor that enumerates FRED. On processors that support FRED but not CET, FRED transitions do not use these MSRs, but they remain accessible via MSR instructions such as RDMSR and WRMSR.
Intercept MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP when CET shadow stack is not supported, regardless of FRED support. This ensures the guest value remains fully virtual and does not modify the hardware FRED SSP0 MSR.
This behavior is consistent with the current setup in vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(), so no change is needed to the interception logic for MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP.
---
Changes in v7:
* Rewrite the changelog and comment, majorly for MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP.
Changes in v5:
* Skip execution of vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr() if FRED is not available or enabled (Sean).
* Use 'intercept' as the variable name to indicate whether MSR interception should be enabled (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +47 -0
@@ -4127,6 +4127,51 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } } +static void vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +bool intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_FRED ); + +if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED )) +return ; + +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); + +/* +* MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (aka MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0) are +* designed for event delivery while executing in userspace. Since KVM +* operates entirely in kernel mode (CPL is always 0 after any VM exit), +* it can safely retain and operate with guest-defined values for these +* MSRs. +* +* As a result, interception of MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP +* is unnecessary. +* +* Note: Saving and restoring MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP is part of CET supervisor +* context management. However, FRED SSP MSRs, including MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, +* are available on any processor that enumerates FRED. +* +* On processors that support FRED but not CET, FRED transitions do not +* use these MSRs, but they remain accessible via MSR instructions such +* as RDMSR and WRMSR. +* +* Intercept MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP when CET shadow stack is not supported, +* regardless of FRED support. This ensures the guest value remains +* fully virtual and does not modify the hardware FRED SSP0 MSR. +* +* This behavior is consistent with the current setup in +* vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(), so no change is needed to the interception +* logic for MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP. +*/ +vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); +} +static void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {bool intercept;
@@ -4193,6 +4238,8 @@ static void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_S_CET ,MSR_TYPE_RW , intercept); } +vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr (vcpu); +/* * x2APIC and LBR MSR intercepts are modified on-demand and cannot be * filtered by userspace.
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 8/21 KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Save guest FRED RSP0 in vmx_prepare_switch_to_host() and restore it in vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest() because MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 is passed through to the guest, thus is volatile/unknown.
Note, host FRED RSP0 is restored in arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(), regardless of whether it is modified in KVM.
---
Changes in v5:
* Remove the cpu_feature_enabled() check when set/get guest MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, as guest_cpu_cap_has() should suffice (Sean).
* Add a comment when synchronizing current MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 MSR to the kernel's local cache, because its handling is different from the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE handling (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Changes in v3:
* KVM only needs to save/restore guest FRED RSP0 now as host FRED RSP0 is restored in arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() (Sean Christopherson).
Changes in v2:
* Don't use guest_cpuid_has() in vmx_prepare_switch_to_{host,guest}(), which are called from IRQ-disabled context (Chao Gao).
* Reset msr_guest_fred_rsp0 in __vmx_vcpu_reset() (Chao Gao).
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +13 -0
@@ -1292,6 +1292,9 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }wrmsrq (MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE , vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base); + +if (guest_cpu_cap_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_FRED )) +wrmsrns (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 , vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);#else savesegment (fs, fs_sel);savesegment (gs, gs_sel);
@@ -1336,6 +1339,16 @@ static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)invalidate_tss_limit ();#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 wrmsrq (MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE , vmx->vt.msr_host_kernel_gs_base); + +if (guest_cpu_cap_has (&vmx->vcpu,X86_FEATURE_FRED )) { + vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 =read_msr (MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ); +/* +* Synchronize the current value in hardware to the kernel's +* local cache. The desired host RSP0 will be set when the +* CPU exits to userspace (RSP0 is a per-task value). +*/ +fred_sync_rsp0 (vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0); + }#endif load_fixmap_gdt (raw_smp_processor_id ()); vmx->vt.guest_state_loaded = false;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +1 -0
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {bool guest_uret_msrs_loaded;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; +u64 msr_guest_fred_rsp0;#endif u64 spec_ctrl;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 9/21 KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Introduce support for handling FRED MSR access requests, enabling both host and guest to read and write FRED MSRs, which is essential for VM save/restore and live migration, and allows userspace tools such as QEMU to access the relevant MSRs.
Specially, intercept accesses to the FRED SSP0 MSR (IA32_PL0_SSP), which remains accessible when FRED is enumerated even if CET is not. This ensures the guest value is fully virtual and does not alter the hardware FRED SSP0 MSR.
---
Change in v7:
* Intercept accesses to FRED SSP0, i.e., IA32_PL0_SSP, which remains accessible when FRED but !CET (Sean).
Change in v6:
* Return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED instead of 1 when FRED is not available (Chao Gao)
* Handle MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP when FRED is enumerated but CET not.
Change in v5:
* Use the newly added guest MSR read/write helpers (Sean).
* Check the size of fred_msr_vmcs_fields[] using static_assert() (Sean).
* Rewrite setting FRED MSRs to make it much easier to read (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Changes since v2:
* Add a helper to convert FRED MSR index to VMCS field encoding to make the code more compact (Chao Gao).
* Get rid of the "host_initiated" check because userspace has to set CPUID before MSRs (Chao Gao & Sean Christopherson).
* Address a few cleanup comments (Sean Christopherson).
Changes since v1:
* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
* Fail host requested FRED MSRs access if KVM cannot virtualize FRED (Chao Gao).
* Handle the case FRED MSRs are valid but KVM cannot virtualize FRED (Chao Gao).
* Add sanity checks when writing to FRED MSRs.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +5 -0
@@ -1092,6 +1092,11 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV )hpa_t hv_root_tdp;#endif +/* +* Stores the FRED SSP0 MSR when CET is not supported, prompting KVM +* to intercept its accesses. +*/ +u64 fred_ssp0_fallback; };struct kvm_lpage_info {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +45 -0
69 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +82 -3
133 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 10/21 KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
--- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h +15 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,21 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,return !!kvm_read_cr4_bits (vcpu, cr4_bit); } +/* +* It's enough to check just CR4.FRED (X86_CR4_FRED) to tell if +* a vCPU is running with FRED enabled, because: +* 1) CR4.FRED can be set to 1 only _after_ IA32_EFER.LMA = 1. +* 2) To leave IA-32e mode, CR4.FRED must be cleared first. +*/ +static inline bool is_fred_enabled (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_FRED ); +#else +return false; +#endif +} +static inline ulong kvm_read_cr3 (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {if (!kvm_register_is_available (vcpu,VCPU_EXREG_CR3 ))
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 11/21 KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Set injected-event data when injecting a #PF, #DB, or #NM caused by extended feature disable using FRED event delivery, and save original-event data for being used as injected-event data.
