6.18.19-rc1 review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 147/333 usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiasheng Jiang <[email protected]>
commit b9fde507355342a2d64225d582dc8b98ff5ecb19 upstream.
The tpg->tpg_nexus pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully established or immediately after it is dropped.
Currently, functions like bot_submit_command() and the data transfer paths retrieve tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus and immediately dereference tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess without any validation. If a malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport) command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS).
This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer functions like usbg_submit_command() and bot_send_bad_response() correctly implement a NULL check for tv_nexus before proceeding.
Fix this by bringing consistency to the nexus handling. Add the missing if (!tv_nexus) checks to the vulnerable BOT command and request processing paths, aborting the command gracefully with an error instead of crashing the system.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c +14 -0
@@ -1222,6 +1222,13 @@ static void usbg_submit_cmd(struct usbg_ se_cmd = &cmd->se_cmd; tpg = cmd->fu->tpg; tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus; +if (!tv_nexus) { +struct usb_gadget *gadget =fuas_to_gadget (cmd->fu); + +dev_err (&gadget->dev,"Missing nexus, ignoring command\n" ); +return ; + } + dir =get_cmd_dir (cmd->cmd_buf);if (dir <0 ) goto out;
@@ -1482,6 +1489,13 @@ static void bot_cmd_work(struct work_str se_cmd = &cmd->se_cmd; tpg = cmd->fu->tpg; tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus; +if (!tv_nexus) { +struct usb_gadget *gadget =fuas_to_gadget (cmd->fu); + +dev_err (&gadget->dev,"Missing nexus, ignoring command\n" ); +return ; + } + dir =get_cmd_dir (cmd->cmd_buf);if (dir <0 ) goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/333 usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix atomic context locking issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit 0d6c8144ca4d93253de952a5ea0028c19ed7ab68 upstream.
The ncm_set_alt function was holding a mutex to protect against races with configfs, which invokes the might-sleep function inside an atomic context.
Remove the struct net_device pointer from the f_ncm_opts structure to eliminate the contention. The connection state is now managed by a new boolean flag to preserve the use-after-free fix from
commit 6334b8e4553c ("usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix UAF ncm object at re-bind after usb ep transport error").
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xc0 dump_stack+0x14/0x16 __might_resched+0x389/0x4c0 __might_sleep+0x8e/0x100 ... __mutex_lock+0x6f/0x1740 ... ncm_set_alt+0x209/0xa40 set_config+0x6b6/0xb40 composite_setup+0x734/0x2b40 ...
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 29 ++++++++++--------------- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether_configfs.h | 11 --------- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h | 1 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c +12 -17
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct f_ncm {u8 notify_state;atomic_t notify_count;bool is_open; +bool is_connected;const struct ndp_parser_opts *parser_opts;bool is_crc;
@@ -864,7 +865,6 @@ invalid:static int ncm_set_alt (struct usb_function *f,unsigned intf,unsigned alt) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); -struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;/* Control interface has only altsetting 0 */
@@ -887,13 +887,12 @@ static int ncm_set_alt(struct usb_functiif (alt >1 ) goto fail; - scoped_guard(mutex, &opts->lock) -if (opts->net) { -DBG (cdev,"reset ncm\n" ); - opts->net =NULL ; -gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); -ncm_reset_values (ncm); - } +if (ncm->is_connected) { +DBG (cdev,"reset ncm\n" ); + ncm->is_connected = false; +gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); +ncm_reset_values (ncm); + }/* * CDC Network only sends data in non-default altsettings.
@@ -926,8 +925,7 @@ static int ncm_set_alt(struct usb_functi net =gether_connect (&ncm->port);if (IS_ERR (net))return PTR_ERR (net); -scoped_guard (mutex, &opts->lock) - opts->net = net; + ncm->is_connected = true; }spin_lock (&ncm->lock);
@@ -1374,16 +1372,14 @@ err:static void ncm_disable (struct usb_function *f) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); -struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;DBG (cdev,"ncm deactivated\n" ); - scoped_guard(mutex, &opts->lock) -if (opts->net) { - opts->net =NULL ; -gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); - } +if (ncm->is_connected) { + ncm->is_connected = false; +gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); + }if (ncm->notify->enabled) {usb_ep_disable (ncm->notify);
@@ -1687,7 +1683,6 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *ncmif (!opts)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - opts->net =NULL ; opts->ncm_os_desc.ext_compat_id = opts->ncm_ext_compat_id;gether_setup_opts_default (&opts->net_opts,"usb" );
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether_configfs.h +1 -10
@@ -326,18 +326,9 @@ out: \ char *page) \ { \ struct f_##_f_##_opts *opts = to_f_##_f_##_opts(item); \ -const char *name; \ \guard (mutex)(&opts->lock); \ -rtnl_lock (); \ -if (opts->net_opts.ifname_set) \ - name = opts->net_opts.name; \ -else if (opts->net) \ - name =netdev_name (opts->net); \ -else \ - name ="(inactive net_device)" ; \ -rtnl_unlock (); \ -return sysfs_emit (page,"%s\n" , name); \ +return sysfs_emit (page,"%s\n" , opts->net_opts.name); \ } \ \ static ssize_t _f_##_opts_ifname_store(struct config_item *item, \
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h +0 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@struct f_ncm_opts {struct usb_function_instance func_inst; -struct net_device *net;struct gether_opts net_opts;struct config_group *ncm_interf_group;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/333 usb: legacy: ncm: Fix NPE in gncm_bind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit fde0634ad9856b3943a2d1a8cc8de174a63ac840 upstream.
Commit 56a512a9b410 ("usb: gadget: f_ncm: align net_device lifecycle with bind/unbind") deferred the allocation of the net_device. This change leads to a NULL pointer dereference in the legacy NCM driver as it attempts to access the net_device before it's fully instantiated.
Store the provided qmult, host_addr, and dev_addr into the struct ncm_opts->net_opts during gncm_bind(). These values will be properly applied to the net_device when it is allocated and configured later in the binding process by the NCM function driver.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c +10 -3
@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@/* #define DEBUG */ /* #define VERBOSE_DEBUG */ +#include <linux/hex.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/usb/composite.h> #include "u_ether.h"
@@ -129,6 +131,7 @@ static int gncm_bind(struct usb_composite_dev *cdev)struct usb_gadget *gadget = cdev->gadget;struct f_ncm_opts *ncm_opts;int status; +u8 mac[ETH_ALEN ]; f_ncm_inst =usb_get_function_instance ("ncm" );if (IS_ERR (f_ncm_inst))
@@ -136,11 +139,15 @@ static int gncm_bind(struct usb_composite_dev *cdev) ncm_opts = container_of(f_ncm_inst, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); -gether_set_qmult (ncm_opts->net, qmult); -if (!gether_set_host_addr (ncm_opts->net, host_addr)) + ncm_opts->net_opts.qmult = qmult; +if (host_addr &&mac_pton (host_addr, mac)) { +memcpy (&ncm_opts->net_opts.host_mac, mac,ETH_ALEN );pr_info ("using host ethernet address: %s" , host_addr); -if (!gether_set_dev_addr (ncm_opts->net, dev_addr)) + } +if (dev_addr &&mac_pton (dev_addr, mac)) { +memcpy (&ncm_opts->net_opts.dev_mac, mac,ETH_ALEN );pr_info ("using self ethernet address: %s" , dev_addr); + }/* Allocate string descriptor numbers ... note that string * contents can be overridden by the composite_dev glue.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/333 Revert "usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix atomic context locking issue"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit 11199720fac2debbe718aec11e026ab3330dc80d upstream.
This reverts commit 0d6c8144ca4d93253de952a5ea0028c19ed7ab68.
This commit is being reverted as part of a series-wide revert.
By deferring the net_device allocation to the bind() phase, a single function instance will spawn multiple network devices if it is symlinked to multiple USB configurations.
This causes regressions for userspace tools (like the postmarketOS DHCP daemon) that rely on reading the interface name (e.g., "usb0") from configfs. Currently, configfs returns the template "usb%d", causing the userspace network setup to fail.
Crucially, because this patch breaks the 1:1 mapping between the function instance and the network device, this naming issue cannot simply be patched. Configfs only exposes a single 'ifname' attribute per instance, making it impossible to accurately report the actual interface name when multiple underlying network devices can exist for that single instance.
All configurations tied to the same function instance are meant to share a single network device. Revert this change to restore the 1:1 mapping by allocating the network device at the instance level (alloc_inst).
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 29 ++++++++++++++----------- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether_configfs.h | 11 ++++++++- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h | 1 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c +17 -12
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ struct f_ncm {u8 notify_state;atomic_t notify_count;bool is_open; -bool is_connected;const struct ndp_parser_opts *parser_opts;bool is_crc;
@@ -865,6 +864,7 @@ invalid:static int ncm_set_alt (struct usb_function *f,unsigned intf,unsigned alt) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); +struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;/* Control interface has only altsetting 0 */
@@ -887,12 +887,13 @@ static int ncm_set_alt(struct usb_functiif (alt >1 ) goto fail; -if (ncm->is_connected) { -DBG (cdev,"reset ncm\n" ); - ncm->is_connected = false; -gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); -ncm_reset_values (ncm); - } + scoped_guard(mutex, &opts->lock) +if (opts->net) { +DBG (cdev,"reset ncm\n" ); + opts->net =NULL ; +gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); +ncm_reset_values (ncm); + }/* * CDC Network only sends data in non-default altsettings.
@@ -925,7 +926,8 @@ static int ncm_set_alt(struct usb_functi net =gether_connect (&ncm->port);if (IS_ERR (net))return PTR_ERR (net); - ncm->is_connected = true; +scoped_guard (mutex, &opts->lock) + opts->net = net; }spin_lock (&ncm->lock);
@@ -1372,14 +1374,16 @@ err:static void ncm_disable (struct usb_function *f) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); +struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;DBG (cdev,"ncm deactivated\n" ); -if (ncm->is_connected) { - ncm->is_connected = false; -gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); - } + scoped_guard(mutex, &opts->lock) +if (opts->net) { + opts->net =NULL ; +gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); + }if (ncm->notify->enabled) {usb_ep_disable (ncm->notify);
@@ -1683,6 +1687,7 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *ncmif (!opts)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + opts->net =NULL ; opts->ncm_os_desc.ext_compat_id = opts->ncm_ext_compat_id;gether_setup_opts_default (&opts->net_opts,"usb" );
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether_configfs.h +10 -1
@@ -326,9 +326,18 @@ out: \ char *page) \ { \ struct f_##_f_##_opts *opts = to_f_##_f_##_opts(item); \ +const char *name; \ \guard (mutex)(&opts->lock); \ -return sysfs_emit (page,"%s\n" , opts->net_opts.name); \ +rtnl_lock (); \ +if (opts->net_opts.ifname_set) \ + name = opts->net_opts.name; \ +else if (opts->net) \ + name =netdev_name (opts->net); \ +else \ + name ="(inactive net_device)" ; \ +rtnl_unlock (); \ +return sysfs_emit (page,"%s\n" , name); \ } \ \ static ssize_t _f_##_opts_ifname_store(struct config_item *item, \
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@struct f_ncm_opts {struct usb_function_instance func_inst; +struct net_device *net;struct gether_opts net_opts;struct config_group *ncm_interf_group;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/333 Revert "usb: legacy: ncm: Fix NPE in gncm_bind"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit f2524c0e6ff0a5f72f1e1a32441c69d3b56430c4 upstream.
This reverts commit fde0634ad9856b3943a2d1a8cc8de174a63ac840.
This commit is being reverted as part of a series-wide revert.
By deferring the net_device allocation to the bind() phase, a single function instance will spawn multiple network devices if it is symlinked to multiple USB configurations.
This causes regressions for userspace tools (like the postmarketOS DHCP daemon) that rely on reading the interface name (e.g., "usb0") from configfs. Currently, configfs returns the template "usb%d", causing the userspace network setup to fail.
Crucially, because this patch breaks the 1:1 mapping between the function instance and the network device, this naming issue cannot simply be patched. Configfs only exposes a single 'ifname' attribute per instance, making it impossible to accurately report the actual interface name when multiple underlying network devices can exist for that single instance.
All configurations tied to the same function instance are meant to share a single network device. Revert this change to restore the 1:1 mapping by allocating the network device at the instance level (alloc_inst).
--- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c | 13 +++---------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c +3 -10
@@ -15,10 +15,8 @@/* #define DEBUG */ /* #define VERBOSE_DEBUG */ -#include <linux/hex.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/usb/composite.h> #include "u_ether.h"
@@ -131,7 +129,6 @@ static int gncm_bind(struct usb_composite_dev *cdev)struct usb_gadget *gadget = cdev->gadget;struct f_ncm_opts *ncm_opts;int status; -u8 mac[ETH_ALEN ]; f_ncm_inst =usb_get_function_instance ("ncm" );if (IS_ERR (f_ncm_inst))
@@ -139,15 +136,11 @@ static int gncm_bind(struct usb_composite_dev *cdev) ncm_opts = container_of(f_ncm_inst, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); - ncm_opts->net_opts.qmult = qmult; -if (host_addr &&mac_pton (host_addr, mac)) { -memcpy (&ncm_opts->net_opts.host_mac, mac,ETH_ALEN ); +gether_set_qmult (ncm_opts->net, qmult); +if (!gether_set_host_addr (ncm_opts->net, host_addr))pr_info ("using host ethernet address: %s" , host_addr); - } -if (dev_addr &&mac_pton (dev_addr, mac)) { -memcpy (&ncm_opts->net_opts.dev_mac, mac,ETH_ALEN ); +if (!gether_set_dev_addr (ncm_opts->net, dev_addr))pr_info ("using self ethernet address: %s" , dev_addr); - }/* Allocate string descriptor numbers ... note that string * contents can be overridden by the composite_dev glue.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/333 Revert "usb: gadget: u_ether: Add auto-cleanup helper for freeing net_device"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit 46662d3a1ad40282ba9f753cccc6f909ec4468cc upstream.
This reverts commit 0c0981126b99288ed354d3d414c8a5fd42ac9e25.
This commit is being reverted as part of a series-wide revert.
By deferring the net_device allocation to the bind() phase, a single function instance will spawn multiple network devices if it is symlinked to multiple USB configurations.
This causes regressions for userspace tools (like the postmarketOS DHCP daemon) that rely on reading the interface name (e.g., "usb0") from configfs. Currently, configfs returns the template "usb%d", causing the userspace network setup to fail.
Crucially, because this patch breaks the 1:1 mapping between the function instance and the network device, this naming issue cannot simply be patched. Configfs only exposes a single 'ifname' attribute per instance, making it impossible to accurately report the actual interface name when multiple underlying network devices can exist for that single instance.
