vfs: allow mounting inside a container without FS_USERNS_MOUNT by root
RFC PATCH 1/1 vfs: allow mounting inside a container without FS_USERNS_MOUNT by root
Meta (and some other places) have an unusual process for doing an NFS mount inside an unprivilged container. They do the fsopen() and inside the container, and then pass it to a privileged daemon running outside that container via unix socket, that then does the mount.
Commit e1c5ae59c0f22 ("fs: don't allow non-init s_user_ns for filesystems without FS_USERNS_MOUNT") broke this scheme, as the fc->user_ns is not init_user_ns, even though the daemon doing the mount has CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Add a check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN to get it working again.
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We've needed to revert e1c5ae59c0f22 for the last year or so in order to keep NFS mounts inside containers working. Does this approach seem sane, or are there valid concerns with allowing this that I'm not aware of?
This is not well tested yet, hence the RFC.
--- fs/super.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/super.c +6 -3
@@ -738,12 +738,15 @@ struct super_block *sget_fc(struct fs_context *fc,int err;/* -* Never allow s_user_ns != &init_user_ns when FS_USERNS_MOUNT is +* Don't allow s_user_ns != &init_user_ns when FS_USERNS_MOUNT is * not set, as the filesystem is likely unprepared to handle it. * This can happen when fsconfig() is called from init_user_ns with -* an fs_fd opened in another user namespace. +* an fs_fd opened in another user namespace. If the user has +* CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init_user_ns however, allow it. */ -if (user_ns != &init_user_ns && !(fc->fs_type->fs_flags &FS_USERNS_MOUNT )) { +if (user_ns != &init_user_ns && + !(fc->fs_type->fs_flags &FS_USERNS_MOUNT ) && + !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) {errorfc (fc,"VFS: Mounting from non-initial user namespace is not allowed" );return ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); }
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base-commit: 1f97d9dcf53649c41c33227b345a36902cbb08ad
change-id: 20260128-twmount-c29299e88464
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 37 lines · Jeff Layton
Meta (and some other places) have an unusual process for doing an NFS mount inside an unprivilged container. They do the
fsopen()and inside the container, and then pass it to a privileged daemon running outside that container via unix socket, that then does the mount.Commit
e1c5ae59c0f22("fs: don't allow non-inits_user_nsfor filesystems withoutFS_USERNS_MOUNT") broke this scheme, as thefc->user_nsis notinit_user_ns, even though the daemon doing the mount hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN.Add a check for
CAP_SYS_ADMINto get it working again.Fixes e1c5ae59c0f22 ("fs: don't allow non-init s_user_ns for filesystems without FS_USERNS_MOUNT")Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>---
We've needed to reverte1c5ae59c0f22for the last year or so in order to keep NFS mounts inside containers working. Does this approach seem sane, or are there valid concerns with allowing this that I'm not aware of?This is not well tested yet, hence the RFC.
--- fs/super.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/super.c +1
-2@@ -738,12 +738,15 @@ struct super_block *sget_fc(struct fs_context *fc,int err;/* -* Never allow s_user_ns != &init_user_ns when FS_USERNS_MOUNT is +* Don't allow s_user_ns != &init_user_ns when FS_USERNS_MOUNT is * not set, as the filesystem is likely unprepared to handle it. * This can happen when fsconfig() is called from init_user_ns with -* an fs_fd opened in another user namespace.
fs/super.c struct super_block *sget_fc(struct fs_context *fc, · line 752
Quoted 10 lines
fs/super.c +5
-1+* an fs_fd opened in another user namespace. If the user has +* CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init_user_ns however, allow it. */ -if (user_ns != &init_user_ns && !(fc->fs_type->fs_flags &FS_USERNS_MOUNT )) { +if (user_ns != &init_user_ns && + !(fc->fs_type->fs_flags &FS_USERNS_MOUNT ) && + !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) {errorfc (fc,"VFS: Mounting from non-initial user namespace is not allowed" );return ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); }
Actually, the above seems wrong, and goes against what the original patch is trying to do. That said, I think the original patch is wrong too. The original flag is only supposed to govern whether root inside the userns is allowed to mount this fs_type:
#define FS_USERNS_MOUNT 8 /* Can be mounted by userns root */
...but e1c5ae59c0f22 uses this as proxy for "filesystem can work inside a different userns". These are two different things.
For instance, AFAICT NFS works just fine when mounted inside an alternate userns. We don't want to add FS_USERNS_MOUNT though, since there is too much danger of someone mounting a malicious server to exploit a bug in the client -- we want to leave that to a privileged daemon in the init_user_ns.
Should we split this flag into two?
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>