KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry
v2 cover KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry
AMD EPYC 5th generation and above processors support IBPB-on-Entry for SNP guests. By invoking an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) on VMRUN, old indirect branch predictions are prevented from influencing indirect branches within the guest.
The first patch is guest-side support which unmasks the Zen5+ feature bit to allow kernel guests to set the feature.
The second patch is host-side support that checks the CPUID and then sets the feature bit in the VMSA supported features mask.
The third patch is a trivial #define rename that was a result of the review discussion from v1's 2/2, to clarify SEV features that are implemented in the guest.
Based on https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux kvm-x86/next (currently v6.19-rc6-182-ge944fe2c09f4).
This v2 series now also available here:
https://github.com/AMDESE/linux/tree/ibpb-on-entry-latest
Advance qemu bits (to add ibpb-on-entry=on/off switch) available here:
https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/tree/ibpb-on-entry-latest
Qemu bits will be posted upstream once kernel bits are merged. They depend on Naveen Rao's "target/i386: SEV: Add support for enabling VMSA SEV features":
https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/
---
v2:
- Change first patch's title (Nikunj)
- Add reviews-by (Nikunj, Tom)
- Change second patch's description to more generally explain what the patch does (Boris)
- Add new, third patch renaming SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT->SNP_FEATURES_IMPL
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
Kim Phillips (3):
x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry x86/sev: Rename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT->SNP_FEATURES_IMPL
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 7 ++++--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
base-commit: e944fe2c09f405a2e2d147145c9b470084bc4c9a
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v2 1/3 x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side implementation. The feature was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP features were added to the kernel.
In its abundant precaution, commit 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support") included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking guests from using the feature.
Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.
---
v2:
- Change title (Nikunj)
- Add reviews-by (Nikunj, Tom)
- Change the description to more generally explain what the patch does (Boris)
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 1 + arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +1 -0
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC | \ +MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 | \ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +1 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = { [MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt", [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt", [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT] = "SecureAVIC", + [MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT] = "IBPBOnEntry", };/*
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +4 -1
@@ -735,7 +735,10 @@#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT 18#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT) -#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 19 +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19) +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT 23 +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 24#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT)#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL 0xc0010138#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_EN_BIT 0
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 03 Feb 2026 16:24:03 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 02 Mar 2026 11:08:59 +01:00
x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP features were added to the kernel.
In its abundant precaution, commit
8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking guests from using the feature.
Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 1 + arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +1 -0
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC | \ +MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 | \ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +1 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = { [MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt", [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt", [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT] = "SecureAVIC", + [MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT] = "IBPBOnEntry", };/*
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +4 -1
@@ -740,7 +740,10 @@#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT 18#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT) -#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 19 +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19) +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT 23 +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 24#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT)#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL 0xc0010138#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_EN_BIT 0
PATCH v2 2/3 KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry
In reply to Kim PhillipsAMD EPYC 5th generation and above processors support IBPB-on-Entry for SNP guests. By invoking an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) on VMRUN, old indirect branch predictions are prevented from influencing indirect branches within the guest.
SNP guests may choose to enable IBPB-on-Entry by setting SEV_FEATURES bit 21 (IbpbOnEntry).
Host support for IBPB on Entry is indicated by CPUID Fn8000_001F[IbpbOnEntry], bit 31.
If supported, indicate support for IBPB on Entry in sev_supported_vmsa_features bit 23 (IbpbOnEntry).
For more info, refer to page 615, Section 15.36.17 "Side-Channel Protection", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming Part 2, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024 (see Link).
---
v2: Added Tom's Reviewed-by.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27)/* Allowed SEV Features */ #define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28)/* "svsm" SVSM present */ #define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED (19*32+30)/* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY (19*32+31)/* SEV-SNP IBPB on VM Entry */ /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9) +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT(21)#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -1
@@ -3165,8 +3165,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; -if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) +if (!sev_snp_enabled) +return ; +/* the following feature bit checks are SNP specific */ + +if (tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY )) + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY ; }void sev_hardware_unsetup (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerSean, ack for the KVM bits and me taking them thru tip?
Quoted 78 lines · Kim Phillips
AMD EPYC 5th generation and above processors support IBPB-on-Entry for SNP guests. By invoking an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) on VMRUN, old indirect branch predictions are prevented from influencing indirect branches within the guest.
