fork/pid: Fix use-after-free in __task_pid_nr_ns
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 fork/pid: Fix use-after-free in __task_pid_nr_ns
Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free issue in __task_pid_nr_ns:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __task_pid_nr_ns+0x1e4/0x490...
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807f8058a8 by task syz.1.574/8108The race condition occurs between the failure path of copy_process() and getting the PIDTYPE_TGID via __task_pid_nr_ns().
Bug timeline:
Task B perf_event_open()
Task A <--------------------------- clone() copy_process()
perf_event_init_task()
...
one copy failed
free_signal_struct() close(event_fd)
perf_child_detach()
__task_pid_nr_ns()
access child task->signalThis is fixed by:
1. Setting task->signal = NULL in the failure cleanup path of copy_process.
2. Adding a null check for task->signal before accessing PIDTYPE_TGID from task->signal.
Note: This bug was reported by syzbot without a reproducer. The fix is based on code inspection and race condition analysis.
--- kernel/fork.c | 8 ++++++-- kernel/pid.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/fork.c +6 -2
@@ -1975,6 +1975,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(struct file *pidfile =NULL ;const u64 clone_flags = args->flags;struct nsproxy *nsp = current->nsproxy; +struct signal_struct *free_sig =NULL ;/* * Don't allow sharing the root directory with processes in a different
@@ -2501,8 +2502,11 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(mmput (p->mm); } bad_fork_cleanup_signal: -if (!(clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD )) -free_signal_struct (p->signal); +if (!(clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD )) { + free_sig = p->signal; + p->signal =NULL ; +free_signal_struct (free_sig); + } bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:__cleanup_sighand (p->sighand); bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
kernel/pid.c +3 -3
@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid);static struct pid **task_pid_ptr (struct task_struct *task,enum pid_type type) { -return (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) ? - &task->thread_pid : - &task->signal->pids[type]; +if (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) +return &task->thread_pid; +return task->signal ? &task->signal->pids[type] :NULL ; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 21 lines · On Mon, 5 Jan 2026 12:36:27 +0800 Qing Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free issue in
__task_pid_nr_ns:BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __task_pid_nr_ns+0x1e4/0x490... Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807f8058a8 by task syz.1.574/8108The race condition occurs between the failure path of
copy_process()and getting thePIDTYPE_TGIDvia__task_pid_nr_ns().Bug timeline:
Task Bperf_event_open()
Task A <---------------------------clone()copy_process()perf_event_init_task() ... one copy failed free_signal_struct() close(event_fd) perf_child_detach() __task_pid_nr_ns() access child task->signal
Quoted 7 lines
This is fixed by:
1. Settingtask->signal= NULL in the failure cleanup path ofcopy_process.
2. Adding a null check fortask->signalbefore accessingPIDTYPE_TGIDfromtask->signal.Note: This bug was reported by syzbot without a reproducer. The fix is based on code inspection and race condition analysis.
Thanks.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/pid.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid); · line 335
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/pid.c +3
-3@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid);static struct pid **task_pid_ptr (struct task_struct *task,enum pid_type type) { -return (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) ? - &task->thread_pid : - &task->signal->pids[type]; +if (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) +return &task->thread_pid; +return task->signal ? &task->signal->pids[type] :NULL ; }
It might be helpful to have a comment here telling readers how task->signal can be zero.
Also, what in here prevents task->signal from being zeroed after we've tested it and before we dereference it?
Quoted 5 lines
It might be helpful to have a comment here telling readers how
task->signalcan be zero.Also, what in here prevents
task->signalfrom being zeroed after we've tested it and before we dereference it?
Thank you for your feedback. Regarding the "test-and-use" race condition you raised, I’ve thought about it extensively but haven’t found a better solution on the access side.
However, after re-examining the issue, I guess the root cause lies in the copy_process() flow itself, and we may not need complex handling at the access site:
1. The signal_struct is not fully managed by reference counting: In the normal (successful) path of copy_process(), the signal structure is indeed reference-counted, and its lifetime should be at least longer than the task’s. However, in the failure/cleanup path, signal is explicitly freed via free_signal_struct(), which prematurely ends its lifetime. At the same time, other subsystems (e.g., perf) might still hold references and attempt to access it—even if such access may be questionable.
2. A newly created task should not be visible to other CPUs during
creation: The perf subsystem copies the parent’s events
to the child during copy_process(). Later, when the parent closes or manipulates its own perf event, it may traverse child events and access child_ctx->task->signal. This means that a child process that has not yet been fully created can be referenced by other CPUs.
Based on this analysis, I propose two possible fixes—either one should resolve the issue:
1. Remove the explicit free_signal() in the cleanup path, and fully managed by reference counting for signal lifetime. Currently put_signal_struct() is only used in __put_task_struct(), so the lifetime of signal is longer than or equal to task.