All configurations tied to the same function instance are meant to share a single network device. Revert this change to restore the 1:1 mapping by allocating the network device at the instance level (alloc_inst).
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 15 --------------- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h | 2 -- 2 files changed, 17 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +0 -15
@@ -1125,21 +1125,6 @@ void gether_cleanup(struct eth_dev *dev) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_cleanup); -void gether_unregister_free_netdev (struct net_device *net) -{ -if (!net) -return ; - -struct eth_dev *dev =netdev_priv (net); - -if (net->reg_state ==NETREG_REGISTERED ) { -unregister_netdev (net); -flush_work (&dev->work); - } -free_netdev (net); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_unregister_free_netdev); -/** * gether_connect - notify network layer that USB link is active * @link: the USB link, set up with endpoints, descriptors matching
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h +0 -2
@@ -283,8 +283,6 @@ int gether_get_ifname(struct net_deviceint gether_set_ifname (struct net_device *net,const char *name,int len);void gether_cleanup (struct eth_dev *dev); -void gether_unregister_free_netdev (struct net_device *net); -DEFINE_FREE(free_gether_netdev, struct net_device *, gether_unregister_free_netdev(_T));void gether_setup_opts_default (struct gether_opts *opts,const char *name);void gether_apply_opts (struct net_device *net,struct gether_opts *opts);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/333 Revert "usb: gadget: f_ncm: align net_device lifecycle with bind/unbind"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit 37893bc5de2460c543ec1aa8250c37a305234054 upstream.
This reverts commit 56a512a9b4107079f68701e7d55da8507eb963d9.
This commit is being reverted as part of a series-wide revert.
By deferring the net_device allocation to the bind() phase, a single function instance will spawn multiple network devices if it is symlinked to multiple USB configurations.
This causes regressions for userspace tools (like the postmarketOS DHCP daemon) that rely on reading the interface name (e.g., "usb0") from configfs. Currently, configfs returns the template "usb%d", causing the userspace network setup to fail.
Crucially, because this patch breaks the 1:1 mapping between the function instance and the network device, this naming issue cannot simply be patched. Configfs only exposes a single 'ifname' attribute per instance, making it impossible to accurately report the actual interface name when multiple underlying network devices can exist for that single instance.
All configurations tied to the same function instance are meant to share a single network device. Revert this change to restore the 1:1 mapping by allocating the network device at the instance level (alloc_inst).
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h | 4 - 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c +65 -63
@@ -83,11 +83,6 @@ static inline struct f_ncm *func_to_ncm( return container_of(f, struct f_ncm, port.func); } -static inline struct f_ncm_opts *func_to_ncm_opts (struct usb_function *f) -{ - return container_of(f->fi, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); -} -/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /*
@@ -864,7 +859,6 @@ invalid:static int ncm_set_alt (struct usb_function *f,unsigned intf,unsigned alt) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); -struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;/* Control interface has only altsetting 0 */
@@ -887,13 +881,12 @@ static int ncm_set_alt(struct usb_functiif (alt >1 ) goto fail; - scoped_guard(mutex, &opts->lock) -if (opts->net) { -DBG (cdev,"reset ncm\n" ); - opts->net =NULL ; -gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); -ncm_reset_values (ncm); - } +if (ncm->netdev) { +DBG (cdev,"reset ncm\n" ); + ncm->netdev =NULL ; +gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); +ncm_reset_values (ncm); + }/* * CDC Network only sends data in non-default altsettings.
@@ -926,8 +919,7 @@ static int ncm_set_alt(struct usb_functi net =gether_connect (&ncm->port);if (IS_ERR (net))return PTR_ERR (net); -scoped_guard (mutex, &opts->lock) - opts->net = net; + ncm->netdev = net; }spin_lock (&ncm->lock);
@@ -1374,16 +1366,14 @@ err:static void ncm_disable (struct usb_function *f) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); -struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;DBG (cdev,"ncm deactivated\n" ); - scoped_guard(mutex, &opts->lock) -if (opts->net) { - opts->net =NULL ; -gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); - } +if (ncm->netdev) { + ncm->netdev =NULL ; +gether_disconnect (&ncm->port); + }if (ncm->notify->enabled) {usb_ep_disable (ncm->notify);
@@ -1443,44 +1433,39 @@ static int ncm_bind(struct usb_configura {struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = c->cdev;struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); -struct f_ncm_opts *ncm_opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f);struct usb_string *us;int status =0 ;struct usb_ep *ep; +struct f_ncm_opts *ncm_opts; struct usb_os_desc_table *os_desc_table __free(kfree) = NULL; - struct net_device *netdev __free(free_gether_netdev) = NULL; struct usb_request *request __free(free_usb_request) = NULL;if (!can_support_ecm (cdev->gadget))return -EINVAL ; + ncm_opts = container_of(f->fi, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); +if (cdev->use_os_string) { os_desc_table =kzalloc (sizeof (*os_desc_table),GFP_KERNEL );if (!os_desc_table)return -ENOMEM ; } - netdev =gether_setup_default (); -if (IS_ERR (netdev)) -return -ENOMEM ; - - scoped_guard(mutex, &ncm_opts->lock) { -gether_apply_opts (netdev, &ncm_opts->net_opts); - netdev->mtu = ncm_opts->max_segment_size -ETH_HLEN ; +mutex_lock (&ncm_opts->lock); +gether_set_gadget (ncm_opts->net, cdev->gadget); +if (!ncm_opts->bound) { + ncm_opts->net->mtu = (ncm_opts->max_segment_size -ETH_HLEN ); + status =gether_register_netdev (ncm_opts->net); } +mutex_unlock (&ncm_opts->lock); -gether_set_gadget (netdev, cdev->gadget); - status =gether_register_netdev (netdev);if (status)return status; -/* export host's Ethernet address in CDC format */ - status =gether_get_host_addr_cdc (netdev, ncm->ethaddr, -sizeof (ncm->ethaddr)); -if (status <12 ) -return -EINVAL ; - ncm_string_defs[STRING_MAC_IDX ].s = ncm->ethaddr; + ncm_opts->bound = true; + + ncm_string_defs[1 ].s = ncm->ethaddr; us =usb_gstrings_attach (cdev, ncm_strings,ARRAY_SIZE (ncm_string_defs));
@@ -1578,8 +1563,6 @@ static int ncm_bind(struct usb_configura f->os_desc_n =1 ; } ncm->notify_req =no_free_ptr (request); - ncm->netdev =no_free_ptr (netdev); - ncm->port.ioport =netdev_priv (ncm->netdev); DBG(cdev, "CDC Network: IN/%s OUT/%s NOTIFY/%s\n", ncm->port.in_ep->name, ncm->port.out_ep->name,
@@ -1594,19 +1577,19 @@ static inline struct f_ncm_opts *to_f_nc }/* f_ncm_item_ops */ -USB_ETHER_OPTS_ITEM (ncm); +USB_ETHERNET_CONFIGFS_ITEM (ncm);/* f_ncm_opts_dev_addr */ -USB_ETHER_OPTS_ATTR_DEV_ADDR (ncm); +USB_ETHERNET_CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR_DEV_ADDR (ncm);/* f_ncm_opts_host_addr */ -USB_ETHER_OPTS_ATTR_HOST_ADDR (ncm); +USB_ETHERNET_CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR_HOST_ADDR (ncm);/* f_ncm_opts_qmult */ -USB_ETHER_OPTS_ATTR_QMULT (ncm); +USB_ETHERNET_CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR_QMULT (ncm);/* f_ncm_opts_ifname */ -USB_ETHER_OPTS_ATTR_IFNAME (ncm); +USB_ETHERNET_CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR_IFNAME (ncm);static ssize_t ncm_opts_max_segment_size_show (struct config_item *item,char *page)
@@ -1672,27 +1655,34 @@ static void ncm_free_inst(struct usb_funstruct f_ncm_opts *opts; opts = container_of(f, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); +if (opts->bound) +gether_cleanup (netdev_priv (opts->net)); +else +free_netdev (opts->net);kfree (opts->ncm_interf_group);kfree (opts); }static struct usb_function_instance *ncm_alloc_inst (void ) { -struct usb_function_instance *ret; +struct f_ncm_opts *opts;struct usb_os_desc *descs[1 ];char *names[1 ];struct config_group *ncm_interf_group; - struct f_ncm_opts *opts __free(kfree) = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL); + opts =kzalloc (sizeof (*opts),GFP_KERNEL );if (!opts)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - - opts->net =NULL ; opts->ncm_os_desc.ext_compat_id = opts->ncm_ext_compat_id; -gether_setup_opts_default (&opts->net_opts,"usb" );mutex_init (&opts->lock); opts->func_inst.free_func_inst = ncm_free_inst; + opts->net =gether_setup_default (); +if (IS_ERR (opts->net)) { +struct net_device *net = opts->net; +kfree (opts); +return ERR_CAST (net); + } opts->max_segment_size =ETH_FRAME_LEN ;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&opts->ncm_os_desc.ext_prop);
@@ -1703,22 +1693,26 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *ncm ncm_interf_group =usb_os_desc_prepare_interf_dir (&opts->func_inst.group,1 , descs, names,THIS_MODULE ); -if (IS_ERR (ncm_interf_group)) +if (IS_ERR (ncm_interf_group)) { +ncm_free_inst (&opts->func_inst);return ERR_CAST (ncm_interf_group); + } opts->ncm_interf_group = ncm_interf_group; - ret = &opts->func_inst; -retain_and_null_ptr (opts); -return ret; +return &opts->func_inst; }static void ncm_free (struct usb_function *f) { -struct f_ncm_opts *opts =func_to_ncm_opts (f); +struct f_ncm *ncm; +struct f_ncm_opts *opts; -scoped_guard (mutex, &opts->lock) - opts->refcnt--; -kfree (func_to_ncm (f)); + ncm =func_to_ncm (f); + opts = container_of(f->fi, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); +kfree (ncm); +mutex_lock (&opts->lock); + opts->refcnt--; +mutex_unlock (&opts->lock); }static void ncm_unbind (struct usb_configuration *c,struct usb_function *f)
@@ -1742,15 +1736,13 @@ static void ncm_unbind(struct usb_configkfree (ncm->notify_req->buf);usb_ep_free_request (ncm->notify, ncm->notify_req); - - ncm->port.ioport =NULL ; -gether_cleanup (netdev_priv (ncm->netdev)); }static struct usb_function *ncm_alloc (struct usb_function_instance *fi) {struct f_ncm *ncm;struct f_ncm_opts *opts; +int status;/* allocate and initialize one new instance */ ncm =kzalloc (sizeof (*ncm),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -1758,12 +1750,22 @@ static struct usb_function *ncm_alloc(streturn ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); opts = container_of(fi, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); +mutex_lock (&opts->lock); + opts->refcnt++; -scoped_guard (mutex, &opts->lock) - opts->refcnt++; +/* export host's Ethernet address in CDC format */ + status =gether_get_host_addr_cdc (opts->net, ncm->ethaddr, +sizeof (ncm->ethaddr)); +if (status <12 ) {/* strlen("01234567890a") */ +kfree (ncm); +mutex_unlock (&opts->lock); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + }spin_lock_init (&ncm->lock);ncm_reset_values (ncm); + ncm->port.ioport =netdev_priv (opts->net); +mutex_unlock (&opts->lock); ncm->port.is_fixed = true; ncm->port.supports_multi_frame = true;
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h +1 -3
@@ -15,13 +15,11 @@#include <linux/usb/composite.h> -#include "u_ether.h" -struct f_ncm_opts {struct usb_function_instance func_inst;struct net_device *net; +bool bound; -struct gether_opts net_opts;struct config_group *ncm_interf_group;struct usb_os_desc ncm_os_desc;char ncm_ext_compat_id[16 ];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/333 Revert "usb: gadget: u_ether: add gether_opts for config caching"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit 3131c1aff7cdffb96239f06f98e16188cbc2083f upstream.
This reverts commit e065c6a7e46c2ee9c677fdbf50035323d2de1215.
This commit is being reverted as part of a series-wide revert.
By deferring the net_device allocation to the bind() phase, a single function instance will spawn multiple network devices if it is symlinked to multiple USB configurations.
This causes regressions for userspace tools (like the postmarketOS DHCP daemon) that rely on reading the interface name (e.g., "usb0") from configfs. Currently, configfs returns the template "usb%d", causing the userspace network setup to fail.
Crucially, because this patch breaks the 1:1 mapping between the function instance and the network device, this naming issue cannot simply be patched. Configfs only exposes a single 'ifname' attribute per instance, making it impossible to accurately report the actual interface name when multiple underlying network devices can exist for that single instance.
All configurations tied to the same function instance are meant to share a single network device. Revert this change to restore the 1:1 mapping by allocating the network device at the instance level (alloc_inst).
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 30 ---- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h | 28 --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether_configfs.h | 176 ------------------------- 3 files changed, 234 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +0 -30
@@ -1039,36 +1039,6 @@ int gether_set_ifname(struct net_device }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_set_ifname); -void gether_setup_opts_default (struct gether_opts *opts,const char *name) -{ - opts->qmult =QMULT_DEFAULT ; -snprintf (opts->name,sizeof (opts->name),"%s%%d" , name); -eth_random_addr (opts->dev_mac); - opts->addr_assign_type =NET_ADDR_RANDOM ; -eth_random_addr (opts->host_mac); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_setup_opts_default); - -void gether_apply_opts (struct net_device *net,struct gether_opts *opts) -{ -struct eth_dev *dev =netdev_priv (net); - - dev->qmult = opts->qmult; - -if (opts->ifname_set) { -strscpy (net->name, opts->name,sizeof (net->name)); - dev->ifname_set = true; - } - -memcpy (dev->host_mac, opts->host_mac,sizeof (dev->host_mac)); - -if (opts->addr_assign_type ==NET_ADDR_SET ) { -memcpy (dev->dev_mac, opts->dev_mac,sizeof (dev->dev_mac)); - net->addr_assign_type = opts->addr_assign_type; - } -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_apply_opts); -void gether_suspend (struct gether *link) {struct eth_dev *dev = link->ioport;
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h +0 -28
@@ -38,31 +38,6 @@struct eth_dev ; -/** -* struct gether_opts - Options for Ethernet gadget function instances -* @name: Pattern for the network interface name (e.g., "usb%d"). -* Used to generate the net device name. -* @qmult: Queue length multiplier for high/super speed. -* @host_mac: The MAC address to be used by the host side. -* @dev_mac: The MAC address to be used by the device side. -* @ifname_set: True if the interface name pattern has been set by userspace. -* @addr_assign_type: The method used for assigning the device MAC address -* (e.g., NET_ADDR_RANDOM, NET_ADDR_SET). -* -* This structure caches network-related settings provided through configfs -* before the net_device is fully instantiated. This allows for early -* configuration while deferring net_device allocation until the function -* is bound. -*/ -struct gether_opts { -char name[IFNAMSIZ ]; -unsigned int qmult; -u8 host_mac[ETH_ALEN ]; -u8 dev_mac[ETH_ALEN ]; -bool ifname_set; -unsigned char addr_assign_type; -}; -/* * This represents the USB side of an "ethernet" link, managed by a USB * function which provides control and (maybe) framing. Two functions
@@ -284,9 +259,6 @@ int gether_set_ifname(struct net_devicevoid gether_cleanup (struct eth_dev *dev); -void gether_setup_opts_default (struct gether_opts *opts,const char *name); -void gether_apply_opts (struct net_device *net,struct gether_opts *opts); -void gether_suspend (struct gether *link);void gether_resume (struct gether *link);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether_configfs.h +0 -176
186 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/333 usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]>
commit ec35c1969650e7cb6c8a91020e568ed46e3551b0 upstream.
