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KVM: arm64: Fix guest feature sanitization and pKVM state synchronization

PATCH Applied Fuad Tabba 2 participants 6 messages Feb 13

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Fuad Tabba

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover KVM: arm64: Fix guest feature sanitization and pKVM state synchronization

This series addresses state management and feature synchronization vulnerabilities in both standard KVM and pKVM implementations on arm64. The primary focus is ensuring that the hypervisor correctly handles architectural extensions during context switches to prevent state corruption.

Changes since v1 [1]:
- Moved optimising away S1POE handling when not supported by host to a separate patch.
- Fixed clearing, checking and setting KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Based on Linux 6.19.

Cheers,
/fuad

Fuad Tabba (4):
KVM: arm64: Hide S1POE from guests when not supported by the host
KVM: arm64: Optimise away S1POE handling when not supported by host
KVM: arm64: Fix ID register initialization for non-protected pKVM
guests
KVM: arm64: Remove redundant kern_hyp_va() in unpin_host_sve_state()

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  3 ++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c    | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c         |  3 +++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

base-commit: 05f7e89ab9731565d8a62e3b5d1ec206485eeb0b

Signature · 1 line
2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/4 KVM: arm64: Hide S1POE from guests when not supported by the host

When CONFIG_ARM64_POE is disabled, KVM does not save/restore POR_EL1. However, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 sanitisation currently exposes the feature to guests whenever the hardware supports it, ignoring the host kernel configuration.

If a guest detects this feature and attempts to use it, the host will fail to context-switch POR_EL1, potentially leading to state corruption.

Fix this by masking ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1.S1POE in the sanitised system registers, preventing KVM from advertising the feature when the host does not support it (i.e. system_supports_poe() is false).

Fixes 70ed7238297f ("KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +3 -0
index 88a57ca36d96..237e8bd1cf29 100644
@@ -1816,6 +1816,9 @@ static u64 __kvm_read_sanitised_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		       ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_SCTLRX |
 		       ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1POE |
 		       ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1PIE;
+
+		if (!system_supports_poe())
+			val &= ~ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1POE;
 		break;
 	case SYS_ID_MMFR4_EL1:
 		val &= ~ID_MMFR4_EL1_CCIDX;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/4 KVM: arm64: Optimise away S1POE handling when not supported by host

In reply to Fuad Tabba

Although ID register sanitisation prevents guests from seeing the feature, adding this check to the helper allows the compiler to entirely eliminate S1POE-specific code paths (such as context switching POR_EL1) when the host kernel is compiled without support (CONFIG_ARM64_POE is disabled).

This aligns with the pattern used for other optional features like SVE (kvm_has_sve()) and FPMR (kvm_has_fpmr()), ensuring no POE logic if the host lacks support, regardless of the guest configuration state.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -1
index ac7f970c7883..7af72ca749a6 100644
@@ -1592,7 +1592,8 @@ void kvm_set_vm_id_reg(struct kvm *kvm, u32 reg, u64 val);
 	(kvm_has_feat((k), ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1PIE, IMP))
 
 #define kvm_has_s1poe(k)				\
-	(kvm_has_feat((k), ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1POE, IMP))
+	(system_supports_poe() &&			\
+	 kvm_has_feat((k), ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1POE, IMP))
 
 #define kvm_has_ras(k)					\
 	(kvm_has_feat((k), ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, RAS, IMP))
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/4 KVM: arm64: Fix ID register initialization for non-protected pKVM guests

In reply to Fuad Tabba

In protected mode, the hypervisor maintains a separate instance of the kvm structure for each VM. For non-protected VMs, this structure is initialized from the host's kvm state.

Currently, pkvm_init_features_from_host() copies the KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED flag from the host without the underlying id_regs data being initialized. This results in the hypervisor seeing the flag as set while the ID registers remain zeroed.

Consequently, kvm_has_feat() checks at EL2 fail (return 0) for non-protected VMs. This breaks logic that relies on feature detection, such as ctxt_has_tcrx() for TCR2_EL1 support. As a result, certain system registers (e.g., TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, POR_EL1) are not saved/restored during the world switch, which could lead to state corruption.

