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mm/kfence: randomize the freelist on initialization

PATCH Applied Pimyn Girgis 3 participants 3 messages Jan 20 – Jan 23

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 mm/kfence: randomize the freelist on initialization

Randomize the KFENCE freelist during pool initialization to make allocation patterns less predictable. This is achieved by shuffling the order in which metadata objects are added to the freelist using get_random_u32_below().

Additionally, ensure the error path correctly calculates the address range to be reset if initialization fails, as the address increment logic has been moved to a separate loop.

Fixes 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
---
 mm/kfence/core.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/kfence/core.c +19 -4
index 577a1699c553..9e8b3cfd3f76 100644
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
 static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 {
 	unsigned long addr, start_pfn;
-	int i;
+	int i, rand;
 
 	if (!arch_kfence_init_pool())
 		return (unsigned long)__kfence_pool;
@@ -647,13 +647,27 @@ static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list);
 		raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock);
 		meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED;
-		meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */
-		list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+		/* Use addr to randomize the freelist. */
+		meta->addr = i;
 
 		/* Protect the right redzone. */
-		if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE)))
+		if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + 2 * i * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE)))
 			goto reset_slab;
+	}
+
+	for (i = CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i > 0; i--) {
+		rand = get_random_u32_below(i);
+		swap(kfence_metadata_init[i - 1].addr, kfence_metadata_init[rand].addr);
+	}
 
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		struct kfence_metadata *meta_1 = &kfence_metadata_init[i];
+		struct kfence_metadata *meta_2 = &kfence_metadata_init[meta_1->addr];
+
+		list_add_tail(&meta_2->list, &kfence_freelist);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		kfence_metadata_init[i].addr = addr;
 		addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
 
@@ -666,6 +680,7 @@ static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 	return 0;
 
 reset_slab:
+	addr += 2 * i * PAGE_SIZE;
 	for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
 		struct page *page;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0.457.g6b5491de43-goog
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · On Tue, 20 Jan 2026 17:15:10 +0100 Pimyn Girgis <[email protected]> wrote:

Randomize the KFENCE freelist during pool initialization to make allocation patterns less predictable. This is achieved by shuffling the order in which metadata objects are added to the freelist using get_random_u32_below().

Additionally, ensure the error path correctly calculates the address range to be reset if initialization fails, as the address increment logic has been moved to a separate loop.

Fixes 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")

It isn't clear (to me) what was wrong with 0ce20dd84089, nor why a -stable backport is proposed.

Can we please have a full description of the current misbehavior? What are the worst-case userspace-visible effects of this flaw?

maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Pimyn Girgis
Quoted 5 lines · Pimyn Girgis

Randomize the KFENCE freelist during pool initialization to make allocation patterns less predictable. This is achieved by shuffling the order in which metadata objects are added to the freelist using get_random_u32_below().

Quoted 7 lines

Additionally, ensure the error path correctly calculates the address range to be reset if initialization fails, as the address increment logic has been moved to a separate loop.

Fixes 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")