Enable core PMU for DMR and NVL
Subsystems (2)
v2 cover Enable core PMU for DMR and NVL
Changes:
v1 -> v2:
* Rebase to latest perf/core base (6.19-rc1 based).
* Refine intel_fixup_er() helper (Zide).
* Optimize commit message.
This patch-set enables core PMU functionalities for Diamond Rapids (DMR) and Nova Lake (NVL).
Comparing with previous platforms, there are 3 main changes on core PMU functionalities.
1. Introduce OFF-MODULE RESPONSE (OMR) facility to replace Off-Core Response (OCR) facility
Legacy microarchitectures used the OCR facility to evaluate off-core and multi-core off-module transactions. The properly renamed, OMR facility, improves the OCR capability for scalable coverage of new memory systems of multi-core module systems.
Along with the introduction of OMR, 4 equivalent MSRs (OFFMODULE_RSP_0 ~ OFFMODULE_RSP_3) are introduced to specify attributes of the off-module transaction and the legacy 2 OFFCORE_RSP MSRs are retired.
For more details about OMR events and OFFMODULE_RSP_x MSRs, please refer to the section 16.1 "OFF-MODULE RESPONSE (OMR) FACILITY" in latest ISE[1] documentation.
2. New PEBS data source encoding layout
Diamond Rapids and Nova Lake include PEBS Load Latency and Store Latency support similar to previous platforms but with a different data source encoding layout.
Briefly speaking, the new data source encoding is determined by bit[8] of memory auxiliary info field. The bit[8] indicates whether a L2 cache miss occurs for a memory load or store instruction. If bit[8] is 0, it signifies no L2 cache miss, and bits[7:0] specify the exact cache data source (up to the L2 cache level). If bit[8] is 1, bits[7:0] represents the OMR encoding, indicating the specific L3 cache or memory region involved in the memory access.
A significant enhancement for OMR encoding is the ability to provide up to 8 fine-grained memory regions in addition to the cache region, offering more detailed insights into memory access regions.
For more details about the new data source layout, please refer to the section 16.2 "PEBS LOAD LATENCY AND STORE LATENCY FACILITY" in latest ISE documentation.
3. Support "rdpmc user disable" feature
Currently executing RDPMC when CPL > 0 is allowed if the CR4.PCE flag (performance-monitoring counter enable) is set. This introduces a security risk that any user space process can read the count of any PMU counter even though the counter belongs to a system-wide event as long as CR4.PCE = 1.
To mitigate this security risk, the rdpmc user disable feature is introduced to provide per-counter rdpmc control.
'rdpmc user disable' introduces a new bit "RDPMC_USR_DISABLE" to manage if the counter can be read in user space by leveraging rdpmc instruction for each GP and fixed counter.
The details are
- New RDPMC_USR_DISABLE bit in each EVNTSELx[37] MSR to indicate counter can't be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- New RDPMC_USR_DISABLE bits in bits 33,37,41,45,etc.,
in IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL MSR for fixed counters 0-3, etc.
- On RDPMC for counter x, use select to choose the final counter value:
If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1 ) ? 0 : counter_value
- RDPMC_USR_DISABLE is enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].
For more details about "rdpmc user disable", please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in latest ISE.
This patch-set adds support for these 3 new changes or features. Besides the DMR and NVL specific counter constraints are supported together.
Tests:
The below tests pass on DMR and NVL (both P-core and E-core).
a) Perf counting tests pass.
b) Perf sampling tests pass.
c) Perf PEBS based sampling tests pass.
d) "rdpmc user disable" functionality tests pass.
Ref:
ISE (version 60): https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/content-details/869288/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.html
History:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Dapeng Mi (7):
perf/x86/intel: Support the 4 new OMR MSRs introduced in DMR and NVL perf/x86/intel: Add support for PEBS memory auxiliary info field in
DMR
perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for DMR perf/x86/intel: Add support for PEBS memory auxiliary info field in
NVL
perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for Novalake perf/x86: Use macros to replace magic numbers in attr_rdpmc perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
.../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 ++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 28 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 362 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 261 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/p6.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 26 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +- include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 27 +- tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 27 +- 10 files changed, 756 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc
base-commit: 01122b89361e565b3c88b9fbebe92dc5c7420cb7
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 1/7 perf/x86/intel: Support the 4 new OMR MSRs introduced in DMR and NVL
Diamond Rapids (DMR) and Nova Lake (NVL) introduce an enhanced Off-Module Response (OMR) facility, replacing the Off-Core Response (OCR) Performance Monitoring of previous processors.
Legacy microarchitectures used the OCR facility to evaluate off-core and multi-core off-module transactions. The newly named OMR facility improves OCR capabilities for scalable coverage of new memory systems in multi-core module systems.
Similar to OCR, 4 additional off-module configuration MSRs (OFFMODULE_RSP_0 to OFFMODULE_RSP_3) are introduced to specify attributes of off-module transactions. When multiple identical OMR events are created, they need to occupy the same OFFMODULE_RSP_x MSR. To ensure these multiple identical OMR events can work simultaneously, the intel_alt_er() and intel_fixup_er() helpers are enhanced to rotate these OMR events across different OFFMODULE_RSP_* MSRs, similar to previous OCR events.
For more details about OMR, please refer to section 16.1 "OFF-MODULE
RESPONSE (OMR) FACILITY" in ISE documentation.
---
v2: Optimize intel_fixup_er().
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++ 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +37 -18
@@ -3532,17 +3532,28 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,struct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (cpuc->pmu, extra_regs);int alt_idx = idx; -if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 )) -return idx; - -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ) - alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ; - -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) - alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; +if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 || idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { +if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 )) +return idx; +if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) + alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; +if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask) +return idx; + } -if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask) -return idx; +if (idx >=EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 && idx <=EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) { +if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_OMR )) +return idx; +if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) + alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; +/* +* Subtracting EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ensures to get correct +* OMR extra_reg entries which start from 0. +*/ +if (config & + ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask) +return idx; + }return alt_idx; }
@@ -3550,16 +3561,24 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,static void intel_fixup_er (struct perf_event *event,int idx) {struct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (event->pmu, extra_regs); - event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx; +int er_idx; -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ) { - event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK ; - event->hw.config |= extra_regs[EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ].event; - event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 ; - }else if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { + event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx; +switch (idx) { + case EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ... EXTRA_REG_RSP_1: + er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK ; - event->hw.config |= extra_regs[EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ].event; - event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1 ; + event->hw.config |= extra_regs[er_idx].event; + event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 + er_idx; +break ; + case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3: + er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK ; + event->hw.config |=1ULL << (8 + er_idx); + event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OMR_0 + er_idx; +break ; +default : +pr_warn ("The extra reg idx %d is not supported.\n" , idx); } }
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +5 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ enum extra_reg_type {EXTRA_REG_FE =4 ,/* fe_* */ EXTRA_REG_SNOOP_0 =5 ,/* snoop response 0 */ EXTRA_REG_SNOOP_1 =6 ,/* snoop response 1 */ +EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 =7 ,/* OMR 0 */ +EXTRA_REG_OMR_1 =8 ,/* OMR 1 */ +EXTRA_REG_OMR_2 =9 ,/* OMR 2 */ +EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 =10 ,/* OMR 3 */ EXTRA_REG_MAX /* number of entries needed */ };
@@ -1099,6 +1103,7 @@ do { \#define PMU_FL_RETIRE_LATENCY 0x200/* Support Retire Latency in PEBS */ #define PMU_FL_BR_CNTR 0x400/* Support branch counter logging */ #define PMU_FL_DYN_CONSTRAINT 0x800/* Needs dynamic constraint */ +#define PMU_FL_HAS_OMR 0x1000/* has 4 equivalent OMR regs */ #define EVENT_VAR (_id) event_attr_##_id#define EVENT_PTR (_id) &event_attr_##_id.attr.attr
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +5 -0
@@ -263,6 +263,11 @@#define MSR_SNOOP_RSP_0 0x00001328#define MSR_SNOOP_RSP_1 0x00001329 +#define MSR_OMR_0 0x000003e0 +#define MSR_OMR_1 0x000003e1 +#define MSR_OMR_2 0x000003e2 +#define MSR_OMR_3 0x000003e3 +#define MSR_LBR_SELECT 0x000001c8#define MSR_LBR_TOS 0x000001c9
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [Patch v2 1/7] perf/x86/intel: Support the 4 new OMR MSRs introduced in DMR and NVL
Quoted 1 line · Dapeng Mi
Does intel guarantee this link is stable? If not, it is not appropriate to stick in a changelog that will live 'forever'.
