evm: check return values of crypto_shash functions
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 evm: check return values of crypto_shash functions
The crypto_shash_update() and crypto_shash_final() functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were being ignored in several places in evm_crypto.c:
- hmac_add_misc(): ignores returns from crypto_shash_update() and crypto_shash_final()
- evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(): ignores returns from crypto_shash_update()
- evm_init_hmac(): ignores returns from crypto_shash_update()
If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete. This could potentially allow integrity verification to pass with incorrect HMACs, weakening EVM's security guarantees.
Fix this by:
- Changing hmac_add_misc() from void to int return type
- Checking and propagating error codes from all crypto_shash calls
- Updating all callers to check the return values
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +30 -15
@@ -132,58 +132,65 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) }return desc; }/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode * specific info. * * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete * protection.) */ -static void hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, -char type,char *digest) +static int hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, +char type,char *digest) {struct h_misc {unsigned long ino;__u32 generation;uid_t uid;gid_t gid;umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; +int ret;memset (&hmac_misc,0 ,sizeof (hmac_misc));/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ if (type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; }/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because * everything is signed. */ hmac_misc.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); +if (ret) +return ret;if ((evm_hmac_attrs &EVM_ATTR_FSUUID ) && - type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) -crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); -crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); + type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); +if (ret) +return ret; + } + ret =crypto_shash_final (desc, digest);pr_debug ("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n" ,sizeof (struct h_misc ), (int )sizeof (struct h_misc ), &hmac_misc); +return ret; }/* * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexadecimal string. * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.) */ static void dump_security_xattr_l (const char *prefix,const void *src,size_t count) {#if defined(DEBUG ) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG )
@@ -253,23 +260,24 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,/* * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated * signatures/HMACs. */ if (type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !xattr->enabled)continue ;if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp (xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) { - error =0 ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, + req_xattr_value_len); +if (error) + goto out;if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len);continue ; } size =vfs_getxattr_alloc (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name, &xattr_value, xattr_size,GFP_NOFS );
@@ -279,29 +287,32 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, }if (size <0 )continue ; user_space_size =vfs_getxattr (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,NULL ,0 );if (user_space_size != size)pr_debug ("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n" , dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size, user_space_size); - error =0 ; xattr_size = size; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); +if (error) + goto out;if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size); } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); +if (error) + goto out;if (inode !=d_backing_inode (dentry) && iint) {if (IS_I_VERSION (inode)) i_version =inode_query_iversion (inode);integrity_inode_attrs_store (&iint->metadata_inode, i_version, inode); }/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ if (type ==EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
@@ -394,37 +405,41 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, rc =__vfs_removexattr (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry,XATTR_NAME_EVM ); }return rc; }int evm_init_hmac (struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *xattrs,char *hmac_val) {struct shash_desc *desc;const struct xattr *xattr; +int ret; desc =init_desc (EVM_XATTR_HMAC ,HASH_ALGO_SHA1 );if (IS_ERR (desc)) {pr_info ("init_desc failed\n" );return PTR_ERR (desc); }for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) {if (!evm_protected_xattr (xattr->name))continue ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); +if (ret) + goto out; } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); + ret =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); +out:kfree (desc); -return 0 ; +return ret; }/* * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC */ int evm_init_key (void ) {struct key *evm_key;struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
Quoted 77 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were being ignored in several places inevm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc(): ignores returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(): ignores returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac(): ignores returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete. This could potentially allow integrity verification to pass with incorrect HMACs, weakening EVM's security guarantees.
Fix this by:
- Changinghmac_add_misc()from void to int return type
- Checking and propagating error codes from allcrypto_shashcalls
- Updating all callers to check the return valuesFixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +6
-3@@ -132,58 +132,65 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) }return desc; }/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode * specific info. * * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete * protection.) */ -static void hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, -char type,char *digest) +static int hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, +char type,char *digest) {struct h_misc {unsigned long ino;__u32 generation;uid_t uid;gid_t gid;umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; +int ret;memset (&hmac_misc,0 ,sizeof (hmac_misc));/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ if (type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; }/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because * everything is signed. */ hmac_misc.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); +if (ret) +return ret;
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) · line 182
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +6
-3if ((evm_hmac_attrs &EVM_ATTR_FSUUID ) && - type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) -crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); -crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); + type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); +if (ret) +return ret; + } + ret =crypto_shash_final (desc, digest);
Maybe we should also indicate if an error occurred, with a separate error message, or adding the result in the message below.
