libceph: CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 (--key-type aes256k) support
Ilya Dryomov
maintainercover libceph: CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 (--key-type aes256k) support
Hello,
This series adds support for the upcoming CephX key type that is based on Kerberos 5.
Thanks,
Ilya
Ilya Dryomov (5):
libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
libceph: generalize ceph_x_encrypt_offset() and
ceph_x_encrypt_buflen()
libceph: introduce ceph_crypto_key_prepare()
libceph: add support for CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5
libceph: adapt ceph_x_challenge_blob hashing and msgr1 message signing
include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 5 +- net/ceph/Kconfig | 1 + net/ceph/auth_x.c | 195 ++++++++++++++++++------- net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h | 38 +++++ net/ceph/crypto.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- net/ceph/crypto.h | 21 ++- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 16 +- 7 files changed, 433 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerPATCH 1/5 libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane length.
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled elsewhere anyway.
--- net/ceph/crypto.c | 8 +++++--- net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 +- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ceph/crypto.c +5 -3
@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ static int set_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void *buf)return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (!key->len) -return -EINVAL ; - key->key =kmemdup (buf, key->len,GFP_NOIO );if (!key->key) { ret = -ENOMEM ;
@@ -83,6 +80,11 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end)ceph_decode_copy (p, &key->created,sizeof (key->created)); key->len =ceph_decode_16 (p);ceph_decode_need (p, end, key->len, bad); +if (key->len >CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN ) { +pr_err ("secret too big %d\n" , key->len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + ret =set_secret (key, *p);memzero_explicit (*p, key->len); *p += key->len;
net/ceph/crypto.h +1 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@#include <linux/ceph/types.h> #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h> -#define CEPH_KEY_LEN 16 +#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 16#define CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN 64/*
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1 -1
@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ static int process_auth_reply_more(struct ceph_connection *con,*/ static int process_auth_done (struct ceph_connection *con,void *p,void *end) { -u8 session_key_buf[CEPH_KEY_LEN +16 ]; +u8 session_key_buf[CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN +16 ];u8 con_secret_buf[CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN +16 ];u8 *session_key =PTR_ALIGN (&session_key_buf[0 ],16 );u8 *con_secret =PTR_ALIGN (&con_secret_buf[0 ],16 );
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH 1/5] libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
Quoted 22 lines · Ilya Dryomov
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into a fixed-size buffer in
process_auth_done()and generally has a sane length.The new
CEPH_MAX_KEY_LENcheck replaces the existing check for a key with no key material which is a) not universal sinceCEPH_CRYPTO_NONEhas to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled elsewhere anyway.Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>--- net/ceph/crypto.c | 8 +++++--- net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 +- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)net/ceph/crypto.c +0
-0
net/ceph/crypto.c static int set_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void *buf) · line 41
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +0
-2@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ static int set_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void *buf)return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (!key->len) -return -EINVAL ;
Are you sure that this check is not necessary? What is the motivation that we can remove this check?
Could be key->len bigger than CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN?
Quoted 21 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +5
-1- key->key =kmemdup (buf, key->len,GFP_NOIO );if (!key->key) { ret = -ENOMEM ;@@ -83,6 +80,11 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end)ceph_decode_copy (p, &key->created,sizeof (key->created)); key->len =ceph_decode_16 (p);ceph_decode_need (p, end, key->len, bad); +if (key->len >CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN ) { +pr_err ("secret too big %d\n" , key->len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + ret =set_secret (key, *p);memzero_explicit (*p, key->len); *p += key->len;net/ceph/crypto.h +0
-0
net/ceph/crypto.h line 8
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/crypto.h +1
-1@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@#include <linux/ceph/types.h> #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h> -#define CEPH_KEY_LEN 16 +#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 16
Frankly speaking, I don't quite follow what was the point to change the constant name?
Thanks,
Slava.
Quoted 16 lines
net/ceph/crypto.h +0
-0#define CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN 64/* net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ static int process_auth_reply_more(struct ceph_connection *con,*/ static int process_auth_done (struct ceph_connection *con,void *p,void *end) { -u8 session_key_buf[CEPH_KEY_LEN +16 ]; +u8 session_key_buf[CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN +16 ];u8 con_secret_buf[CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN +16 ];u8 *session_key =PTR_ALIGN (&session_key_buf[0 ],16 );u8 *con_secret =PTR_ALIGN (&con_secret_buf[0 ],16 );
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/5] libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
Quoted 27 lines · Viacheslav Dubeyko
Quoted 25 lines · Ilya Dryomov
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into a fixed-size buffer in
process_auth_done()and generally has a sane length.The new
CEPH_MAX_KEY_LENcheck replaces the existing check for a key with no key material which is a) not universal sinceCEPH_CRYPTO_NONEhas to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled elsewhere anyway.Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>--- net/ceph/crypto.c | 8 +++++--- net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 +- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)net/ceph/crypto.c +0
-0@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ static int set_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void *buf)return -ENOTSUPP ; }
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c static int set_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void *buf) · line 41
Quoted 2 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +0
-2-if (!key->len) -return -EINVAL ;Are you sure that this check is not necessary? What is the motivation that we can remove this check?
Hi Slava,
The motivation is explained in the patch description:
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled elsewhere anyway.
The important point is (b): I don't see much sense in explicitly denying 0-byte keys but accepting e.g. 1-byte keys. Both will be rejected by crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey() later anyway.
Quoted 2 lines
Could be
key->lenbigger thanCEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN?
Not if everything is working as expected. But in theory anything is possible because the key that we start with is essentially user input and therefore can easily be malformed -- hence this change.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +5
-1- key->key =kmemdup (buf, key->len,GFP_NOIO );if (!key->key) { ret = -ENOMEM ;@@ -83,6 +80,11 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end)ceph_decode_copy (p, &key->created,sizeof (key->created)); key->len =ceph_decode_16 (p);ceph_decode_need (p, end, key->len, bad); +if (key->len >CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN ) { +pr_err ("secret too big %d\n" , key->len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + ret =set_secret (key, *p);memzero_explicit (*p, key->len); *p += key->len;net/ceph/crypto.h +0
-0@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@#include <linux/ceph/types.h> #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/crypto.h line 8
Quoted 2 lines
net/ceph/crypto.h +1
-1-#define CEPH_KEY_LEN 16 +#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 16Frankly speaking, I don't quite follow what was the point to change the constant name?
CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 is going to operate on 32-byte keys. And, irrespective of that, having MAX in the name communicates the intended usage better.
Thanks,
Ilya
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerPATCH 2/5 libceph: generalize ceph_x_encrypt_offset() and ceph_x_encrypt_buflen()
In reply to Ilya Dryomov- introduce the notion of a data offset for ceph_x_encrypt_offset() to allow for e.g. confounder to be prepended before the encryption header in the future. For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES, the data offset is 0 (i.e. nothing is prepended).
- adjust ceph_x_encrypt_buflen() accordingly and make it account for PKCS#7 padding that is used by CEPH_CRYPTO_AES precisely instead of just always adding 16.
--- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- net/ceph/crypto.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
net/ceph/auth_x.c +29 -15
@@ -44,23 +44,35 @@ static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)return !!need; } -static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset (void ) +static int __ceph_x_encrypt_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -return sizeof (u32) +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); +return ceph_crypt_data_offset (key) + +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); } -static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (int ilen) +static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -return ceph_x_encrypt_offset () + ilen +16 ; +return sizeof (u32) +__ceph_x_encrypt_offset (key); +} + +/* +* AES: ciphertext_len | hdr | data... | padding +*/ +static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +int data_len) +{ +int encrypt_len =sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ) + data_len; +return sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_buflen (key, encrypt_len); }static int ceph_x_encrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *buf,int buf_len,int plaintext_len) { -struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = buf +sizeof (u32); +struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int ciphertext_len;int ret; + hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret); hdr->struct_v =1 ; hdr->magic =cpu_to_le64 (CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC );
@@ -77,7 +89,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf,static int __ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *p,int ciphertext_len) { -struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = p; +struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int plaintext_len;int ret;
@@ -86,6 +98,7 @@ static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p,if (ret)return ret; + hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret);if (le64_to_cpu (hdr->magic) !=CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ) {pr_err ("%s bad magic\n" , __func__);return -EINVAL ;
@@ -193,7 +206,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, }/* blob for me */ - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;
@@ -220,7 +233,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, is_enc, bad);if (is_enc) {/* encrypted */ - tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;
@@ -312,7 +325,7 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, p = (void *)(msg_a +1 ) +le32_to_cpu (msg_a->ticket_blob.blob_len); end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len; - msg_b = p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + msg_b = p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&au->session_key); msg_b->struct_v =2 ; msg_b->nonce =cpu_to_le64 (au->nonce);if (server_challenge) {
@@ -368,7 +381,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, goto out_au; maxlen =sizeof (*msg_a) + ticket_blob_len + -ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (sizeof (*msg_b)); +ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (&au->session_key,sizeof (*msg_b));dout (" need len %d\n" , maxlen);if (au->buf && au->buf->alloc_len < maxlen) {ceph_buffer_put (au->buf);
@@ -507,7 +520,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,struct ceph_x_authenticate *auth = (void *)(head +1 );void *enc_buf = xi->auth_authorizer.enc_buf;struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob = enc_buf + -ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&xi->secret);u64 *u; p = auth +1 ;
@@ -634,7 +647,7 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id,ceph_decode_need (p, end, len, e_inval);dout ("%s connection secret blob len %d\n" , __func__, len);if (len >0 ) { - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, *p + len);if (ret <0 )return ret;
@@ -804,7 +817,7 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,return ret;dout ("%s decrypted %d bytes\n" , __func__, ret); - dp = challenge +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); + dp = challenge +__ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); dend = dp + ret;ceph_decode_skip_8 (&dp, dend, e_inval);/* struct_v */
@@ -851,7 +864,7 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,u8 struct_v;int ret; - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end);if (ret <0 )return ret;
@@ -974,7 +987,8 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,__le32 front_crc;__le32 middle_crc;__le32 data_crc; - }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf + +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&au->session_key); sigblock->len =cpu_to_le32 (4 *sizeof (u32)); sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;
net/ceph/crypto.c +25 -0
@@ -285,6 +285,31 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, } } +int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) +{ +switch (key->type) { +case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE : +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES : +return 0 ; +default : +BUG (); + } +} + +int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len) +{ +switch (key->type) { +case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE : +return data_len; +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES : +/* PKCS#7 padding at the end */ +return data_len +AES_BLOCK_SIZE - + (data_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE -1 )); +default : +BUG (); + } +} +static int ceph_key_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) {struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
net/ceph/crypto.h +2 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key);/* crypto.c */ int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len); +int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key); +int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len);int ceph_crypto_init (void );void ceph_crypto_shutdown (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH 2/5] libceph: generalize ceph_x_encrypt_offset() and ceph_x_encrypt_buflen()
Quoted 27 lines · Ilya Dryomov
- introduce the notion of a data offset for
ceph_x_encrypt_offset()to allow for e.g. confounder to be prepended before the encryption header in the future. ForCEPH_CRYPTO_AES, the data offset is 0 (i.e. nothing is prepended).- adjust
ceph_x_encrypt_buflen()accordingly and make it account for PKCS#7 padding that is used byCEPH_CRYPTO_AESprecisely instead of just always adding 16.Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>--- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- net/ceph/crypto.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)net/ceph/auth_x.c +1
-1@@ -44,23 +44,35 @@ static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)return !!need; } -static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset (void ) +static int __ceph_x_encrypt_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) {
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) · line 55
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +4
-3-return sizeof (u32) +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); +return ceph_crypt_data_offset (key) + +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); } -static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (int ilen) +static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -return ceph_x_encrypt_offset () + ilen +16 ; +return sizeof (u32) +__ceph_x_encrypt_offset (key);
Frankly speaking, it's hard to follow why sizeof(u32) is used. Maybe, it makes sense to introduce a named constant? This could make the code more easy to understand.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) · line 65
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +10
-0+} + +/* +* AES: ciphertext_len | hdr | data... | padding +*/ +static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +int data_len) +{ +int encrypt_len =sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ) + data_len; +return sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_buflen (key, encrypt_len);
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) · line 75
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1}static int ceph_x_encrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *buf,int buf_len,int plaintext_len) { -struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = buf +sizeof (u32); +struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int ciphertext_len;int ret; + hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret);
Ditto.
Quoted 108 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +12
-10hdr->struct_v =1 ; hdr->magic =cpu_to_le64 (CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC );@@ -77,7 +89,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf,static int __ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *p,int ciphertext_len) { -struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = p; +struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int plaintext_len;int ret;@@ -86,6 +98,7 @@ static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p,if (ret)return ret; + hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret);if (le64_to_cpu (hdr->magic) !=CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ) {pr_err ("%s bad magic\n" , __func__);return -EINVAL ;@@ -193,7 +206,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, }/* blob for me */ - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;@@ -220,7 +233,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, is_enc, bad);if (is_enc) {/* encrypted */ - tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;@@ -312,7 +325,7 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, p = (void *)(msg_a +1 ) +le32_to_cpu (msg_a->ticket_blob.blob_len); end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len; - msg_b = p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + msg_b = p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&au->session_key); msg_b->struct_v =2 ; msg_b->nonce =cpu_to_le64 (au->nonce);if (server_challenge) {@@ -368,7 +381,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, goto out_au; maxlen =sizeof (*msg_a) + ticket_blob_len + -ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (sizeof (*msg_b)); +ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (&au->session_key,sizeof (*msg_b));dout (" need len %d\n" , maxlen);if (au->buf && au->buf->alloc_len < maxlen) {ceph_buffer_put (au->buf);@@ -507,7 +520,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,struct ceph_x_authenticate *auth = (void *)(head +1 );void *enc_buf = xi->auth_authorizer.enc_buf;struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob = enc_buf + -ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&xi->secret);u64 *u; p = auth +1 ;@@ -634,7 +647,7 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id,ceph_decode_need (p, end, len, e_inval);dout ("%s connection secret blob len %d\n" , __func__, len);if (len >0 ) { - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, *p + len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -804,7 +817,7 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,return ret;dout ("%s decrypted %d bytes\n" , __func__, ret); - dp = challenge +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); + dp = challenge +__ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); dend = dp + ret;ceph_decode_skip_8 (&dp, dend, e_inval);/* struct_v */ @@ -851,7 +864,7 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,u8 struct_v;int ret; - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -974,7 +987,8 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,__le32 front_crc;__le32 middle_crc;__le32 data_crc; - }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf + +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&au->session_key); sigblock->len =cpu_to_le32 (4 *sizeof (u32)); sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;net/ceph/crypto.c +0
-0@@ -285,6 +285,31 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, }
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, · line 295
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +8
-0} +int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) +{ +switch (key->type) { +case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE : +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES : +return 0 ; +default : +BUG ();
Maybe, return error code or INT_MAX instead of BUG()?
Quoted 4 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +4
-0+ } +} + +int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len)
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, · line 309
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +10
-0+{ +switch (key->type) { +case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE : +return data_len; +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES : +/* PKCS#7 padding at the end */ +return data_len +AES_BLOCK_SIZE - + (data_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE -1 )); +default : +BUG ();
Ditto.
Thanks,
Slava.