Quoted 65 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +29
-18@@ -3532,17 +3532,28 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,struct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (cpuc->pmu, extra_regs);int alt_idx = idx; -if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 )) -return idx; - -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ) - alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ; - -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) - alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; +if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 || idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { +if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 )) +return idx; +if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) + alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; +if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask) +return idx; + } -if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask) -return idx; +if (idx >=EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 && idx <=EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) { +if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_OMR )) +return idx; +if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) + alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; +/* +* Subtracting EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ensures to get correct +* OMR extra_reg entries which start from 0. +*/ +if (config & + ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask) +return idx; + }return alt_idx; }@@ -3550,16 +3561,24 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,static void intel_fixup_er (struct perf_event *event,int idx) {struct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (event->pmu, extra_regs); - event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx; +int er_idx; -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ) { - event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK ; - event->hw.config |= extra_regs[EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ].event; - event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 ; - }else if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { + event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx; +switch (idx) { + case EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ... EXTRA_REG_RSP_1: + er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK ; - event->hw.config |= extra_regs[EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ].event; - event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1 ; + event->hw.config |= extra_regs[er_idx].event; + event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 + er_idx; +break ;
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, · line 3583
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +8
-0+ case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3: + er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK ; + event->hw.config |=1ULL << (8 + er_idx); + event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OMR_0 + er_idx; +break ; +default : +pr_warn ("The extra reg idx %d is not supported.\n" , idx); } }
I found it jarring to have these two functions so dissimilar; I've changed both to be a switch statement.
---
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +11 -5
@@ -3532,16 +3532,17 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_evstruct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (cpuc->pmu, extra_regs);int alt_idx = idx; -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 || idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { +switch (idx) { + case EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ... EXTRA_REG_RSP_1:if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 ))return idx;if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ;if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask)return idx; - } +break ; -if (idx >=EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 && idx <=EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) { + case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3:if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_OMR ))return idx;if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 )
@@ -3550,9 +3551,12 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_ev* Subtracting EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ensures to get correct * OMR extra_reg entries which start from 0. */ -if (config & - ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask) +if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask)return idx; +break ; + +default : +break ; }return alt_idx;
@@ -3571,12 +3575,14 @@ static void intel_fixup_er(struct perf_e event->hw.config |= extra_regs[er_idx].event; event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 + er_idx;break ; + case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3: er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK ; event->hw.config |=1ULL << (8 + er_idx); event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OMR_0 + er_idx;break ; +default :pr_warn ("The extra reg idx %d is not supported.\n" , idx); }
Re: [Patch v2 1/7] perf/x86/intel: Support the 4 new OMR MSRs introduced in DMR and NVL
Quoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 1 line · Dapeng Mi
Does intel guarantee this link is stable? If not, it is not appropriate to stick in a changelog that will live 'forever'.
Maybe not. I suppose it's good enough to put the ISE link into cover letter. I would remove the ISE link from the commit messages.
Quoted 124 lines
Quoted 67 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +29
-18@@ -3532,17 +3532,28 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,struct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (cpuc->pmu, extra_regs);int alt_idx = idx; -if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 )) -return idx; - -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ) - alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ; - -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) - alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; +if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 || idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { +if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 )) +return idx; +if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) + alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; +if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask) +return idx; + } -if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask) -return idx; +if (idx >=EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 && idx <=EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) { +if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_OMR )) +return idx; +if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) + alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; +/* +* Subtracting EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ensures to get correct +* OMR extra_reg entries which start from 0. +*/ +if (config & + ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask) +return idx; + }return alt_idx; }@@ -3550,16 +3561,24 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,static void intel_fixup_er (struct perf_event *event,int idx) {struct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (event->pmu, extra_regs); - event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx; +int er_idx; -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ) { - event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK ; - event->hw.config |= extra_regs[EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ].event; - event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 ; - }else if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { + event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx; +switch (idx) { + case EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ... EXTRA_REG_RSP_1: + er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ; event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK ; - event->hw.config |= extra_regs[EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ].event; - event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1 ; + event->hw.config |= extra_regs[er_idx].event; + event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 + er_idx; +break ;arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, · line 3583
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +8
-0+ case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3: + er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK ; + event->hw.config |=1ULL << (8 + er_idx); + event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OMR_0 + er_idx; +break ; +default : +pr_warn ("The extra reg idx %d is not supported.\n" , idx); } }I found it jarring to have these two functions so dissimilar; I've changed both to be a switch statement.
---
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-5@@ -3532,16 +3532,17 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_evstruct extra_reg *extra_regs =hybrid (cpuc->pmu, extra_regs);int alt_idx = idx; -if (idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 || idx ==EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) { +switch (idx) { + case EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ... EXTRA_REG_RSP_1:if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 ))return idx;if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_RSP_1 ) alt_idx =EXTRA_REG_RSP_0 ;if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx].valid_mask)return idx; - } +break ; -if (idx >=EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 && idx <=EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 ) { + case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3:if (!(x86_pmu.flags &PMU_FL_HAS_OMR ))return idx;if (++alt_idx >EXTRA_REG_OMR_3 )@@ -3550,9 +3551,12 @@ static int intel_alt_er(struct cpu_hw_ev* Subtracting EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ensures to get correct * OMR extra_reg entries which start from 0. */ -if (config & - ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask) +if (config & ~extra_regs[alt_idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ].valid_mask)return idx; +break ; + +default : +break ; }return alt_idx;@@ -3571,12 +3575,14 @@ static void intel_fixup_er(struct perf_e event->hw.config |= extra_regs[er_idx].event; event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 + er_idx;break ; +
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_fixup_er(struct perf_e · line 3588
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +1
-0case EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ... EXTRA_REG_OMR_3: er_idx = idx -EXTRA_REG_OMR_0 ; event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK ; event->hw.config |=1ULL << (8 + er_idx); event->hw.extra_reg.reg =MSR_OMR_0 + er_idx;break ; +default :pr_warn ("The extra reg idx %d is not supported.\n" , idx); }
Yeah, this looks prettier. Would change it.
PATCH v2 2/7 perf/x86/intel: Add support for PEBS memory auxiliary info field in DMR
In reply to Dapeng MiWith the introduction of the OMR feature, the PEBS memory auxiliary info field for load and store latency events has been restructured for DMR.
The memory auxiliary info field's bit[8] indicates whether a L2 cache miss occurred for a memory load or store instruction. If bit[8] is 0, it signifies no L2 cache miss, and bits[7:0] specify the exact cache data source (up to the L2 cache level). If bit[8] is 1, bits[7:0] represent the OMR encoding, indicating the specific L3 cache or memory region involved in the memory access. A significant enhancement is OMR encoding provides up to 8 fine-grained memory regions besides the cache region.
A significant enhancement for OMR encoding is the ability to provide up to 8 fine-grained memory regions in addition to the cache region, offering more detailed insights into memory access regions.
For detailed information on the memory auxiliary info encoding, please refer to section 16.2 "PEBS LOAD LATENCY AND STORE LATENCY FACILITY" in the ISE documentation.
This patch ensures that the PEBS memory auxiliary info field is correctly interpreted and utilized in DMR.
--- arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 27 ++++- tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 27 ++++- 4 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +140 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@ struct pebs_record_32 {*/ +union omr_encoding { +struct { +u8 omr_source :4 ; +u8 omr_remote :1 ; +u8 omr_hitm :1 ; +u8 omr_snoop :1 ; +u8 omr_promoted :1 ; + }; +u8 omr_full; +}; +union intel_x86_pebs_dse {u64 val;struct {
@@ -73,6 +84,18 @@ union intel_x86_pebs_dse { unsigned int lnc_addr_blk:1; unsigned int ld_reserved6:18; }; +struct { +unsigned int pnc_dse:8 ; +unsigned int pnc_l2_miss:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_stlb_clean_hit:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_stlb_any_hit:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_stlb_miss:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_locked:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_data_blk:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_addr_blk:1 ; +unsigned int pnc_fb_full:1 ; +unsigned int ld_reserved8:16 ; + }; };
@@ -228,6 +251,85 @@ void __init intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_lnl(void)__intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_cmt (data_source); } +/* Version for Panthercove and later */ + +/* L2 hit */ +#define PNC_PEBS_DATA_SOURCE_MAX 16 +static u64 pnc_pebs_l2_hit_data_source[PNC_PEBS_DATA_SOURCE_MAX ] = { +P (OP ,LOAD ) |P (LVL ,NA ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NA ),/* 0x00: non-cache access */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (L0 ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x01: L0 hit */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L1 ) |LEVEL (L1 ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x02: L1 hit */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,LFB ) |LEVEL (LFB ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x03: L1 Miss Handling Buffer hit */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x04: L2 Hit Clean */ +0 ,/* 0x05: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x06: Reserved */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,HIT ),/* 0x07: L2 Hit Snoop HIT */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,HITM ),/* 0x08: L2 Hit Snoop Hit Modified */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,MISS ),/* 0x09: Prefetch Promotion */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,MISS ),/* 0x0a: Cross Core Prefetch Promotion */ +0 ,/* 0x0b: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0c: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0d: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0e: Reserved */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,UNC ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x0f: uncached */ +}; + +/* L2 miss */ +#define OMR_DATA_SOURCE_MAX 16 +static u64 omr_data_source[OMR_DATA_SOURCE_MAX ] = { +P (OP ,LOAD ) |P (LVL ,NA ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NA ),/* 0x00: invalid */ +0 ,/* 0x01: Reserved */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L3 ) |LEVEL (L3 ) |P (REGION ,L_SHARE ),/* 0x02: local CA shared cache */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L3 ) |LEVEL (L3 ) |P (REGION ,L_NON_SHARE ),/* 0x03: local CA non-shared cache */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L3 ) |LEVEL (L3 ) |P (REGION ,O_IO ),/* 0x04: other CA IO agent */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L3 ) |LEVEL (L3 ) |P (REGION ,O_SHARE ),/* 0x05: other CA shared cache */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L3 ) |LEVEL (L3 ) |P (REGION ,O_NON_SHARE ),/* 0x06: other CA non-shared cache */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MMIO ),/* 0x07: MMIO */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM0 ),/* 0x08: Memory region 0 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM1 ),/* 0x09: Memory region 1 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM2 ),/* 0x0a: Memory region 2 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM3 ),/* 0x0b: Memory region 3 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM4 ),/* 0x0c: Memory region 4 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM5 ),/* 0x0d: Memory region 5 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM6 ),/* 0x0e: Memory region 6 */ +OP_LH |LEVEL (RAM ) |P (REGION ,MEM7 ),/* 0x0f: Memory region 7 */ +}; + +static u64 parse_omr_data_source (u8 dse) +{ +union omr_encoding omr; +u64 val =0 ; + + omr.omr_full = dse; + val = omr_data_source[omr.omr_source]; +if (omr.omr_source >0x1 && omr.omr_source <0x7 ) + val |= omr.omr_remote ?P (LVL ,REM_CCE1 ) :0 ; +else if (omr.omr_source >0x7 ) + val |= omr.omr_remote ?P (LVL ,REM_RAM1 ) :P (LVL ,LOC_RAM ); + +if (omr.omr_remote) + val |=REM ; + + val |= omr.omr_hitm ?P (SNOOP ,HITM ) :P (SNOOP ,HIT ); + +if (omr.omr_source ==0x2 ) { +u8 snoop = omr.omr_snoop | omr.omr_promoted; + +if (snoop ==0x0 ) + val |=P (SNOOP ,NA ); +else if (snoop ==0x1 ) + val |=P (SNOOP ,MISS ); +else if (snoop ==0x2 ) + val |=P (SNOOP ,HIT ); +else if (snoop ==0x3 ) + val |=P (SNOOP ,NONE ); + }else if (omr.omr_source >0x2 && omr.omr_source <0x7 ) { + val |= omr.omr_snoop ?P (SNOOPX ,FWD ) :0 ; + } + +return val; +} +static u64 precise_store_data (u64 status) {union intel_x86_pebs_dse dse;
@@ -411,6 +513,44 @@ u64 arl_h_latency_data(struct perf_event *event, u64 status)return lnl_latency_data (event, status); } +u64 pnc_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status) +{ +union intel_x86_pebs_dse dse; +union perf_mem_data_src src; +u64 val; + + dse.val = status; + +if (!dse.pnc_l2_miss) + val = pnc_pebs_l2_hit_data_source[dse.pnc_dse &0xf ]; +else + val =parse_omr_data_source (dse.pnc_dse); + +if (!val) + val =P (OP ,LOAD ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NA ); + +if (dse.pnc_stlb_miss) + val |=P (TLB ,MISS ) |P (TLB ,L2 ); +else + val |=P (TLB ,HIT ) |P (TLB ,L1 ) |P (TLB ,L2 ); + +if (dse.pnc_locked) + val |=P (LOCK ,LOCKED ); + +if (dse.pnc_data_blk) + val |=P (BLK ,DATA ); +if (dse.pnc_addr_blk) + val |=P (BLK ,ADDR ); +if (!dse.pnc_data_blk && !dse.pnc_addr_blk) + val |=P (BLK ,NA ); + + src.val = val; +if (event->hw.flags &PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_ST_HSW ) + src.mem_op =P (OP ,STORE ); + +return src.val; +} +static u64 load_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status) {union intel_x86_pebs_dse dse;
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +2 -0
@@ -1664,6 +1664,8 @@ u64 lnl_latency_data(struct perf_event *event, u64 status);u64 arl_h_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status); +u64 pnc_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status); +extern struct event_constraint intel_core2_pebs_event_constraints[];extern struct event_constraint intel_atom_pebs_event_constraints[];
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +24 -3
@@ -1330,14 +1330,16 @@ union perf_mem_data_src { mem_snoopx : 2, /* Snoop mode, ext */ mem_blk : 3, /* Access blocked */ mem_hops : 3, /* Hop level */ - mem_rsvd : 18; + mem_region : 5, /* cache/memory regions */ + mem_rsvd : 13; }; };#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)union perf_mem_data_src {__u64 val;struct { -__u64 mem_rsvd :18 , +__u64 mem_rsvd :13 , + mem_region :5 ,/* cache/memory regions */ mem_hops :3 ,/* Hop level */ mem_blk :3 ,/* Access blocked */ mem_snoopx : 2, /* Snoop mode, ext */
@@ -1394,7 +1396,7 @@ union perf_mem_data_src {#define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_L4 0x0004/* L4 */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_L2_MHB 0x0005/* L2 Miss Handling Buffer */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_MSC 0x0006/* Memory-side Cache */ -/* 0x007 available */ +#define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_L0 0x0007/* L0 */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_UNC 0x0008/* Uncached */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_CXL 0x0009/* CXL */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_IO 0x000a/* I/O */
@@ -1447,6 +1449,25 @@ union perf_mem_data_src {/* 5-7 available */ #define PERF_MEM_HOPS_SHIFT 43 +/* Cache/Memory region */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_NA 0x0/* Invalid */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_RSVD 0x01/* Reserved */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_L_SHARE 0x02/* Local CA shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_L_NON_SHARE 0x03/* Local CA non-shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_O_IO 0x04/* Other CA IO agent */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_O_SHARE 0x05/* Other CA shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_O_NON_SHARE 0x06/* Other CA non-shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MMIO 0x07/* MMIO */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM0 0x08/* Memory region 0 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM1 0x09/* Memory region 1 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM2 0x0a/* Memory region 2 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM3 0x0b/* Memory region 3 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM4 0x0c/* Memory region 4 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM5 0x0d/* Memory region 5 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM6 0x0e/* Memory region 6 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM7 0x0f/* Memory region 7 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_SHIFT 46 +#define PERF_MEM_S (a, s) \ (((__u64)PERF_MEM_##a##_##s) << PERF_MEM_##a##_SHIFT)
tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +24 -3
@@ -1330,14 +1330,16 @@ union perf_mem_data_src { mem_snoopx : 2, /* Snoop mode, ext */ mem_blk : 3, /* Access blocked */ mem_hops : 3, /* Hop level */ - mem_rsvd : 18; + mem_region : 5, /* cache/memory regions */ + mem_rsvd : 13; }; };#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)union perf_mem_data_src {__u64 val;struct { -__u64 mem_rsvd :18 , +__u64 mem_rsvd :13 , + mem_region :5 ,/* cache/memory regions */ mem_hops :3 ,/* Hop level */ mem_blk :3 ,/* Access blocked */ mem_snoopx : 2, /* Snoop mode, ext */
@@ -1394,7 +1396,7 @@ union perf_mem_data_src {#define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_L4 0x0004/* L4 */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_L2_MHB 0x0005/* L2 Miss Handling Buffer */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_MSC 0x0006/* Memory-side Cache */ -/* 0x007 available */ +#define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_L0 0x0007/* L0 */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_UNC 0x0008/* Uncached */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_CXL 0x0009/* CXL */ #define PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_IO 0x000a/* I/O */
@@ -1447,6 +1449,25 @@ union perf_mem_data_src {/* 5-7 available */ #define PERF_MEM_HOPS_SHIFT 43 +/* Cache/Memory region */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_NA 0x0/* Invalid */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_RSVD 0x01/* Reserved */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_L_SHARE 0x02/* Local CA shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_L_NON_SHARE 0x03/* Local CA non-shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_O_IO 0x04/* Other CA IO agent */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_O_SHARE 0x05/* Other CA shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_O_NON_SHARE 0x06/* Other CA non-shared cache */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MMIO 0x07/* MMIO */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM0 0x08/* Memory region 0 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM1 0x09/* Memory region 1 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM2 0x0a/* Memory region 2 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM3 0x0b/* Memory region 3 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM4 0x0c/* Memory region 4 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM5 0x0d/* Memory region 5 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM6 0x0e/* Memory region 6 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_MEM7 0x0f/* Memory region 7 */ +#define PERF_MEM_REGION_SHIFT 46 +#define PERF_MEM_S (a, s) \ (((__u64)PERF_MEM_##a##_##s) << PERF_MEM_##a##_SHIFT)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 3/7 perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for DMR
In reply to Dapeng MiThis patch enables core PMU features for Diamond Rapids (Panther Cove microarchitecture), including Panther Cove specific counter and PEBS constraints, a new cache events ID table, and the model-specific OMR events extra registers table.