Thanks
Roberto
Quoted 122 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +18
-9pr_debug ("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n" ,sizeof (struct h_misc ), (int )sizeof (struct h_misc ), &hmac_misc); +return ret; }/* * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexadecimal string. * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.) */ static void dump_security_xattr_l (const char *prefix,const void *src,size_t count) {#if defined(DEBUG ) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG )@@ -253,23 +260,24 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,/* * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated * signatures/HMACs. */ if (type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !xattr->enabled)continue ;if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp (xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) { - error =0 ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, + req_xattr_value_len); +if (error) + goto out;if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len);continue ; } size =vfs_getxattr_alloc (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name, &xattr_value, xattr_size,GFP_NOFS );@@ -279,29 +287,32 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, }if (size <0 )continue ; user_space_size =vfs_getxattr (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,NULL ,0 );if (user_space_size != size)pr_debug ("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n" , dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size, user_space_size); - error =0 ; xattr_size = size; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); +if (error) + goto out;if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size); } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); +if (error) + goto out;if (inode !=d_backing_inode (dentry) && iint) {if (IS_I_VERSION (inode)) i_version =inode_query_iversion (inode);integrity_inode_attrs_store (&iint->metadata_inode, i_version, inode); }/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ if (type ==EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)@@ -394,37 +405,41 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, rc =__vfs_removexattr (&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry,XATTR_NAME_EVM ); }return rc; }int evm_init_hmac (struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *xattrs,char *hmac_val) {struct shash_desc *desc;const struct xattr *xattr; +int ret; desc =init_desc (EVM_XATTR_HMAC ,HASH_ALGO_SHA1 );if (IS_ERR (desc)) {pr_info ("init_desc failed\n" );return PTR_ERR (desc); }for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) {if (!evm_protected_xattr (xattr->name))continue ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); +if (ret) + goto out; } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); + ret =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); +out:kfree (desc); -return 0 ; +return ret; }/* * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC */ int evm_init_key (void ) {struct key *evm_key;struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;int rc;
Quoted 92 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 77 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were being ignored in several places inevm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc(): ignores returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(): ignores returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac(): ignores returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete. This could potentially allow integrity verification to pass with incorrect HMACs, weakening EVM's security guarantees.
Fix this by:
- Changinghmac_add_misc()from void to int return type
- Checking and propagating error codes from allcrypto_shashcalls
- Updating all callers to check the return valuesFixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +6
-3@@ -132,58 +132,65 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) }return desc; }/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode * specific info. * * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete * protection.) */ -static void hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, -char type,char *digest) +static int hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, +char type,char *digest) {struct h_misc {unsigned long ino;__u32 generation;uid_t uid;gid_t gid;umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; +int ret;memset (&hmac_misc,0 ,sizeof (hmac_misc));/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ if (type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; }/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because * everything is signed. */ hmac_misc.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); +if (ret) +return ret;security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) · line 182
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +6
-3if ((evm_hmac_attrs &EVM_ATTR_FSUUID ) && - type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) -crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); -crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); + type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { + ret =crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); +if (ret) +return ret; + } + ret =crypto_shash_final (desc, digest);Maybe we should also indicate if an error occurred, with a separate error message, or adding the result in the message below.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks
Roberto
That makes sense, I'll send a V2. I'm having trouble with my corporate email mail delivery so it might come from my personal email.