2. Defer perf_event_init_task() until after copy_signal() succeeds, ensuring that if copy_process() failed perf events will be cleaned up before the signal. This guarantees that no perf event can access the signal.
I believe either approach would eliminate the issue. Could you please review whether this analysis and the proposed solutions are correct? Any guidance would be greatly appreciated.
Quoted 9 lines · Qing Wang
The race condition occurs between the failure path of
copy_process()and getting thePIDTYPE_TGIDvia__task_pid_nr_ns().Bug timeline:
Task Bperf_event_open()
Task A <---------------------------clone()copy_process()
Quoted 7 lines
perf_event_init_task()
...
one copy failed
free_signal_struct() close(event_fd)
perf_child_detach()
__task_pid_nr_ns()
access child task->signalSorry, this description very confusing to me... Is it Task B who does clone? Or another Task A does copy_process() ? Could you write a more clear changelog?
Quoted 16 lines
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:(quoted diff) +5
-2- if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) - free_signal_struct(p->signal); + if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) { + free_sig = p->signal; + p->signal = NULL; + free_signal_struct(free_sig); + } bad_fork_cleanup_sighand: __cleanup_sighand(p->sighand); bad_fork_cleanup_fs:kernel/pid.c +0
-0
kernel/pid.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid); · line 335
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/pid.c +3
-3@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid);static struct pid **task_pid_ptr (struct task_struct *task,enum pid_type type) { -return (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) ? - &task->thread_pid : - &task->signal->pids[type]; +if (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) +return &task->thread_pid; +return task->signal ? &task->signal->pids[type] :NULL ; }
At first glance this is racy. Can't task->signal be freed right after the check?
And... Can't we make another fix? If copy_process() fails and does free_signal_struct(), the child has not been added to rcu protected lists and init_task_pid(child) was not called yet.
So perhaps something like the patch below can work?
Oleg.
---
kernel/events/core.c +4 -3
@@ -1422,16 +1422,17 @@ unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *cstatic u32 perf_event_pid_type (struct perf_event *event,struct task_struct *p,enum pid_type type) { -u32 nr; +u32 nr =0 ;/* * only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in */ if (event->parent) event = event->parent; - nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns); +if (pid_alive (p)) + nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns);/* avoid -1 if it is idle thread or runs in another ns */ -if (!nr && !pid_alive (p)) +if (!nr) nr =-1 ;return nr; }
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Sorry, this description very confusing to me... Is it Task B who does clone? Or another Task A does
copy_process()? Could you write a more clear changelog?
The "<---...---clone" graph may have misled you. What I meant was that Task A is cloned from Task B.
The modified bug timeline with explanation:
Task B perf_event_open()
Task A <--------------------------- clone() copy_process()
perf_event_init_task()
...
one copy failed
free_signal_struct()
close(event_fd)
perf_child_detach()
__task_pid_nr_ns()
access child task->signal
perf_event_init_task()1. Task B create perf events by perf_event_open().
2. Task B clone Task A, and Task A have perf events copied from Task B in this clone().
3. Task A do one clone and fail to copy one(eg. copy_mm) in copy_process(), then goto cleanup free_signal_struct().
4. Task B do close(event_fd), and access Task A's signal after free_signal_struct() and before perf_event_init_task() in Task A.
Quoted 25 lines
At first glance this is racy. Can't
task->signalbe freed right after the check?And... Can't we make another fix? If
copy_process()fails and doesfree_signal_struct(), the child has not been added to rcu protected lists andinit_task_pid(child)was not called yet.So perhaps something like the patch below can work?
Oleg.
---kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -1422,16 +1422,17 @@ unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *cstatic u32 perf_event_pid_type (struct perf_event *event,struct task_struct *p,enum pid_type type) { -u32 nr; +u32 nr =0 ;/* * only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in */ if (event->parent) event = event->parent;
kernel/events/core.c unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *c · line 1438
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/events/core.c +3
-2- nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns); +if (pid_alive (p)) + nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns);/* avoid -1 if it is idle thread or runs in another ns */ -if (!nr && !pid_alive (p)) +if (!nr) nr =-1 ;return nr; }
I think it doesn't work, as I explained in my previous reply to Andrew:
A newly created task should not be visible to other CPUs during
creation: The perf subsystem copies the parent’s events
to the child during copy_process(). Later, when the parent closes its own perf event, it may traverse child events and access child_ctx->task->signal. This means that a child process that has not yet been fully created can be referenced by other CPUs.
Quoted 25 lines · Oleg Nesterov
At first glance this is racy. Can't
task->signalbe freed right after the check?And... Can't we make another fix? If
copy_process()fails and doesfree_signal_struct(), the child has not been added to rcu protected lists andinit_task_pid(child)was not called yet.So perhaps something like the patch below can work?