SNP guests may choose to enable IBPB-on-Entry by setting
SEV_FEATURESbit 21 (IbpbOnEntry).Host support for IBPB on Entry is indicated by CPUID Fn8000_001F[IbpbOnEntry], bit 31.
If supported, indicate support for IBPB on Entry in
sev_supported_vmsa_featuresbit 23 (IbpbOnEntry).For more info, refer to page 615, Section 15.36.17 "Side-Channel Protection", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming Part 2, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024 (see Link).
Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>---
v2: Added Tom's Reviewed-by.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1
-0@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27)/* Allowed SEV Features */ #define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28)/* "svsm" SVSM present */ #define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED (19*32+30)/* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY (19*32+31)/* SEV-SNP IBPB on VM Entry */ /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* No Nested Data Breakpoints */ arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1
-0@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9) +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT(21)#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-1@@ -3165,8 +3165,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; -if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) +if (!sev_snp_enabled) +return ; +/* the following feature bit checks are SNP specific */ + +if (tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY )) + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY ; }void sev_hardware_unsetup (void )Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteSean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Borislav Petkov
Sean, ack for the KVM bits and me taking them thru tip?
Ya, should be fine for this to go through tip.
Quoted 23 lines · Kim Phillips
Quoted 22 lines
AMD EPYC 5th generation and above processors support IBPB-on-Entry for SNP guests. By invoking an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) on VMRUN, old indirect branch predictions are prevented from influencing indirect branches within the guest.
SNP guests may choose to enable IBPB-on-Entry by setting
SEV_FEATURESbit 21 (IbpbOnEntry).Host support for IBPB on Entry is indicated by CPUID Fn8000_001F[IbpbOnEntry], bit 31.
If supported, indicate support for IBPB on Entry in
sev_supported_vmsa_featuresbit 23 (IbpbOnEntry).For more info, refer to page 615, Section 15.36.17 "Side-Channel Protection", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming Part 2, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024 (see Link).
Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>---
...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0@@ -3165,8 +3165,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ;
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 3177
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-1-if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) +if (!sev_snp_enabled) +return ; +/* the following feature bit checks are SNP specific */ + +if (tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY )) + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY ; }
I think I'd prefer to nest the if-statement, e.g.
if (sev_snp_enabled) {
if (tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY))
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY;
}I'm mildly concerned that'll we'll overlook the early return and unintentionally bury common code in the SNP-section tail.
More importantly, this patch is buggy. __sev_guest_init() needs to disallow setting SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY for non-SNP guests.
As a follow-up, I also think we should advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE and allow userspace to set the flag in kvm_sev_init.flags. KVM still needs to set the flag for backwards compatibility, but disallowing SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE for an SNP guest is bizarre.
E.g. across 2 or 3 patches:
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +4 -0
@@ -307,6 +307,10 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9) +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \ + SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC | \ + SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY) +#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)struct vmcb_seg {
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -3
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,return -EINVAL ;if (!snp_active) - valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; + valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK ;if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -3218,8 +3218,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; -if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) - sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; +if (sev_snp_enabled) { + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE ; + +if (tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY )) + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY ; + } }void sev_hardware_unsetup (void )
PATCH v2 3/3 x86/sev: Rename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT->SNP_FEATURES_IMPL
In reply to Kim PhillipsRename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT->SNP_FEATURES_IMPL to denote its counterpart relationship with SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ.
---
v2: new this series
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +3 -3
@@ -198,11 +198,11 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)#endif /* -* SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented +* SNP_FEATURES_IMPL is the mask of SNP features that are implemented * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask. */ -#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \ +#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \ MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \ SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)if (!(status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ))return 0 ; -return status &SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT ; +return status &SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_IMPL ; }void snp_check_features (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Rename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL
The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 531397a80360661b61fb69ab41c7359c1f7d35c1 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/531397a80360661b61fb69ab41c7359c1f7d35c1 Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 03 Feb 2026 16:24:05 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 21:08:50 +01:00
x86/sev: Rename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL
Rename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL to denote its counterpart relationship with SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ.
[ bp: Drop stable@, massage commit message. ]
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +3 -3
@@ -198,11 +198,11 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)#endif /* -* SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented +* SNP_FEATURES_IMPL is the mask of SNP features that are implemented * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask. */ -#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \ +#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \ MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \ SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)if (!(status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ))return 0 ; -return status &SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT ; +return status &SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_IMPL ; }void snp_check_features (void )