Unlike IDT using some extra CPU register as part of an event context, e.g., %cr2 for #PF, FRED saves a complete event context in its stack frame, e.g., FRED saves the faulting linear address of a #PF into the event data field defined in its stack frame.
Thus a new VMX control field called injected-event data is added to provide the event data that will be pushed into a FRED stack frame for VM entries that inject an event using FRED event delivery. In addition, a new VM exit information field called original-event data is added to store the event data that would have saved into a FRED stack frame for VM exits that occur during FRED event delivery. After such a VM exit is handled to allow the original-event to be delivered, the data in the original-event data VMCS field needs to be set into the injected-event data VMCS field for the injection of the original event.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v3:
* Rework event data injection for nested (Chao Gao & Sean Christopherson).
Changes in v2:
* Document event data should be equal to CR2/DR6/IA32_XFD_ERR instead of using WARN_ON() (Chao Gao).
* Zero event data if a #NM was not caused by extended feature disable (Chao Gao).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -1
@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ struct kvm_queued_exception {u32 error_code;unsigned long payload;bool has_payload; +u64 event_data; };/*
@@ -2230,7 +2231,7 @@ void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);void kvm_queue_exception_e (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned nr,u32 error_code);void kvm_queue_exception_p (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned nr,unsigned long payload);void kvm_requeue_exception (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned int nr, -bool has_error_code,u32 error_code); +bool has_error_code,u32 error_code,u64 event_data);void kvm_inject_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct x86_exception *fault);void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct x86_exception *fault);
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +4 -0
@@ -269,8 +269,12 @@ enum vmcs_field {PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH =0x00002043 ,SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS =0x00002044 ,SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS_HIGH =0x00002045 , +INJECTED_EVENT_DATA =0x00002052 , +INJECTED_EVENT_DATA_HIGH =0x00002053 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS =0x00002400 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x00002401 , +ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA =0x00002404 , +ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA_HIGH =0x00002405 ,VMCS_LINK_POINTER =0x00002800 ,VMCS_LINK_POINTER_HIGH =0x00002801 , GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL = 0x00002802,
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -4099,7 +4099,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvm_requeue_exception (vcpu, vector, exitintinfo &SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR , - error_code); + error_code,0 );break ; }case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR :
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +18 -4
@@ -1860,6 +1860,9 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmcs_write32 (VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD , intr_info); +if (is_fred_enabled (vcpu)) +vmcs_write64 (INJECTED_EVENT_DATA , ex->event_data); +vmx_clear_hlt (vcpu); }
@@ -7280,7 +7283,8 @@ static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)static void __vmx_complete_interrupts (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 idt_vectoring_info,int instr_len_field, -int error_code_field) +int error_code_field, +int event_data_field) {u8 vector;int type;
@@ -7315,13 +7319,17 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fallthrough;case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION : {u32 error_code =0 ; +u64 event_data =0 ;if (idt_vectoring_info &VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK ) error_code =vmcs_read32 (error_code_field); +if (is_fred_enabled (vcpu)) + event_data =vmcs_read64 (event_data_field);kvm_requeue_exception (vcpu, vector, idt_vectoring_info &VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK , - error_code); + error_code, + event_data);break ; }case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR :
@@ -7339,7 +7347,8 @@ static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) {__vmx_complete_interrupts (&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN , -IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE ); +IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE , +ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA ); }void vmx_cancel_injection (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -7347,7 +7356,8 @@ void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)__vmx_complete_interrupts (vcpu,vmcs_read32 (VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD ),VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN , -VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE ); +VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE , +INJECTED_EVENT_DATA );vmcs_write32 (VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD ,0 ); }
@@ -7501,6 +7511,10 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,vmx_disable_fb_clear (vmx); +/* +* Note, even though FRED delivers the faulting linear address via the +* event data field on the stack, CR2 is still updated. +*/ if (vcpu->arch.cr2 !=native_read_cr2 ())native_write_cr2 (vcpu->arch.cr2);
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +15 -1
@@ -815,9 +815,22 @@ void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,* breakpoint), it is reserved and must be zero in DR6. */ vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~BIT (12 ); + +/* +* FRED #DB event data matches DR6, but follows the polarity of +* VMX's pending debug exceptions, not DR6. +*/ + ex->event_data = ex->payload & ~BIT (12 ); +break ; +case NM_VECTOR : + ex->event_data = ex->payload;break ;case PF_VECTOR : vcpu->arch.cr2 = ex->payload; + ex->event_data = ex->payload; +break ; +default : + ex->event_data =0 ;break ; }
@@ -925,7 +938,7 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, }void kvm_requeue_exception (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned int nr, -bool has_error_code,u32 error_code) +bool has_error_code,u32 error_code,u64 event_data) {/*
@@ -950,6 +963,7 @@ void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr, vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code; vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = false; vcpu->arch.exception.payload =0 ; + vcpu->arch.exception.event_data = event_data; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL (kvm_requeue_exception);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 12/21 KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Set the VMX nested exception bit in VM-entry interruption information field when injecting a nested exception using FRED event delivery to ensure:
1) A nested exception is injected on a correct stack level.
2) The nested bit defined in FRED stack frame is set.
The event stack level used by FRED event delivery depends on whether the event was a nested exception encountered during delivery of an earlier event, because a nested exception is "regarded" as happening on ring 0. E.g., when #PF is configured to use stack level 1 in IA32_FRED_STKLVLS MSR:
- nested #PF will be delivered on the stack pointed by IA32_FRED_RSP1 MSR when encountered in ring 3 and ring 0.
- normal #PF will be delivered on the stack pointed by IA32_FRED_RSP0 MSR when encountered in ring 3.
The VMX nested-exception support ensures a correct event stack level is chosen when a VM entry injects a nested exception.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Move the check is_fred_enable() from kvm_multiple_exception() to vmx_inject_exception() thus avoid bleeding FRED details into kvm_multiple_exception() (Chao Gao).
Change in v3:
* Rework kvm_requeue_exception() to simply the code changes (Sean Christopherson).
