bpf: annotate file argument as __nullable in bpf_lsm_mmap_file
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: annotate file argument as __nullable in bpf_lsm_mmap_file
As reported in [0], anonymous memory mappings are not backed by a struct file instance. Consequently, the struct file pointer passed to the security_mmap_file() LSM hook is NULL in such cases.
The BPF verifier is currently unaware of this, allowing BPF LSM programs to dereference this struct file pointer without needing to perform an explicit NULL check. This leads to potential NULL pointer dereference and a kernel crash.
Add a strong override for bpf_lsm_mmap_file() which annotates the struct file pointer parameter with the __nullable suffix. This explicitly informs the BPF verifier that this pointer (PTR_MAYBE_NULL) can be NULL, forcing BPF LSM programs to perform a check on it before dereferencing it.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
---
v2:
- Updated the comment against the new strong definition for bpf_lsm_mmap_file(), clarifying the need for using the __nullable suffix annotation against the struct file pointer parameter name.
MAINTAINERS | 1 + kernel/bpf/Makefile | 12 +++++++++++- kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 5 +++-- kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm_proto.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm_proto.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -4754,6 +4754,7 @@ S: Maintained F: Documentation/bpf/prog_lsm.rst F: include/linux/bpf_lsm.h F: kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +F: kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm_proto.c F: kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c F: security/bpf/
kernel/bpf/Makefile +11 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,17 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_BPF_JIT),y) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_struct_ops.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += cpumask.o -obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm.o +# bpf_lsm_proto.o must precede bpf_lsm.o. The current pahole logic +# deduplicates function prototypes within +# btf_encoder__add_saved_func() by keeping the first instance seen. We +# need the function prototype(s) in bpf_lsm_proto.o to take precedence +# over those within bpf_lsm.o. Having bpf_lsm_proto.o precede +# bpf_lsm.o ensures its DWARF CU is processed early, forcing the +# generated BTF to contain the overrides. +# +# Notably, this is a temporary workaround whilst the deduplication +# semantics within pahole are revisited accordingly. +obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm_proto.o bpf_lsm.o endif ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO),) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += crypto.o
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@#include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop -* function where a BPF program can be attached. +* function where a BPF program can be attached. Notably, we qualify each with +* weak linkage such that strong overrides can be implemented if need be. */ #define LSM_HOOK (RET ,DEFAULT ,NAME , ...) \ -noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \ +__weak noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \ { \ return DEFAULT; \ }
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm_proto.c new file +19 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* +* Copyright 2025 Google LLC. +*/ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> + +/* +* Strong definition of the mmap_file() BPF LSM hook. The __nullable suffix on +* the struct file pointer parameter name marks it as PTR_MAYBE_NULL. This +* explicitly enforces that BPF LSM programs check for NULL before attempting to +* dereference it. +*/ +int bpf_lsm_mmap_file (struct file *file__nullable,unsigned long reqprot, +unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags) +{ +return 0 ; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0.313.g674ac2bdf7-goog
PATCH v2 2/2 selftests/bpf: add test case for BPF LSM hook bpf_lsm_mmap_file
Add a trivial test case asserting that the BPF verifier enforces PTR_MAYBE_NULL semantics on the struct file pointer argument of BPF LSM hook bpf_lsm_mmap_file().
Dereferencing the struct file pointer passed into bpf_lsm_mmap_file() without explicitly performing a NULL check first should not be permitted by the BPF verifier as it can lead to NULL pointer dereferences and a kernel crash.
--- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_lsm.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_lsm.c +30 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <vmlinux.h> #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h> #include "bpf_misc.h" SEC ("lsm/file_permission" )
@@ -159,4 +160,32 @@ __naked int disabled_hook_test3(void *ctx) ::: __clobber_all); } +SEC("lsm/mmap_file") +__description("not null checking nullable pointer in bpf_lsm_mmap_file") +__failure __msg("R1 invalid mem access 'trusted_ptr_or_null_'") +int BPF_PROG(no_null_check, struct file *file) +{ +struct inode *inode; + + inode = file->f_inode; +__sink (inode); + +return 0 ; +} + +SEC("lsm/mmap_file") +__description("null checking nullable pointer in bpf_lsm_mmap_file") +__success +int BPF_PROG (null_check ,struct file *file) +{ +struct inode *inode; + +if (file) { + inode = file->f_inode; +__sink (inode); + } + +return 0 ; +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0.313.g674ac2bdf7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: add test case for BPF LSM hook bpf_lsm_mmap_file
Quoted 11 lines · Matt Bobrowski
Add a trivial test case asserting that the BPF verifier enforces
PTR_MAYBE_NULLsemantics on the struct file pointer argument of BPF LSM hookbpf_lsm_mmap_file().Dereferencing the struct file pointer passed into
bpf_lsm_mmap_file()without explicitly performing a NULL check first should not be permitted by the BPF verifier as it can lead to NULL pointer dereferences and a kernel crash.Signed-off-by Matt Bobrowski <[email protected]>
On Tue, Dec 16, 2025 at 5:30 AM Matt Bobrowski <[email protected]> wrote:
[...]
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/bpf/Makefile +0
-1@@ -42,7 +42,17 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_BPF_JIT),y) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_struct_ops.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += cpumask.o -obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm.o
kernel/bpf/Makefile endif · line 54
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/Makefile +10
-0+# bpf_lsm_proto.o must precede bpf_lsm.o. The current pahole logic +# deduplicates function prototypes within +# btf_encoder__add_saved_func() by keeping the first instance seen. We +# need the function prototype(s) in bpf_lsm_proto.o to take precedence +# over those within bpf_lsm.o. Having bpf_lsm_proto.o precede +# bpf_lsm.o ensures its DWARF CU is processed early, forcing the +# generated BTF to contain the overrides. +# +# Notably, this is a temporary workaround whilst the deduplication +# semantics within pahole are revisited accordingly.
This is quite tricky, but I can confirm we need bpf_lsm_proto.o first.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/Makefile +1
-0+obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm_proto.o bpf_lsm.o endif ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO),) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += crypto.o
[...]
Quoted 15 lines · Song Liu
On Tue, Dec 16, 2025 at 5:30 AM Matt Bobrowski <[email protected]> wrote:
[...]Quoted 13 lines
kernel/bpf/Makefile +4
-1@@ -42,7 +42,17 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_BPF_JIT),y) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_struct_ops.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += cpumask.o -obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm.o +# bpf_lsm_proto.o must precede bpf_lsm.o. The current pahole logic +# deduplicates function prototypes within +# btf_encoder__add_saved_func() by keeping the first instance seen. We +# need the function prototype(s) in bpf_lsm_proto.o to take precedence
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/Makefile endif · line 54
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/Makefile +6
-0+# over those within bpf_lsm.o. Having bpf_lsm_proto.o precede +# bpf_lsm.o ensures its DWARF CU is processed early, forcing the +# generated BTF to contain the overrides. +# +# Notably, this is a temporary workaround whilst the deduplication +# semantics within pahole are revisited accordingly.This is quite tricky, but I can confirm we need bpf_lsm_proto.o first.
Yes, agree, but it's an outright "hack" at this point. Note that I'm also going to send a fix addressing a shortcoming within pahole, as per this thread [0]. I'm just waiting to see what the BTF experts have to say about it.
Quoted 23 lines · Matt Bobrowski
As reported in [0], anonymous memory mappings are not backed by a struct file instance. Consequently, the struct file pointer passed to the
security_mmap_file()LSM hook is NULL in such cases.The BPF verifier is currently unaware of this, allowing BPF LSM programs to dereference this struct file pointer without needing to perform an explicit NULL check. This leads to potential NULL pointer dereference and a kernel crash.
Add a strong override for
bpf_lsm_mmap_file()which annotates the struct file pointer parameter with the__nullablesuffix. This explicitly informs the BPF verifier that this pointer (PTR_MAYBE_NULL) can be NULL, forcing BPF LSM programs to perform a check on it before dereferencing it.[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
Reported-by Kaiyan Mei <[email protected]>Reported-by Yinhao Hu <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Matt Bobrowski <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
---
v2:
- Updated the comment against the new strong definition forbpf_lsm_mmap_file(), clarifying the need for using the__nullablesuffix annotation against the struct file pointer parameter name.
It was applied.
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