Quoted 19 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +3
-0+ } +} +static int ceph_key_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) {struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;net/ceph/crypto.h +2
-0@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key);/* crypto.c */ int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len); +int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key); +int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len);int ceph_crypto_init (void );void ceph_crypto_shutdown (void );
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/5] libceph: generalize ceph_x_encrypt_offset() and ceph_x_encrypt_buflen()
Quoted 34 lines · Viacheslav Dubeyko
Quoted 32 lines · Ilya Dryomov
- introduce the notion of a data offset for
ceph_x_encrypt_offset()to allow for e.g. confounder to be prepended before the encryption header in the future. ForCEPH_CRYPTO_AES, the data offset is 0 (i.e. nothing is prepended).- adjust
ceph_x_encrypt_buflen()accordingly and make it account for PKCS#7 padding that is used byCEPH_CRYPTO_AESprecisely instead of just always adding 16.Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>--- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- net/ceph/crypto.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-2@@ -44,23 +44,35 @@ static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)return !!need; } -static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset (void ) +static int __ceph_x_encrypt_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -return sizeof (u32) +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); +return ceph_crypt_data_offset (key) + +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); }
Quoted 9 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) · line 55
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-2-static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (int ilen) +static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -return ceph_x_encrypt_offset () + ilen +16 ; +return sizeof (u32) +__ceph_x_encrypt_offset (key);Frankly speaking, it's hard to follow why sizeof(u32) is used. Maybe, it makes sense to introduce a named constant? This could make the code more easy to understand.
It's part of the on-wire format which dictates that ciphertext_len is encoded as a 32-bit integer. It's pre-existing code (I just moved it) and a meaningful name for "length of ciphertext_len in the encoding" would be significationly more verbose.
The comment that I have added just a couple of lines below attempts to fill in the blanks:
/*
* AES: ciphertext_len | hdr | data... | padding */
Quoted 138 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) · line 65
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +10
-0+} + +/* +* AES: ciphertext_len | hdr | data... | padding +*/ +static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +int data_len) +{ +int encrypt_len =sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ) + data_len; +return sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_buflen (key, encrypt_len);Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) · line 75
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1}static int ceph_x_encrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *buf,int buf_len,int plaintext_len) { -struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = buf +sizeof (u32); +struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int ciphertext_len;int ret; + hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret);Ditto.
Quoted 110 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +12
-10hdr->struct_v =1 ; hdr->magic =cpu_to_le64 (CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC );@@ -77,7 +89,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf,static int __ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *p,int ciphertext_len) { -struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = p; +struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int plaintext_len;int ret;@@ -86,6 +98,7 @@ static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p,if (ret)return ret; + hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret);if (le64_to_cpu (hdr->magic) !=CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ) {pr_err ("%s bad magic\n" , __func__);return -EINVAL ;@@ -193,7 +206,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, }/* blob for me */ - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;@@ -220,7 +233,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, is_enc, bad);if (is_enc) {/* encrypted */ - tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;@@ -312,7 +325,7 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, p = (void *)(msg_a +1 ) +le32_to_cpu (msg_a->ticket_blob.blob_len); end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len; - msg_b = p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + msg_b = p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&au->session_key); msg_b->struct_v =2 ; msg_b->nonce =cpu_to_le64 (au->nonce);if (server_challenge) {@@ -368,7 +381,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, goto out_au; maxlen =sizeof (*msg_a) + ticket_blob_len + -ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (sizeof (*msg_b)); +ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (&au->session_key,sizeof (*msg_b));dout (" need len %d\n" , maxlen);if (au->buf && au->buf->alloc_len < maxlen) {ceph_buffer_put (au->buf);@@ -507,7 +520,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,struct ceph_x_authenticate *auth = (void *)(head +1 );void *enc_buf = xi->auth_authorizer.enc_buf;struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob = enc_buf + -ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&xi->secret);u64 *u; p = auth +1 ;@@ -634,7 +647,7 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id,ceph_decode_need (p, end, len, e_inval);dout ("%s connection secret blob len %d\n" , __func__, len);if (len >0 ) { - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, *p + len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -804,7 +817,7 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,return ret;dout ("%s decrypted %d bytes\n" , __func__, ret); - dp = challenge +sizeof (struct ceph_x_encrypt_header ); + dp = challenge +__ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); dend = dp + ret;ceph_decode_skip_8 (&dp, dend, e_inval);/* struct_v */ @@ -851,7 +864,7 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,u8 struct_v;int ret; - dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -974,7 +987,8 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,__le32 front_crc;__le32 middle_crc;__le32 data_crc; - }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (); + }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf + +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&au->session_key); sigblock->len =cpu_to_le32 (4 *sizeof (u32)); sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;net/ceph/crypto.c +0
-0@@ -285,6 +285,31 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, } }
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, · line 295
Quoted 8 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +8
-0+int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) +{ +switch (key->type) { +case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE : +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES : +return 0 ; +default : +BUG ();Maybe, return error code or
INT_MAXinstead ofBUG()?
Random sentinel values like that often backfire in my experience. A BUG is much more clear and acceptable here IMO because a key of an unsupported type is expected be rejected at prepare time.
Thanks,
Ilya
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerPATCH 3/5 libceph: introduce ceph_crypto_key_prepare()
In reply to Ilya DryomovIn preparation for bringing in a new encryption scheme/key type, decouple decoding or cloning the key from allocating required crypto API objects and setting them up. The rationale is that a) in some cases a shallow clone is sufficient and b) ceph_crypto_key_prepare() may grow additional parameters that would be inconvenient to provide at the point the key is originally decoded.
--- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 26 +++++++++++++---- net/ceph/crypto.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ net/ceph/crypto.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
net/ceph/auth_x.c +20 -6
@@ -221,6 +221,10 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (ret) goto out; + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&new_session_key); +if (ret) + goto out; +ceph_decode_need (&dp, dend,sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ), bad);ceph_decode_timespec64 (&validity, dp); dp +=sizeof (struct ceph_timespec );
@@ -380,6 +384,10 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (ret) goto out_au; + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&au->session_key); +if (ret) + goto out_au; + maxlen =sizeof (*msg_a) + ticket_blob_len +ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (&au->session_key,sizeof (*msg_b));dout (" need len %d\n" , maxlen);
@@ -1106,21 +1114,26 @@ int ceph_x_init(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)int ret;dout ("ceph_x_init %p\n" , ac); - ret = -ENOMEM ; xi =kzalloc (sizeof (*xi),GFP_NOFS );if (!xi) - goto out; +return -ENOMEM ; ret = -EINVAL ;if (!ac->key) {pr_err ("no secret set (for auth_x protocol)\n" ); - goto out_nomem; + goto err_xi; } ret =ceph_crypto_key_clone (&xi->secret, ac->key);if (ret <0 ) {pr_err ("cannot clone key: %d\n" , ret); - goto out_nomem; + goto err_xi; + } + + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&xi->secret); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("cannot prepare key: %d\n" , ret); + goto err_secret; } xi->starting = true;
@@ -1131,8 +1144,9 @@ int ceph_x_init(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) ac->ops = &ceph_x_ops;return 0 ; -out_nomem: +err_secret: +ceph_crypto_key_destroy (&xi->secret); +err_xi:kfree (xi); -out:return ret; }
net/ceph/crypto.c +35 -36
117 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ceph/crypto.h +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct ceph_crypto_key {struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm; }; +int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key);int ceph_crypto_key_clone (struct ceph_crypto_key *dst,const struct ceph_crypto_key *src);int ceph_crypto_key_decode (struct ceph_crypto_key *key,void **p,void *end);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerPATCH 4/5 libceph: add support for CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5
In reply to Ilya DryomovThis is based on AES256-CTS-HMAC384-192 crypto algorithm per RFC 8009 (i.e. Kerberos 5, hence the name) with custom-defined key usage numbers. The implementation allows a given key to have/be linked to between one and three usage numbers.
The existing CEPH_CRYPTO_AES remains in place and unchanged. The usage_slot parameter that needed to be added to ceph_crypt() and its wrappers is simply ignored there.
--- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 5 +- net/ceph/Kconfig | 1 + net/ceph/auth_x.c | 88 ++++++++++++++------ net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h | 38 +++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/ceph/crypto.h | 16 +++- 6 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +3 -2
@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ struct ceph_dir_layout { } __attribute__ ((packed));/* crypto algorithms */ -#define CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE 0x0 -#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES 0x1 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE 0x0 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES 0x1 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 0x2/* AES256-CTS-HMAC384-192 */ #define CEPH_AES_IV "cephsageyudagreg"
net/ceph/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config CEPH_LIB select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_CBC select CRYPTO_GCM + select CRYPTO_KRB5 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO select KEYS
net/ceph/auth_x.c +61 -27
212 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h +38 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,44 @@#define CEPHX_GET_PRINCIPAL_SESSION_KEY 0x0200#define CEPHX_GET_ROTATING_KEY 0x0400 +/* Client <-> AuthMonitor */ +/* +* The AUTH session's connection secret: encrypted with the AUTH +* ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET 0x03 +/* +* The ticket's blob for the client ("blob for me", contains the +* session key): encrypted with the client's secret key in case of +* the AUTH ticket and the AUTH ticket session key in case of other +* service tickets +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY 0x04 +/* +* The ticket's blob for the service (ceph_x_ticket_blob): possibly +* encrypted with the old AUTH ticket session key in case of the AUTH +* ticket and not encrypted in case of other service tickets +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB 0x05 + +/* Client <-> Service */ +/* +* The client's authorization request (ceph_x_authorize_b): +* encrypted with the service ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE 0x10 +/* +* The service's challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge): +* encrypted with the service ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE 0x11 +/* +* The service's final reply (ceph_x_authorize_reply + the service +* session's connection secret): encrypted with the service ticket +* session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY 0x12 +/* common bits */ struct ceph_x_ticket_blob {__u8 struct_v;
net/ceph/crypto.c +142 -15
227 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ceph/crypto.h +12 -4
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@#include <linux/ceph/types.h> #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h> -#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 16 +#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 32#define CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN 64/*
@@ -16,10 +16,18 @@ struct ceph_crypto_key {struct ceph_timespec created;int len;void *key; -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm; + +union { +struct crypto_sync_skcipher *aes_tfm; +struct { +const struct krb5_enctype *krb5_type; +struct crypto_aead *krb5_tfms[3 ]; + }; + }; }; -int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key); +int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +const u32 *key_usages,int key_usage_cnt);int ceph_crypto_key_clone (struct ceph_crypto_key *dst,const struct ceph_crypto_key *src);int ceph_crypto_key_decode (struct ceph_crypto_key *key,void **p,void *end);
@@ -27,7 +35,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *in);void ceph_crypto_key_destroy (struct ceph_crypto_key *key);/* crypto.c */ -int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,bool encrypt, +int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len);int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key);int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH 4/5] libceph: add support for CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5
Quoted 87 lines · Ilya Dryomov
This is based on AES256-CTS-HMAC384-192 crypto algorithm per RFC 8009 (i.e. Kerberos 5, hence the name) with custom-defined key usage numbers. The implementation allows a given key to have/be linked to between one and three usage numbers.
The existing
CEPH_CRYPTO_AESremains in place and unchanged. Theusage_slotparameter that needed to be added toceph_crypt()and its wrappers is simply ignored there.Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 5 +- net/ceph/Kconfig | 1 + net/ceph/auth_x.c | 88 ++++++++++++++------ net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h | 38 +++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/ceph/crypto.h | 16 +++- 6 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +3
-2@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ struct ceph_dir_layout { } __attribute__ ((packed));/* crypto algorithms */ -#define CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE 0x0 -#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES 0x1 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE 0x0 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES 0x1 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 0x2/* AES256-CTS-HMAC384-192 */ #define CEPH_AES_IV "cephsageyudagreg"net/ceph/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config CEPH_LIB select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_CBC select CRYPTO_GCM + select CRYPTO_KRB5 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO select KEYSnet/ceph/auth_x.c +17
-1@@ -17,6 +17,22 @@#include "auth_x.h" #include "auth_x_protocol.h" +static const u32 ticket_key_usages[] = { +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET +}; + +static const u32 authorizer_key_usages[] = { +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY +}; + +static const u32 client_key_usages[] = { +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY +}; +static void ceph_x_validate_tickets (struct ceph_auth_client *ac,int *pneed);static int ceph_x_is_authenticated (struct ceph_auth_client *ac)@@ -57,6 +73,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key)/* * AES: ciphertext_len | hdr | data... | padding +* AES256KRB5: ciphertext_len | confounder | hdr | data... | hmac */ static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len)@@ -65,19 +82,19 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,return sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_buflen (key, encrypt_len); } -static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf,
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, · line 92
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-2- int buf_len, int plaintext_len) +static int ceph_x_encrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *buf,int buf_len,int plaintext_len) {struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int ciphertext_len;int ret; - hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret); + hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (key);
What about to have a named constant for this sizeof(u32)?
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, · line 97
Quoted 7 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-2hdr->struct_v =1 ; hdr->magic =cpu_to_le64 (CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ); - ret = ceph_crypt(secret, true, buf + sizeof(u32), buf_len - sizeof(u32), - plaintext_len + sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header), + ret = ceph_crypt(key, usage_slot, true, buf + sizeof(u32), + buf_len - sizeof(u32), plaintext_len + sizeof(*hdr),
Ditto.
Quoted 48 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +8
-7&ciphertext_len);if (ret)return ret;@@ -86,19 +103,19 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf,return sizeof (u32) + ciphertext_len; } -static int __ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *p, -int ciphertext_len) +static int __ceph_x_decrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *p,int ciphertext_len) {struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int plaintext_len;int ret; - ret =ceph_crypt (secret, false, p, ciphertext_len, ciphertext_len, - &plaintext_len); + ret =ceph_crypt (key, usage_slot, false, p, ciphertext_len, + ciphertext_len, &plaintext_len);if (ret)return ret; - hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret); + hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (key);if (le64_to_cpu (hdr->magic) !=CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ) {pr_err ("%s bad magic\n" , __func__);return -EINVAL ;@@ -107,7 +124,8 @@ static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p,return plaintext_len -sizeof (*hdr); } -static int ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void **p,void *end) +static int ceph_x_decrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void **p,void *end) {int ciphertext_len;int ret;@@ -115,7 +133,7 @@ static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void **p, void *end)ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval);ceph_decode_need (p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval); - ret =__ceph_x_decrypt (secret, *p, ciphertext_len); + ret =__ceph_x_decrypt (key, usage_slot, *p, ciphertext_len);if (ret <0 )return ret;
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, · line 229
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1@@ -207,7 +225,9 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,/* blob for me */ dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, + 0 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY */,
This looks really confusing. If we have the named constant already, then what's the point to comment it instead of using it?
Quoted 15 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;dout (" decrypted %d bytes\n" , ret);@@ -221,7 +241,8 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (ret) goto out; - ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&new_session_key); + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&new_session_key, ticket_key_usages, +ARRAY_SIZE (ticket_key_usages));if (ret) goto out;
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, · line 263
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1@@ -238,7 +259,9 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (is_enc) {/* encrypted */ tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, end); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, + 1 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB */,
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, · line 368
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;dout (" encrypted ticket, decrypted %d bytes\n" , ret);@@ -341,7 +364,9 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, msg_b->server_challenge_plus_one =0 ; } - ret =ceph_x_encrypt (&au->session_key, p, end - p,sizeof (*msg_b)); + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, + 0 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE */,
Ditto.