PATCH v2 1/1 evm: check return values of crypto_shash functions
The crypto_shash_update() and crypto_shash_final() functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places in security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:
- hmac_add_misc() ignored returns from crypto_shash_update() and crypto_shash_final()
- evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() ignored returns from crypto_shash_update()
- evm_init_hmac() ignored returns from crypto_shash_update()
If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts hmac_add_misc() from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +42 -13
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)* (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete * protection.) */ -static void hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, +static int hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode,char type,char *digest) { struct h_misc {
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,gid_t gid;umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; +int error;memset (&hmac_misc,0 ,sizeof (hmac_misc));/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
@@ -169,14 +170,28 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + }if ((evm_hmac_attrs &EVM_ATTR_FSUUID ) && - type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) -crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); -crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); + type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + } + } + error =crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_final() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + }pr_debug ("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n" ,sizeof (struct h_misc ), (int )sizeof (struct h_misc ), &hmac_misc); +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -260,9 +275,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp (xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) { - error =0 ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + }if (is_ima) ima_present = true;
@@ -286,15 +304,20 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,pr_debug ("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n" , dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size, user_space_size); - error =0 ; xattr_size = size; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + }if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size); } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); +if (error) + goto out;if (inode !=d_backing_inode (dentry) && iint) {if (IS_I_VERSION (inode))
@@ -401,6 +424,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs, {struct shash_desc *desc;const struct xattr *xattr; +int error; desc =init_desc (EVM_XATTR_HMAC ,HASH_ALGO_SHA1 );if (IS_ERR (desc)) {
@@ -412,12 +436,17 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs,if (!evm_protected_xattr (xattr->name))continue ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + } } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); +out:kfree (desc); -return 0 ; +return error; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places insecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts
hmac_add_misc()from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
After fixing the minor issue below:
Quoted 59 lines
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +20
-5@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)* (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete * protection.) */ -static void hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, +static int hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode,char type,char *digest) { struct h_misc {@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,gid_t gid;umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; +int error;memset (&hmac_misc,0 ,sizeof (hmac_misc));/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable @@ -169,14 +170,28 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + }if ((evm_hmac_attrs &EVM_ATTR_FSUUID ) && - type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) -crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); -crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); + type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + } + } + error =crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_final() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + }pr_debug ("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n" ,sizeof (struct h_misc ), (int )sizeof (struct h_misc ), &hmac_misc); +return 0 ; }/*
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, · line 279
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +1
-2@@ -260,9 +275,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp (xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) { - error =0 ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len);
Please align this.
Thanks
Roberto
Quoted 60 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +21
-6+if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + }if (is_ima) ima_present = true;@@ -286,15 +304,20 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,pr_debug ("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n" , dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size, user_space_size); - error =0 ; xattr_size = size; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + }if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size); } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); +if (error) + goto out;if (inode !=d_backing_inode (dentry) && iint) {if (IS_I_VERSION (inode))@@ -401,6 +424,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs, {struct shash_desc *desc;const struct xattr *xattr; +int error; desc =init_desc (EVM_XATTR_HMAC ,HASH_ALGO_SHA1 );if (IS_ERR (desc)) {@@ -412,12 +436,17 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs,if (!evm_protected_xattr (xattr->name))continue ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + } } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); +out:kfree (desc); -return 0 ; +return error; }/*
Quoted 21 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places insecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts
hmac_add_misc()from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>After fixing the minor issue below:
Already did it. The patch is here (after fixing a conflict with 0496fc9cdc38 "evm: Use ordered xattrs list to calculate HMAC in evm_init_hmac()"):
https://github.com/robertosassu/linux/commit/d5aba42198b602c6de002ef02a4e6cc1d75652d7
Roberto
Quoted 135 lines
Reviewed-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>Quoted 59 lines
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +20
-5@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)* (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete * protection.) */ -static void hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode, +static int hmac_add_misc (struct shash_desc *desc,struct inode *inode,char type,char *digest) { struct h_misc {@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,gid_t gid;umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; +int error;memset (&hmac_misc,0 ,sizeof (hmac_misc));/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable @@ -169,14 +170,28 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc,sizeof (hmac_misc)); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + }if ((evm_hmac_attrs &EVM_ATTR_FSUUID ) && - type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) -crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); -crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); + type !=EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG ) { + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid,UUID_SIZE ); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + } + } + error =crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_final() failed: %d\n" , error); +return error; + }pr_debug ("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n" ,sizeof (struct h_misc ), (int )sizeof (struct h_misc ), &hmac_misc); +return 0 ; }/* security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, · line 279
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +1
-2@@ -260,9 +275,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp (xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) { - error =0 ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len);Please align this.
