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xfs: validate log record version against superblock log version

PATCH Applied Raphael Pinsonneault-Thibeault 2 participants 3 messages Jan 29 – Jan 30 XFS filesystem

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PATCH v6 1/1 xfs: validate log record version against superblock log version

Syzbot creates a fuzzed record where xfs_has_logv2() but the xlog_rec_header h_version != XLOG_VERSION_2. This causes a

KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in xlog_do_recovery_pass() ->

xlog_recover_process() -> xlog_cksum().

Fix by adding a check to xlog_valid_rec_header() to abort journal recovery if the xlog_rec_header h_version does not match the super block log version.

A file system with a version 2 log will only ever set XLOG_VERSION_2 in its headers (and v1 will only ever set V_1), so if there is any mismatch, either the journal or the superblock has been corrupted and therefore we abort processing with a -EFSCORRUPTED error immediately.

Also, refactor the structure of the validity checks for better readability. At the default error level (LOW), XFS_IS_CORRUPT() emits the condition that failed, the file and line number it is located at, then dumps the stack. This gives us everything we need to know about the failure if we do a single validity check per XFS_IS_CORRUPT().

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 45cf976008dd ("xfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup")

---
Changelog
v1 -> v2:
- reject the mount for h_size > XLOG_HEADER_CYCLE_SIZE && !XLOG_VERSION_2 v2 -> v3:
- abort journal recovery if the xlog_rec_header h_version does not match the super block log version
v3 -> v4:
- refactor for readability
v4 -> v5:
- stop pretending h_version is a bitmap, remove check using XLOG_VERSION_OKBITS
v5 -> v6:
- added Reviewed-by tags

It seems that this patch has fallen through the cracks, so I have resend'd with the Reviewed-by tags.
Link to original thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +16 -11
index 03e42c7dab56..e9a3e21af34a 100644
@@ -2953,18 +2953,23 @@ xlog_valid_rec_header(
 	xfs_daddr_t		blkno,
 	int			bufsize)
 {
+	struct xfs_mount	*mp = log->l_mp;
+	u32			h_version = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version);
 	int			hlen;
 
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp,
 			   rhead->h_magicno != cpu_to_be32(XLOG_HEADER_MAGIC_NUM)))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
-			   (!rhead->h_version ||
-			   (be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version) &
-			    (~XLOG_VERSION_OKBITS))))) {
-		xfs_warn(log->l_mp, "%s: unrecognised log version (%d).",
-			__func__, be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version));
-		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+	/*
+	 * The log version must match the superblock
+	 */
+	if (xfs_has_logv2(mp)) {
+		if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, h_version != XLOG_VERSION_2))
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	} else {
+		if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, h_version != XLOG_VERSION_1))
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2972,12 +2977,12 @@ xlog_valid_rec_header(
 	 * and h_len must not be greater than LR buffer size.
 	 */
 	hlen = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_len);
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp, hlen <= 0 || hlen > bufsize))
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, hlen <= 0 || hlen > bufsize))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
-			   blkno > log->l_logBBsize || blkno > INT_MAX))
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, blkno > log->l_logBBsize || blkno > INT_MAX))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 44 lines · Raphael Pinsonneault-Thibeault

Syzbot creates a fuzzed record where xfs_has_logv2() but the xlog_rec_header h_version != XLOG_VERSION_2. This causes a

KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in xlog_do_recovery_pass() ->

xlog_recover_process() -> xlog_cksum().

Fix by adding a check to xlog_valid_rec_header() to abort journal recovery if the xlog_rec_header h_version does not match the super block log version.

A file system with a version 2 log will only ever set XLOG_VERSION_2 in its headers (and v1 will only ever set V_1), so if there is any mismatch, either the journal or the superblock has been corrupted and therefore we abort processing with a -EFSCORRUPTED error immediately.

Also, refactor the structure of the validity checks for better readability. At the default error level (LOW), XFS_IS_CORRUPT() emits the condition that failed, the file and line number it is located at, then dumps the stack. This gives us everything we need to know about the failure if we do a single validity check per XFS_IS_CORRUPT().

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 45cf976008dd ("xfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup")

---
Changelog
v1 -> v2:
- reject the mount for h_size > XLOG_HEADER_CYCLE_SIZE && !XLOG_VERSION_2 v2 -> v3:
- abort journal recovery if the xlog_rec_header h_version does not match the super block log version
v3 -> v4:
- refactor for readability
v4 -> v5:
- stop pretending h_version is a bitmap, remove check using XLOG_VERSION_OKBITS
v5 -> v6:
- added Reviewed-by tags

Quoted 4 lines

It seems that this patch has fallen through the cracks, so I have resend'd with the Reviewed-by tags.
Link to original thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Yes, thanks, please avoid sending new versions "In-Reply-To" old ones, that tends to hide new versions.
Also I had issues with my (now old) email provider.

I'll queue this one for 7.0

Quoted 60 lines
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +16 -11
index 03e42c7dab56..e9a3e21af34a 100644
@@ -2953,18 +2953,23 @@ xlog_valid_rec_header(
 	xfs_daddr_t		blkno,
 	int			bufsize)
 {
+	struct xfs_mount	*mp = log->l_mp;
+	u32			h_version = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version);
 	int			hlen;
 
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp,
 			   rhead->h_magicno != cpu_to_be32(XLOG_HEADER_MAGIC_NUM)))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
-			   (!rhead->h_version ||
-			   (be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version) &
-			    (~XLOG_VERSION_OKBITS))))) {
-		xfs_warn(log->l_mp, "%s: unrecognised log version (%d).",
-			__func__, be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version));
-		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+	/*
+	 * The log version must match the superblock
+	 */
+	if (xfs_has_logv2(mp)) {
+		if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, h_version != XLOG_VERSION_2))
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	} else {
+		if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, h_version != XLOG_VERSION_1))
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2972,12 +2977,12 @@ xlog_valid_rec_header(
 	 * and h_len must not be greater than LR buffer size.
 	 */
 	hlen = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_len);
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp, hlen <= 0 || hlen > bufsize))
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, hlen <= 0 || hlen > bufsize))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
-			   blkno > log->l_logBBsize || blkno > INT_MAX))
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, blkno > log->l_logBBsize || blkno > INT_MAX))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
maintainer Applied
#2 lore raw
In reply to Raphael Pinsonneault-Thibeault
Quoted 10 lines · Raphael Pinsonneault-Thibeault

Syzbot creates a fuzzed record where xfs_has_logv2() but the xlog_rec_header h_version != XLOG_VERSION_2. This causes a

KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in xlog_do_recovery_pass() ->

xlog_recover_process() -> xlog_cksum().

Fix by adding a check to xlog_valid_rec_header() to abort journal recovery if the xlog_rec_header h_version does not match the super block log version.

[...]

Applied to for-next, thanks!

[1/1] xfs: validate log record version against superblock log version

      commit: 44b9553c3dd043f14903d8ae5d4e7a9797c6d92e

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>