FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree
Subsystems (3)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026011919-violin-either-12c7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 16:43:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever
XFD[i]=1
When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1 will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.
E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1, and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().
and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120 kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM, XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD (and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component):
If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i, the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1; instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).
Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.
Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +29 -3
@@ -319,10 +319,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features);#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 void fpu_update_guest_xfd (struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu,u64 xfd) { +struct fpstate *fpstate = guest_fpu->fpstate; +fpregs_lock (); - guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd; -if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use) -xfd_update_state (guest_fpu->fpstate); + +/* +* KVM's guest ABI is that setting XFD[i]=1 *can* immediately revert the +* save state to its initial configuration. Likewise, KVM_GET_XSAVE does +* the same as XSAVE and returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 whenever XFD[i]=1. +* +* If the guest's FPU state is in hardware, just update XFD: the XSAVE +* in fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate will clear XSTATE_BV[i] whenever XFD[i]=1. +* +* If however the guest's FPU state is NOT resident in hardware, clear +* disabled components in XSTATE_BV now, or a subsequent XRSTOR will +* attempt to load disabled components and generate #NM _in the host_. +*/ +if (xfd &&test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) + fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~xfd; + + fpstate->xfd = xfd; +if (fpstate->in_use) +xfd_update_state (fpstate); +fpregs_unlock (); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (fpu_update_guest_xfd);
@@ -430,6 +449,13 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf,if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0)return -EINVAL ; +/* +* Disabled features must be in their initial state, otherwise XRSTOR +* causes an exception. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & kstate->xfd)) +return -EINVAL ; +/* * Nullify @vpkru to preserve its current value if PKRU's bit isn't set * in the header. KVM's odd ABI is to leave PKRU untouched in this
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +9 -0
@@ -5807,9 +5807,18 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave) { +union fpregs_state *xstate = (union fpregs_state *)guest_xsave->region; +if (fpstate_is_confidential (&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL :0 ; +/* +* For backwards compatibility, do not expect disabled features to be in +* their initial state. XSTATE_BV[i] must still be cleared whenever +* XFD[i]=1, or XRSTOR would cause a #NM. +*/ + xstate->xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; + return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, guest_xsave->region, kvm_caps.supported_xcr0,
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6 ]
When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1 will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.
E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1, and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().
and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120 kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM, XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD (and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component):
If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i, the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1; instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).
Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.
Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
--- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +29 -3
@@ -294,10 +294,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features);#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 void fpu_update_guest_xfd (struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu,u64 xfd) { +struct fpstate *fpstate = guest_fpu->fpstate; +fpregs_lock (); - guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd; -if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use) -xfd_update_state (guest_fpu->fpstate); + +/* +* KVM's guest ABI is that setting XFD[i]=1 *can* immediately revert the +* save state to its initial configuration. Likewise, KVM_GET_XSAVE does +* the same as XSAVE and returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 whenever XFD[i]=1. +* +* If the guest's FPU state is in hardware, just update XFD: the XSAVE +* in fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate will clear XSTATE_BV[i] whenever XFD[i]=1. +* +* If however the guest's FPU state is NOT resident in hardware, clear +* disabled components in XSTATE_BV now, or a subsequent XRSTOR will +* attempt to load disabled components and generate #NM _in the host_. +*/ +if (xfd &&test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) + fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~xfd; + + fpstate->xfd = xfd; +if (fpstate->in_use) +xfd_update_state (fpstate); +fpregs_unlock (); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fpu_update_guest_xfd);
@@ -405,6 +424,13 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf,if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0)return -EINVAL ; +/* +* Disabled features must be in their initial state, otherwise XRSTOR +* causes an exception. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & kstate->xfd)) +return -EINVAL ; +/* * Nullify @vpkru to preserve its current value if PKRU's bit isn't set * in the header. KVM's odd ABI is to leave PKRU untouched in this
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +9 -0
@@ -5341,9 +5341,18 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave) { +union fpregs_state *xstate = (union fpregs_state *)guest_xsave->region; +if (fpstate_is_confidential (&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))return 0 ; +/* +* For backwards compatibility, do not expect disabled features to be in +* their initial state. XSTATE_BV[i] must still be cleared whenever +* XFD[i]=1, or XRSTOR would cause a #NM. +*/ + xstate->xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; + return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, guest_xsave->region, kvm_caps.supported_xcr0,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0