Thanks
Roberto
Quoted 60 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +21
-6+if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + }if (is_ima) ima_present = true;@@ -286,15 +304,20 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,pr_debug ("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n" , dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size, user_space_size); - error =0 ; xattr_size = size; -crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + }if (is_ima) ima_present = true;dump_security_xattr (xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size); } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode, type, data->digest); +if (error) + goto out;if (inode !=d_backing_inode (dentry) && iint) {if (IS_I_VERSION (inode))@@ -401,6 +424,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs, {struct shash_desc *desc;const struct xattr *xattr; +int error; desc =init_desc (EVM_XATTR_HMAC ,HASH_ALGO_SHA1 );if (IS_ERR (desc)) {@@ -412,12 +436,17 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs,if (!evm_protected_xattr (xattr->name))continue ; -crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + error =crypto_shash_update (desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); +if (error) { +pr_err ("crypto_shash_update() failed: %d\n" , error); + goto out; + } } -hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); + error =hmac_add_misc (desc, inode,EVM_XATTR_HMAC , hmac_val); +out:kfree (desc); -return 0 ; +return error; }/*
Quoted 27 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 21 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places insecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts
hmac_add_misc()from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>After fixing the minor issue below:
Quoted 7 lines
Already did it. The patch is here (after fixing a conflict with
0496fc9cdc38"evm: Use ordered xattrs list to calculate HMAC inevm_init_hmac()"):https://github.com/robertosassu/linux/commit/d5aba42198b602c6de002ef02a4e6cc1d75652d7
Roberto
Nice, thanks for handling that!
-Daniel
Quoted 32 lines · Daniel Hodges
Quoted 31 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 21 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places insecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts
hmac_add_misc()from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>After fixing the minor issue below:
Already did it. The patch is here (after fixing a conflict with
0496fc9cdc38"evm: Use ordered xattrs list to calculate HMAC inevm_init_hmac()"):
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
https://github.com/robertosassu/linux/commit/d5aba42198b602c6de002ef02a4e6cc1d75652d7
Roberto
Nice, thanks for handling that!
Welcome!
Roberto
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 21 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places insecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts
hmac_add_misc()from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>After fixing the minor issue below:
Reviewed-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Thanks Daniel, Roberto. Daniel there are a couple of places where the line length is greater than 80. To see them, add "--max-line-length=80" to scripts/checkpatch.pl. I'd appreciate your fixing them. Otherwise, the patch looks good.
Thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 25 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 24 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 22 lines · Daniel Hodges
The
crypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()functions can fail and return error codes, but their return values were not being checked in several places insecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:-
hmac_add_misc()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()andcrypto_shash_final()
-evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()
-evm_init_hmac()ignored returns fromcrypto_shash_update()If these hash operations fail silently, the resulting HMAC could be invalid or incomplete, which could weaken the integrity verification security that EVM provides.
This patch converts
hmac_add_misc()from void to int return type and adds proper error checking and propagation for all crypto_shash_* function calls. All callers are updated to handle the new return values. Additionally, error messages are logged when cryptographic operations fail to provide visibility into the failure rather than silently returning error codes.Fixes 66dbc325afce ("evm: re-release")Signed-off-by Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
After fixing the minor issue below:
Reviewed-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>Thanks Daniel, Roberto. Daniel there are a couple of places where the line length is greater than 80. To see them, add "--max-line-length=80" to
scripts/checkpatch.pl. I'd appreciate your fixing them. Otherwise, the patch looks good.
Daniel, do you have time to fix the style issues, so that we upstream your patch?
Thanks
Roberto