For detailed information about counter constraints, please refer to section 16.3 "COUNTER RESTRICTIONS" in the ISE documentation.
--- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 27 ++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +182 -0
@@ -435,6 +435,62 @@ static struct extra_reg intel_lnc_extra_regs[] __read_mostly = {EVENT_EXTRA_END }; +static struct event_constraint intel_pnc_event_constraints[] = { +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x00c0 ,0 ),/* INST_RETIRED.ANY */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0100 ,0 ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x003c ,1 ),/* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.CORE */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0300 ,2 ),/* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.REF */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x013c ,2 ),/* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.REF_TSC_P */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0400 ,3 ),/* SLOTS */ +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_RETIRING ,0 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_BAD_SPEC ,1 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_FE_BOUND ,2 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_BE_BOUND ,3 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_HEAVY_OPS ,4 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_BR_MISPREDICT ,5 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_FETCH_LAT ,6 ), +METRIC_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (INTEL_TD_METRIC_MEM_BOUND ,7 ), + +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x20 ,0xf ), +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x79 ,0xf ), + +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0275 ,0xf ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0176 ,0xf ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x04a4 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x08a4 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01cd ,0xfc ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x02cd ,0x3 ), + +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0xf ), +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0xf ), +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd4 ,0xf ), +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd6 ,0xf ), +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xdf ,0xf ), +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xce ,0x1 ), + +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01b1 ,0x8 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0847 ,0xf ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0446 ,0xf ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0846 ,0xf ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0148 ,0xf ), + +EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END +}; + +static struct extra_reg intel_pnc_extra_regs[]__read_mostly = { +/* must define OMR_X first, see intel_alt_er() */ +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x012a ,MSR_OMR_0 ,0x40ffffff0000ffffull ,OMR_0 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x022a ,MSR_OMR_1 ,0x40ffffff0000ffffull ,OMR_1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x042a ,MSR_OMR_2 ,0x40ffffff0000ffffull ,OMR_2 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x082a ,MSR_OMR_3 ,0x40ffffff0000ffffull ,OMR_3 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_PEBS_LDLAT_EXTRA_REG (0x01cd ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x02c6 ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x9 ,FE ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x03c6 ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x7fff1f ,FE ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x40ad ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0xf ,FE ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x04c2 ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x8 ,FE ), +EVENT_EXTRA_END +}; +EVENT_ATTR_STR (mem-loads, mem_ld_nhm,"event=0x0b,umask=0x10,ldlat=3" );EVENT_ATTR_STR (mem-loads, mem_ld_snb,"event=0xcd,umask=0x1,ldlat=3" );EVENT_ATTR_STR (mem-stores, mem_st_snb,"event=0xcd,umask=0x2" );
@@ -650,6 +706,102 @@ static __initconst const u64 glc_hw_cache_extra_regs }, }; +static __initconst const u64 pnc_hw_cache_event_ids + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX ] + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX ] + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX ] = +{ + [C (L1D ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x81d0 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xe124 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x82d0 , + }, + }, + [C (L1I ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xe424 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =-1 , + }, + }, + [C (LL ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x12a , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0x12a , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x12a , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0x12a , + }, + }, + [C (DTLB ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x81d0 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xe12 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x82d0 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xe13 , + }, + }, + [C (ITLB ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xe11 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =-1 , + }, + [C (OP_PREFETCH ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =-1 , + }, + }, + [C (BPU ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x4c4 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0x4c5 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =-1 , + }, + [C (OP_PREFETCH ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =-1 , + }, + }, + [C (NODE ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =-1 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =-1 , + }, + }, +}; + +static __initconst const u64 pnc_hw_cache_extra_regs + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX ] + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX ] + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX ] = +{ + [C (LL ) ] = { + [C (OP_READ ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x4000000000000001 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xFFFFF000000001 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE ) ] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS ) ] =0x4000000000000002 , + [C (RESULT_MISS ) ] =0xFFFFF000000002 , + }, + }, +}; +/* * Notes on the events: * - data reads do not include code reads (comparable to earlier tables)
@@ -7230,6 +7382,20 @@ static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_lnc(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, extra_regs) = intel_lnc_extra_regs; } +static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_pnc(struct pmu *pmu) +{ +intel_pmu_init_glc (pmu); + x86_pmu.flags &= ~PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 ; + x86_pmu.flags |=PMU_FL_HAS_OMR ; +memcpy (hybrid_var (pmu, hw_cache_event_ids), + pnc_hw_cache_event_ids,sizeof (hw_cache_event_ids)); +memcpy (hybrid_var (pmu, hw_cache_extra_regs), + pnc_hw_cache_extra_regs,sizeof (hw_cache_extra_regs)); +hybrid (pmu, event_constraints) = intel_pnc_event_constraints; +hybrid (pmu, pebs_constraints) = intel_pnc_pebs_event_constraints; +hybrid (pmu, extra_regs) = intel_pnc_extra_regs; +} + static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_skt(struct pmu *pmu) {intel_pmu_init_grt (pmu);
@@ -7906,6 +8072,22 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl (true);break ; +case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X : +intel_pmu_init_pnc (NULL ); + x86_pmu.pebs_ept =1 ; + x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; + x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; + x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; + extra_attr =boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) ? + hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr; + extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr; + mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; + td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs; + tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs; +pr_cont ("Panthercove events, " ); + name ="panthercove" ; +break ; +case INTEL_ALDERLAKE :case INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L :case INTEL_RAPTORLAKE :
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +27 -0
@@ -1425,6 +1425,33 @@ struct event_constraint intel_lnc_pebs_event_constraints[] = {EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END }; +struct event_constraint intel_pnc_pebs_event_constraints[] = { +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x100 ,0x100000000ULL ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0400 ,0x800000000ULL ), + +INTEL_HYBRID_LDLAT_CONSTRAINT (0x1cd ,0xfc ), +INTEL_HYBRID_STLAT_CONSTRAINT (0x2cd ,0x3 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD (0x11d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.STLB_MISS_LOADS */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_ST (0x12d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.STLB_MISS_STORES */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD (0x21d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.LOCK_LOADS */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD (0x41d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.SPLIT_LOADS */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_ST (0x42d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.SPLIT_STORES */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD (0x81d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.ALL_LOADS */ +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_ST (0x82d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.ALL_STORES */ + +INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD_RANGE (0xd1 ,0xd4 ,0xf ), + +INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0xf ), +INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd6 ,0xf ), + +/* +* Everything else is handled by PMU_FL_PEBS_ALL, because we +* need the full constraints from the main table. +*/ + +EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END +}; +struct event_constraint *intel_pebs_constraints (struct perf_event *event) {struct event_constraint *pebs_constraints =hybrid (event->pmu, pebs_constraints);
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +2 -0
@@ -1698,6 +1698,8 @@ extern struct event_constraint intel_glc_pebs_event_constraints[];extern struct event_constraint intel_lnc_pebs_event_constraints[]; +extern struct event_constraint intel_pnc_pebs_event_constraints[]; +struct event_constraint *intel_pebs_constraints (struct perf_event *event);void intel_pmu_pebs_add (struct perf_event *event);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [Patch v2 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for DMR
Quoted 13 lines · Dapeng Mi
(quoted diff) +9
-0@@ -7906,6 +8072,22 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl(true); break; + case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X: + intel_pmu_init_pnc(NULL); + x86_pmu.pebs_ept = 1; + x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; + x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; + x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; + extra_attr = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) ? + hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr; + extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr;
Review __init int intel_pmu_init(void) · line 8093
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +7
-0+ mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; + td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs; + tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs; + pr_cont("Panthercove events, "); + name = "panthercove"; + break; + case INTEL_ALDERLAKE: case INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L: case INTEL_RAPTORLAKE:
Does something like so make sense?