The network device outlived its parent gadget device during disconnection, resulting in dangling sysfs links and null pointer dereference problems.
A prior attempt to solve this by removing SET_NETDEV_DEV entirely [1] was reverted due to power management ordering concerns and a NO-CARRIER regression.
A subsequent attempt to defer net_device allocation to bind [2] broke 1:1 mapping between function instance and network device, making it impossible for configfs to report the resolved interface name. This results in a regression where the DHCP server fails on pmOS.
Use device_move to reparent the net_device between the gadget device and /sys/devices/virtual/ across bind/unbind cycles. This preserves the network interface across USB reconnection, allowing the DHCP server to retain their binding.
Introduce gether_attach_gadget()/gether_detach_gadget() helpers and use __free(detach_gadget) macro to undo attachment on bind failure. The bind_count ensures device_move executes only on the first bind.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h | 2 - 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c +25 -13
@@ -1439,6 +1439,7 @@ static int ncm_bind(struct usb_configurastruct f_ncm_opts *ncm_opts; struct usb_os_desc_table *os_desc_table __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct net_device *net __free(detach_gadget) = NULL; struct usb_request *request __free(free_usb_request) = NULL;if (!can_support_ecm (cdev->gadget))
@@ -1452,18 +1453,19 @@ static int ncm_bind(struct usb_configurareturn -ENOMEM ; } -mutex_lock (&ncm_opts->lock); -gether_set_gadget (ncm_opts->net, cdev->gadget); -if (!ncm_opts->bound) { - ncm_opts->net->mtu = (ncm_opts->max_segment_size -ETH_HLEN ); - status =gether_register_netdev (ncm_opts->net); - } -mutex_unlock (&ncm_opts->lock); - -if (status) -return status; - - ncm_opts->bound = true; + scoped_guard(mutex, &ncm_opts->lock) +if (ncm_opts->bind_count ==0 ) { +if (!device_is_registered (&ncm_opts->net->dev)) { + ncm_opts->net->mtu = (ncm_opts->max_segment_size -ETH_HLEN ); +gether_set_gadget (ncm_opts->net, cdev->gadget); + status =gether_register_netdev (ncm_opts->net); + }else + status =gether_attach_gadget (ncm_opts->net, cdev->gadget); + +if (status) +return status; + net = ncm_opts->net; + } ncm_string_defs[1 ].s = ncm->ethaddr;
@@ -1564,6 +1566,9 @@ static int ncm_bind(struct usb_configura } ncm->notify_req =no_free_ptr (request); + ncm_opts->bind_count++; +retain_and_null_ptr (net); +DBG (cdev,"CDC Network: IN/%s OUT/%s NOTIFY/%s\n" , ncm->port.in_ep->name, ncm->port.out_ep->name, ncm->notify->name);
@@ -1655,7 +1660,7 @@ static void ncm_free_inst(struct usb_funstruct f_ncm_opts *opts; opts = container_of(f, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); -if (opts->bound) +if (device_is_registered (&opts->net->dev))gether_cleanup (netdev_priv (opts->net));else free_netdev (opts->net);
@@ -1718,9 +1723,12 @@ static void ncm_free(struct usb_functionstatic void ncm_unbind (struct usb_configuration *c,struct usb_function *f) {struct f_ncm *ncm =func_to_ncm (f); +struct f_ncm_opts *ncm_opts;DBG (c->cdev,"ncm unbind\n" ); + ncm_opts = container_of(f->fi, struct f_ncm_opts, func_inst); +hrtimer_cancel (&ncm->task_timer);kfree (f->os_desc_table);
@@ -1736,6 +1744,10 @@ static void ncm_unbind(struct usb_configkfree (ncm->notify_req->buf);usb_ep_free_request (ncm->notify, ncm->notify_req); + + ncm_opts->bind_count--; +if (ncm_opts->bind_count ==0 ) +gether_detach_gadget (ncm_opts->net); }static struct usb_function *ncm_alloc (struct usb_function_instance *fi)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +22 -0
@@ -896,6 +896,28 @@ void gether_set_gadget(struct net_device }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_set_gadget); +int gether_attach_gadget (struct net_device *net,struct usb_gadget *g) +{ +int ret; + + ret =device_move (&net->dev, &g->dev,DPM_ORDER_DEV_AFTER_PARENT ); +if (ret) +return ret; + +gether_set_gadget (net, g); +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_attach_gadget); + +void gether_detach_gadget (struct net_device *net) +{ +struct eth_dev *dev =netdev_priv (net); + +device_move (&net->dev,NULL ,DPM_ORDER_NONE ); + dev->gadget =NULL ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (gether_detach_gadget); +int gether_set_dev_addr (struct net_device *net,const char *dev_addr) {struct eth_dev *dev;
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h +26 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,32 @@ static inline struct net_device *gether_void gether_set_gadget (struct net_device *net,struct usb_gadget *g);/** +* gether_attach_gadget - Reparent net_device to the gadget device. +* @net: The network device to reparent. +* @g: The target USB gadget device to parent to. +* +* This function moves the network device to be a child of the USB gadget +* device in the device hierarchy. This is typically done when the function +* is bound to a configuration. +* +* Returns 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure. +*/ +int gether_attach_gadget (struct net_device *net,struct usb_gadget *g); + +/** +* gether_detach_gadget - Detach net_device from its gadget parent. +* @net: The network device to detach. +* +* This function moves the network device to be a child of the virtual +* devices parent, effectively detaching it from the USB gadget device +* hierarchy. This is typically done when the function is unbound +* from a configuration but the instance is not yet freed. +*/ +void gether_detach_gadget (struct net_device *net); + +DEFINE_FREE(detach_gadget, struct net_device *, if (_T) gether_detach_gadget(_T)) + +/** * gether_set_dev_addr - initialize an ethernet-over-usb link with eth address * @net: device representing this link * @dev_addr: eth address of this device
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@struct f_ncm_opts {struct usb_function_instance func_inst;struct net_device *net; -bool bound; +int bind_count;struct config_group *ncm_interf_group;struct usb_os_desc ncm_os_desc;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/333 mm/tracing: rss_stat: ensure curr is false from kthread context
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
commit 079c24d5690262e83ee476e2a548e416f3237511 upstream.
The rss_stat trace event allows userspace tools, like Perfetto [1], to inspect per-process RSS metric changes over time.
The curr field was introduced to rss_stat in commit e4dcad204d3a ("rss_stat: add support to detect RSS updates of external mm"). Its intent is to indicate whether the RSS update is for the mm_struct of the current execution context; and is set to false when operating on a remote mm_struct (e.g., via kswapd or a direct reclaimer).
However, an issue arises when a kernel thread temporarily adopts a user process's mm_struct. Kernel threads do not have their own mm_struct and normally have current->mm set to NULL. To operate on user memory, they can "borrow" a memory context using kthread_use_mm(), which sets current->mm to the user process's mm.
This can be observed, for example, in the USB Function Filesystem (FFS) driver. The ffs_user_copy_worker() handles AIO completions and uses kthread_use_mm() to copy data to a user-space buffer. If a page fault occurs during this copy, the fault handler executes in the kthread's context.
At this point, current is the kthread, but current->mm points to the user process's mm. Since the rss_stat event (from the page fault) is for that same mm, the condition current->mm == mm becomes true, causing curr to be incorrectly set to true when the trace event is emitted.
This is misleading because it suggests the mm belongs to the kthread, confusing userspace tools that track per-process RSS changes and corrupting their mm_id-to-process association.
Fix this by ensuring curr is always false when the trace event is emitted from a kthread context by checking for the PF_KTHREAD flag.
--- include/trace/events/kmem.h | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/trace/events/kmem.h +7 -1
@@ -440,7 +440,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rss_stat,TP_fast_assign ( __entry->mm_id = mm_ptr_to_hash(mm); - __entry->curr = !!(current->mm == mm); +/* +* curr is true if the mm matches the current task's mm_struct. +* Since kthreads (PF_KTHREAD) have no mm_struct of their own +* but can borrow one via kthread_use_mm(), we must filter them +* out to avoid incorrectly attributing the RSS update to them. +*/ + __entry->curr = current->mm == mm && !(current->flags &PF_KTHREAD ); __entry->member = member; __entry->size = (percpu_counter_sum_positive (&mm->rss_stat[member]) <<PAGE_SHIFT );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/333 mm/kfence: fix KASAN hardware tag faults during late enablement
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
commit d155aab90fffa00f93cea1f107aef0a3d548b2ff upstream.
When KASAN hardware tags are enabled, re-enabling KFENCE late (via /sys/module/kfence/parameters/sample_interval) causes KASAN faults.
This happens because the KFENCE pool and metadata are allocated via the page allocator, which tags the memory, while KFENCE continues to access it using untagged pointers during initialization.
Use __GFP_SKIP_KASAN for late KFENCE pool and metadata allocations to ensure the memory remains untagged, consistent with early allocations from memblock. To support this, add __GFP_SKIP_KASAN to the allowlist in __alloc_contig_verify_gfp_mask().
--- mm/kfence/core.c | 14 ++++++++------ mm/page_alloc.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
mm/kfence/core.c +8 -6
@@ -951,14 +951,14 @@ static int kfence_init_late(void)#ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC struct page *pages; - pages =alloc_contig_pages (nr_pages_pool,GFP_KERNEL , first_online_node, -NULL ); + pages =alloc_contig_pages (nr_pages_pool,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_SKIP_KASAN, + first_online_node,NULL );if (!pages)return -ENOMEM ; __kfence_pool =page_to_virt (pages); - pages =alloc_contig_pages (nr_pages_meta,GFP_KERNEL , first_online_node, -NULL ); + pages =alloc_contig_pages (nr_pages_meta,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_SKIP_KASAN, + first_online_node,NULL );if (pages) kfence_metadata_init =page_to_virt (pages);#else
@@ -968,11 +968,13 @@ static int kfence_init_late(void) return -EINVAL; } - __kfence_pool =alloc_pages_exact (KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); + __kfence_pool =alloc_pages_exact (KFENCE_POOL_SIZE , +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_SKIP_KASAN);if (!__kfence_pool)return -ENOMEM ; - kfence_metadata_init =alloc_pages_exact (KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); + kfence_metadata_init =alloc_pages_exact (KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE , +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_SKIP_KASAN);#endif if (!kfence_metadata_init)
mm/page_alloc.c +2 -1
@@ -6888,7 +6888,8 @@ static int __alloc_contig_verify_gfp_mas {const gfp_t reclaim_mask = __GFP_IO | __GFP_FS | __GFP_RECLAIM;const gfp_t action_mask = __GFP_COMP | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN | - __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_ZEROTAGS | __GFP_SKIP_ZERO; + __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_ZEROTAGS | __GFP_SKIP_ZERO | + __GFP_SKIP_KASAN;const gfp_t cc_action_mask = __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN;/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/333 mmc: mmci: Fix device_node reference leak in of_get_dml_pipe_index()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
commit af12e64ae0661546e8b4f5d30d55c5f53a11efe7 upstream.
When calling of_parse_phandle_with_args(), the caller is responsible to call of_node_put() to release the reference of device node. In of_get_dml_pipe_index(), it does not release the reference.
--- drivers/mmc/host/mmci_qcom_dml.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/mmci_qcom_dml.c +1 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ static int of_get_dml_pipe_index(struct &dma_spec))return -ENODEV ; +of_node_put (dma_spec.np);if (dma_spec.args_count)return dma_spec.args[0 ];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/333 mm/kfence: disable KFENCE upon KASAN HW tags enablement
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
commit 09833d99db36d74456a4d13eb29c32d56ff8f2b6 upstream.
KFENCE does not currently support KASAN hardware tags. As a result, the two features are incompatible when enabled simultaneously.
Given that MTE provides deterministic protection and KFENCE is a sampling-based debugging tool, prioritize the stronger hardware protections. Disable KFENCE initialization and free the pre-allocated pool if KASAN hardware tags are detected to ensure the system maintains the security guarantees provided by MTE.
--- mm/kfence/core.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
mm/kfence/core.c +15 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/hash.h> #include <linux/irq_work.h> #include <linux/jhash.h> +#include <linux/kasan-enabled.h> #include <linux/kcsan-checks.h> #include <linux/kfence.h> #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
@@ -883,6 +884,20 @@ void __init kfence_alloc_pool_and_metadareturn ;/* +* If KASAN hardware tags are enabled, disable KFENCE, because it +* does not support MTE yet. +*/ +if (kasan_hw_tags_enabled ()) { +pr_info ("disabled as KASAN HW tags are enabled\n" ); +if (__kfence_pool) { +memblock_free (__kfence_pool,KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ); + __kfence_pool =NULL ; + } + kfence_sample_interval =0 ; +return ; + } + +/* * If the pool has already been initialized by arch, there is no need to * re-allocate the memory pool. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/333 mmc: core: Avoid bitfield RMW for claim/retune flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Penghe Geng <[email protected]>
commit 901084c51a0a8fb42a3f37d2e9c62083c495f824 upstream.
Move claimed and retune control flags out of the bitfield word to avoid unrelated RMW side effects in asynchronous contexts.
The host->claimed bit shared a word with retune flags. Writes to claimed in __mmc_claim_host() or retune_now in mmc_mq_queue_rq() can overwrite other bits when concurrent updates happen in other contexts, triggering spurious WARN_ON(!host->claimed). Convert claimed, can_retune, retune_now and retune_paused to bool to remove shared-word coupling.