Quoted 15 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b));if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -384,7 +409,8 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (ret) goto out_au; - ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&au->session_key); + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&au->session_key, authorizer_key_usages, +ARRAY_SIZE (authorizer_key_usages));if (ret) goto out_au;
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, · line 571
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +1
-1@@ -542,7 +568,8 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,get_random_bytes (&auth->client_challenge,sizeof (u64)); blob->client_challenge = auth->client_challenge; blob->server_challenge =cpu_to_le64 (xi->server_challenge); - ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, 0 /* dummy */,
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id, · line 687
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , sizeof(*blob));if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -656,7 +683,9 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id,dout ("%s connection secret blob len %d\n" , __func__, len);if (len >0 ) { dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, *p + len); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, + 2 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET */,
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, · line 853
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, *p + len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -820,7 +849,9 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,int ret;/* no leading len */ - ret =__ceph_x_decrypt (secret, challenge, challenge_len); + ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(secret, + 1 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE */,
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, · line 907
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1+ challenge, challenge_len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -873,7 +904,8 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,int ret; dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, 2 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY */,
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, · line 1039
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-2+ p, end);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -1004,8 +1036,9 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc; sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc; - ret =ceph_x_encrypt (&au->session_key, enc_buf, -CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN ,sizeof (*sigblock)); + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,
Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, · line 1072
Quoted 13 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-3+ enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , + sizeof(*sigblock));if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -1036,9 +1069,9 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq;/* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */ - ret =ceph_crypt (&au->session_key, true, enc_buf, -CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN ,sizeof (*sigblock), - &ciphertext_len); + ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,
Ditto.
Quoted 158 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +4
-1+ true, enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , + sizeof(*sigblock), &ciphertext_len);if (ret)return ret;@@ -1130,7 +1163,8 @@ int ceph_x_init(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) goto err_xi; } - ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&xi->secret); + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&xi->secret, client_key_usages, +ARRAY_SIZE (client_key_usages));if (ret) {pr_err ("cannot prepare key: %d\n" , ret); goto err_secret;net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h +38
-0@@ -6,6 +6,44 @@#define CEPHX_GET_PRINCIPAL_SESSION_KEY 0x0200#define CEPHX_GET_ROTATING_KEY 0x0400 +/* Client <-> AuthMonitor */ +/* +* The AUTH session's connection secret: encrypted with the AUTH +* ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET 0x03 +/* +* The ticket's blob for the client ("blob for me", contains the +* session key): encrypted with the client's secret key in case of +* the AUTH ticket and the AUTH ticket session key in case of other +* service tickets +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY 0x04 +/* +* The ticket's blob for the service (ceph_x_ticket_blob): possibly +* encrypted with the old AUTH ticket session key in case of the AUTH +* ticket and not encrypted in case of other service tickets +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB 0x05 + +/* Client <-> Service */ +/* +* The client's authorization request (ceph_x_authorize_b): +* encrypted with the service ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE 0x10 +/* +* The service's challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge): +* encrypted with the service ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE 0x11 +/* +* The service's final reply (ceph_x_authorize_reply + the service +* session's connection secret): encrypted with the service ticket +* session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY 0x12 +/* common bits */ struct ceph_x_ticket_blob {__u8 struct_v;net/ceph/crypto.c +47
-9@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/krb5.h> #include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> @@ -22,28 +23,68 @@ static int set_aes_tfm(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)int ret; noio_flag =memalloc_noio_save (); - key->tfm =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher ("cbc(aes)" ,0 ,0 ); + key->aes_tfm =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher ("cbc(aes)" ,0 ,0 );memalloc_noio_restore (noio_flag); -if (IS_ERR (key->tfm)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (key->tfm); - key->tfm =NULL ; +if (IS_ERR (key->aes_tfm)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (key->aes_tfm); + key->aes_tfm =NULL ;return ret; } - ret =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (key->tfm, key->key, key->len); + ret =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (key->aes_tfm, key->key, key->len);if (ret)return ret;return 0 ; } -int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key) +static int set_krb5_tfms (struct ceph_crypto_key *key,const u32 *key_usages, +int key_usage_cnt) +{ +struct krb5_buffer TK = { .len = key->len, .data = key->key }; +unsigned int noio_flag; +int ret =0 ; +int i; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (key_usage_cnt >ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms))) +return -EINVAL ; + + key->krb5_type =crypto_krb5_find_enctype ( +KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192 ); +if (!key->krb5_type) +return -ENOPKG ; + +/* +* Despite crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption() taking a gfp mask, +* crypto_alloc_aead() inside of it allocates with GFP_KERNEL. +*/ + noio_flag =memalloc_noio_save (); +for (i =0 ; i < key_usage_cnt; i++) { + key->krb5_tfms[i] =crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption ( + key->krb5_type, &TK , key_usages[i], +GFP_NOIO ); +if (IS_ERR (key->krb5_tfms[i])) { + ret =PTR_ERR (key->krb5_tfms[i]); + key->krb5_tfms[i] =NULL ; + goto out_flag; + } + } + +out_flag: +memalloc_noio_restore (noio_flag); +return ret; +} + +int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +const u32 *key_usages,int key_usage_cnt) {switch (key->type) {case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE :return 0 ;/* nothing to do */ case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return set_aes_tfm (key); +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +return set_krb5_tfms (key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);default :return -ENOTSUPP ; }@@ -123,12 +164,25 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey)void ceph_crypto_key_destroy (struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -if (key) { -kfree_sensitive (key->key); - key->key =NULL ;
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey) · line 173
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +7
-3-if (key->tfm) { -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (key->tfm); - key->tfm =NULL ; +int i; + +if (!key) +return ; + +kfree_sensitive (key->key); + key->key =NULL ;
The key->key looks strange. :) Maybe, another name like crypto_key?
Quoted 34 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +14
-2+ +if (key->type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES ) { +if (key->aes_tfm) { +crypto_free_sync_skcipher (key->aes_tfm); + key->aes_tfm =NULL ; + } + }else if (key->type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 ) { +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms); i++) { +if (key->krb5_tfms[i]) { +crypto_free_aead (key->krb5_tfms[i]); + key->krb5_tfms[i] =NULL ; + } } } }@@ -208,7 +262,7 @@ static void teardown_sgtable(struct sg_table *sgt)static int ceph_aes_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len) { -SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK (req, key->tfm); +SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK (req, key->aes_tfm);struct sg_table sgt;struct scatterlist prealloc_sg;char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(8) ;@@ -224,7 +278,7 @@ static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,return ret;memcpy (iv, aes_iv,AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); -skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, key->tfm); +skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, key->aes_tfm);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, crypt_len, iv);
net/ceph/crypto.c static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, · line 327
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +2
-1@@ -269,7 +323,68 @@ static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,return ret; } -int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, +static int ceph_krb5_encrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len)
If we have really many function's arguments, then, maybe, we need to introduce some structure?
Quoted 77 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +66
-0+{ +struct sg_table sgt; +struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; +int ret; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (usage_slot >=ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms))) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =setup_sgtable (&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, buf_len); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =crypto_krb5_encrypt (key->krb5_type, key->krb5_tfms[usage_slot], + sgt.sgl, sgt.nents, buf_len,AES_BLOCK_SIZE , + in_len, false); +if (ret <0 ) { +pr_err ("%s encrypt failed: %d\n" , __func__, ret); + goto out_sgt; + } + + *pout_len = ret; + ret =0 ; + +out_sgt: +teardown_sgtable (&sgt); +return ret; +} + +static int ceph_krb5_decrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len) +{ +struct sg_table sgt; +struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; +size_t data_off =0 ; +size_t data_len = in_len; +int ret; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (usage_slot >=ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms))) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =setup_sgtable (&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, in_len); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =crypto_krb5_decrypt (key->krb5_type, key->krb5_tfms[usage_slot], + sgt.sgl, sgt.nents, &data_off, &data_len); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("%s decrypt failed: %d\n" , __func__, ret); + goto out_sgt; + } + +WARN_ON (data_off !=AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + *pout_len = data_len; + +out_sgt: +teardown_sgtable (&sgt); +return ret; +} + +int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len) {switch (key->type) {@@ -279,6 +394,12 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return ceph_aes_crypt (key, encrypt, buf, buf_len, in_len, pout_len); +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +return encrypt ? +ceph_krb5_encrypt (key, usage_slot, buf, buf_len, in_len, + pout_len) : +ceph_krb5_decrypt (key, usage_slot, buf, buf_len, in_len, + pout_len);default :return -ENOTSUPP ; }
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) · line 415
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +2
-0@@ -290,6 +411,9 @@ int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key)case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE :case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return 0 ; +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +/* confounder */
Frankly speaking, I don't follow what this comment imply. :)
Thanks,
Slava.