Change in v2:
* Set the nested flag when there is an original interrupt (Chao Gao).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +3 -1
@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ struct kvm_queued_exception {u32 error_code;unsigned long payload;bool has_payload; +bool nested;u64 event_data; };
@@ -2231,7 +2232,8 @@ void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);void kvm_queue_exception_e (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned nr,u32 error_code);void kvm_queue_exception_p (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned nr,unsigned long payload);void kvm_requeue_exception (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned int nr, -bool has_error_code,u32 error_code,u64 event_data); +bool has_error_code,u32 error_code,bool nested, +u64 event_data);void kvm_inject_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct x86_exception *fault);void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct x86_exception *fault);
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +4 -1
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@#define VMX_BASIC_INOUT BIT_ULL(54)#define VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS BIT_ULL(55)#define VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC BIT_ULL(56) +#define VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION BIT_ULL(58)static inline u32 vmx_basic_vmcs_revision_id (u64 vmx_basic) {
@@ -442,13 +443,15 @@ enum vmcs_field {#define INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK 0x700/* 10:8 */ #define INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK 0x800/* 11 */ #define INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI 0x1000/* 12 */ +#define INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK 0x2000/* 13 */ #define INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK 0x80000000/* 31 */ -#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK 0x7ffff000 +#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK 0x7fffd000#define VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK#define VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK#define VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK#define VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK +#define VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK#define INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR (EVENT_TYPE_EXTINT << 8)/* external interrupt */ #define INTR_TYPE_RESERVED (EVENT_TYPE_RESERVED << 8)/* reserved */
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -4099,7 +4099,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvm_requeue_exception (vcpu, vector, exitintinfo &SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR , - error_code,0 ); + error_code, false,0 );break ; }case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR :
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5 -1
@@ -1855,8 +1855,11 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmcs_write32 (VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN , vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len); intr_info |=INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION ; - }else + }else { intr_info |=INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION ; +if (ex->nested &&is_fred_enabled (vcpu)) + intr_info |=INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK ; + }vmcs_write32 (VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD , intr_info);
@@ -7329,6 +7332,7 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,kvm_requeue_exception (vcpu, vector, idt_vectoring_info &VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK , error_code, + idt_vectoring_info &VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK , event_data);break ; }
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +12 -1
@@ -879,6 +879,10 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr, vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true; vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false; + vcpu->arch.exception.nested = vcpu->arch.exception.nested || + vcpu->arch.nmi_injected || + vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected; + vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = has_error; vcpu->arch.exception.vector = nr; vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
@@ -908,8 +912,13 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr, vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false; vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false; +/* #DF is NOT a nested event, per its definition. */ + vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false; +kvm_queue_exception_e (vcpu,DF_VECTOR ,0 ); }else { + vcpu->arch.exception.nested = true; +/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost exception */
@@ -938,7 +947,8 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, }void kvm_requeue_exception (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned int nr, -bool has_error_code,u32 error_code,u64 event_data) +bool has_error_code,u32 error_code,bool nested, +u64 event_data) {/*
@@ -963,6 +973,7 @@ void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr, vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code; vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = false; vcpu->arch.exception.payload =0 ; + vcpu->arch.exception.nested = nested; vcpu->arch.exception.event_data = event_data; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL (kvm_requeue_exception);
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +1 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false; vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false; + vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false; vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 13/21 KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)Save/restore the nested flag of an exception during VM save/restore and live migration to ensure a correct event stack level is chosen when a nested exception is injected through FRED event delivery.
---
Change in v8:
* Update KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG, as the number in v7 is used by another new cap.
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Add live migration support for exception nested flag (Chao Gao).
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +20 -1
@@ -1184,6 +1184,10 @@ The following bits are defined in the flags field: fields contain a valid state. This bit will be set whenever KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD is enabled. +- KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NESTED_FLAG may be set to inform that the + exception is a nested exception. This bit will be set whenever + KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG is enabled. + - KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT may be set to signal that the triple_fault_pending field contains a valid state. This bit will be set whenever KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT is enabled.
@@ -1283,6 +1287,10 @@ can be set in the flags field to signal that the exception_has_payload, exception_payload, and exception.pending fields contain a valid state and shall be written into the VCPU. +If KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG is enabled, KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NESTED_FLAG +can be set in the flags field to inform that the exception is a nested +exception and exception_is_nested shall be written into the VCPU. + If KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT is enabled, KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT can be set in flags field to signal that the triple_fault field contains a valid state and shall be written into the VCPU.
@@ -8678,7 +8686,7 @@ given VM. When this capability is enabled, KVM resets the VCPU when setting MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED through IOCTL. The original MP_STATE is preserved. -7.43 KVM_CAP_ARM_CACHEABLE_PFNMAP_SUPPORTED +7.44 KVM_CAP_ARM_CACHEABLE_PFNMAP_SUPPORTED ------------------------------------------- :Architectures: arm64
@@ -8689,6 +8697,17 @@ This capability indicate to the userspace whether a PFNMAP memory region can be safely mapped as cacheable. This relies on the presence of force write back (FWB) feature support on the hardware. +7.45 KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG +---------------------------------- + +:Architectures: x86 +:Parameters: args[0] whether feature should be enabled or not + +With this capability enabled, an exception is save/restored with the +additional information of whether it was nested or not. FRED event +delivery uses this information to ensure a correct event stack level +is chosen when a VM entry injects a nested exception. + 8. Other capabilities. ======================
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1491,6 +1491,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {bool has_mapped_host_mmio;bool guest_can_read_msr_platform_info;bool exception_payload_enabled; +bool exception_nested_flag_enabled;bool triple_fault_event;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +3 -1
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ struct kvm_reinject_control {#define KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM 0x00000008#define KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD 0x00000010#define KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT 0x00000020 +#define KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NESTED_FLAG 0x00000040/* Interrupt shadow states */ #define KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS 0x01
@@ -368,7 +369,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_events {struct {__u8 pending; } triple_fault; -__u8 reserved[26 ]; +__u8 reserved[25 ]; +__u8 exception_is_nested;__u8 exception_has_payload;__u64 exception_payload; };
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +18 -1
@@ -4968,6 +4968,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)case KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES :case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO :case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD : +case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG :case KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT :case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG :case KVM_CAP_LAST_CPU :
@@ -5713,6 +5714,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, events->exception.error_code = ex->error_code; events->exception_has_payload = ex->has_payload; events->exception_payload = ex->payload; + events->exception_is_nested = ex->nested; events->interrupt.injected = vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected && !vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft;
@@ -5738,6 +5740,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM);if (vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled) events->flags |=KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD ; +if (vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_nested_flag_enabled) + events->flags |=KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NESTED_FLAG ;if (vcpu->kvm->arch.triple_fault_event) { events->triple_fault.pending =kvm_test_request (KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT , vcpu); events->flags |=KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT ;
@@ -5752,7 +5756,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD - | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT)) + | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT + | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NESTED_FLAG))return -EINVAL ;if (events->flags &KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD ) {
@@ -5767,6 +5772,13 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, events->exception_has_payload =0 ; } +if (events->flags &KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NESTED_FLAG ) { +if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_nested_flag_enabled) +return -EINVAL ; + }else { + events->exception_is_nested =0 ; + } +if ((events->exception.injected || events->exception.pending) && (events->exception.nr >31 || events->exception.nr ==NMI_VECTOR ))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -5792,6 +5804,7 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = events->exception.error_code; vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = events->exception_has_payload; vcpu->arch.exception.payload = events->exception_payload; + vcpu->arch.exception.nested = events->exception_is_nested; vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected = events->interrupt.injected; vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr = events->interrupt.nr;
@@ -6912,6 +6925,10 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled = cap->args[0 ]; r =0 ;break ; +case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG : + kvm->arch.exception_nested_flag_enabled = cap->args[0 ]; + r =0 ; +break ;case KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT : kvm->arch.triple_fault_event = cap->args[0 ]; r =0 ;
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -963,6 +963,7 @@ struct kvm_enable_cap {#define KVM_CAP_RISCV_MP_STATE_RESET 242#define KVM_CAP_ARM_CACHEABLE_PFNMAP_SUPPORTED 243#define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP 244 +#define KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_NESTED_FLAG 245struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip {__u32 irqchip;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 14/21 KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
The CR4.FRED bit, i.e., CR4[32], is no longer a reserved bit when guest cpu cap has FRED, i.e.,
1) All of FRED KVM support is in place.