--- include/linux/mmc/host.h | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/mmc/host.h +5 -4
@@ -486,14 +486,12 @@ struct mmc_host {struct mmc_ios ios;/* current io bus settings */ +bool claimed;/* host exclusively claimed */ +/* group bitfields together to minimize padding */ unsigned int use_spi_crc:1; - unsigned int claimed:1; /* host exclusively claimed */ unsigned int doing_init_tune:1; /* initial tuning in progress */ - unsigned int can_retune:1; /* re-tuning can be used */ unsigned int doing_retune:1; /* re-tuning in progress */ - unsigned int retune_now:1; /* do re-tuning at next req */ - unsigned int retune_paused:1; /* re-tuning is temporarily disabled */ unsigned int retune_crc_disable:1; /* don't trigger retune upon crc */ unsigned int can_dma_map_merge:1; /* merging can be used */ unsigned int vqmmc_enabled:1; /* vqmmc regulator is enabled */
@@ -508,6 +506,9 @@ struct mmc_host {int rescan_disable;/* disable card detection */ int rescan_entered;/* used with nonremovable devices */ +bool can_retune;/* re-tuning can be used */ +bool retune_now;/* do re-tuning at next req */ +bool retune_paused;/* re-tuning is temporarily disabled */ int need_retune;/* re-tuning is needed */ int hold_retune;/* hold off re-tuning */ unsigned int retune_period;/* re-tuning period in secs */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/333 ASoC: qcom: qdsp6: Fix q6apm remove ordering during ADSP stop and start
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ravi Hothi <[email protected]>
commit d6db827b430bdcca3976cebca7bd69cca03cde2c upstream.
During ADSP stop and start, the kernel crashes due to the order in which ASoC components are removed.
On ADSP stop, the q6apm-audio .remove callback unloads topology and removes PCM runtimes during ASoC teardown. This deletes the RTDs that contain the q6apm DAI components before their removal pass runs, leaving those components still linked to the card and causing crashes on the next rebind.
Fix this by ensuring that all dependent (child) components are removed first, and the q6apm component is removed last.
[ 48.105720] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000d0 [ 48.114763] Mem abort info: [ 48.117650] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 48.121526] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 48.127010] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 48.130172] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 48.133415] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 48.138446] Data abort info: [ 48.141422] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 48.147079] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 48.152354] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 48.157859] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001173cf000 [ 48.164517] [00000000000000d0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 48.171530] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 48.177348] Modules linked in: q6prm_clocks q6apm_lpass_dais q6apm_dai snd_q6dsp_common q6prm snd_q6apm 8021q garp mrp stp llc snd_soc_hdmi_codec apr pdr_interface phy_qcom_edp fastrpc qcom_pd_mapper rpmsg_ctrl qrtr_smd rpmsg_char qcom_pdr_msg qcom_iris v4l2_mem2mem videobuf2_dma_contig ath11k_pci msm ubwc_config at24 ath11k videobuf2_memops mac80211 ocmem videobuf2_v4l2 libarc4 drm_gpuvm mhi qrtr videodev drm_exec snd_soc_sc8280xp gpu_sched videobuf2_common nvmem_qcom_spmi_sdam snd_soc_qcom_sdw drm_dp_aux_bus qcom_q6v5_pas qcom_spmi_temp_alarm snd_soc_qcom_common rtc_pm8xxx qcom_pon drm_display_helper cec qcom_pil_info qcom_stats soundwire_bus drm_client_lib mc dispcc0_sa8775p videocc_sa8775p qcom_q6v5 camcc_sa8775p snd_soc_dmic phy_qcom_sgmii_eth snd_soc_max98357a i2c_qcom_geni snd_soc_core dwmac_qcom_ethqos llcc_qcom icc_bwmon qcom_sysmon snd_compress qcom_refgen_regulator coresight_stm stmmac_platform snd_pcm_dmaengine qcom_common coresight_tmc stmmac coresight_replicator qcom_glink_smem coresight_cti stm_core [ 48.177444] coresight_funnel snd_pcm ufs_qcom phy_qcom_qmp_usb gpi phy_qcom_snps_femto_v2 coresight phy_qcom_qmp_ufs qcom_wdt gpucc_sa8775p pcs_xpcs mdt_loader qcom_ice icc_osm_l3 qmi_helpers snd_timer snd soundcore display_connector qcom_rng nvmem_reboot_mode drm_kms_helper phy_qcom_qmp_pcie sha256 cfg80211 rfkill socinfo fuse drm backlight ipv6 [ 48.301059] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 293 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-dirty #10 PREEMPT [ 48.310081] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Lemans EVK (DT) [ 48.316782] Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface] [ 48.323672] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 48.330825] pc : mutex_lock+0xc/0x54 [ 48.334514] lr : soc_dapm_shutdown_dapm+0x44/0x174 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.340794] sp : ffff800084ddb7b0 [ 48.344207] x29: ffff800084ddb7b0 x28: ffff00009cd9cf30 x27: ffff00009cd9cc00 [ 48.351544] x26: ffff000099610190 x25: ffffa31d2f19c810 x24: ffffa31d2f185098 [ 48.358869] x23: ffff800084ddb7f8 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 00000000000000d0 [ 48.366198] x20: ffff00009ba6c338 x19: ffff00009ba6c338 x18: 00000000ffffffff [ 48.373528] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffa31d4ae6dca8 x15: 072007740775076f [ 48.380853] x14: 0765076d07690774 x13: 00313a323a656369 x12: 767265733a637673 [ 48.388182] x11: 00000000000003f9 x10: ffffa31d4c7dea98 x9 : 0000000000000001 [ 48.395519] x8 : ffff00009a2aadc0 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 48.402854] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000028 x3 : ffff000ef397a698 [ 48.410180] x2 : ffff00009a2aadc0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000000000d0 [ 48.417506] Call trace: [ 48.420025] mutex_lock+0xc/0x54 (P) [ 48.423712] snd_soc_dapm_shutdown+0x44/0xbc [snd_soc_core] [ 48.429447] soc_cleanup_card_resources+0x30/0x2c0 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.435719] snd_soc_bind_card+0x4dc/0xcc0 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.441278] snd_soc_add_component+0x27c/0x2c8 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.447192] snd_soc_register_component+0x9c/0xf4 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.453371] devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x64/0xc4 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.459994] apm_probe+0xb4/0x110 [snd_q6apm] [ 48.464479] apr_device_probe+0x24/0x40 [apr] [ 48.468964] really_probe+0xbc/0x298 [ 48.472651] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c [ 48.477132] driver_probe_device+0x40/0x160 [ 48.481435] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x134 [ 48.486011] bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xdc [ 48.489964] __device_attach+0xa8/0x1b0 [ 48.493916] device_initial_probe+0x50/0x54 [ 48.498219] bus_probe_device+0x38/0xa0 [ 48.502170] device_add+0x590/0x760 [ 48.505761] device_register+0x20/0x30 [ 48.509623] of_register_apr_devices+0x1d8/0x318 [apr] [ 48.514905] apr_pd_status+0x2c/0x54 [apr] [ 48.519114] pdr_notifier_work+0x8c/0xe0 [pdr_interface] [ 48.524570] process_one_work+0x150/0x294 [ 48.528692] worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3d8 [ 48.532551] kthread+0x130/0x204 [ 48.535874] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 48.539559] Code: d65f03c0 d5384102 d503201f d2800001 (c8e17c02) [ 48.545823] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c | 1 + sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-lpass-dais.c | 1 + sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c +1 -0
@@ -851,6 +851,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_dr .ack = q6apm_dai_ack, .compress_ops = &q6apm_dai_compress_ops, .use_dai_pcm_id = true, + .remove_order = SND_SOC_COMP_ORDER_EARLY, };static int q6apm_dai_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-lpass-dais.c +1 -0
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_dr .of_xlate_dai_name = q6dsp_audio_ports_of_xlate_dai_name, .be_pcm_base = AUDIOREACH_BE_PCM_BASE, .use_dai_pcm_id = true, + .remove_order = SND_SOC_COMP_ORDER_FIRST, };static int q6apm_lpass_dai_dev_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c +1 -0
@@ -735,6 +735,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_dr .name = APM_AUDIO_DRV_NAME, .probe = q6apm_audio_probe, .remove = q6apm_audio_remove, + .remove_order = SND_SOC_COMP_ORDER_LAST, };static int apm_probe (gpr_device_t *gdev)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/333 tipc: fix divide-by-zero in tipc_sk_filter_connect()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mehul Rao <[email protected]>
commit 6c5a9baa15de240e747263aba435a0951da8d8d2 upstream.
A user can set conn_timeout to any value via setsockopt(TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT), including values less than 4. When a SYN is rejected with TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD and the retry path in tipc_sk_filter_connect() executes:
delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout / 4);
If conn_timeout is in the range [0, 3], the integer division yields 0, and the modulo operation triggers a divide-by-zero exception, causing a kernel oops/panic.
Fix this by clamping conn_timeout to a minimum of 4 at the point of use in tipc_sk_filter_connect().
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: poc-F144 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_filter_rcv (net/tipc/socket.c:2236 net/tipc/socket.c:2362) Call Trace: tipc_sk_backlog_rcv (include/linux/instrumented.h:82 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 include/net/sock.h:2357 net/tipc/socket.c:2406) __release_sock (include/net/sock.h:1185 net/core/sock.c:3213) release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3797) tipc_connect (net/tipc/socket.c:2570) __sys_connect (include/linux/file.h:62 include/linux/file.h:83 net/socket.c:2098)
--- net/tipc/socket.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/tipc/socket.c +2 -0
@@ -2233,6 +2233,8 @@ static bool tipc_sk_filter_connect(strucif (skb_queue_empty (&sk->sk_write_queue))break ;get_random_bytes (&delay,2 ); +if (tsk->conn_timeout <4 ) + tsk->conn_timeout =4 ; delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout /4 ); delay =msecs_to_jiffies (delay +100 );sk_reset_timer (sk, &sk->sk_timer, jiffies + delay);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/333 kprobes: avoid crash when rmmod/insmod after ftrace killed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
commit e113f0b46d19626ec15388bcb91432c9a4fd6261 upstream.
After we hit ftrace is killed by some errors, the kernel crash if we remove modules in which kprobe probes.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff805000d PGD 817fcc067 P4D 817fcc067 PUD 817fc8067 PMD 101555067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2012 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W OE Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE RIP: 0010:kprobes_module_callback+0x89/0x790 RSP: 0018:ffff88812e157d30 EFLAGS: 00010a02 RAX: 1ffffffff805000d RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff86a8de90 RDX: ffffed1025c2af9b RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffc0280068 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1025c2af9a R10: ffff88812e157cd7 R11: 205d323130325420 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffffffc0290488 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffffffffc0280040 FS: 00007fbc450dd740(0000) GS:ffff888420331000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff805000d CR3: 000000010f624000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> notifier_call_chain+0xc6/0x280 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x32a/0x4e0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xfa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
This is because the kprobe on ftrace does not correctly handles the kprobe_ftrace_disabled flag set by ftrace_kill().
To prevent this error, check kprobe_ftrace_disabled in __disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and skip all ftrace related operations.
--- kernel/kprobes.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/kprobes.c +4 -0
@@ -1104,6 +1104,10 @@ static int __disarm_kprobe_ftrace(structint ret;lockdep_assert_held (&kprobe_mutex); +if (unlikely (kprobe_ftrace_disabled)) { +/* Now ftrace is disabled forever, disarm is already done. */ +return 0 ; + }if (*cnt ==1 ) { ret =unregister_ftrace_function (ops);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/333 ceph: add a bunch of missing ceph_path_info initializers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
commit 43323a5934b660afae687e8e4e95ac328615a5c4 upstream.
ceph_mdsc_build_path() must be called with a zero-initialized ceph_path_info parameter, or else the following ceph_mdsc_free_path_info() may crash.
Example crash (on Linux 6.18.12):
virt_to_cache: Object is not a Slab page!
WARNING: CPU: 184 PID: 2871736 at mm/slub.c:6732 kmem_cache_free+0x316/0x400 [...] Call Trace: [...] ceph_open+0x13d/0x3e0 do_dentry_open+0x134/0x480 vfs_open+0x2a/0xe0 path_openat+0x9a3/0x1160 [...] cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. names_cache but object is from ceph_inode_info WARNING: CPU: 184 PID: 2871736 at mm/slub.c:6746 kmem_cache_free+0x2dd/0x400 [...] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:634! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x1a4/0x350
Some of the ceph_mdsc_build_path() callers had initializers, but others had not, even though they were all added by commit 15f519e9f883 ("ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state"). The ones without initializer are suspectible to random crashes. (I can imagine it could even be possible to exploit this bug to elevate privileges.)
Unfortunately, these Ceph functions are undocumented and its semantics can only be derived from the code. I see that ceph_mdsc_build_path() initializes the structure only on success, but not on error.
Calling ceph_mdsc_free_path_info() after a failed ceph_mdsc_build_path() call does not even make sense, but that's what all callers do, and for it to be safe, the structure must be zero-initialized. The least intrusive approach to fix this is therefore to add initializers everywhere.
--- fs/ceph/debugfs.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/dir.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/file.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/debugfs.c +2 -2
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int mdsc_show(struct seq_file *s,if (req->r_inode) {seq_printf (s," #%llx" ,ceph_ino (req->r_inode)); }else if (req->r_dentry) { -struct ceph_path_info path_info; +struct ceph_path_info path_info = {0 }; path =ceph_mdsc_build_path (mdsc, req->r_dentry, &path_info,0 );if (IS_ERR (path)) path =NULL ;
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int mdsc_show(struct seq_file *s, }if (req->r_old_dentry) { -struct ceph_path_info path_info; +struct ceph_path_info path_info = {0 }; path =ceph_mdsc_build_path (mdsc, req->r_old_dentry, &path_info,0 );if (IS_ERR (path)) path =NULL ;
fs/ceph/dir.c +1 -1
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ static int ceph_unlink(struct inode *dirif (!dn) { try_async = false; }else { -struct ceph_path_info path_info; +struct ceph_path_info path_info = {0 }; path =ceph_mdsc_build_path (mdsc, dn, &path_info,0 );if (IS_ERR (path)) { try_async = false;
fs/ceph/file.c +2 -2
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ int ceph_open(struct inode *inode, strucif (!dentry) { do_sync = true; }else { -struct ceph_path_info path_info; +struct ceph_path_info path_info = {0 }; path =ceph_mdsc_build_path (mdsc, dentry, &path_info,0 );if (IS_ERR (path)) { do_sync = true;
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir,if (!dn) { try_async = false; }else { -struct ceph_path_info path_info; +struct ceph_path_info path_info = {0 }; path =ceph_mdsc_build_path (mdsc, dn, &path_info,0 );if (IS_ERR (path)) { try_async = false;
fs/ceph/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -2562,7 +2562,7 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmif (!dentry) { do_sync = true; }else { -struct ceph_path_info path_info; +struct ceph_path_info path_info = {0 }; path =ceph_mdsc_build_path (mdsc, dentry, &path_info,0 );if (IS_ERR (path)) { do_sync = true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/333 libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>
commit b282c43ed156ae15ea76748fc15cd5c39dc9ab72 upstream.