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +6 -13
@@ -8066,6 +8066,9 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) glc_common:intel_pmu_init_glc (NULL ); +intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl (true); + + glc_base: x86_pmu.pebs_ept =1 ; x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints;
@@ -8075,24 +8078,14 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs; tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs; -intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl (true);break ;case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X : -intel_pmu_init_pnc (NULL ); - x86_pmu.pebs_ept =1 ; - x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; - x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; - x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; - extra_attr =boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) ? - hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr; - extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr; - mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; - td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs; - tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs;pr_cont ("Panthercove events, " ); name ="panthercove" ; -break ; +intel_pmu_init_pnc (NULL ); + x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; + goto glc_base;case INTEL_ALDERLAKE :case INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L :
Re: [Patch v2 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for DMR
Quoted 57 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 13 lines · Dapeng Mi
(quoted diff) +9
-0@@ -7906,6 +8072,22 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl(true); break; + case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X: + intel_pmu_init_pnc(NULL); + x86_pmu.pebs_ept = 1; + x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; + x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; + x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; + extra_attr = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) ? + hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr; + extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr;Review __init int intel_pmu_init(void) · line 8093
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +7
-0+ mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; + td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs; + tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs; + pr_cont("Panthercove events, "); + name = "panthercove"; + break; + case INTEL_ALDERLAKE: case INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L: case INTEL_RAPTORLAKE:Does something like so make sense?
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +3
-11@@ -8066,6 +8066,9 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) glc_common:intel_pmu_init_glc (NULL ); +intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl (true); + + glc_base: x86_pmu.pebs_ept =1 ; x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints;@@ -8075,24 +8078,14 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs; tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs; -intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl (true);break ;case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X : -intel_pmu_init_pnc (NULL ); - x86_pmu.pebs_ept =1 ; - x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config; - x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; - x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; - extra_attr =boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) ? - hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr; - extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr; - mem_attr = glc_events_attrs; - td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs;
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c __init int intel_pmu_init(void) · line 8091
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +3
-2- tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs;pr_cont ("Panthercove events, " ); name ="panthercove" ; -break ; +intel_pmu_init_pnc (NULL ); + x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; + goto glc_base;case INTEL_ALDERLAKE :case INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L :
Yes, that looks better, but "goto behind" seems a little weird, I tweak the code a little bit. Thanks.
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +0 -0
@@ -8155,26 +8155,23 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_rwc_extra_regs; pr_cont("Granite Rapids events, "); name = "granite_rapids";
+ goto glc_common;
+
+ case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X:
+ intel_pmu_init_pnc(NULL);
+ x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; +
+ pr_cont("Panthercove events, ");
+ name = "panthercove";
+ goto glc_base;
glc_common:
intel_pmu_init_glc(NULL);
- x86_pmu.pebs_ept = 1;
- x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config;
- x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; - extra_attr = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) ?
- hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr;
- extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr;
- mem_attr = glc_events_attrs;
- td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs;
- tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs; intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl(true);
- break;
- case INTEL_DIAMONDRAPIDS_X:
- intel_pmu_init_pnc(NULL);
+ glc_base:
x86_pmu.pebs_ept = 1;
x86_pmu.hw_config = hsw_hw_config;
- x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = pnc_latency_data; x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = glc_get_event_constraints; extra_attr = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) ? hsw_format_attr : nhm_format_attr;
@@ -8182,8 +8179,6 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
mem_attr = glc_events_attrs;
td_attr = glc_td_events_attrs;
tsx_attr = glc_tsx_events_attrs;
- pr_cont("Panthercove events, ");
- name = "panthercove";
PATCH v2 4/7 perf/x86/intel: Add support for PEBS memory auxiliary info field in NVL
In reply to Dapeng MiSimilar to DMR (Panther Cove uarch), both P-core (Coyote Cove uarch) and E-core (Arctic Wolf uarch) of NVL adopt the new PEBS memory auxiliary info layout.
Coyote Cove microarchitecture shares the same PMU capabilities, including the memory auxiliary info layout, with Panther Cove. Arctic Wolf microarchitecture has a similar layout to Panther Cove, with the only difference being specific data source encoding for L2 hit cases (up to the L2 cache level). The OMR encoding remains the same as in Panther Cove.
For detailed information on the memory auxiliary info encoding, please refer to section 16.2 "PEBS LOAD LATENCY AND STORE LATENCY FACILITY" in the latest ISE documentation.
This patch defines Arctic Wolf specific data source encoding and then supports PEBS memory auxiliary info field for NVL.
--- arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +83 -0
@@ -96,6 +96,18 @@ union intel_x86_pebs_dse { unsigned int pnc_fb_full:1; unsigned int ld_reserved8:16; }; +struct { +unsigned int arw_dse:8 ; +unsigned int arw_l2_miss:1 ; +unsigned int arw_xq_promotion:1 ; +unsigned int arw_reissue:1 ; +unsigned int arw_stlb_miss:1 ; +unsigned int arw_locked:1 ; +unsigned int arw_data_blk:1 ; +unsigned int arw_addr_blk:1 ; +unsigned int arw_fb_full:1 ; +unsigned int ld_reserved9:16 ; + }; };
@@ -274,6 +286,29 @@ static u64 pnc_pebs_l2_hit_data_source[PNC_PEBS_DATA_SOURCE_MAX] = { OP_LH | P(LVL, UNC) | LEVEL(NA) | P(SNOOP, NONE), /* 0x0f: uncached */ }; +/* Version for Arctic Wolf and later */ + +/* L2 hit */ +#define ARW_PEBS_DATA_SOURCE_MAX 16 +static u64 arw_pebs_l2_hit_data_source[ARW_PEBS_DATA_SOURCE_MAX ] = { +P (OP ,LOAD ) |P (LVL ,NA ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NA ),/* 0x00: non-cache access */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L1 ) |LEVEL (L1 ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x01: L1 hit */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,LFB ) |LEVEL (LFB ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x02: WCB Hit */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x03: L2 Hit Clean */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,HIT ),/* 0x04: L2 Hit Snoop HIT */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,L2 ) |LEVEL (L2 ) |P (SNOOP ,HITM ),/* 0x05: L2 Hit Snoop Hit Modified */ +OP_LH |P (LVL ,UNC ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NONE ),/* 0x06: uncached */ +0 ,/* 0x07: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x08: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x09: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0a: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0b: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0c: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0d: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0e: Reserved */ +0 ,/* 0x0f: Reserved */ +}; +/* L2 miss */ #define OMR_DATA_SOURCE_MAX 16static u64 omr_data_source[OMR_DATA_SOURCE_MAX ] = {
@@ -458,6 +493,44 @@ u64 cmt_latency_data(struct perf_event *event, u64 status) dse.mtl_fwd_blk); } +static u64 arw_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status) +{ +union intel_x86_pebs_dse dse; +union perf_mem_data_src src; +u64 val; + + dse.val = status; + +if (!dse.arw_l2_miss) + val = arw_pebs_l2_hit_data_source[dse.arw_dse &0xf ]; +else + val =parse_omr_data_source (dse.arw_dse); + +if (!val) + val =P (OP ,LOAD ) |LEVEL (NA ) |P (SNOOP ,NA ); + +if (dse.arw_stlb_miss) + val |=P (TLB ,MISS ) |P (TLB ,L2 ); +else + val |=P (TLB ,HIT ) |P (TLB ,L1 ) |P (TLB ,L2 ); + +if (dse.arw_locked) + val |=P (LOCK ,LOCKED ); + +if (dse.arw_data_blk) + val |=P (BLK ,DATA ); +if (dse.arw_addr_blk) + val |=P (BLK ,ADDR ); +if (!dse.arw_data_blk && !dse.arw_addr_blk) + val |=P (BLK ,NA ); + + src.val = val; +if (event->hw.flags &PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_ST_HSW ) + src.mem_op =P (OP ,STORE ); + +return src.val; +} +static u64 lnc_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status) {union intel_x86_pebs_dse dse;
@@ -551,6 +624,16 @@ u64 pnc_latency_data(struct perf_event *event, u64 status)return src.val; } +u64 nvl_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status) +{ +struct x86_hybrid_pmu *pmu =hybrid_pmu (event->pmu); + +if (pmu->pmu_type == hybrid_small) +return arw_latency_data (event, status); + +return pnc_latency_data (event, status); +} +static u64 load_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status) {union intel_x86_pebs_dse dse;
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +2 -0
@@ -1666,6 +1666,8 @@ u64 arl_h_latency_data(struct perf_event *event, u64 status);u64 pnc_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status); +u64 nvl_latency_data (struct perf_event *event,u64 status); +extern struct event_constraint intel_core2_pebs_event_constraints[];extern struct event_constraint intel_atom_pebs_event_constraints[];
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 5/7 perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for Novalake
In reply to Dapeng MiThis patch enables core PMU support for Novalake, covering both P-core and E-core. It includes Arctic Wolf-specific counters and PEBS constraints, and the model-specific OMR extra registers table.
Since Coyote Cove shares the same PMU capabilities as Panther Cove, the existing Panther Cove PMU enabling functions are reused for Coyote Cove.
For detailed information about counter constraints, please refer to section 16.3 "COUNTER RESTRICTIONS" in the ISE documentation.
--- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 11 ++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +99 -0
@@ -232,6 +232,29 @@ static struct event_constraint intel_skt_event_constraints[] __read_mostly = {EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END }; +static struct event_constraint intel_arw_event_constraints[]__read_mostly = { +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x00c0 ,0 ),/* INST_RETIRED.ANY */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x003c ,1 ),/* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.CORE */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0300 ,2 ),/* pseudo CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.REF */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x013c ,2 ),/* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.REF_TSC_P */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0073 ,4 ),/* TOPDOWN_BAD_SPECULATION.ALL */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x019c ,5 ),/* TOPDOWN_FE_BOUND.ALL */ +FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x02c2 ,6 ),/* TOPDOWN_RETIRING.ALL */ +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01b7 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x02b7 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x04b7 ,0x4 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x08b7 ,0x8 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01d4 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x02d4 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x04d4 ,0x4 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x08d4 ,0x8 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0175 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0275 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x21d3 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x22d3 ,0x1 ), +EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END +}; +static struct event_constraint intel_skl_event_constraints[] = {FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x00c0 ,0 ),/* INST_RETIRED.ANY */ FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x003c ,1 ),/* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.CORE */
@@ -2319,6 +2342,26 @@ static __initconst const u64 tnt_hw_cache_extra_regs }, }; +static __initconst const u64 arw_hw_cache_extra_regs + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX ] + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX ] + [PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX ] = { + [C (LL )] = { + [C (OP_READ )] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS )] =0x4000000000000001 , + [C (RESULT_MISS )] =0xFFFFF000000001 , + }, + [C (OP_WRITE )] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS )] =0x4000000000000002 , + [C (RESULT_MISS )] =0xFFFFF000000002 , + }, + [C (OP_PREFETCH )] = { + [C (RESULT_ACCESS )] =0x0 , + [C (RESULT_MISS )] =0x0 , + }, + }, +}; +EVENT_ATTR_STR (topdown-fe-bound, td_fe_bound_tnt,"event=0x71,umask=0x0" );EVENT_ATTR_STR (topdown-retiring, td_retiring_tnt,"event=0xc2,umask=0x0" );EVENT_ATTR_STR (topdown-bad-spec, td_bad_spec_tnt,"event=0x73,umask=0x6" );
@@ -2377,6 +2420,22 @@ static struct extra_reg intel_cmt_extra_regs[] __read_mostly = {EVENT_EXTRA_END }; +static struct extra_reg intel_arw_extra_regs[]__read_mostly = { +/* must define OMR_X first, see intel_alt_er() */ +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x01b7 ,MSR_OMR_0 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_0 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x02b7 ,MSR_OMR_1 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x04b7 ,MSR_OMR_2 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_2 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x08b7 ,MSR_OMR_3 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_3 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x01d4 ,MSR_OMR_0 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_0 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x02d4 ,MSR_OMR_1 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_1 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x04d4 ,MSR_OMR_2 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_2 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x08d4 ,MSR_OMR_3 ,0xc0ffffffffffffffull ,OMR_3 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_PEBS_LDLAT_EXTRA_REG (0x5d0 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x0127 ,MSR_SNOOP_RSP_0 ,0xffffffffffffffffull ,SNOOP_0 ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x0227 ,MSR_SNOOP_RSP_1 ,0xffffffffffffffffull ,SNOOP_1 ), +EVENT_EXTRA_END +}; +EVENT_ATTR_STR (topdown-fe-bound, td_fe_bound_skt,"event=0x9c,umask=0x01" );EVENT_ATTR_STR (topdown-retiring, td_retiring_skt,"event=0xc2,umask=0x02" );EVENT_ATTR_STR (topdown-be-bound, td_be_bound_skt,"event=0xa4,umask=0x02" );
@@ -7404,6 +7463,19 @@ static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_skt(struct pmu *pmu)static_call_update (intel_pmu_enable_acr_event, intel_pmu_enable_acr); } +static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_arw(struct pmu *pmu) +{ +intel_pmu_init_grt (pmu); + x86_pmu.flags &= ~PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1 ; + x86_pmu.flags |=PMU_FL_HAS_OMR ; +memcpy (hybrid_var (pmu, hw_cache_extra_regs), + arw_hw_cache_extra_regs,sizeof (hw_cache_extra_regs)); +hybrid (pmu, event_constraints) = intel_arw_event_constraints; +hybrid (pmu, pebs_constraints) = intel_arw_pebs_event_constraints; +hybrid (pmu, extra_regs) = intel_arw_extra_regs; +static_call_update (intel_pmu_enable_acr_event, intel_pmu_enable_acr); +} +__init int intel_pmu_init (void ) {struct attribute **extra_skl_attr = &empty_attrs;
@@ -8249,6 +8321,33 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) name ="arrowlake_h_hybrid" ;break ; +case INTEL_NOVALAKE : +case INTEL_NOVALAKE_L : +pr_cont ("Novalake Hybrid events, " ); + name ="novalake_hybrid" ; +intel_pmu_init_hybrid (hybrid_big_small); + + x86_pmu.pebs_latency_data = nvl_latency_data; + x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = mtl_get_event_constraints; + x86_pmu.hw_config = adl_hw_config; + + td_attr = lnl_hybrid_events_attrs; + mem_attr = mtl_hybrid_mem_attrs; + tsx_attr = adl_hybrid_tsx_attrs; + extra_attr =boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) ? + mtl_hybrid_extra_attr_rtm : mtl_hybrid_extra_attr; + +/* Initialize big core specific PerfMon capabilities.*/ + pmu = &x86_pmu.hybrid_pmu[X86_HYBRID_PMU_CORE_IDX ]; +intel_pmu_init_pnc (&pmu->pmu); + +/* Initialize Atom core specific PerfMon capabilities.*/ + pmu = &x86_pmu.hybrid_pmu[X86_HYBRID_PMU_ATOM_IDX ]; +intel_pmu_init_arw (&pmu->pmu); + +intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_lnl (); +break ; +default :switch (x86_pmu.version) {case 1 :
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +11 -0
@@ -1293,6 +1293,17 @@ struct event_constraint intel_grt_pebs_event_constraints[] = {EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END }; +struct event_constraint intel_arw_pebs_event_constraints[] = { +/* Allow all events as PEBS with no flags */ +INTEL_HYBRID_LAT_CONSTRAINT (0x5d0 ,0xff ), +INTEL_HYBRID_LAT_CONSTRAINT (0x6d0 ,0xff ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01d4 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x02d4 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x04d4 ,0x4 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x08d4 ,0x8 ), +EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END +}; +struct event_constraint intel_nehalem_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_PLD_CONSTRAINT (0x100b ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0f ,0xf ),/* MEM_UNCORE_RETIRED.* */
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +2 -0
@@ -1680,6 +1680,8 @@ extern struct event_constraint intel_glp_pebs_event_constraints[];extern struct event_constraint intel_grt_pebs_event_constraints[]; +extern struct event_constraint intel_arw_pebs_event_constraints[]; +extern struct event_constraint intel_nehalem_pebs_event_constraints[];extern struct event_constraint intel_westmere_pebs_event_constraints[];
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 6/7 perf/x86: Use macros to replace magic numbers in attr_rdpmc
In reply to Dapeng MiReplace magic numbers in attr_rdpmc with macros to improve readability and make their meanings clearer for users.
--- arch/x86/events/core.c | 7 ++++--- arch/x86/events/intel/p6.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/events/core.c +4 -3
@@ -2163,7 +2163,8 @@ static int __init init_hw_perf_events(void)pr_cont ("%s PMU driver.\n" , x86_pmu.name); - x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc =1 ;/* enable userspace RDPMC usage by default */ +/* enable userspace RDPMC usage by default */ + x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc =X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE ;for (quirk = x86_pmu.quirks; quirk; quirk = quirk->next) quirk->func ();
@@ -2643,12 +2644,12 @@ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,*/ if (val ==0 )static_branch_inc (&rdpmc_never_available_key); -else if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==0 ) +else if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_NEVER_ENABLE )static_branch_dec (&rdpmc_never_available_key);if (val ==2 )static_branch_inc (&rdpmc_always_available_key); -else if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==2 ) +else if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE )static_branch_dec (&rdpmc_always_available_key);on_each_cpu (cr4_update_pce,NULL ,1 );
arch/x86/events/intel/p6.c +1 -1
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static __init void p6_pmu_rdpmc_quirk(void)*/ pr_warn ("Userspace RDPMC support disabled due to a CPU erratum\n" ); x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc_broken =1 ; - x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc =0 ; + x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc =X86_USER_RDPMC_NEVER_ENABLE ; } }
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +7 -0
@@ -187,6 +187,13 @@ struct amd_nb { (1ULL << PERF_REG_X86_R14) | \ (1ULL << PERF_REG_X86_R15)) +/* user space rdpmc control values */ +enum { +X86_USER_RDPMC_NEVER_ENABLE =0 , +X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE =1 , +X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE =2 , +}; +/* * Per register state. */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 7/7 perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
In reply to Dapeng MiStarting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new RDPMC_USR_DISABLE bit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- New RDPMC_USR_DISABLE bits in IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL MSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:
If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;
- RDPMC_USR_DISABLE is enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].