2) Guest enumerates FRED.
Otherwise it is still a reserved bit.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Rebase on top of "guest_cpu_cap".
Change in v3:
* Don't allow CR4.FRED=1 before all of FRED KVM support is in place (Sean Christopherson).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \ | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \ | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP \ - | X86_CR4_LAM_SUP | X86_CR4_CET)) + | X86_CR4_LAM_SUP | X86_CR4_CET | X86_CR4_FRED))#define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +2 -0
@@ -687,6 +687,8 @@ static inline bool __kvm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && \ !__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_IBT )) \ __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_CET ; \ +if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_FRED )) \ + __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_FRED ; \ __reserved_bits; \ })
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 15/21 KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to dump FRED context.
---
Changes in v5:
* Read guest FRED RSP0 with vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0() (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v3:
* Use (vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED) instead of is_fred_enabled() (Chao Gao).
Changes in v2:
* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
* Dump guest FRED states only if guest has FRED enabled (Nikolay Borisov).
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +36 -7
@@ -1398,6 +1398,9 @@ static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)vmx_write_guest_host_msr (vmx,MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 , data, &vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0); } +#else +/* Make sure it builds on 32-bit */ +static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0 (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) {return 0 ; }#endif static void grow_ple_window (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -6441,7 +6444,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =to_vmx (vcpu);u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control; -u64 tertiary_exec_control; +u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;unsigned long cr4;int efer_slot;
@@ -6452,6 +6455,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmentry_ctl =vmcs_read32 (VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS ); vmexit_ctl =vmcs_read32 (VM_EXIT_CONTROLS ); + secondary_vmexit_ctl =cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls () ? +vmcs_read64 (SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS ) :0 ; cpu_based_exec_ctrl =vmcs_read32 (CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); pin_based_exec_ctrl =vmcs_read32 (PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); cr4 =vmcs_readl (GUEST_CR4 );
@@ -6498,6 +6503,16 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmx_dump_sel ("LDTR:" ,GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR );vmx_dump_dtsel ("IDTR:" ,GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT );vmx_dump_sel ("TR: " ,GUEST_TR_SELECTOR ); +if (vmentry_ctl &VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED ) +pr_err ("FRED guest: config=0x%016llx, stack_levels=0x%016llx\n" +"RSP0=0x%016llx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n" +"RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n" , +vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG ), +vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS ), +vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0 (vmx), +vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ), +vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ), +vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 )); efer_slot =vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot (&vmx->msr_autoload.guest,MSR_EFER );if (vmentry_ctl &VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER )pr_err ("EFER= 0x%016llx\n" ,vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_EFER ));
@@ -6549,6 +6564,16 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));pr_err ("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n" ,vmcs_readl (HOST_GDTR_BASE ),vmcs_readl (HOST_IDTR_BASE )); +if (vmexit_ctl &SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED ) +pr_err ("FRED host: config=0x%016llx, stack_levels=0x%016llx\n" +"RSP0=0x%016lx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n" +"RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n" , +vmcs_read64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG ), +vmcs_read64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS ), + (unsigned long )task_stack_page (current) +THREAD_SIZE , +vmcs_read64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ), +vmcs_read64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ), +vmcs_read64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ));pr_err ("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n" ,vmcs_readl (HOST_CR0 ),vmcs_readl (HOST_CR3 ),vmcs_readl (HOST_CR4 ));
@@ -6574,25 +6599,29 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)pr_err ("*** Control State ***\n" );pr_err ("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n" , cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control); -pr_err ("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n" , - pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl); +pr_err ("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=0x%08x\n" , + pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl); +pr_err ("ExitControls=0x%08x SecondaryExitControls=0x%016llx\n" , + vmexit_ctl, secondary_vmexit_ctl);pr_err ("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n" ,vmcs_read32 (EXCEPTION_BITMAP ),vmcs_read32 (PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK ),vmcs_read32 (PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH )); -pr_err ("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n" , +pr_err ("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x event_data=%016llx\n" ,vmcs_read32 (VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD ),vmcs_read32 (VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE ), -vmcs_read32 (VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN )); +vmcs_read32 (VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN ), +kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED ) ?vmcs_read64 (INJECTED_EVENT_DATA ) :0 );pr_err ("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n" ,vmcs_read32 (VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO ),vmcs_read32 (VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE ),vmcs_read32 (VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN ));pr_err (" reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n" ,vmcs_read32 (VM_EXIT_REASON ),vmcs_readl (EXIT_QUALIFICATION )); -pr_err ("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n" , +pr_err ("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x event_data=%016llx\n" ,vmcs_read32 (IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD ), -vmcs_read32 (IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE )); +vmcs_read32 (IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE ), +kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_FRED ) ?vmcs_read64 (ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA ) :0 );pr_err ("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n" ,vmcs_read64 (TSC_OFFSET ));if (secondary_exec_control &SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING ) pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 16/21 KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Advertise support for FRED to userspace after changes required to enable FRED in a KVM guest are in place.