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply() that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32, as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262 CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 print_report+0xd1/0x620 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210 kasan_report+0xe7/0x130 ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20 ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph] ? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0 ? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0 ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph] ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph] process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph] ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph] ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph] ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230 ? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760 ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph] process_one_work+0x629/0xf80 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x396/0x830 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK>
[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for
payload_len and result_msg_len ]
--- net/ceph/auth.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ceph/auth.c +4 -2
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ int ceph_handle_auth_reply(struct ceph_as32 result;u64 global_id;void *payload, *payload_end; -int payload_len; +u32 payload_len;char *result_msg; -int result_msg_len; +u32 result_msg_len;int ret = -EINVAL ;mutex_lock (&ac->mutex);
@@ -217,10 +217,12 @@ int ceph_handle_auth_reply(struct ceph_a result =ceph_decode_32 (&p); global_id =ceph_decode_64 (&p); payload_len =ceph_decode_32 (&p); +ceph_decode_need (&p, end, payload_len, bad); payload = p; p += payload_len;ceph_decode_need (&p, end,sizeof (u32), bad); result_msg_len =ceph_decode_32 (&p); +ceph_decode_need (&p, end, result_msg_len, bad); result_msg = p; p += result_msg_len;if (p != end)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/333 libceph: reject preamble if control segment is empty
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
commit c4c22b846eceff05b1129b8844a80310e55a7f87 upstream.
While head_onwire_len() has a branch to handle ctrl_len == 0 case, prepare_read_control() always sets up a kvec for the CRC meaning that a non-empty control segment is effectively assumed. All frames that clients deal with meet that assumption, so let's make it official and treat the preamble with an empty control segment as malformed.
--- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +8 -9
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int head_onwire_len(int ctrl_len,int head_len;int rem_len; -BUG_ON (ctrl_len <0 || ctrl_len >CEPH_MSG_MAX_CONTROL_LEN ); +BUG_ON (ctrl_len <1 || ctrl_len >CEPH_MSG_MAX_CONTROL_LEN );if (secure) { head_len =CEPH_PREAMBLE_SECURE_LEN ;
@@ -401,9 +401,7 @@ static int head_onwire_len(int ctrl_len, head_len +=padded_len (rem_len) +CEPH_GCM_TAG_LEN ; } }else { - head_len =CEPH_PREAMBLE_PLAIN_LEN ; -if (ctrl_len) - head_len += ctrl_len +CEPH_CRC_LEN ; + head_len =CEPH_PREAMBLE_PLAIN_LEN + ctrl_len +CEPH_CRC_LEN ; }return head_len; }
@@ -528,11 +526,16 @@ static int decode_preamble(void *p, stru desc->fd_aligns[i] =ceph_decode_16 (&p); } -if (desc->fd_lens[0 ] <0 || +/* +* This would fire for FRAME_TAG_WAIT (it has one empty +* segment), but we should never get it as client. +*/ +if (desc->fd_lens[0 ] <1 || desc->fd_lens[0 ] >CEPH_MSG_MAX_CONTROL_LEN ) {pr_err ("bad control segment length %d\n" , desc->fd_lens[0 ]);return -EINVAL ; } +if (desc->fd_lens[1 ] <0 || desc->fd_lens[1 ] >CEPH_MSG_MAX_FRONT_LEN ) {pr_err ("bad front segment length %d\n" , desc->fd_lens[1 ]);
@@ -549,10 +552,6 @@ static int decode_preamble(void *p, strureturn -EINVAL ; } -/* -* This would fire for FRAME_TAG_WAIT (it has one empty -* segment), but we should never get it as client. -*/ if (!desc->fd_lens[desc->fd_seg_cnt -1 ]) {pr_err ("last segment empty, segment count %d\n" , desc->fd_seg_cnt);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/333 libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
commit 69fb5d91bba44ecf7eb80530b85fa4fb028921d5 upstream.
If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the message header or a different frame is made to look like a message frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().
Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header.
--- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +8 -1
@@ -2834,12 +2834,15 @@ static int process_message_header(struct void *p, void *end) { struct ceph_frame_desc *desc = &con->v2.in_desc; -struct ceph_msg_header2 *hdr2 = p; +struct ceph_msg_header2 *hdr2;struct ceph_msg_header hdr;int skip;int ret;u64 seq; +ceph_decode_need (&p, end,sizeof (*hdr2), bad); + hdr2 = p; +/* verify seq# */ seq =le64_to_cpu (hdr2->seq);if ((s64 )seq - (s64 )con->in_seq <1 ) {
@@ -2870,6 +2873,10 @@ static int process_message_header(structWARN_ON (!con->in_msg);WARN_ON (con->in_msg->con != con);return 1 ; + +bad: +pr_err ("failed to decode message header\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; }static int process_message (struct ceph_connection *con)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/333 libceph: Use u32 for non-negative values in ceph_monmap_decode()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>
commit 770444611f047dbfd4517ec0bc1b179d40c2f346 upstream.
This patch fixes unnecessary implicit conversions that change signedness of blob_len and num_mon in ceph_monmap_decode().
Currently blob_len and num_mon are (signed) int variables. They are used to hold values that are always non-negative and get assigned in ceph_decode_32_safe(), which is meant to assign u32 values. Both variables are subsequently used as unsigned values, and the value of num_mon is further assigned to monmap->num_mon, which is of type u32. Therefore, both variables should be of type u32. This is especially relevant for num_mon. If the value read from the incoming message is very large, it is interpreted as a negative value, and the check for num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON does not catch it. This leads to the attempt to allocate a very large chunk of memory for monmap, which will most likely fail. In this case, an unnecessary attempt to allocate memory is performed, and -ENOMEM is returned instead of -EINVAL.
--- net/ceph/mon_client.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ceph/mon_client.c +3 -3
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ static struct ceph_monmap *ceph_monmap_dstruct ceph_monmap *monmap =NULL ;struct ceph_fsid fsid;u32 struct_len; -int blob_len; -int num_mon; +u32 blob_len; +u32 num_mon;u8 struct_v;u32 epoch;int ret;
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static struct ceph_monmap *ceph_monmap_d }ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, num_mon, e_inval); -dout ("%s fsid %pU epoch %u num_mon %d\n" , __func__, &fsid, epoch, +dout ("%s fsid %pU epoch %u num_mon %u\n" , __func__, &fsid, epoch, num_mon);if (num_mon >CEPH_MAX_MON ) goto e_inval;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/333 libceph: admit message frames only in CEPH_CON_S_OPEN state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
commit a5a373705081d7cc6363e16990e2361b0b362314 upstream.
Similar checks are performed for all control frames, but an early check for message frames was missing. process_message() is already set up to terminate the loop in case the state changes while con->ops->dispatch() handler is being executed.
--- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +5 -0
@@ -2906,6 +2906,11 @@ static int __handle_control(struct ceph_if (con->v2.in_desc.fd_tag !=FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE )return process_control (con, p, end); +if (con->state !=CEPH_CON_S_OPEN ) { + con->error_msg ="protocol error, unexpected message" ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + ret =process_message_header (con, p, end);if (ret <0 )return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/333 ceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlink
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
commit ce0123cbb4a40a2f1bbb815f292b26e96088639f upstream.
During async unlink, we drop the i_nlink counter before we receive the completion (that will eventually update the i_nlink) because "we assume that the unlink will succeed". That is not a bad idea, but it races against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of our own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like this one:
WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 Modules linked in: CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655 Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720 sp : ffff80012173bc90 x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680 x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203 x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365 x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74 x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94 x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002 x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P) vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8 do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158
In ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the CEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion.
Meanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a worker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or just a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own completion). These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the i_nlink counter to the value received from the MDS. If that new i_nlink value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it further. But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then.
The WARNING can be reproduced this way:
1. Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected. Having no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the MDS wouldn't give me the "Fxr" capabilities, so I patched get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed.
(Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel, without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.)
2. Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is called. This guarantees that the i_nlink is already zero before drop_nlink() runs.
The solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero, but doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU). Since ceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this seems like the proper lock to protect the i_nlink updates.
I found prior art in NFS and SMB (using inode.i_lock) and AFS (using afs_vnode.cb_lock). All three have the zero check as well.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/dir.c +14 -1
@@ -1338,6 +1338,7 @@ static int ceph_unlink(struct inode *dirstruct ceph_client *cl = fsc->client;struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = fsc->mdsc;struct inode *inode =d_inode (dentry); +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);struct ceph_mds_request *req;bool try_async =ceph_test_mount_opt (fsc,ASYNC_DIROPS );struct dentry *dn;
@@ -1423,7 +1424,19 @@ retry:* We have enough caps, so we assume that the unlink * will succeed. Fix up the target inode and dcache. */ -drop_nlink (inode); + +/* +* Protect the i_nlink update with i_ceph_lock +* to precent racing against ceph_fill_inode() +* handling our completion on a worker thread +* and don't decrement if i_nlink has already +* been updated to zero by this completion. +*/ +spin_lock (&ci->i_ceph_lock); +if (inode->i_nlink >0 ) +drop_nlink (inode); +spin_unlock (&ci->i_ceph_lock); +d_delete (dentry); }else {spin_lock (&fsc->async_unlink_conflict_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/333 ceph: do not skip the first folio of the next object in writeback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hristo Venev <[email protected]>
commit 081a0b78ef30f5746cda3e92e28b4d4ae92901d1 upstream.
When ceph_process_folio_batch encounters a folio past the end of the current object, it should leave it in the batch so that it is picked up in the next iteration.
Removing the folio from the batch means that it does not get written back and remains dirty instead. This makes fsync() silently skip some of the data, delays capability release, and breaks coherence with O_DIRECT.
The link below contains instructions for reproducing the bug.
--- fs/ceph/addr.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/addr.c +0 -1
@@ -1334,7 +1334,6 @@ int ceph_process_folio_batch(struct addr }else if (rc == -E2BIG ) { rc =0 ;folio_unlock (folio); - ceph_wbc->fbatch.folios[i] =NULL ;break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/333 ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
commit 040d159a45ded7f33201421a81df0aa2a86e5a0b upstream.
Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the "path" pointer obtained by __getname(). If ownership of this pointer is not passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it before returning.
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +3 -0
@@ -2767,6 +2767,7 @@ retry:if (ret <0 ) {dput (parent);dput (cur); +__putname (path);return ERR_PTR (ret); }
@@ -2776,6 +2777,7 @@ retry:if (len <0 ) {dput (parent);dput (cur); +__putname (path);return ERR_PTR (len); } }
@@ -2812,6 +2814,7 @@ retry:* cannot ever succeed. Creating paths that long is * possible with Ceph, but Linux cannot use them. */ +__putname (path);return ERR_PTR (-ENAMETOOLONG ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/333 ALSA: usb-audio: Improve Focusrite sample rate filtering
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geoffrey D. Bennett <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 24d2d3c5f94007a5a0554065ab7349bb69e28bcb ]
Replace the bLength == 10 max_rate check in focusrite_valid_sample_rate() with filtering that also examines the bmControls VAL_ALT_SETTINGS bit.
When VAL_ALT_SETTINGS is readable, the device uses strict per-altsetting rate filtering (only the highest rate pair for that altsetting is valid). When it is not readable, all rates up to max_rate are valid.
For devices without the bLength == 10 Format Type descriptor extension but with VAL_ALT_SETTINGS readable and multiple altsettings (only seen in Scarlett 18i8 3rd Gen playback), fall back to the Focusrite
convention: alt 1 = 48kHz, alt 2 = 96kHz, alt 3 = 192kHz.
This produces correct rate tables for all tested Focusrite devices (all Scarlett 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Gen, Clarett+, and Vocaster) using only USB descriptors, allowing QUIRK_FLAG_VALIDATE_RATES to be removed for Focusrite in the next commit.
--- sound/usb/format.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/usb/format.c +65 -5
@@ -302,17 +302,48 @@ static bool s1810c_valid_sample_rate(struct audioformat *fp, }/* -* Many Focusrite devices supports a limited set of sampling rates per -* altsetting. Maximum rate is exposed in the last 4 bytes of Format Type -* descriptor which has a non-standard bLength = 10. +* Focusrite devices use rate pairs: 44100/48000, 88200/96000, and +* 176400/192000. Return true if rate is in the pair for max_rate. +*/ +static bool focusrite_rate_pair (unsigned int rate, +unsigned int max_rate) +{ +switch (max_rate) { +case 48000 :return rate ==44100 || rate ==48000 ; +case 96000 :return rate ==88200 || rate ==96000 ; +case 192000 :return rate ==176400 || rate ==192000 ; +default :return true; + } +} + +/* +* Focusrite devices report all supported rates in a single clock +* source but only a subset is valid per altsetting. +* +* Detection uses two descriptor features: +* +* 1. Format Type descriptor bLength == 10: non-standard extension +* with max sample rate in bytes 6..9. +* +* 2. bmControls VAL_ALT_SETTINGS readable bit: when set, the device +* only supports the highest rate pair for that altsetting, and when +* clear, all rates up to max_rate are valid. +* +* For devices without the bLength == 10 extension but with +* VAL_ALT_SETTINGS readable and multiple altsettings (only seen in +* Scarlett 18i8 3rd Gen playback), fall back to the Focusrite +* convention: alt 1 = 48kHz, alt 2 = 96kHz, alt 3 = 192kHz. */ static bool focusrite_valid_sample_rate (struct snd_usb_audio *chip,struct audioformat *fp,unsigned int rate) { +struct usb_interface *iface;struct usb_host_interface *alts; +struct uac2_as_header_descriptor *as;unsigned char *fmt;unsigned int max_rate; +bool val_alt; alts =snd_usb_get_host_interface (chip, fp->iface, fp->altsetting);if (!alts)
@@ -323,9 +354,21 @@ static bool focusrite_valid_sample_rate(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,if (!fmt)return true; + as =snd_usb_find_csint_desc (alts->extra, alts->extralen, +NULL ,UAC_AS_GENERAL ); +if (!as) +return true; + + val_alt =uac_v2v3_control_is_readable (as->bmControls, +UAC2_AS_VAL_ALT_SETTINGS ); +if (fmt[0 ] ==10 ) {/* bLength */ max_rate =combine_quad (&fmt[6 ]); +if (val_alt) +return focusrite_rate_pair (rate, max_rate); + +/* No val_alt: rates fall through from higher */ switch (max_rate) {case 192000 :if (rate ==176400 || rate ==192000 )
@@ -341,12 +384,29 @@ static bool focusrite_valid_sample_rate(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,usb_audio_info (chip,"%u:%d : unexpected max rate: %u\n" , fp->iface, fp->altsetting, max_rate); -return true; } } -return true; +if (!val_alt) +return true; + +/* Multi-altsetting device with val_alt but no max_rate +* in the format descriptor. Use Focusrite convention: +* alt 1 = 48kHz, alt 2 = 96kHz, alt 3 = 192kHz. +*/ + iface =usb_ifnum_to_if (chip->dev, fp->iface); +if (!iface || iface->num_altsetting <=2 ) +return true; + +switch (fp->altsetting) { +case 1 : max_rate =48000 ;break ; +case 2 : max_rate =96000 ;break ; +case 3 : max_rate =192000 ;break ; +default :return true; + } + +return focusrite_rate_pair (rate, max_rate); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/333 time/jiffies: Mark jiffies_64_to_clock_t() notrace
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 755a648e78f12574482d4698d877375793867fa1 ]
The trace_clock_jiffies() function that handles the "uptime" clock for tracing calls jiffies_64_to_clock_t(). This causes the function tracer to constantly recurse when the tracing clock is set to "uptime". Mark it notrace to prevent unnecessary recursion when using the "uptime" clock.