This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:
- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.
The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers. + - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped, + user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters. + + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.
arch/x86/events/core.c +21 -0
@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +26 -0
@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up
@@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. +* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; + } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)
@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);
@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6 -0
@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6 -2
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)
@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))
@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; };
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Quoted 9 lines · Dapeng Mi
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0+static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. +* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked.
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3286
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; + } +}
Is it not simpler to invert that condition?
if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_NEVER || !event->ctx->task) event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE; else event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE;
Re: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Quoted 23 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Dapeng Mi
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0+static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. +* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3286
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; + } +}Is it not simpler to invert that condition?
Quoted 5 lines
if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_NEVER || !event->ctx->task) event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE; else event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE;
Hmm, it seems the logic changes along with the code change. The system-wide event should be allowed to read with rdpmc from user space when attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE, but it doesn't with the new code.
If we don't change the logic and just invert the condition, the code simplicity has no much change.
if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_NEVER ||
(x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE &&
!event->ctx->task))
event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE;
else
event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE;Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Quoted 31 lines · Dapeng
Quoted 23 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Dapeng Mi
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0+static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. +* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3286
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; + } +}Is it not simpler to invert that condition?
Quoted 5 lines
if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_NEVER || !event->ctx->task) event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE; else event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE;
Quoted 3 lines
Hmm, it seems the logic changes along with the code change. The system-wide event should be allowed to read with rdpmc from user space when
attr_rdpmc==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE, but it doesn't with the new code.
Bah, indeed. Oh well.
Ian Rogers
reviewerRe: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
In reply to Dapeng MiQuoted 68 lines · Dapeng Mi
Starting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEbit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- NewRDPMC_USR_DISABLEbits inIA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRLMSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;-
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEis enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (
/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
Signed-off-by Dapeng Mi <[email protected]>--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmcDocumentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers.
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc line 17
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +10
-0+ - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped, + user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters.
Fwiw, I found it surprising in the test:
https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools-next.git/tree/tools/perf/tests/mmap-basic.c?h=perf-tools-next#n375
that the enable/disable of rdpmc on cpu_atom affected cpu_core and vice-versa. Perhaps the docs could mention this.
Also fwiw, I remember Peter's proposal to improve rdpmc so that restartable sequences or CPU affinities aren't necessary on hybrid machines by handling faults in the kernel:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/[email protected]/
which imo would be a welcome addition. Perhaps without that fix we can document the affinity/rseq needs.
Thanks,
Ian
Quoted 173 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +23
-0+ + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.arch/x86/events/core.c +21
-0@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +26
-0@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up @@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. +* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; + } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6
-0@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6
-3@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; }; --2.34.1
Re: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Quoted 74 lines · Ian Rogers
Quoted 73 lines · Dapeng Mi
Starting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEbit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- NewRDPMC_USR_DISABLEbits inIA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRLMSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;-
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEis enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (
/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
Signed-off-by Dapeng Mi <[email protected]>--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmcDocumentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers. + - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped,
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc line 17
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +4
-0+ user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters.Fwiw, I found it surprising in the test:
https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools-next.git/tree/tools/perf/tests/mmap-basic.c?h=perf-tools-next#n375
that the enable/disable of rdpmc oncpu_atomaffectedcpu_coreand vice-versa. Perhaps the docs could mention this.
Yes, currently the rdpmc attribute is implemented as global attribute in x86 PMU driver even for the hybrid platform. I suppose it's fine and reasonable since there could be no such real requirement to set different rdpmc attribute on hybrid platforms.
Sure. I would add words to mention this.
Quoted 7 lines
Also fwiw, I remember Peter's proposal to improve rdpmc so that restartable sequences or CPU affinities aren't necessary on hybrid machines by handling faults in the kernel:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/[email protected]/
which imo would be a welcome addition. Perhaps without that fix we can document the affinity/rseq needs.
I would create an independent patch for Peter's proposal and post it to upstream for review. Actually it has been in my to-do list, I'm just always interrupted by other higher priority things. Thanks.
Quoted 177 lines
Thanks,
IanQuoted 173 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +23
-0+ + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.arch/x86/events/core.c +21
-0@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +26
-0@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up @@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. +* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; + } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6
-0@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6
-3@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; }; --2.34.1
Ian Rogers
reviewerRe: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
In reply to Dapeng MiQuoted 157 lines · Dapeng Mi
Starting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEbit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- NewRDPMC_USR_DISABLEbits inIA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRLMSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;-
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEis enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (
/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
Signed-off-by Dapeng Mi <[email protected]>--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmcDocumentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +40
-0@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers. + - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped, + user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters. + + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.arch/x86/events/core.c +21
-0@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up @@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event.
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3284
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;
AI code review flagged this, but I think the conditions are discussed in the comments. Posting the AI review out just in case as I'm not sure:
If x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE (1) and
this is a system-wide event, RDPMC_USER_DISABLE is set to block rdpmc in user space. However, during x86_pmu_event_init(), PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT is set because x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc is non-zero. Since it is not cleared when RDPMC_USER_DISABLE is active, arch_perf_update_userpage() will still set cap_user_rdpmc = 1. Does this cause user space to mistakenly attempt rdpmc? If user space uses rdpmc for the system-wide event, the hardware will return 0 due to the RDPMC_USER_DISABLE bit, which might result in user space silently reading garbage values instead of falling back to the read() syscall. Would it make sense to clear cap_user_rdpmc when RDPMC_USER_DISABLE is set?
Thanks,
Ian
Quoted 84 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +7
-0+ } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6
-0@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6
-3@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; }; --2.34.1
Re: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Quoted 174 lines · Ian Rogers
Quoted 156 lines · Dapeng Mi
Starting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEbit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- NewRDPMC_USR_DISABLEbits inIA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRLMSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;-
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEis enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (
/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
Signed-off-by Dapeng Mi <[email protected]>--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmcDocumentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +40
-0@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers. + - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped, + user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters. + + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.arch/x86/events/core.c +21
-0@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up @@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3284
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;AI code review flagged this, but I think the conditions are discussed in the comments. Posting the AI review out just in case as I'm not sure:
If x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE(1) and
this is a system-wide event,RDPMC_USER_DISABLEis set to block rdpmc in user space. However, duringx86_pmu_event_init(),PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNTis set because x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc is
Quoted 8 lines
non-zero. Since it is not cleared when
RDPMC_USER_DISABLEis active,arch_perf_update_userpage()will still setcap_user_rdpmc= 1. Does this cause user space to mistakenly attempt rdpmc? If user space uses rdpmc for the system-wide event, the hardware will return 0 due to theRDPMC_USER_DISABLEbit, which might result in user space silently reading garbage values instead of falling back to theread()syscall. Would it make sense to clearcap_user_rdpmcwhenRDPMC_USER_DISABLEis set?
Yes, I suppose the comment makes sense. We can further update the cap_user_rdpmc base on the RDPMC_USER_DISABLE bit. Thanks.
Quoted 88 lines
Thanks,
IanQuoted 84 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +7
-0+ } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6
-0@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6
-3@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; }; --2.34.1
Re: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Hi, is the "update cap_user_rdpmc" patch already on lkml?
Thanks,
CT
Quoted 279 lines · Dapeng
Quoted 174 lines · Ian Rogers
Quoted 156 lines · Dapeng Mi
Starting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEbit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- NewRDPMC_USR_DISABLEbits inIA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRLMSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;-
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEis enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (
/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
Signed-off-by Dapeng Mi <[email protected]>--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmcDocumentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +40
-0@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers. + - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped, + user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters. + + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.arch/x86/events/core.c +21
-0@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up @@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3284
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;AI code review flagged this, but I think the conditions are discussed in the comments. Posting the AI review out just in case as I'm not sure:
If x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE(1) and
this is a system-wide event,RDPMC_USER_DISABLEis set to block rdpmc in user space. However, duringx86_pmu_event_init(),PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNTis set because x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc isQuoted 8 lines
non-zero. Since it is not cleared when
RDPMC_USER_DISABLEis active,arch_perf_update_userpage()will still setcap_user_rdpmc= 1. Does this cause user space to mistakenly attempt rdpmc? If user space uses rdpmc for the system-wide event, the hardware will return 0 due to theRDPMC_USER_DISABLEbit, which might result in user space silently reading garbage values instead of falling back to theread()syscall. Would it make sense to clearcap_user_rdpmcwhenRDPMC_USER_DISABLEis set?Yes, I suppose the comment makes sense. We can further update the
cap_user_rdpmcbase on theRDPMC_USER_DISABLEbit. Thanks.Quoted 88 lines
Thanks,
IanQuoted 84 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +7
-0+ } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6
-0@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6
-3@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; }; --2.34.1
Re: [Patch v2 7/7] perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
Never mind, I found it.
