crash_dump-fix-dm_crypt-keys-locking-and-ref-leak.patch removed from -mm tree
The quilt patch titled
Subject: crash_dump: fix dm_crypt keys locking and ref leak
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
crash_dump-fix-dm_crypt-keys-locking-and-ref-leak.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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From: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Subject: crash_dump: fix dm_crypt keys locking and ref leak
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 12:20:46 +0100
crash_load_dm_crypt_keys() reads dm-crypt volume keys from the user keyring. It uses user_key_payload_locked() without holding key->sem, which makes lockdep complain when kexec_file_load() assembles the crash image:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
-----------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by kexec/4875.
stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0x96 crash_load_dm_crypt_keys+0x314/0x390 bzImage64_load+0x116/0x9a0 ? __lock_acquire+0x464/0x1ba0 __do_sys_kexec_file_load+0x26a/0x4f0 do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x430 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
In addition, the key returned by request_key() is never key_put()'d, leaking a key reference on each load attempt.
Take key->sem while copying the payload and drop the key reference afterwards.
---
kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c renamed from kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c~crash_dump-fix-dm_crypt-keys-locking-and-ref-leak +13 -4
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int read_key_from_user_keying(str {const struct user_key_payload *ukp;struct key *key; +int ret =0 ;kexec_dprintk ("Requesting logon key %s" , dm_key->key_desc); key =request_key (&key_type_logon, dm_key->key_desc,NULL );
@@ -152,20 +153,28 @@ static int read_key_from_user_keying(strreturn PTR_ERR (key); } +down_read (&key->sem); ukp =user_key_payload_locked (key); -if (!ukp) -return -EKEYREVOKED ; +if (!ukp) { + ret = -EKEYREVOKED ; + goto out; + }if (ukp->datalen >KEY_SIZE_MAX ) {pr_err ("Key size %u exceeds maximum (%u)\n" , ukp->datalen,KEY_SIZE_MAX ); -return -EINVAL ; + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; }memcpy (dm_key->data, ukp->data, ukp->datalen); dm_key->key_size = ukp->datalen;kexec_dprintk ("Get dm crypt key (size=%u) %s: %8ph\n" , dm_key->key_size, dm_key->key_desc, dm_key->data); -return 0 ; + +out: +up_read (&key->sem); +key_put (key); +return ret; }struct config_key {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are