Oleg.
---kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -1422,16 +1422,17 @@ unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *cstatic u32 perf_event_pid_type (struct perf_event *event,struct task_struct *p,enum pid_type type) { -u32 nr; +u32 nr =0 ;/* * only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in */ if (event->parent) event = event->parent;
kernel/events/core.c unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *c · line 1438
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/events/core.c +3
-2- nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns); +if (pid_alive (p)) + nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns);/* avoid -1 if it is idle thread or runs in another ns */ -if (!nr && !pid_alive (p)) +if (!nr) nr =-1 ;return nr; }
Sorry, please ignore my previous reply. I've reconsidered your code, and using pid_alive() to check the validity of tsk->signal is actually correct. The pid is assigned after copy_signal(), so if a task has a PID, its tsk->signal memory is guaranteed to be valid.
Quoted 28 lines · Qing Wang
Quoted 26 lines · Oleg Nesterov
At first glance this is racy. Can't
task->signalbe freed right after the check?And... Can't we make another fix? If
copy_process()fails and doesfree_signal_struct(), the child has not been added to rcu protected lists andinit_task_pid(child)was not called yet.So perhaps something like the patch below can work?
Oleg.
---kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -1422,16 +1422,17 @@ unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *cstatic u32 perf_event_pid_type (struct perf_event *event,struct task_struct *p,enum pid_type type) { -u32 nr; +u32 nr =0 ;/* * only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in */ if (event->parent) event = event->parent;
Quoted 14 lines
kernel/events/core.c unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *c · line 1438
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/events/core.c +3
-2- nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns); +if (pid_alive (p)) + nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns);/* avoid -1 if it is idle thread or runs in another ns */ -if (!nr && !pid_alive (p)) +if (!nr) nr =-1 ;return nr; }Sorry, please ignore my previous reply. I've reconsidered your code, and using
pid_alive()to check the validity oftsk->signalis actually correct. The pid is assigned aftercopy_signal(), so if a task has a PID, itstsk->signalmemory is guaranteed to be valid.
Yes, if the child wasn't fully created then init_task_pid(child) was not called so pid_alive(p) can't be true.
OK, if you agree with this approach, can you make V2? Or do you prefer another approach?
The patch above is not 100% correct wrt "avoid -1 ...", but it seems that this can be fixed.
Oleg.
Quoted 25 lines · Oleg Nesterov
At first glance this is racy. Can't
task->signalbe freed right after the check?And... Can't we make another fix? If
copy_process()fails and doesfree_signal_struct(), the child has not been added to rcu protected lists andinit_task_pid(child)was not called yet.So perhaps something like the patch below can work?
Oleg.
---kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -1422,16 +1422,17 @@ unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *cstatic u32 perf_event_pid_type (struct perf_event *event,struct task_struct *p,enum pid_type type) { -u32 nr; +u32 nr =0 ;/* * only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in */ if (event->parent) event = event->parent;
kernel/events/core.c unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *c · line 1438
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/events/core.c +3
-2- nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns); +if (pid_alive (p)) + nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns);/* avoid -1 if it is idle thread or runs in another ns */ -if (!nr && !pid_alive (p)) +if (!nr) nr =-1 ;return nr; }
Could we put the checking 'pid_alive(task)' into __task_pid_nr_ns()? Because there is another similar use case here.
arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
619,9: pid = __task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, type, event->ns);
---
kernel/pid.c +1 -1
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,rcu_read_lock ();if (!ns) ns =task_active_pid_ns (current); -if (ns) +if (ns &&pid_alive (task)) nr =pid_nr_ns (rcu_dereference (*task_pid_ptr (task, type)), ns);rcu_read_unlock ();
Quoted 2 lines · Qing Wang
Could we put the checking '
pid_alive(task)' into__task_pid_nr_ns()?
I don't think so... see below.
Quoted 5 lines
Because there is another similar use case here.
arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
619,9: pid =__task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, type, event->ns);
This case is not similar. This tsk was found by find_task_by_pid_ns(), it must be fully initialized.
So I don't think it makes sense to add the additional check into __task_pid_nr_ns().
kernel/pid.c pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type, · line 518
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/pid.c +1
-1@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,rcu_read_lock ();if (!ns) ns =task_active_pid_ns (current); -if (ns) +if (ns &&pid_alive (task))
This reminds me... the 2nd "if (ns) check must die. I'll ping Cristian. See https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Oleg.
Quoted 5 lines · Oleg Nesterov
This case is not similar. This tsk was found by
find_task_by_pid_ns(), it must be fully initialized.So I don't think it makes sense to add the additional check into
__task_pid_nr_ns().
I agree with this. Let's make an new patch.