Quoted 57 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +4
-0+return AES_BLOCK_SIZE ;default :BUG (); }@@ -304,6 +428,9 @@ int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len)/* PKCS#7 padding at the end */ return data_len +AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (data_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE -1 )); +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +/* confounder at the beginning and 192-bit HMAC at the end */ +return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + data_len +24 ;default :BUG (); }net/ceph/crypto.h +12
-4@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@#include <linux/ceph/types.h> #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h> -#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 16 +#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 32#define CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN 64/* @@ -16,10 +16,18 @@ struct ceph_crypto_key {struct ceph_timespec created;int len;void *key; -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm; + +union { +struct crypto_sync_skcipher *aes_tfm; +struct { +const struct krb5_enctype *krb5_type; +struct crypto_aead *krb5_tfms[3 ]; + }; + }; }; -int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key); +int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +const u32 *key_usages,int key_usage_cnt);int ceph_crypto_key_clone (struct ceph_crypto_key *dst,const struct ceph_crypto_key *src);int ceph_crypto_key_decode (struct ceph_crypto_key *key,void **p,void *end);@@ -27,7 +35,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *in);void ceph_crypto_key_destroy (struct ceph_crypto_key *key);/* crypto.c */ -int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,bool encrypt, +int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len);int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key);int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len);
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4/5] libceph: add support for CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5
Quoted 97 lines · Viacheslav Dubeyko
Quoted 95 lines · Ilya Dryomov
This is based on AES256-CTS-HMAC384-192 crypto algorithm per RFC 8009 (i.e. Kerberos 5, hence the name) with custom-defined key usage numbers. The implementation allows a given key to have/be linked to between one and three usage numbers.
The existing
CEPH_CRYPTO_AESremains in place and unchanged. Theusage_slotparameter that needed to be added toceph_crypt()and its wrappers is simply ignored there.Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 5 +- net/ceph/Kconfig | 1 + net/ceph/auth_x.c | 88 ++++++++++++++------ net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h | 38 +++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/ceph/crypto.h | 16 +++- 6 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +3
-2@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ struct ceph_dir_layout { } __attribute__ ((packed));/* crypto algorithms */ -#define CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE 0x0 -#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES 0x1 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE 0x0 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES 0x1 +#define CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 0x2/* AES256-CTS-HMAC384-192 */ #define CEPH_AES_IV "cephsageyudagreg"net/ceph/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config CEPH_LIB select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_CBC select CRYPTO_GCM + select CRYPTO_KRB5 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO select KEYSnet/ceph/auth_x.c +19
-2@@ -17,6 +17,22 @@#include "auth_x.h" #include "auth_x_protocol.h" +static const u32 ticket_key_usages[] = { +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET +}; + +static const u32 authorizer_key_usages[] = { +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE , +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY +}; + +static const u32 client_key_usages[] = { +CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY +}; +static void ceph_x_validate_tickets (struct ceph_auth_client *ac,int *pneed);static int ceph_x_is_authenticated (struct ceph_auth_client *ac)@@ -57,6 +73,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key)/* * AES: ciphertext_len | hdr | data... | padding +* AES256KRB5: ciphertext_len | confounder | hdr | data... | hmac */ static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len)@@ -65,19 +82,19 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,return sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_buflen (key, encrypt_len); } -static int ceph_x_encrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *buf, -int buf_len,int plaintext_len) +static int ceph_x_encrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *buf,int buf_len,int plaintext_len) {struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int ciphertext_len;int ret;
Quoted 4 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, · line 92
Quoted 2 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +1
-1- hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret); + hdr = buf +sizeof (u32) +ceph_crypt_data_offset (key);What about to have a named constant for this sizeof(u32)?
Already covered on another patch -- this is the ciphertext_len thing, all pre-existing code.
Quoted 60 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_encrypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, · line 97
Quoted 8 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-2hdr->struct_v =1 ; hdr->magic =cpu_to_le64 (CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ); - ret = ceph_crypt(secret, true, buf + sizeof(u32), buf_len - sizeof(u32), - plaintext_len + sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header), + ret = ceph_crypt(key, usage_slot, true, buf + sizeof(u32), + buf_len - sizeof(u32), plaintext_len + sizeof(*hdr),Ditto.
Quoted 49 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +8
-7&ciphertext_len);if (ret)return ret;@@ -86,19 +103,19 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf,return sizeof (u32) + ciphertext_len; } -static int __ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void *p, -int ciphertext_len) +static int __ceph_x_decrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *p,int ciphertext_len) {struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr;int plaintext_len;int ret; - ret =ceph_crypt (secret, false, p, ciphertext_len, ciphertext_len, - &plaintext_len); + ret =ceph_crypt (key, usage_slot, false, p, ciphertext_len, + ciphertext_len, &plaintext_len);if (ret)return ret; - hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (secret); + hdr = p +ceph_crypt_data_offset (key);if (le64_to_cpu (hdr->magic) !=CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC ) {pr_err ("%s bad magic\n" , __func__);return -EINVAL ;@@ -107,7 +124,8 @@ static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p,return plaintext_len -sizeof (*hdr); } -static int ceph_x_decrypt (struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,void **p,void *end) +static int ceph_x_decrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void **p,void *end) {int ciphertext_len;int ret;@@ -115,7 +133,7 @@ static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void **p, void *end)ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval);ceph_decode_need (p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval); - ret =__ceph_x_decrypt (secret, *p, ciphertext_len); + ret =__ceph_x_decrypt (key, usage_slot, *p, ciphertext_len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -207,7 +225,9 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
Quoted 8 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, · line 229
Quoted 5 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1/* blob for me */ dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, + 0 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY */,This looks really confusing. If we have the named constant already, then what's the point to comment it instead of using it?
The named constant in question has a different value:
#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY 0x04
Notice that the respective ceph_x_decrypt() parameter is named usage_slot, not key_usage or something like that. The 0 here selects the first of the three available key usage slots -- the one that gets set up to correspond to CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY at prepare time.
Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 16 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;dout (" decrypted %d bytes\n" , ret);@@ -221,7 +241,8 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (ret) goto out; - ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&new_session_key); + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&new_session_key, ticket_key_usages, +ARRAY_SIZE (ticket_key_usages));if (ret) goto out;net/ceph/auth_x.c static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, · line 263
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1@@ -238,7 +259,9 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (is_enc) {/* encrypted */ tp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, end); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, + 1 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB */,Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, · line 368
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, end);if (ret <0 ) goto out;dout (" encrypted ticket, decrypted %d bytes\n" , ret);@@ -341,7 +364,9 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, msg_b->server_challenge_plus_one =0 ; } - ret =ceph_x_encrypt (&au->session_key, p, end - p,sizeof (*msg_b)); + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, + 0 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE */,Ditto.
Quoted 14 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b));if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -384,7 +409,8 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (ret) goto out_au; - ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&au->session_key); + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&au->session_key, authorizer_key_usages, +ARRAY_SIZE (authorizer_key_usages));if (ret) goto out_au;
Quoted 8 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, · line 571
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +1
-1@@ -542,7 +568,8 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,get_random_bytes (&auth->client_challenge,sizeof (u64)); blob->client_challenge = auth->client_challenge; blob->server_challenge =cpu_to_le64 (xi->server_challenge); - ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, 0 /* dummy */,Ditto.
The "dummy" aspect is noted in the patch description:
The existing CEPH_CRYPTO_AES remains in place and unchanged. The usage_slot parameter that needed to be added to ceph_crypt() and its wrappers is simply ignored there.
