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USB: gadget: max3420: validate endpoint index for max3420 udc

PATCH In review Kery Qi 2 participants 2 messages Jan 5 – Jan 16 USB

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Kery Qi

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 USB: gadget: max3420: validate endpoint index for max3420 udc

Assure that the host may not manipulate the index to point past the endpoint array.

In max3420_getstatus(), the driver uses the wIndex value from the setup packet to obtain the endpoint index. However, there is no check to ensure this index is within the valid bounds of the udc->ep[] array.

A malicious host could send a USB_REQ_GET_STATUS request with a large endpoint index, leading to an out-of-bounds memory access.

This patch adds a validation check against MAX3420_MAX_EPS. If the endpoint index is invalid, the request is stalled.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c +5 -1
index 7349ea774adf..ac11ddf3fcbc 100644
@@ -548,7 +548,11 @@ static void max3420_getstatus(struct max3420_udc *udc)
 			goto stall;
 		break;
 	case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
-		ep = &udc->ep[udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK];
+		u8 epnum = udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+
+		if (epnum >= MAX3420_MAX_EPS)
+			goto stall;
+		ep = &udc->ep[epnum];
 		if (udc->setup.wIndex & USB_DIR_IN) {
 			if (!ep->ep_usb.caps.dir_in)
 				goto stall;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 39 lines · Kery Qi

Assure that the host may not manipulate the index to point past the endpoint array.

In max3420_getstatus(), the driver uses the wIndex value from the setup packet to obtain the endpoint index. However, there is no check to ensure this index is within the valid bounds of the udc->ep[] array.

A malicious host could send a USB_REQ_GET_STATUS request with a large endpoint index, leading to an out-of-bounds memory access.

This patch adds a validation check against MAX3420_MAX_EPS. If the endpoint index is invalid, the request is stalled.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c +5 -1
index 7349ea774adf..ac11ddf3fcbc 100644
@@ -548,7 +548,11 @@ static void max3420_getstatus(struct max3420_udc *udc)
 			goto stall;
 		break;
 	case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
-		ep = &udc->ep[udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK];
+		u8 epnum = udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+
+		if (epnum >= MAX3420_MAX_EPS)
+			goto stall;
+		ep = &udc->ep[epnum];
 		if (udc->setup.wIndex & USB_DIR_IN) {
 			if (!ep->ep_usb.caps.dir_in)
 				goto stall;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1

You didn't use scripts/get_maintainer.pl to determine what list to send this to :(

Anyway, if you have a malicious USB host, then don't bind to it, we implicitly trust hosts in the kernel. Also, I don't think that this will protect anything here, see the thread on the linux-usb list in the past when this has come up:

	https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

thanks,

greg k-h