---
Change in v5:
* Don't advertise FRED/LKGS together, LKGS can be advertised as an independent feature (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
@@ -1014,6 +1014,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)F (FSRS ),F (FSRC ),F (WRMSRNS ), +X86_64_F (FRED ),X86_64_F (LKGS ),F (AMX_FP16 ), F(AVX_IFMA),
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 17/21 KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Enable the secondary VM exit controls to prepare for nested FRED.
---
Changes in v8:
* Relocate secondary_vm_exit_controls to the last u64 padding field.
* Remove the change to Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst.
Changes in v5:
* Allow writing MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2 (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v3:
* Read secondary VM exit controls from vmcs_conf insteasd of the hardware MSR MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2 to avoid advertising features to L1 that KVM itself doesn't support, e.g. because the expected entry+exit pairs aren't supported. (Sean Christopherson)
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct nested_vmx_msrs {u32 pinbased_ctls_high;u32 exit_ctls_low;u32 exit_ctls_high; +u64 secondary_exit_ctls;u32 entry_ctls_low;u32 entry_ctls_high;u32 misc_low;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +25 -1
@@ -1531,6 +1531,11 @@ int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data)return -EINVAL ; vmx->nested.msrs.vmfunc_controls = data;return 0 ; +case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2 : +if (data & ~vmcs_config.nested.secondary_exit_ctls) +return -EINVAL ; + vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_exit_ctls = data; +return 0 ;default :/* * The rest of the VMX capability MSRs do not support restore.
@@ -1570,6 +1575,9 @@ int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)if (msr_index ==MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS ) *pdata |=VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2 : + *pdata = msrs->secondary_exit_ctls; +break ;case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS :case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS : *pdata = vmx_control_msr(
@@ -2520,6 +2528,11 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs0 exec_control &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER ;vm_exit_controls_set (vmx, exec_control); +if (exec_control &VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ) { + exec_control =__secondary_vm_exit_controls_get (vmcs01); +secondary_vm_exit_controls_set (vmx, exec_control); + } +/* * Interrupt/Exception Fields */
@@ -7179,7 +7192,8 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_exit_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE | #endifVM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT |VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | -VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE ; +VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE | +VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; msrs->exit_ctls_high |=VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
@@ -7192,6 +7206,16 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_exit_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,/* We support free control of debug control saving. */ msrs->exit_ctls_low &= ~VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS ; + +if (msrs->exit_ctls_high &VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ) { + msrs->secondary_exit_ctls = vmcs_conf->vmexit_2nd_ctrl; +/* +* As the secondary VM exit control is always loaded, do not +* advertise any feature in it to nVMX until its nVMX support +* is ready. +*/ + msrs->secondary_exit_ctls &=0 ; + } } static void nested_vmx_setup_entry_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c +1 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ const unsigned short vmcs12_field_offsets[] = {FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_PAT , host_ia32_pat),FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_EFER , host_ia32_efer),FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL , host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl), +FIELD64 (SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS , secondary_vm_exit_controls),FIELD (PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL , pin_based_vm_exec_control),FIELD (CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL , cpu_based_vm_exec_control), FIELD(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap),
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h +2 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {u64 pml_address;u64 encls_exiting_bitmap;u64 tsc_multiplier; -u64 padding64[1 ];/* room for future expansion */ +u64 secondary_vm_exit_controls;/* * To allow migration of L1 (complete with its L2 guests) between * machines of different natural widths (32 or 64 bit), we cannot have
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)CHECK_OFFSET (pml_address,312 );CHECK_OFFSET (encls_exiting_bitmap,320 );CHECK_OFFSET (tsc_multiplier,328 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (secondary_vm_exit_controls,336 );CHECK_OFFSET (cr0_guest_host_mask,344 );CHECK_OFFSET (cr4_guest_host_mask,352 );CHECK_OFFSET (cr0_read_shadow,360 );
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +1 -1
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ do { \* associated feature that KVM supports for nested virtualization. */ #define KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC -#define KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC +#define KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2#define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP 128#define KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW 4096
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 18/21 KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Extend nested VMX context management to include FRED-related VMCS fields. This enables proper handling of FRED state during nested virtualization.
Because KVM always sets SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED, FRED MSRs are always saved to vmcs02. However an L1 VMM may choose to clear this bit, i.e., not to save FRED MSRs to vmcs12. This is not a problem when the L1 VMM sets SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED, as KVM then immediately loads host FRED MSRs of vmcs12 to guest FRED MSRs of vmcs01. However if the L1 VMM clears SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED, KVM should retain FRED MSRs to run the L1 VMM.
To propagate guest FRED MSRs from vmcs02 to vmcs01, save them in sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12() regardless of whether SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED is set in vmcs12. Then, use the saved values to set guest FRED MSRs in vmcs01 within load_vmcs12_host_state() when !nested_cpu_load_host_fred_state().
---
Changes in v8:
* Make the newly added FRED fields 64-bit aligned in vmcs12 (Isaku).
* Remove the change to Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst.
Change in v6:
* Handle FRED MSR pre-vmenter save/restore (Chao Gao).
* Save FRED MSRs of vmcs02 at VM-Exit even an L1 VMM clears SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED.
* Save FRED MSRs in sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12() instead of its rare version.
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Changes in v4:
* Advertise VMX nested exception as if the CPU supports it (Chao Gao).
* Split FRED state management controls (Chao Gao).
Changes in v3:
* Add and use nested_cpu_has_fred(vmcs12) because vmcs02 should be set from vmcs12 if and only if the field is enabled in L1's VMX config (Sean Christopherson).
* Fix coding style issues (Sean Christopherson).
Changes in v2:
* Remove hyperv TLFS related changes (Jeremi Piotrowski).
* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 22 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 18 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 37 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h | 4 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 41 ++++++++++ 7 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +5 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_no_hw_errcode_cc(void)return vmcs_config.basic &VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC ; } +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_nested_exception (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.basic &VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION ; +} +static inline bool cpu_has_virtual_nmis (void ) { return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS &&
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +111 -2
192 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h +22 -0
@@ -249,6 +249,11 @@ static inline bool nested_cpu_has_save_preemption_timer(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER ; } +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_secondary_vm_exit_controls (struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ +return vmcs12->vm_exit_controls &VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; +} +static inline bool nested_exit_on_nmi (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {return nested_cpu_has_nmi_exiting (get_vmcs12 (vcpu));
@@ -269,6 +274,23 @@ static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)return nested_cpu_has2 (vmcs12,SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING ); } +static inline bool nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state (struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ +return vmcs12->vm_entry_controls &VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED ; +} + +static inline bool nested_cpu_save_guest_fred_state (struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ +return nested_cpu_has_secondary_vm_exit_controls (vmcs12) && + vmcs12->secondary_vm_exit_controls &SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED ; +} + +static inline bool nested_cpu_load_host_fred_state (struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ +return nested_cpu_has_secondary_vm_exit_controls (vmcs12) && + vmcs12->secondary_vm_exit_controls &SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED ; +} +/* * if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1 * if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c +18 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,24 @@ const unsigned short vmcs12_field_offsets[] = {FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_EFER , host_ia32_efer),FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL , host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl),FIELD64 (SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS , secondary_vm_exit_controls), +FIELD64 (INJECTED_EVENT_DATA , injected_event_data), +FIELD64 (ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA , original_event_data), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG , guest_ia32_fred_config), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 , guest_ia32_fred_rsp1), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 , guest_ia32_fred_rsp2), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 , guest_ia32_fred_rsp3), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS , guest_ia32_fred_stklvls), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 , guest_ia32_fred_ssp1), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 , guest_ia32_fred_ssp2), +FIELD64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 , guest_ia32_fred_ssp3), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG , host_ia32_fred_config), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 , host_ia32_fred_rsp1), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 , host_ia32_fred_rsp2), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 , host_ia32_fred_rsp3), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS , host_ia32_fred_stklvls), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 , host_ia32_fred_ssp1), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 , host_ia32_fred_ssp2), +FIELD64 (HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 , host_ia32_fred_ssp3),FIELD (PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL , pin_based_vm_exec_control),FIELD (CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL , cpu_based_vm_exec_control), FIELD(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap),
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h +37 -0
@@ -191,6 +191,25 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {u16 host_gs_selector;u16 host_tr_selector;u16 guest_pml_index; +u16 padding16[1 ];/* align to 64-bit boundary */ +u64 guest_ia32_fred_config; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_rsp1; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_rsp2; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_rsp3; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_stklvls; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_ssp1; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_ssp2; +u64 guest_ia32_fred_ssp3; +u64 host_ia32_fred_config; +u64 host_ia32_fred_rsp1; +u64 host_ia32_fred_rsp2; +u64 host_ia32_fred_rsp3; +u64 host_ia32_fred_stklvls; +u64 host_ia32_fred_ssp1; +u64 host_ia32_fred_ssp2; +u64 host_ia32_fred_ssp3; +u64 injected_event_data; +u64 original_event_data; };/*
@@ -373,6 +392,24 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)CHECK_OFFSET (host_gs_selector,992 );CHECK_OFFSET (host_tr_selector,994 );CHECK_OFFSET (guest_pml_index,996 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_config,1000 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_rsp1,1008 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_rsp2,1016 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_rsp3,1024 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_stklvls,1032 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_ssp1,1040 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_ssp2,1048 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (guest_ia32_fred_ssp3,1056 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_config,1064 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_rsp1,1072 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_rsp2,1080 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_rsp3,1088 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_stklvls,1096 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_ssp1,1104 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_ssp2,1112 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (host_ia32_fred_ssp3,1120 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (injected_event_data,1128 ); +CHECK_OFFSET (original_event_data,1136 ); }extern const unsigned short vmcs12_field_offsets[];
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h +4 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_BASE, host_gs_base)/* 64-bit */ SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address) SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH, guest_physical_address) +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA, original_event_data) +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA_HIGH, original_event_data) +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA, injected_event_data) +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA_HIGH, injected_event_data)#undef SHADOW_FIELD_RO#undef SHADOW_FIELD_RW
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +41 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Re: [PATCH v8 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling
Quoted 15 lines
/*
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +10
-0@@ -2765,6 +2783,18 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_PAT , vmx->vcpu.arch.pat); } +if (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending || + !nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state (vmcs12)) { +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_config); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp1); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp2); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp3); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_stklvls); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp1); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp2); +vmcs_write64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 , vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp3);
...
Quoted 9 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ } +vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset( vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset, vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(vcpu),arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +0
-0@@ -3679,6 +3709,18 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, &vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_ssp, &vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_ssp_tbl);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, · line 3721
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +10
-0+if (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending || + !nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state (vmcs12)) { + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_config =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp1 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp2 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp3 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_stklvls =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp1 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp2 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp3 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 );
FRED state save/restore is needed only when the guest has FRED support. So, the above save/restore should be guarded by guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED). Otherwise, on hardware without FRED, vmread_error() would be triggered here as reported by syzbot.
Xin Li
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling
Quoted 6 lines · Chao Gao
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +6
-0+if (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending || + !nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state (vmcs12)) { + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_config =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp1 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp2 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_rsp3 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3 );
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, · line 3721
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +4
-0+ vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_stklvls =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp1 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp2 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2 ); + vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_ssp3 =vmcs_read64 (GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3 );FRED state save/restore is needed only when the guest has FRED support. So, the above save/restore should be guarded by
guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED). Otherwise, on hardware without FRED,vmread_error()would be triggered here as reported by syzbot.
You're right, I wanted to avoid unnecessary checking, but this caught me.
Will fix it with a v8A patch.
Xin Li
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling
Quoted 4 lines
You're right, I wanted to avoid unnecessary checking, but this caught me.
Will fix it with a v8A patch.
There is a conflict in patch 13 when I rebase onto kvm-x86/next, so It looks better to send a new v9 on kvm-x86/next.