--- kernel/time/time.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/time/time.c +1 -1
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clock_t_to_jiffies);* * Return: jiffies_64 value converted to 64-bit "clock_t" (CLOCKS_PER_SEC) */ -u64 jiffies_64_to_clock_t (u64 x) +notrace u64 jiffies_64_to_clock_t(u64 x) {#if (TICK_NSEC % (NSEC_PER_SEC /USER_HZ )) ==0 # if HZ <USER_HZ
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/333 i3c: dw-i3c-master: Set SIR_REJECT in DAT on device attach and reattach
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adrian Ng Ho Yin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f311a05784634febd299f03476b80f3f18489767 ]
The DesignWare I3C master controller ACKs IBIs as soon as a valid Device Address Table (DAT) entry is present. This can create a race between device attachment (after DAA) and the point where the client driver enables IBIs via i3c_device_enable_ibi().
Set DEV_ADDR_TABLE_SIR_REJECT in the DAT entry during attach_i3c_dev() and reattach_i3c_dev() so that IBIs are rejected by default. The bit is managed thereafter by the existing dw_i3c_master_set_sir_enabled() function, which clears it in enable_ibi() after ENEC is issued, and restores it in disable_ibi() after DISEC.
--- drivers/i3c/master/dw-i3c-master.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i3c/master/dw-i3c-master.c +2 -2
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static int dw_i3c_master_reattach_i3c_dev(struct i3c_dev_desc *dev, master->free_pos &= ~BIT (pos); } -writel (DEV_ADDR_TABLE_DYNAMIC_ADDR (dev->info.dyn_addr), +writel (DEV_ADDR_TABLE_DYNAMIC_ADDR (dev->info.dyn_addr) |DEV_ADDR_TABLE_SIR_REJECT , master->regs +DEV_ADDR_TABLE_LOC (master->datstartaddr, data->index));
@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ static int dw_i3c_master_attach_i3c_dev(struct i3c_dev_desc *dev) master->free_pos &= ~BIT (pos);i3c_dev_set_master_data (dev, data); -writel (DEV_ADDR_TABLE_DYNAMIC_ADDR (master->devs[pos].addr), +writel (DEV_ADDR_TABLE_DYNAMIC_ADDR (master->devs[pos].addr) |DEV_ADDR_TABLE_SIR_REJECT , master->regs +DEV_ADDR_TABLE_LOC (master->datstartaddr, data->index));
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/333 powerpc, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user callchain
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e9bbfb4bfa86c6b5515b868d6982ac60505d7e39 ]
It may happen that mm is already released, which leads to kernel panic.
This adds the NULL check for current->mm, similarly to
commit 20afc60f892d ("x86, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user callchain").
I was getting this panic when running a profiling BPF program (profile.py from bcc-tools):
[26215.051935] Kernel attempted to read user page (588) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[26215.051950] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000588
[26215.051952] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000020fac0
[26215.051957] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[...]
[26215.052049] Call Trace:
[26215.052050] [c000000061da6d30] [c00000000020fc10] perf_callchain_user_64+0x2d0/0x490 (unreliable)
[26215.052054] [c000000061da6dc0] [c00000000020f92c] perf_callchain_user+0x1c/0x30
[26215.052057] [c000000061da6de0] [c0000000005ab2a0] get_perf_callchain+0x100/0x360
[26215.052063] [c000000061da6e70] [c000000000573bc8] bpf_get_stackid+0x88/0xf0
[26215.052067] [c000000061da6ea0] [c008000000042258] bpf_prog_16d4ab9ab662f669_do_perf_event+0xf8/0x274
[...]In addition, move storing the top-level stack entry to generic perf_callchain_user to make sure the top-evel entry is always captured, even if current->mm is NULL.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c | 5 +++++ arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c | 1 - arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c +5 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *revoid perf_callchain_user (struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry,struct pt_regs *regs) { +perf_callchain_store (entry,perf_arch_instruction_pointer (regs)); + +if (!current->mm) +return ; +if (!is_32bit_task ())perf_callchain_user_64 (entry, regs);else
arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c +0 -1
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ void perf_callchain_user_32(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, next_ip =perf_arch_instruction_pointer (regs); lr = regs->link; sp = regs->gpr[1 ]; -perf_callchain_store (entry, next_ip);while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack) { fp = (unsigned int __user *) (unsigned long ) sp;
arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c +0 -1
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, next_ip =perf_arch_instruction_pointer (regs); lr = regs->link; sp = regs->gpr[1 ]; -perf_callchain_store (entry, next_ip);while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack) { fp = (unsigned long __user *) sp;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/333 scsi: ufs: core: Fix SError in ufshcd_rtc_work() during UFS suspend
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Shuaiwei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b0bd84c39289ef6a6c3827dd52c875659291970a ]
In __ufshcd_wl_suspend(), cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called to cancel the UFS RTC work, but it is placed after ufshcd_vops_suspend(hba, pm_op, POST_CHANGE). This creates a race condition where ufshcd_rtc_work() can still be running while ufshcd_vops_suspend() is executing. When UFSHCD_CAP_CLK_GATING is not supported, the condition !hba->clk_gating.active_reqs is always true, causing ufshcd_update_rtc() to be executed. Since ufshcd_vops_suspend() typically performs clock gating operations, executing ufshcd_update_rtc() at that moment triggers an SError. The kernel panic trace is as follows:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xec/0x128 show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 panic+0x148/0x374 nmi_panic+0x3c/0x8c arm64_serror_panic+0x64/0x8c do_serror+0xc4/0xc8 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c el1h_64_error+0x68/0x6c el1_interrupt+0x20/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c ktime_get+0xc4/0x12c ufshcd_mcq_sq_stop+0x4c/0xec ufshcd_mcq_sq_cleanup+0x64/0x1dc ufshcd_clear_cmd+0x38/0x134 ufshcd_issue_dev_cmd+0x298/0x4d0 ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x1a4/0x1c4 ufshcd_query_attr+0xbc/0x19c ufshcd_rtc_work+0x10c/0x1c8 process_scheduled_works+0x1c4/0x45c worker_thread+0x32c/0x3e8 kthread+0x120/0x1d8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Fix this by moving cancel_delayed_work_sync() before the call to ufshcd_vops_suspend(hba, pm_op, PRE_CHANGE), ensuring the UFS RTC work is fully completed or cancelled at that point.
--- drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +1 -1
@@ -9925,6 +9925,7 @@ static int __ufshcd_wl_suspend(struct ufs_hba *hba, enum ufs_pm_op pm_op) }flush_work (&hba->eeh_work); +cancel_delayed_work_sync (&hba->ufs_rtc_update_work); ret =ufshcd_vops_suspend (hba, pm_op,PRE_CHANGE );if (ret)
@@ -9979,7 +9980,6 @@ static int __ufshcd_wl_suspend(struct ufs_hba *hba, enum ufs_pm_op pm_op)if (ret) goto set_link_active; -cancel_delayed_work_sync (&hba->ufs_rtc_update_work); goto out; set_link_active:
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/333 scsi: hisi_sas: Fix NULL pointer exception during user_scan()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xingui Yang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ddc0c26916574395447ebf4cff684314f6873a9 ]
user_scan() invokes updated sas_user_scan() for channel 0, and if successful, iteratively scans remaining channels (1 to shost->max_channel) via scsi_scan_host_selected() in commit 37c4e72b0651 ("scsi: Fix sas_user_scan() to handle wildcard and multi-channel scans"). However, hisi_sas supports only one channel, and the current value of max_channel is
1. sas_user_scan() for channel 1 will trigger the following NULL pointer exception:
[ 441.554662] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000008b0 [ 441.554699] Mem abort info: [ 441.554710] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 441.554718] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 441.554723] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 441.554726] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 441.554730] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 441.554735] Data abort info: [ 441.554737] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 441.554742] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 441.554747] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 441.554752] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000828377a6000 [ 441.554757] [00000000000008b0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 441.554769] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 441.629589] Modules linked in: arm_spe_pmu arm_smmuv3_pmu tpm_tis_spi hisi_uncore_sllc_pmu hisi_uncore_pa_pmu hisi_uncore_l3c_pmu hisi_uncore_hha_pmu hisi_uncore_ddrc_pmu hisi_uncore_cpa_pmu hns3_pmu hisi_ptt hisi_pcie_pmu tpm_tis_core spidev spi_hisi_sfc_v3xx hisi_uncore_pmu spi_dw_mmio fuse hclge hclge_common hisi_sec2 hisi_hpre hisi_zip hisi_qm hns3 hisi_sas_v3_hw sm3_ce sbsa_gwdt hnae3 hisi_sas_main uacce hisi_dma i2c_hisi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 441.670819] CPU: 46 UID: 0 PID: 6994 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ #84 PREEMPT [ 441.691327] pstate: 81400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 441.698277] pc : sas_find_dev_by_rphy+0x44/0x118 [ 441.702896] lr : sas_find_dev_by_rphy+0x3c/0x118 [ 441.707502] sp : ffff80009abbba40 [ 441.710805] x29: ffff80009abbba40 x28: ffff082819a40008 x27: ffff082810c37c08 [ 441.717930] x26: ffff082810c37c28 x25: ffff082819a40290 x24: ffff082810c37c00 [ 441.725054] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff082819a40000 [ 441.732179] x20: ffff082819a40290 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000020 [ 441.739304] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffb5dad6bda690 x15: 00000000ffffffff [ 441.746428] x14: ffff082814c3b26c x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff082814c3b26a [ 441.753553] x11: 00000000000000c0 x10: 000000000000003a x9 : ffffb5dad5ea94f4 [ 441.760678] x8 : 000000000000003a x7 : ffff80009abbbab0 x6 : 0000000000000030 [ 441.767802] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 441.774926] x2 : ffff08280f35a300 x1 : ffffb5dad7127180 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 441.782053] Call trace: [ 441.784488] sas_find_dev_by_rphy+0x44/0x118 (P) [ 441.789095] sas_target_alloc+0x24/0xb0 [ 441.792920] scsi_alloc_target+0x290/0x330 [ 441.797010] __scsi_scan_target+0x88/0x258 [ 441.801096] scsi_scan_channel+0x74/0xb8 [ 441.805008] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x170/0x188 [ 441.809615] sas_user_scan+0xfc/0x148 [ 441.813267] store_scan+0x10c/0x180 [ 441.816743] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40 [ 441.820398] sysfs_kf_write+0x84/0xa8 [ 441.824054] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1c8 [ 441.828487] vfs_write+0x2c0/0x370 [ 441.831880] ksys_write+0x74/0x118 [ 441.835271] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 [ 441.839182] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 [ 441.842919] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 [ 441.847611] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 441.850913] el0_svc+0x38/0x158 [ 441.854043] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 [ 441.858214] el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 [ 441.861865] Code: aa1303e0 97ff70a8 34ffff80 d10a4273 (f9445a75) [ 441.867946] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Therefore, set max_channel to 0.
--- drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_main.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_v3_hw.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_main.c +1 -1
@@ -2578,7 +2578,7 @@ int hisi_sas_probe(struct platform_device *pdev, shost->transportt = hisi_sas_stt; shost->max_id =HISI_SAS_MAX_DEVICES ; shost->max_lun = ~0 ; - shost->max_channel =1 ; + shost->max_channel =0 ; shost->max_cmd_len =HISI_SAS_MAX_CDB_LEN ;if (hisi_hba->hw->slot_index_alloc) { shost->can_queue =HISI_SAS_MAX_COMMANDS ;
drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_v3_hw.c +1 -1
@@ -4993,7 +4993,7 @@ hisi_sas_v3_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) shost->transportt = hisi_sas_stt; shost->max_id =HISI_SAS_MAX_DEVICES ; shost->max_lun = ~0 ; - shost->max_channel =1 ; + shost->max_channel =0 ; shost->max_cmd_len =HISI_SAS_MAX_CDB_LEN ; shost->can_queue =HISI_SAS_UNRESERVED_IPTT ; shost->cmd_per_lun =HISI_SAS_UNRESERVED_IPTT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/333 Revert "tcpm: allow looking for role_sw device in the main node"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>
commit 6b275bfaa16be3fb1689fa6794e445ecd127a1b4 upstream.
This reverts commit 1366cd228b0c67b60a2c0c26ef37fe9f7cfedb7f.
The fwnode_usb_role_switch_get() returns NULL only if no connection is found, returns ERR_PTR(-EPROBE_DEFER) if connection is found but deferred probe is needed, or a valid pointer of usb_role_switch.
When switching from a NULL check to IS_ERR_OR_NULL(), usb_role_switch_get() returns NULL and overwrites the ERR_PTR(-EPROBE_DEFER) returned by fwnode_usb_role_switch_get(). This causes the deferred probe indication to be lost, preventing the USB role switch from ever being retrieved.
--- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +1 -1
@@ -7877,7 +7877,7 @@ struct tcpm_port *tcpm_register_port(str port->partner_desc.identity = &port->partner_ident; port->role_sw =fwnode_usb_role_switch_get (tcpc->fwnode); -if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (port->role_sw)) +if (!port->role_sw) port->role_sw =usb_role_switch_get (port->dev);if (IS_ERR (port->role_sw)) { err =PTR_ERR (port->role_sw);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/333 Revert "ptdesc: remove references to folios from __pagetable_ctor() and pagetable_dtor()"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Axel Rasmussen <[email protected]>
commit 2d28ed588f8d7d0d41b0a4fad7f0d05e4bbf1797 upstream.
This change swapped out mod_node_page_state for lruvec_stat_add_folio. But, these two APIs are not interchangeable: the lruvec version also increments memcg stats, in addition to "global" pgdat stats.
So after this change, the "pagetables" memcg stat in memory.stat always yields "0", which is a userspace visible regression.