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/pid.c pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type, · line 518
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/pid.c +1
-1@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,rcu_read_lock ();if (!ns) ns =task_active_pid_ns (current); -if (ns) +if (ns &&pid_alive (task))This reminds me... the 2nd "if (ns) check must die. I'll ping Cristian. See https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I viewed this link. Your patches is not merged on master.
On a second thought...
sched_fork() is called before perf_event_init_task(). So perhaps sync_child_event() could also check task->__state != TASK_NEW before perf_event_read_event() ?
Not sure, I know nothing about perf. Would be nice if perf experts can take a look.
Oleg.
Quoted 85 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 9 lines · Qing Wang
The race condition occurs between the failure path of
copy_process()and getting thePIDTYPE_TGIDvia__task_pid_nr_ns().Bug timeline:
Task Bperf_event_open()
Task A <---------------------------clone()copy_process()Quoted 7 lines
perf_event_init_task() ... one copy failed free_signal_struct() close(event_fd) perf_child_detach() __task_pid_nr_ns() access child task->signalSorry, this description very confusing to me... Is it Task B who does clone? Or another Task A does
copy_process()? Could you write a more clear changelog?Quoted 16 lines
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:(quoted diff) +5
-2- if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) - free_signal_struct(p->signal); + if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) { + free_sig = p->signal; + p->signal = NULL; + free_signal_struct(free_sig); + } bad_fork_cleanup_sighand: __cleanup_sighand(p->sighand); bad_fork_cleanup_fs:kernel/pid.c +0
-0kernel/pid.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid); · line 335
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/pid.c +3
-3@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid);static struct pid **task_pid_ptr (struct task_struct *task,enum pid_type type) { -return (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) ? - &task->thread_pid : - &task->signal->pids[type]; +if (type ==PIDTYPE_PID ) +return &task->thread_pid; +return task->signal ? &task->signal->pids[type] :NULL ; }At first glance this is racy. Can't
task->signalbe freed right after the check?And... Can't we make another fix? If
copy_process()fails and doesfree_signal_struct(), the child has not been added to rcu protected lists andinit_task_pid(child)was not called yet.So perhaps something like the patch below can work?
Oleg.
---kernel/events/core.c +4
-3@@ -1422,16 +1422,17 @@ unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *cstatic u32 perf_event_pid_type (struct perf_event *event,struct task_struct *p,enum pid_type type) { -u32 nr; +u32 nr =0 ;/* * only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in */ if (event->parent) event = event->parent; - nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns); +if (pid_alive (p)) + nr =__task_pid_nr_ns (p, type, event->ns);/* avoid -1 if it is idle thread or runs in another ns */ -if (!nr && !pid_alive (p)) +if (!nr) nr =-1 ;return nr; }
Quoted 10 lines · Oleg Nesterov
On a second thought...
sched_fork()is called beforeperf_event_init_task(). So perhapssync_child_event()could also checktask->__state!=TASK_NEWbeforeperf_event_read_event()?Not sure, I know nothing about perf. Would be nice if perf experts can take a look.
Oleg.
I agree with your idea. But we don't need to fix this issue anymore, because after reviewing the current mainline code, I found that it has already been resolved(c418d8b4d7a4 "perf/core: Fix missing read event generation on task exit") by moving sync_child_event() from perf_child_detach() into perf_event_exit_event().
Here https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
As a result, perf_event_read_event() no longer occurs on the problematic path reported (i.e., the close()->perf_release() path).
Qing.
Quoted 11 lines · Qing Wang
I agree with your idea. But we don't need to fix this issue anymore, because after reviewing the current mainline code, I found that it has already been
resolved(c418d8b4d7a4 "perf/core: Fix missing read event generation on task exit")by movingsync_child_event()fromperf_child_detach()intoperf_event_exit_event().Here https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
As a result,
perf_event_read_event()no longer occurs on the problematic path reported (i.e., the close()->perf_release() path).
Great, thanks. So we can forget this problem ;)
Oleg.
Quoted 9 lines · Oleg Nesterov
On a second thought...
sched_fork()is called beforeperf_event_init_task(). So perhapssync_child_event()could also checktask->__state!=TASK_NEWbeforeperf_event_read_event()?Not sure, I know nothing about perf. Would be nice if perf experts can take a look.
Or something else, but we can't rely on pid_alive() or ->signal != NULL checks.
perf_event_init_task() is called soon after dup_task_struct(), so pid_alive() is true and child->signal == current->signal.
Lets forget about use-after-free. What if perf_child_detach() paths call __task_pid_nr_ns() before copy_signal/etc ? In this case perf_event_pid/perf_event_tid will return the pids of the forking process, not the child's pids.
Oleg.