Quoted 234 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id, · line 687
Quoted 12 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , sizeof(*blob));if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -656,7 +683,9 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id,dout ("%s connection secret blob len %d\n" , __func__, len);if (len >0 ) { dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&th->session_key); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (&th->session_key, p, *p + len); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, + 2 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET */,Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, · line 853
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-1+ p, *p + len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -820,7 +849,9 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,int ret;/* no leading len */ - ret =__ceph_x_decrypt (secret, challenge, challenge_len); + ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(secret, + 1 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE */,Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, · line 907
Quoted 10 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-1+ challenge, challenge_len);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -873,7 +904,8 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,int ret; dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (secret); - ret =ceph_x_decrypt (secret, p, end); + ret = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, 2 /* CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY */,Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, · line 1039
Quoted 11 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +2
-2+ p, end);if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -1004,8 +1036,9 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc; sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc; - ret =ceph_x_encrypt (&au->session_key, enc_buf, -CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN ,sizeof (*sigblock)); + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,Ditto.
net/ceph/auth_x.c static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, · line 1072
Quoted 13 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-3+ enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , + sizeof(*sigblock));if (ret <0 )return ret;@@ -1036,9 +1069,9 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq;/* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */ - ret =ceph_crypt (&au->session_key, true, enc_buf, -CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN ,sizeof (*sigblock), - &ciphertext_len); + ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,Ditto.
Quoted 162 lines
net/ceph/auth_x.c +4
-1+ true, enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , + sizeof(*sigblock), &ciphertext_len);if (ret)return ret;@@ -1130,7 +1163,8 @@ int ceph_x_init(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) goto err_xi; } - ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&xi->secret); + ret =ceph_crypto_key_prepare (&xi->secret, client_key_usages, +ARRAY_SIZE (client_key_usages));if (ret) {pr_err ("cannot prepare key: %d\n" , ret); goto err_secret;net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h +38
-0@@ -6,6 +6,44 @@#define CEPHX_GET_PRINCIPAL_SESSION_KEY 0x0200#define CEPHX_GET_ROTATING_KEY 0x0400 +/* Client <-> AuthMonitor */ +/* +* The AUTH session's connection secret: encrypted with the AUTH +* ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTH_CONNECTION_SECRET 0x03 +/* +* The ticket's blob for the client ("blob for me", contains the +* session key): encrypted with the client's secret key in case of +* the AUTH ticket and the AUTH ticket session key in case of other +* service tickets +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_SESSION_KEY 0x04 +/* +* The ticket's blob for the service (ceph_x_ticket_blob): possibly +* encrypted with the old AUTH ticket session key in case of the AUTH +* ticket and not encrypted in case of other service tickets +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_TICKET_BLOB 0x05 + +/* Client <-> Service */ +/* +* The client's authorization request (ceph_x_authorize_b): +* encrypted with the service ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE 0x10 +/* +* The service's challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge): +* encrypted with the service ticket session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_CHALLENGE 0x11 +/* +* The service's final reply (ceph_x_authorize_reply + the service +* session's connection secret): encrypted with the service ticket +* session key +*/ +#define CEPHX_KEY_USAGE_AUTHORIZE_REPLY 0x12 +/* common bits */ struct ceph_x_ticket_blob {__u8 struct_v;net/ceph/crypto.c +48
-12@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/krb5.h> #include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> @@ -22,28 +23,68 @@ static int set_aes_tfm(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)int ret; noio_flag =memalloc_noio_save (); - key->tfm =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher ("cbc(aes)" ,0 ,0 ); + key->aes_tfm =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher ("cbc(aes)" ,0 ,0 );memalloc_noio_restore (noio_flag); -if (IS_ERR (key->tfm)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (key->tfm); - key->tfm =NULL ; +if (IS_ERR (key->aes_tfm)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (key->aes_tfm); + key->aes_tfm =NULL ;return ret; } - ret =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (key->tfm, key->key, key->len); + ret =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (key->aes_tfm, key->key, key->len);if (ret)return ret;return 0 ; } -int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key) +static int set_krb5_tfms (struct ceph_crypto_key *key,const u32 *key_usages, +int key_usage_cnt) +{ +struct krb5_buffer TK = { .len = key->len, .data = key->key }; +unsigned int noio_flag; +int ret =0 ; +int i; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (key_usage_cnt >ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms))) +return -EINVAL ; + + key->krb5_type =crypto_krb5_find_enctype ( +KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192 ); +if (!key->krb5_type) +return -ENOPKG ; + +/* +* Despite crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption() taking a gfp mask, +* crypto_alloc_aead() inside of it allocates with GFP_KERNEL. +*/ + noio_flag =memalloc_noio_save (); +for (i =0 ; i < key_usage_cnt; i++) { + key->krb5_tfms[i] =crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption ( + key->krb5_type, &TK , key_usages[i], +GFP_NOIO ); +if (IS_ERR (key->krb5_tfms[i])) { + ret =PTR_ERR (key->krb5_tfms[i]); + key->krb5_tfms[i] =NULL ; + goto out_flag; + } + } + +out_flag: +memalloc_noio_restore (noio_flag); +return ret; +} + +int ceph_crypto_key_prepare (struct ceph_crypto_key *key, +const u32 *key_usages,int key_usage_cnt) {switch (key->type) {case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE :return 0 ;/* nothing to do */ case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return set_aes_tfm (key); +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +return set_krb5_tfms (key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);default :return -ENOTSUPP ; }@@ -123,12 +164,25 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey)void ceph_crypto_key_destroy (struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { -if (key) { -kfree_sensitive (key->key); - key->key =NULL ; -if (key->tfm) { -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (key->tfm); - key->tfm =NULL ; +int i;
Quoted 8 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey) · line 173
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +6
-0+ +if (!key) +return ; + +kfree_sensitive (key->key); + key->key =NULL ;The
key->keylooks strange. :) Maybe, another name likecrypto_key?
It could certainly be named differently, but this name goes back to 2010. I don't think a wholesale rename is in scope for this series.
Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 38 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +14
-2+ +if (key->type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES ) { +if (key->aes_tfm) { +crypto_free_sync_skcipher (key->aes_tfm); + key->aes_tfm =NULL ; + } + }else if (key->type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 ) { +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms); i++) { +if (key->krb5_tfms[i]) { +crypto_free_aead (key->krb5_tfms[i]); + key->krb5_tfms[i] =NULL ; + } } } }@@ -208,7 +262,7 @@ static void teardown_sgtable(struct sg_table *sgt)static int ceph_aes_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len) { -SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK (req, key->tfm); +SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK (req, key->aes_tfm);struct sg_table sgt;struct scatterlist prealloc_sg;char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(8) ;@@ -224,7 +278,7 @@ static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,return ret;memcpy (iv, aes_iv,AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); -skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, key->tfm); +skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, key->aes_tfm);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, crypt_len, iv);@@ -269,7 +323,68 @@ static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,return ret; }
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, · line 327
Quoted 3 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +2
-1-int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, +static int ceph_krb5_encrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len)If we have really many function's arguments, then, maybe, we need to introduce some structure?
I wouldn't say that six arguments is "really many" -- on x86-64 they all are likely to be passed in registers and it's a rather manageable number in general IMO. See how the crypto API method that this is built upon takes eight arguments, for example.
Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 77 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +66
-0+{ +struct sg_table sgt; +struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; +int ret; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (usage_slot >=ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms))) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =setup_sgtable (&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, buf_len); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =crypto_krb5_encrypt (key->krb5_type, key->krb5_tfms[usage_slot], + sgt.sgl, sgt.nents, buf_len,AES_BLOCK_SIZE , + in_len, false); +if (ret <0 ) { +pr_err ("%s encrypt failed: %d\n" , __func__, ret); + goto out_sgt; + } + + *pout_len = ret; + ret =0 ; + +out_sgt: +teardown_sgtable (&sgt); +return ret; +} + +static int ceph_krb5_decrypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot, +void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len) +{ +struct sg_table sgt; +struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; +size_t data_off =0 ; +size_t data_len = in_len; +int ret; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (usage_slot >=ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms))) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =setup_sgtable (&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, in_len); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =crypto_krb5_decrypt (key->krb5_type, key->krb5_tfms[usage_slot], + sgt.sgl, sgt.nents, &data_off, &data_len); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("%s decrypt failed: %d\n" , __func__, ret); + goto out_sgt; + } + +WARN_ON (data_off !=AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + *pout_len = data_len; + +out_sgt: +teardown_sgtable (&sgt); +return ret; +} + +int ceph_crypt (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int usage_slot,bool encrypt,void *buf,int buf_len,int in_len,int *pout_len) {switch (key->type) {@@ -279,6 +394,12 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return ceph_aes_crypt (key, encrypt, buf, buf_len, in_len, pout_len); +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +return encrypt ? +ceph_krb5_encrypt (key, usage_slot, buf, buf_len, in_len, + pout_len) : +ceph_krb5_decrypt (key, usage_slot, buf, buf_len, in_len, + pout_len);default :return -ENOTSUPP ; }
Quoted 8 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key) · line 415
Quoted 6 lines
net/ceph/crypto.c +2
-0@@ -290,6 +411,9 @@ int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key)case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE :case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return 0 ; +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +/* confounder */ Frankly speaking, I don't follow what this comment imply. :)
Confounder is a random string that the plaintext is prepended with before being encrypted. This is an established term, it's used in RFC 8009 and some other places. Think of it as a kind of initialization vector (IV) in the context of CBC encryption.
The comment then implies that in case of CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 the space that ceph_crypt_data_offset() accounts for gets taken up by the confounder.
Thanks,
Ilya
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerPATCH 5/5 libceph: adapt ceph_x_challenge_blob hashing and msgr1 message signing
In reply to Ilya DryomovThe existing approach where ceph_x_challenge_blob is encrypted with the client's secret key and then the digest derived from the ciphertext is used for the test doesn't work with CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 because the confounder randomizes the ciphertext: the client and the server get two different ciphertexts and therefore two different digests.
msgr1 signatures are affected the same way: a digest derived from the ciphertext for the message's "sigblock" is what becomes a signature and the two sides disagree on the expected value.
For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 (and potential future encryption schemes), switch to HMAC-SHA256 function keyed in the same way as the existing encryption. For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES, everything is preserved as is.
--- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- net/ceph/crypto.c | 18 +++++++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.h | 4 +++ net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 14 +++++----- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
net/ceph/auth_x.c +43 -16
@@ -553,8 +553,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,if (need &CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH ) {struct ceph_x_authenticate *auth = (void *)(head +1 );void *enc_buf = xi->auth_authorizer.enc_buf; -struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob = enc_buf + -ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&xi->secret); +struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob;u64 *u; p = auth +1 ;
@@ -564,15 +563,29 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,dout (" get_auth_session_key\n" ); head->op =cpu_to_le16 (CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY ); -/* encrypt and hash */ +if (xi->secret.type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES ) { + blob = enc_buf +ceph_x_encrypt_offset (&xi->secret); + }else { +BUILD_BUG_ON (SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE +sizeof (*blob) > +CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN ); + blob = enc_buf +SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ; + } +get_random_bytes (&auth->client_challenge,sizeof (u64)); blob->client_challenge = auth->client_challenge; blob->server_challenge =cpu_to_le64 (xi->server_challenge); - ret =ceph_x_encrypt (&xi->secret,0 /* dummy */ , - enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , -sizeof (*blob)); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; + +if (xi->secret.type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES ) { + ret =ceph_x_encrypt (&xi->secret,0 /* dummy */ , + enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , +sizeof (*blob)); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + }else { +ceph_hmac_sha256 (&xi->secret, blob,sizeof (*blob), + enc_buf); + ret =SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ; + } auth->struct_v =3 ;/* nautilus+ */ auth->key =0 ;
@@ -1053,11 +1066,19 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,__le32 data_crc;__le32 data_len;__le32 seq_lower_word; - }__packed *sigblock = enc_buf; + }__packed *sigblock;struct {__le64 a, b, c, d; } __packed *penc = enc_buf; -int ciphertext_len; + +if (au->session_key.type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES ) { +/* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */ + sigblock = enc_buf; + }else { +BUILD_BUG_ON (SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE +sizeof (*sigblock) > +CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN ); + sigblock = enc_buf +SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ; + } sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc; sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc;
@@ -1068,12 +1089,18 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, sigblock->data_len = msg->hdr.data_len; sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq; -/* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */ - ret =ceph_crypt (&au->session_key,0 /* dummy */ , - true, enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , -sizeof (*sigblock), &ciphertext_len); -if (ret) -return ret; +if (au->session_key.type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES ) { +int ciphertext_len;/* unused */ + + ret =ceph_crypt (&au->session_key,0 /* dummy */ , + true, enc_buf,CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN , +sizeof (*sigblock), &ciphertext_len); +if (ret) +return ret; + }else { +ceph_hmac_sha256 (&au->session_key, sigblock, +sizeof (*sigblock), enc_buf); + } *psig = penc->a ^ penc->b ^ penc->c ^ penc->d; }
net/ceph/crypto.c +18 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_prepare(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES :return set_aes_tfm (key);case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +hmac_sha256_preparekey (&key->hmac_key, key->key, key->len);return set_krb5_tfms (key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);default :return -ENOTSUPP ;
@@ -178,6 +179,7 @@ void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key) key->aes_tfm =NULL ; } }else if (key->type ==CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 ) { +memzero_explicit (&key->hmac_key,sizeof (key->hmac_key));for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (key->krb5_tfms); i++) {if (key->krb5_tfms[i]) {crypto_free_aead (key->krb5_tfms[i]);
@@ -436,6 +438,22 @@ int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len) } } +void ceph_hmac_sha256 (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,const void *buf, +int buf_len,u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ]) +{ +switch (key->type) { +case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE : +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES : +memset (hmac,0 ,SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ); +return ; +case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 : +hmac_sha256 (&key->hmac_key, buf, buf_len, hmac); +return ; +default : +BUG (); + } +} +static int ceph_key_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) {struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
net/ceph/crypto.h +4 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#ifndef _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H#define _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <linux/ceph/types.h> #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct ceph_crypto_key {union {struct crypto_sync_skcipher *aes_tfm;struct { +struct hmac_sha256_key hmac_key;const struct krb5_enctype *krb5_type;struct crypto_aead *krb5_tfms[3 ]; };
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot, bool encrypt, void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len);int ceph_crypt_data_offset (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key);int ceph_crypt_buflen (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,int data_len); +void ceph_hmac_sha256 (const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,const void *buf, +int buf_len,u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ]);int ceph_crypto_init (void );void ceph_crypto_shutdown (void );
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +7 -7
@@ -779,9 +779,9 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,return 0 ;/* auth_x, secure mode */ } -static void ceph_hmac_sha256 (struct ceph_connection *con, -const struct kvec *kvecs,int kvec_cnt, -u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ]) +static void con_hmac_sha256 (struct ceph_connection *con, +const struct kvec *kvecs,int kvec_cnt, +u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ]) {struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;int i;
@@ -1438,8 +1438,8 @@ static int prepare_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con)if (!buf)return -ENOMEM ; -ceph_hmac_sha256 (con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, -CTRL_BODY (buf)); +con_hmac_sha256 (con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, +CTRL_BODY (buf));return prepare_control (con,FRAME_TAG_AUTH_SIGNATURE , buf,SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE );
@@ -2436,8 +2436,8 @@ static int process_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con,return -EINVAL ; } -ceph_hmac_sha256 (con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, - hmac); +con_hmac_sha256 (con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, + hmac);ceph_decode_need (&p, end,SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE , bad);if (crypto_memneq (p, hmac,SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0