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 19/21 KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
As with real hardware, nested VMX validates various VMCS fields, including control and guest/host state fields. This patch adds checks for FRED-related VMCS fields to support nested FRED functionality.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +104 -13
@@ -3031,6 +3031,8 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + bool fred_enabled = (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) && + (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED); if (CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls, vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_low,
@@ -3048,22 +3050,11 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u8 vector = intr_info &INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK ;u32 intr_type = intr_info &INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK ;bool has_error_code = intr_info &INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK ; +bool has_nested_exception = vmx->nested.msrs.basic &VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION ;bool urg =nested_cpu_has2 (vmcs12,SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST );bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 &X86_CR0_PE ; -/* VM-entry interruption-info field: interruption type */ -if (CC (intr_type ==INTR_TYPE_RESERVED ) || -CC (intr_type ==INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT && - !nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag (vcpu))) -return -EINVAL ; - -/* VM-entry interruption-info field: vector */ -if (CC (intr_type ==INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR && vector !=NMI_VECTOR ) || -CC (intr_type ==INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && vector >31 ) || -CC (intr_type ==INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT && vector !=0 )) -return -EINVAL ; -/* * Cannot deliver error code in real mode or if the interrupt * type is not hardware exception. For other cases, do the
@@ -3087,8 +3078,28 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,if (CC (intr_info &INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK ))return -EINVAL ; -/* VM-entry instruction length */ +/* +* When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13 +* (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field +* may have value 1. Otherwise bit 13 is reserved. +*/ +if (CC (!(has_nested_exception && intr_type ==INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION ) && + intr_info &INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK )) +return -EINVAL ; +switch (intr_type) { +case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR : +break ; +case INTR_TYPE_RESERVED : +return -EINVAL ; +case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR : +if (CC (vector !=NMI_VECTOR )) +return -EINVAL ; +break ; +case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION : +if (CC (vector >31 )) +return -EINVAL ; +break ;case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION :case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR :case INTR_TYPE_PRIV_SW_EXCEPTION :
@@ -3096,6 +3107,24 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,CC (vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len ==0 && CC(!nested_cpu_has_zero_length_injection(vcpu)))) return -EINVAL; +break ; +case INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT : +switch (vector) { +case 0 : +if (CC (!nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag (vcpu))) +return -EINVAL ; +break ; +case 1 : +case 2 : +if (CC (!fred_enabled)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (CC (vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len >X86_MAX_INSTRUCTION_LENGTH )) +return -EINVAL ; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } +break ; } }
@@ -3182,9 +3211,29 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,if (ia32e) {if (CC (!(vmcs12->host_cr4 &X86_CR4_PAE )))return -EINVAL ; +if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls &VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS && + vmcs12->secondary_vm_exit_controls &SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED ) { +if (CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_config & + (BIT_ULL (11 ) |GENMASK_ULL (5 ,4 ) |BIT_ULL (2 ))) || +CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp1 &GENMASK_ULL (5 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp2 &GENMASK_ULL (5 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp3 &GENMASK_ULL (5 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp1 &GENMASK_ULL (2 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp2 &GENMASK_ULL (2 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp3 &GENMASK_ULL (2 ,0 )) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_config &PAGE_MASK , vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp1, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp2, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp3, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp1, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp2, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp3, vcpu))) +return -EINVAL ; + } }else {if (CC (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls &VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE ) ||CC (vmcs12->host_cr4 &X86_CR4_PCIDE ) || +CC (vmcs12->host_cr4 &X86_CR4_FRED ) ||CC ((vmcs12->host_rip) >>32 ))return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -3353,6 +3402,48 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, CC((vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))))return -EINVAL ; +if (ia32e) { +if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls &VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED ) { +if (CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_config & + (BIT_ULL (11 ) |GENMASK_ULL (5 ,4 ) |BIT_ULL (2 ))) || +CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp1 &GENMASK_ULL (5 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp2 &GENMASK_ULL (5 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp3 &GENMASK_ULL (5 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp1 &GENMASK_ULL (2 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp2 &GENMASK_ULL (2 ,0 )) || +CC (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp3 &GENMASK_ULL (2 ,0 )) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_config &PAGE_MASK , vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp1, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp2, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp3, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp1, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp2, vcpu)) || +CC (is_noncanonical_msr_address (vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp3, vcpu))) +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (vmcs12->guest_cr4 &X86_CR4_FRED ) { +unsigned int ss_dpl =VMX_AR_DPL (vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes); +switch (ss_dpl) { +case 0 : +if (CC (!(vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes &VMX_AR_L_MASK ))) +return -EINVAL ; +break ; +case 1 : +case 2 : +return -EINVAL ; +case 3 : +if (CC (vmcs12->guest_rflags &X86_EFLAGS_IOPL )) +return -EINVAL ; +if (CC (vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info &GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI )) +return -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + } + }else { +if (CC (vmcs12->guest_cr4 &X86_CR4_FRED )) +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls &VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE ) { if (nested_vmx_check_cet_state_common(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_s_cet, vmcs12->guest_ssp,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 20/21 KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Add VMX feature checks before accessing VMCS fields via SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros, as some fields may not be supported on all CPUs.
Functions like copy_shadow_to_vmcs12() and copy_vmcs12_to_shadow() access VMCS fields that may not exist on certain hardware, such as INJECTED_EVENT_DATA. To avoid VMREAD/VMWRITE warnings, skip syncing fields tied to unsupported VMX features.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change since v2:
* Add __SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] for better readability or maintability (Sean).