Quoted 286 lines · Chun-Tse Shao
Hi, is the "update
cap_user_rdpmc" patch already on lkml?Thanks,
CTQuoted 279 lines · Dapeng
Quoted 174 lines · Ian Rogers
Quoted 156 lines · Dapeng Mi
Starting with Panther Cove, the rdpmc user disable feature is supported. This feature allows the perf system to disable user space rdpmc reads at the counter level.
Currently, when a global counter is active, any user with rdpmc rights can read it, even if perf access permissions forbid it (e.g., disallow reading ring 0 counters). The rdpmc user disable feature mitigates this security concern.
Details:
- A new
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEbit (bit 37) in each EVNTSELx MSR indicates that the GP counter cannot be read by RDPMC in ring 3.
- NewRDPMC_USR_DISABLEbits inIA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRLMSR (bits 33, 37, 41, 45, etc.) for fixed counters 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
- When calling rdpmc instruction for counter x, the following pseudo code demonstrates how the counter value is obtained:If (!CPL0 && RDPMC_USR_DISABLE[x] == 1) ? 0 : counter_value;-
RDPMC_USR_DISABLEis enumerated by CPUID.0x23.0.EBX[2].This patch extends the current global user space rdpmc control logic via the sysfs interface (
/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc) as follows:- rdpmc = 0:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are both disabled.
- rdpmc = 1:
Global user space rdpmc is enabled during the mmap-enabled time window, and counter-level user space rdpmc is enabled only for non-system-wide events. This prevents counter data leaks as count data is cleared during context switches.
- rdpmc = 2:
Global user space rdpmc and counter-level user space rdpmc for all counters are enabled unconditionally.The new rdpmc settings only affect newly activated perf events; currently active perf events remain unaffected. This simplifies and cleans up the code. The default value of rdpmc remains unchanged at 1.
For more details about rdpmc user disable, please refer to chapter 15 "RDPMC USER DISABLE" in ISE documentation.
Signed-off-by Dapeng Mi <[email protected]>--- .../sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/core.c | 21 ++++++++++ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 8 +++- 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmcDocumentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-rdpmc new file +40
-0@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +What: /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc +Date: November 2011 +KernelVersion: 3.10 +Contact: Linux kernel mailing list [email protected] +Description: The /sys/bus/event_source/devices/cpu.../rdpmc attribute + is used to show/manage if rdpmc instruction can be + executed in user space. This attribute supports 3 numbers. + - rdpmc = 0 + user space rdpmc is globally disabled for all PMU + counters. + - rdpmc = 1 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled only in event mmap + ioctl called time window. If the mmap region is unmapped, + user space rdpmc is disabled again. + - rdpmc = 2 + user space rdpmc is globally enabled for all PMU + counters. + + In the Intel platforms supporting counter level's user + space rdpmc disable feature (CPUID.23H.EBX[2] = 1), the + meaning of 3 numbers is extended to + - rdpmc = 0 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both disabled. + - rdpmc = 1 + No changes on behavior of global user space rdpmc. + counter level's rdpmc of system-wide events is disabled + but counter level's rdpmc of non-system-wide events is + enabled. + - rdpmc = 2 + global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space + rdpmc of all counters are both enabled unconditionally. + + The default value of rdpmc is 1. + + Please notice global user space rdpmc's behavior would + change immediately along with the rdpmc value's change, + but the behavior of counter level's user space rdpmc + won't take effect immediately until the event is + reactivated or recreated.arch/x86/events/core.c +21
-0@@ -2616,6 +2616,27 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,return snprintf (buf,40 ,"%d\n" , x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc); } +/* +* Behaviors of rdpmc value: +* - rdpmc = 0 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are both disabled. +* - rdpmc = 1 +* global user space rdpmc is enabled in mmap enabled time window and +* counter level's user space rdpmc is enabled for only non system-wide +* events. Counter level's user space rdpmc of system-wide events is +* still disabled by default. This won't introduce counter data leak for +* non system-wide events since their count data would be cleared when +* context switches. +* - rdpmc = 2 +* global user space rdpmc and counter level's user space rdpmc of all +* counters are enabled unconditionally. +* +* Suppose the rdpmc value won't be changed frequently, don't dynamically +* reschedule events to make the new rpdmc value take effect on active perf +* events immediately, the new rdpmc value would only impact the new +* activated perf events. This makes code simpler and cleaner. +*/ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t count)arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +9
-0@@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_USER ;if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS ) bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL ; +if (hwc->config &ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ) + bits |=INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;/* * ANY bit is supported in v3 and up @@ -3263,6 +3265,26 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event)__intel_pmu_update_event_ext (hwc->idx, ext); } +static void intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (struct perf_event *event) +{ +/* +* Counter scope's user-space rdpmc is disabled by default +* except two cases. +* a. rdpmc = 2 (user space rdpmc enabled unconditionally) +* b. rdpmc = 1 and the event is not a system-wide event. arch/x86/events/intel/core.c static void intel_pmu_enable_event_ext(struct perf_event *event) · line 3284
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +10
-0+* The count of non-system-wide events would be cleared when +* context switches, so no count data is leaked. +*/ +if (x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (event->pmu)) { +if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_ALWAYS_ENABLE || + (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE && + event->ctx->task)) + event->hw.config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ; +else + event->hw.config |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;AI code review flagged this, but I think the conditions are discussed in the comments. Posting the AI review out just in case as I'm not sure:
If x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc ==X86_USER_RDPMC_CONDITIONAL_ENABLE(1) and
this is a system-wide event,RDPMC_USER_DISABLEis set to block rdpmc in user space. However, duringx86_pmu_event_init(),PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNTis set because x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc isQuoted 8 lines
non-zero. Since it is not cleared when
RDPMC_USER_DISABLEis active,arch_perf_update_userpage()will still setcap_user_rdpmc= 1. Does this cause user space to mistakenly attempt rdpmc? If user space uses rdpmc for the system-wide event, the hardware will return 0 due to theRDPMC_USER_DISABLEbit, which might result in user space silently reading garbage values instead of falling back to theread()syscall. Would it make sense to clearcap_user_rdpmcwhenRDPMC_USER_DISABLEis set?Yes, I suppose the comment makes sense. We can further update the
cap_user_rdpmcbase on theRDPMC_USER_DISABLEbit. Thanks.Quoted 88 lines
Thanks,
IanQuoted 84 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +7
-0+ } +} +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL (intel_pmu_enable_event_ext, intel_pmu_enable_event_ext);static void intel_pmu_enable_event (struct perf_event *event)@@ -3271,6 +3293,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;int idx = hwc->idx; +intel_pmu_update_rdpmc_user_disable (event); +if (unlikely (event->attr.precise_ip))static_call (x86_pmu_pebs_enable)(event);@@ -5863,6 +5887,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct pmu *pmu)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 ;if (ebx_0.split.eq)hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ ; +if (ebx_0.split.rdpmc_user_disable) +hybrid (pmu, config_mask) |=ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ;if (eax_0.split.cntr_subleaf) { cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF,arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +6
-0@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ static inline u64 x86_pmu_get_event_config(struct perf_event *event)return event->attr.config &hybrid (event->pmu, config_mask); } +static inline bool x86_pmu_has_rdpmc_user_disable (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return !!(hybrid (pmu, config_mask) & +ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE ); +} +extern struct event_constraint emptyconstraint;extern struct event_constraint unconstrained;arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +6
-3@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK 0xFF000000ULL#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_BR_CNTR (1ULL << 35)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ (1ULL << 36) +#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 37)#define ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK2 (0xFFULL << 40)#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE 4@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_0_USER (1ULL << 1)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD (1ULL << 2)#define INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI (1ULL << 3) +#define INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE (1ULL << 33)#define INTEL_FIXED_3_METRICS_CLEAR (1ULL << 2)#define HSW_IN_TX (1ULL << 32)@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@#define INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK \ (INTEL_FIXED_0_KERNEL | INTEL_FIXED_0_USER | \ INTEL_FIXED_0_ANYTHREAD | INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI | \ - ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE) + ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE | INTEL_FIXED_0_RDPMC_USER_DISABLE)#define intel_fixed_bits_by_idx (_idx, _bits) \ ((_bits) << ((_idx) * INTEL_FIXED_BITS_STRIDE))@@ -226,7 +228,9 @@ union cpuid35_ebx { unsigned int umask2:1;/* EQ-bit Supported */ unsigned int eq:1; - unsigned int reserved:30; +/* rdpmc user disable Supported */ + unsigned int rdpmc_user_disable:1; + unsigned int reserved:29; } split;unsigned int full; }; --2.34.1