Fix this by explicitly copying the ID registers from the host kvm to the hypervisor kvm for non-protected VMs during initialization, since we trust the host with its non-protected guests' features. Also ensure KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED is cleared initially in pkvm_init_features_from_host so that vm_copy_id_regs can properly initialize them and set the flag once done.

Fixes 41d6028e28bd ("KVM: arm64: Convert the SVE guest vcpu flag to a vm flag")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +33 -2
index 12b2acfbcfd1..59a010221818 100644
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void pkvm_init_features_from_host(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm, const struc
 	/* No restrictions for non-protected VMs. */
 	if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm)) {
 		hyp_vm->kvm.arch.flags = host_arch_flags;
+		hyp_vm->kvm.arch.flags &= ~BIT_ULL(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED);
 
 		bitmap_copy(kvm->arch.vcpu_features,
 			    host_kvm->arch.vcpu_features,
@@ -471,6 +472,35 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int vm_copy_id_regs(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(hyp_vcpu);
+	const struct kvm *host_kvm = hyp_vm->host_kvm;
+	struct kvm *kvm = &hyp_vm->kvm;
+
+	if (!test_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &host_kvm->arch.flags))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &kvm->arch.flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	memcpy(kvm->arch.id_regs, host_kvm->arch.id_regs, sizeof(kvm->arch.id_regs));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sysregs(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+		kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+	else
+		ret = vm_copy_id_regs(hyp_vcpu);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
 			      struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm,
 			      struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu)
@@ -490,8 +520,9 @@ static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cflags = READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.cflags);
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mp_state.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED;
 
-	if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
-		kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+	ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_sysregs(hyp_vcpu);
+	if (ret)
+		goto done;
 
 	ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_traps(hyp_vcpu);
 	if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/4 KVM: arm64: Remove redundant kern_hyp_va() in unpin_host_sve_state()

In reply to Fuad Tabba

The sve_state pointer in hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch is initialized as a hypervisor virtual address during vCPU initialization in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve().

unpin_host_sve_state() calls kern_hyp_va() on this address. Since kern_hyp_va() is idempotent, it's not a bug. However, it is unnecessary and potentially confusing. Remove the redundant conversion.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +1 -1
index 59a010221818..389fa5f09c3d 100644
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static void unpin_host_sve_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 	if (!vcpu_has_feature(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu, KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE))
 		return;
 
-	sve_state = kern_hyp_va(hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state);
+	sve_state = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state;
 	hyp_unpin_shared_mem(sve_state,
 			     sve_state + vcpu_sve_state_size(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu));
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
maintainer Applied
#5 lore raw
In reply to Fuad Tabba
Quoted 6 lines · Fuad Tabba

This series addresses state management and feature synchronization vulnerabilities in both standard KVM and pKVM implementations on arm64. The primary focus is ensuring that the hypervisor correctly handles architectural extensions during context switches to prevent state corruption.

Quoted 6 lines

Changes since v1 [1]:
- Moved optimising away S1POE handling when not supported by host to a separate patch.
- Fixed clearing, checking and setting KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED

[...]

Applied to fixes, thanks!

[1/4] KVM: arm64: Hide S1POE from guests when not supported by the host

      commit: f66857bafd4f151c5cc6856e47be2e12c1721e43
[2/4] KVM: arm64: Optimise away S1POE handling when not supported by host
      commit: 9cb0468d0b335ccf769bd8e161cc96195e82d8b1
[3/4] KVM: arm64: Fix ID register initialization for non-protected pKVM guests
      commit: 7e7c2cf0024d89443a7af52e09e47b1fe634ab17
[4/4] KVM: arm64: Remove redundant kern_hyp_va() in unpin_host_sve_state()
      commit: 02471a78a052b631204aed051ab718e4d14ae687

Cheers,

	M.
Signature · 1 line
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