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h | 41 +++++++++----- 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +55 -24
@@ -55,14 +55,14 @@ struct shadow_vmcs_field {u16 offset; };static struct shadow_vmcs_field shadow_read_only_fields[] = { -#define SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y) { x, offsetof(struct vmcs12, y) }, +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y, c) { x, offsetof(struct vmcs12, y) }, #include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" };static int max_shadow_read_only_fields =ARRAY_SIZE (shadow_read_only_fields);static struct shadow_vmcs_field shadow_read_write_fields[] = { -#define SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y) { x, offsetof(struct vmcs12, y) }, +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y, c) { x, offsetof(struct vmcs12, y) }, #include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" }; static int max_shadow_read_write_fields =
@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ static void init_vmcs_shadow_fields(void)pr_err ("Missing field from shadow_read_only_field %x\n" , field +1 ); +switch (field) { +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RO (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + if (!(c)) \ + continue; \ + break; +#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" +default : +break ; + } +clear_bit (field, vmx_vmread_bitmap);if (field &1 ) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -110,24 +121,13 @@ static void init_vmcs_shadow_fields(void) field <=GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES , "Update vmcs12_write_any() to drop reserved bits from AR_BYTES"); -/* -* PML and the preemption timer can be emulated, but the -* processor cannot vmwrite to fields that don't exist -* on bare metal. -*/ switch (field) { -case GUEST_PML_INDEX : -if (!cpu_has_vmx_pml ()) -continue ; -break ; -case VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE : -if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer ()) -continue ; -break ; -case GUEST_INTR_STATUS : -if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv ()) -continue ; +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RW (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + if (!(c)) \ + continue; \ break; +#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" default :break ; }
@@ -1633,8 +1633,8 @@ int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)/* * Copy the writable VMCS shadow fields back to the VMCS12, in case they have * been modified by the L1 guest. Note, "writable" in this context means -* "writable by the guest", i.e. tagged SHADOW_FIELD_RW; the set of -* fields tagged SHADOW_FIELD_RO may or may not align with the "read-only" +* "writable by the guest", i.e. tagged __SHADOW_FIELD_RW; the set of +* fields tagged __SHADOW_FIELD_RO may or may not align with the "read-only" * VM-exit information fields (which are actually writable if the vCPU is * configured to support "VMWRITE to any supported field in the VMCS"). */
@@ -1655,6 +1655,18 @@ static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)for (i =0 ; i < max_shadow_read_write_fields; i++) { field = shadow_read_write_fields[i]; + +switch (field.encoding) { +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RW (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + if (!(c)) \ + continue; \ + break; +#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" +default : +break ; + } + val =__vmcs_readl (field.encoding);vmcs12_write_any (vmcs12, field.encoding, field.offset, val); }
@@ -1689,6 +1701,23 @@ static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)for (q =0 ; q <ARRAY_SIZE (fields); q++) {for (i =0 ; i < max_fields[q]; i++) { field = fields[q][i]; + +switch (field.encoding) { +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RO (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + if (!(c)) \ + continue; \ + break; +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RW (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + if (!(c)) \ + continue; \ + break; +#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" +default : +break ; + } + val =vmcs12_read_any (vmcs12, field.encoding, field.offset);__vmcs_writel (field.encoding, val);
@@ -5997,9 +6026,10 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static bool is_shadow_field_rw (unsigned long field) {switch (field) { -#define SHADOW_FIELD_RW (x, y) case x: +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RW (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + return c;#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" -return true;default :break ; }
@@ -6009,9 +6039,10 @@ static bool is_shadow_field_rw(unsigned long field)static bool is_shadow_field_ro (unsigned long field) {switch (field) { -#define SHADOW_FIELD_RO (x, y) case x: +#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RO (x, y, c) \ + case x: \ + return c;#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h" -return true;default :break ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h +28 -13
76 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Xin Li (Intel)
maintainerPATCH v8 21/21 KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls
In reply to Xin Li (Intel)From: Xin Li <[email protected]>
Allow nVMX FRED controls as nested FRED support is in place.
---
Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 5 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +3 -2
@@ -7443,7 +7443,8 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_exit_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,* advertise any feature in it to nVMX until its nVMX support * is ready. */ - msrs->secondary_exit_ctls &=0 ; + msrs->secondary_exit_ctls &=SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED | +SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED ; } }
@@ -7459,7 +7460,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_entry_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE | #endifVM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT |VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS | -VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE ; +VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE |VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED ; msrs->entry_ctls_high |= (VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL );
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -0
@@ -7975,6 +7975,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) entry =kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index (vcpu,0x7 ,1 );cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LAM_SUP , eax,feature_bit (LAM )); +cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_FRED , eax,feature_bit (FRED ));#undef cr4_fixed1_update }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
syzbot ci has tested the following series
syzbot ci has tested the following series
[v8] Enable FRED with KVM VMX
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
* [PATCH v8 01/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
* [PATCH v8 02/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
* [PATCH v8 03/21] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
* [PATCH v8 04/21] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_
* [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
* [PATCH v8 06/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields
* [PATCH v8 07/21] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
* [PATCH v8 08/21] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0
* [PATCH v8 09/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs
* [PATCH v8 10/21] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU
* [PATCH v8 11/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
* [PATCH v8 12/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
* [PATCH v8 13/21] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception
* [PATCH v8 14/21] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved
* [PATCH v8 15/21] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
* [PATCH v8 16/21] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED
* [PATCH v8 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
* [PATCH v8 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling
* [PATCH v8 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks
* [PATCH v8 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros
* [PATCH v8 21/21] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls
and found the following issue:
WARNING in vmread_error
Full report is available here:
https://ci.syzbot.org/series/706e7cbc-a7af-4357-af68-194e1c883968
***
WARNING in vmread_error
tree: torvalds URL: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux base: 0d97f2067c166eb495771fede9f7b73999c67f66 arch: amd64 compiler: Debian clang version 20.1.8 (++20250708063551+0c9f909b7976-1~exp1~20250708183702.136), Debian LLD 20.1.8 config: https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/0033ed68-ef22-4ef4-a630-0d101fb2cb8e/config C repro: https://ci.syzbot.org/findings/a19ef524-0065-4a83-abb5-c42a195ec916/c_repro syz repro: https://ci.syzbot.org/findings/a19ef524-0065-4a83-abb5-c42a195ec916/syz_repro
------------[ cut here ]------------ vmread failed: field=281a WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5954 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:425 vmread_error+0x7e/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:425 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5954 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vmread_error+0x7e/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:425 Code: dc 63 8b 48 89 de 5b 5d e9 cf de cf ff e8 0a 62 68 00 c6 05 4c 67 30 0e 01 90 48 c7 c7 80 db 63 8b 48 89 de e8 03 7f 2b 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 eb 98 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffc90004d66f28 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: c305e84bb7041f00 RBX: 000000000000281a RCX: ffff888109e48000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: ffffc90004d674a8 R08: ffff888121024293 R09: 1ffff11024204852 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1024204853 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8881152e0000 R14: ffff88811292a30f R15: ffff88811292a000 FS: 0000555576a3b500(0000) GS:ffff88818e70e000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001bda0c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __vmcs_readl arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:111 [inline] vmcs_read64 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:177 [inline] nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode+0xa0ef/0xbb20 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:3834 nested_vmx_run+0x5f7/0xc40 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4053 __vmx_handle_exit arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6821 [inline] vmx_handle_exit+0x10a4/0x18c0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6838 vcpu_enter_guest arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11575 [inline] vcpu_run+0x446f/0x6fb0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11733 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xfc9/0x1940 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12072 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x95c/0xe90 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4476 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f22ca18eec9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff1aacefa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f22ca3e5fa0 RCX: 00007f22ca18eec9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f22ca211f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f22ca3e5fa0 R14: 00007f22ca3e5fa0 R15: 0000000000000003 </TASK>
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