I tried to look for a refactor where we add a variant of lruvec_stat_mod_folio which takes a pgdat and a memcg instead of a folio, to try to adhere to the spirit of the original patch. But at the end of the day this just means we have to call folio_memcg(ptdesc_folio(ptdesc)) anyway, which doesn't really accomplish much.
This regression is visible in master as well as 6.18 stable, so CC stable too.
--- include/linux/mm.h | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/mm.h +6 -11
@@ -3138,26 +3138,21 @@ static inline bool ptlock_init(struct ptstatic inline void ptlock_free (struct ptdesc *ptdesc) {}#endif /* defined(CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS) */ -static inline unsigned long ptdesc_nr_pages (const struct ptdesc *ptdesc) -{ -return compound_nr (ptdesc_page (ptdesc)); -} -static inline void __pagetable_ctor (struct ptdesc *ptdesc) { -pg_data_t *pgdat =NODE_DATA (memdesc_nid (ptdesc->pt_flags)); +struct folio *folio =ptdesc_folio (ptdesc); -__SetPageTable (ptdesc_page (ptdesc)); -mod_node_page_state (pgdat,NR_PAGETABLE ,ptdesc_nr_pages (ptdesc)); +__folio_set_pgtable (folio); +lruvec_stat_add_folio (folio,NR_PAGETABLE ); }static inline void pagetable_dtor (struct ptdesc *ptdesc) { -pg_data_t *pgdat =NODE_DATA (memdesc_nid (ptdesc->pt_flags)); +struct folio *folio =ptdesc_folio (ptdesc);ptlock_free (ptdesc); -__ClearPageTable (ptdesc_page (ptdesc)); -mod_node_page_state (pgdat,NR_PAGETABLE , -ptdesc_nr_pages (ptdesc)); +__folio_clear_pgtable (folio); +lruvec_stat_sub_folio (folio,NR_PAGETABLE ); }static inline void pagetable_dtor_free (struct ptdesc *ptdesc)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/333 kthread: consolidate kthread exit paths to prevent use-after-free
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
commit 28aaa9c39945b7925a1cc1d513c8f21ed38f5e4f upstream.
Guillaume reported crashes via corrupted RCU callback function pointers during KUnit testing. The crash was traced back to the pidfs rhashtable conversion which replaced the 24-byte rb_node with an 8-byte rhash_head in struct pid, shrinking it from 160 to 144 bytes.
struct kthread (without CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP) is also 144 bytes. With CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT and SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN both round up to 192 bytes and share the same slab cache. struct pid.rcu.func and struct kthread.affinity_node both sit at offset 0x78.
When a kthread exits via make_task_dead() it bypasses kthread_exit() and misses the affinity_node cleanup. free_kthread_struct() frees the memory while the node is still linked into the global kthread_affinity_list. A subsequent list_del() by another kthread writes through dangling list pointers into the freed and reused memory, corrupting the pid's rcu.func pointer.
Instead of patching free_kthread_struct() to handle the missed cleanup, consolidate all kthread exit paths. Turn kthread_exit() into a macro that calls do_exit() and add kthread_do_exit() which is called from do_exit() for any task with PF_KTHREAD set. This guarantees that kthread-specific cleanup always happens regardless of the exit path - make_task_dead(), direct do_exit(), or kthread_exit().
Replace __to_kthread() with a new tsk_is_kthread() accessor in the public header. Export do_exit() since module code using the kthread_exit() macro now needs it directly.
--- include/linux/kthread.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/exit.c | 6 ++++++ kernel/kthread.c | 41 +++++------------------------------------ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
include/linux/kthread.h +20 -1
@@ -7,6 +7,24 @@struct mm_struct ; +/* opaque kthread data */ +struct kthread ; + +/* +* When "(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)" is set the task is a kthread and will +* always remain a kthread. For kthreads p->worker_private always +* points to a struct kthread. For tasks that are not kthreads +* p->worker_private is used to point to other things. +* +* Return NULL for any task that is not a kthread. +*/ +static inline struct kthread *tsk_is_kthread (struct task_struct *p) +{ +if (p->flags &PF_KTHREAD ) +return p->worker_private; +return NULL ; +} + __printf(4, 5) struct task_struct *kthread_create_on_node(int (*threadfn)(void *data), void *data,
@@ -98,8 +116,9 @@ void *kthread_probe_data(struct task_strint kthread_park (struct task_struct *k);void kthread_unpark (struct task_struct *k);void kthread_parkme (void ); -void kthread_exit (long result)__noreturn ; +#define kthread_exit (result) do_exit(result)void kthread_complete_and_exit (struct completion *,long )__noreturn ; +void kthread_do_exit (struct kthread *,long );int kthreadd (void *unused);extern struct task_struct *kthreadd_task;
kernel/exit.c +6 -0
@@ -897,11 +897,16 @@ static void synchronize_group_exit(strucvoid __noreturn do_exit (long code) {struct task_struct *tsk = current; +struct kthread *kthread;int group_dead;WARN_ON (irqs_disabled ());WARN_ON (tsk->plug); + kthread =tsk_is_kthread (tsk); +if (unlikely (kthread)) +kthread_do_exit (kthread, code); +kcov_task_exit (tsk);kmsan_task_exit (tsk);
@@ -1008,6 +1013,7 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)lockdep_free_task (tsk);do_task_dead (); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (do_exit);void __noreturn make_task_dead (int signr) {
kernel/kthread.c +5 -36
85 lines not on this page · raw message
Re: kthread: consolidate kthread exit paths to prevent use-after-free
Hello,
I want you know that need backport ("bpf: drop kthread_exit from noreturn_deny"), which commit 7fe44c4388146bdbb3c5932d81a26d9fa0fd3ec9 upstream,
or will met "WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol kthread_exit" to cause build fail, I test v6.18.19-rc1 with the patch build ok for me.
BRs
Wentao Guan
Log:
AR drivers/gpu/built-in.a
AR drivers/built-in.a AR built-in.a AR vmlinux.a LD vmlinux.o GEN .vmlinux.objs MODPOST Module.symvers CC .vmlinux.export.o UPD include/generated/utsversion.h CC init/version-timestamp.o KSYMS .tmp_vmlinux0.kallsyms.S AS .tmp_vmlinux0.kallsyms.o LD .tmp_vmlinux1 BTF .tmp_vmlinux1.btf.o NM .tmp_vmlinux1.syms KSYMS .tmp_vmlinux1.kallsyms.S AS .tmp_vmlinux1.kallsyms.o LD .tmp_vmlinux2 NM .tmp_vmlinux2.syms KSYMS .tmp_vmlinux2.kallsyms.S AS .tmp_vmlinux2.kallsyms.o LD vmlinux.unstripped BTFIDS vmlinux.unstripped
WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol kthread_exit
Greg KH
maintainerRe: kthread: consolidate kthread exit paths to prevent use-after-free
Quoted 34 lines · Wentao Guan
Hello,
I want you know that need backport ("bpf: drop
kthread_exitfromnoreturn_deny"), which commit7fe44c4388146bdbb3c5932d81a26d9fa0fd3ec9upstream,
or will met "WARN:resolve_btfids: unresolved symbolkthread_exit" to cause build fail, I test v6.18.19-rc1 with the patch build ok for me.BRs
Wentao GuanLog:
ARdrivers/gpu/built-in.aAR drivers/built-in.a AR built-in.a AR vmlinux.a LD vmlinux.o GEN .vmlinux.objs MODPOST Module.symvers CC .vmlinux.export.o UPD include/generated/utsversion.h CC init/version-timestamp.o KSYMS .tmp_vmlinux0.kallsyms.S AS .tmp_vmlinux0.kallsyms.o LD .tmp_vmlinux1 BTF .tmp_vmlinux1.btf.o NM .tmp_vmlinux1.syms KSYMS .tmp_vmlinux1.kallsyms.S AS .tmp_vmlinux1.kallsyms.o LD .tmp_vmlinux2 NM .tmp_vmlinux2.syms KSYMS .tmp_vmlinux2.kallsyms.S AS .tmp_vmlinux2.kallsyms.o LD vmlinux.unstripped BTFIDS vmlinux.unstripped
Quoted 1 line
WARN:
resolve_btfids: unresolved symbolkthread_exit
Thanks, I've now queued this up.
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/333 cpufreq: intel_pstate: Fix NULL pointer dereference in update_cpu_qos_request()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Arcari <[email protected]>
commit ab39cc4cb8ceecdc2b61747433e7237f1ac2b789 upstream.
The update_cpu_qos_request() function attempts to initialize the 'freq' variable by dereferencing 'cpudata' before verifying if the 'policy' is valid.
This issue occurs on systems booted with the "nosmt" parameter, where all_cpu_data[cpu] is NULL for the SMT sibling threads. As a result, any call to update_qos_requests() will result in a NULL pointer dereference as the code will attempt to access pstate.turbo_freq using the NULL cpudata pointer.
Also, pstate.turbo_freq may be updated by intel_pstate_get_hwp_cap() after initializing the 'freq' variable, so it is better to defer the 'freq' until intel_pstate_get_hwp_cap() has been called.
Fix this by deferring the 'freq' assignment until after the policy and driver_data have been validated.
--- drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c +3 -1
@@ -1663,8 +1663,8 @@ unlock_driver:static void update_cpu_qos_request (int cpu,enum freq_qos_req_type type) {struct cpudata *cpudata = all_cpu_data[cpu]; -unsigned int freq = cpudata->pstate.turbo_freq;struct freq_qos_request *req; +unsigned int freq; struct cpufreq_policy *policy __free(put_cpufreq_policy) = cpufreq_cpu_get(cpu);if (!policy)
@@ -1677,6 +1677,8 @@ static void update_cpu_qos_request(int cif (hwp_active)intel_pstate_get_hwp_cap (cpudata); + freq = cpudata->pstate.turbo_freq; +if (type ==FREQ_QOS_MIN ) { freq =DIV_ROUND_UP (freq * global.min_perf_pct,100 ); }else {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/333 drm/amdgpu: add upper bound check on user inputs in signal ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sunil Khatri <[email protected]>
commit ea78f8c68f4f6211c557df49174c54d167821962 upstream.
Huge input values in amdgpu_userq_signal_ioctl can lead to a OOM and could be exploited.
So check these input value against AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES which is big enough value for genuine use cases and could potentially avoid OOM.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c +7 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@static const struct dma_fence_ops amdgpu_userq_fence_ops;static struct kmem_cache *amdgpu_userq_fence_slab; +#define AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES (1U << 16) +int amdgpu_userq_fence_slab_init (void ) { amdgpu_userq_fence_slab = kmem_cache_create("amdgpu_userq_fence",
@@ -475,6 +477,11 @@ int amdgpu_userq_signal_ioctl(struct drmif (!amdgpu_userq_enabled (dev))return -ENOTSUPP ; +if (args->num_syncobj_handles >AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + args->num_bo_write_handles >AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + args->num_bo_read_handles >AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES ) +return -EINVAL ; + num_syncobj_handles = args->num_syncobj_handles; syncobj_handles =memdup_user (u64_to_user_ptr (args->syncobj_handles),size_mul (sizeof (u32), num_syncobj_handles));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/333 drm/amdgpu/userq: Fix reference leak in amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
commit 49abfa812617a7f2d0132c70d23ac98b389c6ec1 upstream.
Drop reference to syncobj and timeline fence when aborting the ioctl due output array being too small.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c +2 -0
@@ -879,6 +879,7 @@ int amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl(struct drm_ddma_fence_unwrap_for_each (f, &iter, fence) {if (num_fences >= wait_info->num_fences) { r = -EINVAL ; +dma_fence_put (fence); goto free_fences; }
@@ -903,6 +904,7 @@ int amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl(struct drm_dif (num_fences >= wait_info->num_fences) { r = -EINVAL ; +dma_fence_put (fence); goto free_fences; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/333 drm/amdgpu: add upper bound check on user inputs in wait ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sunil Khatri <[email protected]>
commit 64ac7c09fc44985ec9bb6a9db740899fa40ca613 upstream.
Huge input values in amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl can lead to a OOM and could be exploited.
So check these input value against AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES which is big enough value for genuine use cases and could potentially avoid OOM.
v2: squash in Srini's fix
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c +5 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,11 @@ int amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl(struct drm_dif (!amdgpu_userq_enabled (dev))return -ENOTSUPP ; +if (wait_info->num_syncobj_handles >AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + wait_info->num_bo_write_handles >AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + wait_info->num_bo_read_handles >AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES ) +return -EINVAL ; + num_read_bo_handles = wait_info->num_bo_read_handles; bo_handles_read =memdup_user (u64_to_user_ptr (wait_info->bo_read_handles),size_mul (sizeof (u32), num_read_bo_handles));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/333 drm/amd: Disable MES LR compute W/A
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
commit 6b0d812971370c64b837a2db4275410f478272fe upstream.
A workaround was introduced in commit 1fb710793ce2 ("drm/amdgpu: Enable MES lr_compute_wa by default") to help with some hangs observed in gfx1151.
This WA didn't fully fix the issue. It was actually fixed by adjusting the VGPR size to the correct value that matched the hardware in commit b42f3bf9536c ("drm/amdkfd: bump minimum vgpr size for gfx1151").
There are reports of instability on other products with newer GC microcode versions, and I believe they're caused by this workaround. As we don't need the workaround any more, remove it.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v11_0.c | 5 ----- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v12_0.c | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 10 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v11_0.c +0 -5
@@ -714,11 +714,6 @@ static int mes_v11_0_set_hw_resources(st mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_reg_active_poll =1 ; mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_level_process_quantum_check =1 ; mes_set_hw_res_pkt.oversubscription_timer =50 ; -if ((mes->adev->mes.sched_version &AMDGPU_MES_VERSION_MASK ) >=0x7f ) - mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_lr_compute_wa =1 ; -else -dev_info_once (mes->adev->dev, -"MES FW version must be >= 0x7f to enable LR compute workaround.\n" );if (amdgpu_mes_log_enable) { mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_mes_event_int_logging =1 ;
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v12_0.c +0 -5
@@ -775,11 +775,6 @@ static int mes_v12_0_set_hw_resources(st mes_set_hw_res_pkt.use_different_vmid_compute =1 ; mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_reg_active_poll =1 ; mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_level_process_quantum_check =1 ; -if ((mes->adev->mes.sched_version &AMDGPU_MES_VERSION_MASK ) >=0x82 ) - mes_set_hw_res_pkt.enable_lr_compute_wa =1 ; -else -dev_info_once (adev->dev, -"MES FW version must be >= 0x82 to enable LR compute workaround.\n" );/* * Keep oversubscribe timer for sdma . When we have unmapped doorbell
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/333 ipmi:si: Dont block module unload if the BMC is messed up
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
commit f895e5df80316a308c2f7d64d13a78494630ea05 upstream.
If the BMC is in a bad state, don't bother waiting for queues messages since there can't be any. Otherwise the unload is blocked until the BMC is back in a good state.
--- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +2 -1
@@ -2227,7 +2227,8 @@ static void wait_msg_processed(struct smunsigned long jiffies_now;long time_diff; -while (smi_info->curr_msg || (smi_info->si_state !=SI_NORMAL )) { +while (smi_info->si_state !=SI_HOSED && + (smi_info->curr_msg || (smi_info->si_state !=SI_NORMAL ))) { jiffies_now = jiffies; time_diff = (((long )jiffies_now - (long )smi_info->last_timeout_jiffies) *SI_USEC_PER_JIFFY );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/333 ipmi:si: Use a long timeout when the BMC is misbehaving
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
commit c3bb3295637cc9bf514f690941ca9a385bf30113 upstream.
If the driver goes into HOSED state, don't reset the timeout to the short timeout in the timeout handler.
--- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +3 -1
@@ -1114,7 +1114,9 @@ static void smi_timeout(struct timer_lis * SI_USEC_PER_JIFFY); smi_result =smi_event_handler (smi_info, time_diff); -if ((smi_info->io.irq) && (!smi_info->interrupt_disabled)) { +if (smi_info->si_state ==SI_HOSED ) { + timeout = jiffies +SI_TIMEOUT_HOSED ; + }else if ((smi_info->io.irq) && (!smi_info->interrupt_disabled)) {/* Running with interrupts, only do long timeouts. */ timeout = jiffies +SI_TIMEOUT_JIFFIES ;smi_inc_stat (smi_info, long_timeouts);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/333 drm/bridge: samsung-dsim: Fix memory leak in error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Osama Abdelkader <[email protected]>
commit 803ec1faf7c1823e6e3b1f2aaa81be18528c9436 upstream.
In samsung_dsim_host_attach(), drm_bridge_add() is called to add the bridge. However, if samsung_dsim_register_te_irq() or pdata->host_ops->attach() fails afterwards, the function returns without removing the bridge, causing a memory leak.
Fix this by adding proper error handling with goto labels to ensure drm_bridge_remove() is called in all error paths. Also ensure that samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq() is called if the attach operation fails after the TE IRQ has been registered.
samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq() function is moved without changes to be before samsung_dsim_host_attach() to avoid forward declaration.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/samsung-dsim.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/samsung-dsim.c +16 -9
@@ -1881,6 +1881,14 @@ static int samsung_dsim_register_te_irq(return 0 ; } +static void samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq (struct samsung_dsim *dsi) +{ +if (dsi->te_gpio) { +free_irq (gpiod_to_irq (dsi->te_gpio), dsi); +gpiod_put (dsi->te_gpio); + } +} +static int samsung_dsim_host_attach (struct mipi_dsi_host *host,struct mipi_dsi_device *device) {
@@ -1955,13 +1963,13 @@ of_find_panel_or_bridge:if (!(device->mode_flags &MIPI_DSI_MODE_VIDEO )) { ret =samsung_dsim_register_te_irq (dsi, &device->dev);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err_remove_bridge; }if (pdata->host_ops && pdata->host_ops->attach) { ret = pdata->host_ops->attach (dsi, device);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err_unregister_te_irq; } dsi->lanes = device->lanes;
@@ -1969,14 +1977,13 @@ of_find_panel_or_bridge: dsi->mode_flags = device->mode_flags;return 0 ; -} -static void samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq (struct samsung_dsim *dsi) -{ -if (dsi->te_gpio) { -free_irq (gpiod_to_irq (dsi->te_gpio), dsi); -gpiod_put (dsi->te_gpio); - } +err_unregister_te_irq: +if (!(device->mode_flags &MIPI_DSI_MODE_VIDEO )) +samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq (dsi); +err_remove_bridge: +drm_bridge_remove (&dsi->bridge); +return ret; } static int samsung_dsim_host_detach(struct mipi_dsi_host *host,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/333 drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Enable HPD polling if IRQ is not used
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>
commit 0b87d51690dd5131cbe9fbd23746b037aab89815 upstream.
Fallback to polling to detect hotplug events on systems without interrupts.
On systems where the interrupt line of the bridge is not connected, the bridge cannot notify hotplug events. Only add the DRM_BRIDGE_OP_HPD flag if an interrupt has been registered otherwise remain in polling mode.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi86.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi86.c +4 -2
@@ -1314,6 +1314,7 @@ static int ti_sn_bridge_probe(struct aux {struct ti_sn65dsi86 *pdata =dev_get_drvdata (adev->dev.parent);struct device_node *np = pdata->dev->of_node; +const struct i2c_client *client =to_i2c_client (pdata->dev);int ret; pdata->next_bridge =devm_drm_of_get_bridge (&adev->dev, np,1 ,0 );
@@ -1332,8 +1333,9 @@ static int ti_sn_bridge_probe(struct aux ? DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DisplayPort : DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_eDP;if (pdata->bridge.type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DisplayPort) { - pdata->bridge.ops =DRM_BRIDGE_OP_EDID |DRM_BRIDGE_OP_DETECT | -DRM_BRIDGE_OP_HPD ; + pdata->bridge.ops =DRM_BRIDGE_OP_EDID |DRM_BRIDGE_OP_DETECT ; +if (client->irq) + pdata->bridge.ops |=DRM_BRIDGE_OP_HPD ;/* * If comms were already enabled they would have been enabled * with the wrong value of HPD_DISABLE. Update it now. Comms
Re: [PATCH 6.18 190/333] drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Enable HPD polling if IRQ is not used
Hello Greg,
Quoted 16 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>
commit
0b87d51690dd5131cbe9fbd23746b037aab89815upstream.Fallback to polling to detect hotplug events on systems without interrupts.
On systems where the interrupt line of the bridge is not connected, the bridge cannot notify hotplug events. Only add the
DRM_BRIDGE_OP_HPDflag if an interrupt has been registered otherwise remain in polling mode.
Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 55e8ff842051 ("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Add HPD for DisplayPort connector type")Cc [email protected] # 6.16: 9133bc3f0564: drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: AddSigned-off-by Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>[dianders: Adjusted Fixes/stable line based on discussion]Signed-off-by Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Please queue also commit 9133bc3f0564 ("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Add support for DisplayPort mode with HPD"), it is a pre-requisite for this one.
Francesco
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 6.18 190/333] drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Enable HPD polling if IRQ is not used
Quoted 28 lines · Francesco Dolcini
Hello Greg,
Quoted 16 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>
commit
0b87d51690dd5131cbe9fbd23746b037aab89815upstream.Fallback to polling to detect hotplug events on systems without interrupts.
On systems where the interrupt line of the bridge is not connected, the bridge cannot notify hotplug events. Only add the
DRM_BRIDGE_OP_HPDflag if an interrupt has been registered otherwise remain in polling mode.Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 55e8ff842051 ("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Add HPD for DisplayPort connector type")Cc [email protected] # 6.16: 9133bc3f0564: drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: AddSigned-off-by Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>[dianders: Adjusted Fixes/stable line based on discussion]Signed-off-by Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
Please queue also commit
9133bc3f0564("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Add support for DisplayPort mode with HPD"), it is a pre-requisite for this one.
Now queued up.
thanks,
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/333 ipmi:si: Handle waiting messages when BMC failure detected
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
commit 52c9ee202edd21d0599ac3b5a6fe1da2a2f053e5 upstream.
If a BMC failure is detected, the current message is returned with an error. However, if there was a waiting message, it would not be handled.
Add a check for the waiting message after handling the current message.
--- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +6 -0
@@ -810,6 +810,12 @@ restart:*/ return_hosed_msg (smi_info,IPMI_BUS_ERR ); } +if (smi_info->waiting_msg !=NULL ) { +/* Also handle if there was a message waiting. */ + smi_info->curr_msg = smi_info->waiting_msg; + smi_info->waiting_msg =NULL ; +return_hosed_msg (smi_info,IPMI_BUS_ERR ); + }smi_mod_timer (smi_info, jiffies +SI_TIMEOUT_HOSED ); goto out; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/333 nouveau/gsp: drop WARN_ON in ACPI probes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
commit 9478c166c46934160135e197b049b5a05753f2ad upstream.
These WARN_ONs seem to trigger a lot, and we don't seem to have a plan to fix them, so just drop them, as they are most likely harmless.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/gsp/rm/r535/gsp.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/gsp/rm/r535/gsp.c +6 -6
@@ -737,8 +737,8 @@ r535_gsp_acpi_caps(acpi_handle handle, Cif (!obj) goto done; -if (WARN_ON (obj->type !=ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER ) || -WARN_ON (obj->buffer.length !=4 )) +if (obj->type !=ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER || + obj->buffer.length !=4 ) goto done; caps->status =0 ;
@@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ r535_gsp_acpi_jt(acpi_handle handle, JT_if (!obj) goto done; -if (WARN_ON (obj->type !=ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER ) || -WARN_ON (obj->buffer.length !=4 )) +if (obj->type !=ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER || + obj->buffer.length !=4 ) goto done; jt->status =0 ;
@@ -861,8 +861,8 @@ r535_gsp_acpi_dod(acpi_handle handle, DO _DOD = output.pointer; -if (WARN_ON (_DOD->type !=ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE ) || -WARN_ON (_DOD->package.count >ARRAY_SIZE (dod->acpiIdList))) +if (_DOD->type !=ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE || + _DOD->package.count >ARRAY_SIZE (dod->acpiIdList))return ;for (int i =0 ; i < _DOD->package.count; i++) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/333 drm/i915/alpm: ALPM disable fixes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit eb4a7139e97374f42b7242cc754e77f1623fbcd5 upstream.
PORT_ALPM_CTL is supposed to be written only before link training. Remove writing it from ALPM disable.
Also clearing ALPM_CTL_ALPM_AUX_LESS_ENABLE and is not about disabling ALPM but switching to AUX-Wake ALPM. Stop touching this bit on ALPM disable.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_alpm.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_alpm.c +1 -6
@@ -577,12 +577,7 @@ void intel_alpm_disable(struct intel_dpmutex_lock (&intel_dp->alpm_parameters.lock);intel_de_rmw (display,ALPM_CTL (display, cpu_transcoder), -ALPM_CTL_ALPM_ENABLE |ALPM_CTL_LOBF_ENABLE | -ALPM_CTL_ALPM_AUX_LESS_ENABLE ,0 ); - -intel_de_rmw (display, -PORT_ALPM_CTL (cpu_transcoder), -PORT_ALPM_CTL_ALPM_AUX_LESS_ENABLE ,0 ); +ALPM_CTL_ALPM_ENABLE |ALPM_CTL_LOBF_ENABLE ,0 );drm_dbg_kms (display->drm,"Disabling ALPM\n" );mutex_unlock (&intel_dp->alpm_parameters.lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/333 gpiolib: normalize the return value of gc->get() on behalf of buggy drivers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
commit ec2cceadfae72304ca19650f9cac4b2a97b8a2fc upstream.
Commit 86ef402d805d ("gpiolib: sanitize the return value of gpio_chip::get()") started checking the return value of the .get() callback in struct gpio_chip. Now - almost a year later - it turns out that there are quite a few drivers in tree that can break with this change. Partially revert it: normalize the return value in GPIO core but also emit a warning.
--- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +6 -2
@@ -3249,8 +3249,12 @@ static int gpiochip_get(struct gpio_chip/* Make sure this is called after checking for gc->get(). */ ret = gc->get (gc, offset); -if (ret >1 ) - ret = -EBADE ; +if (ret >1 ) { +gpiochip_warn (gc, +"invalid return value from gc->get(): %d, consider fixing the driver\n" , + ret); + ret = !!ret; + }return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/333 ipmi:si: Fix check for a misbehaving BMC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
commit cae66f1a1dcd23e17da5a015ef9d731129f9d2dd upstream.
There is a race on checking the state in the sender, it needs to be checked under a lock. But you also need a check to avoid issues with a misbehaving BMC for run to completion mode. So leave the check at the beginning for run to completion, and add a check under the lock to avoid the race.
--- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +13 -11
@@ -925,9 +925,14 @@ static int sender(void *send_info, struc {struct smi_info *smi_info = send_info;unsigned long flags; +int rv =IPMI_CC_NO_ERROR ;debug_timestamp (smi_info,"Enqueue" ); +/* +* Check here for run to completion mode. A check under lock is +* later. +*/ if (smi_info->si_state ==SI_HOSED )return IPMI_BUS_ERR ;
@@ -941,18 +946,15 @@ static int sender(void *send_info, struc }spin_lock_irqsave (&smi_info->si_lock, flags); -/* -* The following two lines don't need to be under the lock for -* the lock's sake, but they do need SMP memory barriers to -* avoid getting things out of order. We are already claiming -* the lock, anyway, so just do it under the lock to avoid the -* ordering problem. -*/ -BUG_ON (smi_info->waiting_msg); - smi_info->waiting_msg = msg; -check_start_timer_thread (smi_info); +if (smi_info->si_state ==SI_HOSED ) { + rv =IPMI_BUS_ERR ; + }else { +BUG_ON (smi_info->waiting_msg); + smi_info->waiting_msg = msg; +check_start_timer_thread (smi_info); + }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&smi_info->si_lock, flags); -return IPMI_CC_NO_ERROR ; +return rv; }static void set_run_to_completion (void *send_info,bool i_run_to_completion)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/333 drm/xe/sync: Cleanup partially initialized sync on parse failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuicheng Lin <[email protected]>
commit 1bfd7575092420ba5a0b944953c95b74a5646ff8 upstream.
xe_sync_entry_parse() can allocate references (syncobj, fence, chain fence, or user fence) before hitting a later failure path. Several of those paths returned directly, leaving partially initialized state and leaking refs.
Route these error paths through a common free_sync label and call xe_sync_entry_cleanup(sync) before returning the error.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_sync.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_sync.c +17 -7
@@ -146,8 +146,10 @@ int xe_sync_entry_parse(struct xe_deviceif (!signal) { sync->fence =drm_syncobj_fence_get (sync->syncobj); -if (XE_IOCTL_DBG (xe, !sync->fence)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (XE_IOCTL_DBG (xe, !sync->fence)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto free_sync; + } }break ;
@@ -167,17 +169,21 @@ int xe_sync_entry_parse(struct xe_deviceif (signal) { sync->chain_fence =dma_fence_chain_alloc (); -if (!sync->chain_fence) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!sync->chain_fence) { + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto free_sync; + } }else { sync->fence =drm_syncobj_fence_get (sync->syncobj); -if (XE_IOCTL_DBG (xe, !sync->fence)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (XE_IOCTL_DBG (xe, !sync->fence)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto free_sync; + } err =dma_fence_chain_find_seqno (&sync->fence, sync_in.timeline_value);if (err) -return err; + goto free_sync; }break ;
@@ -216,6 +222,10 @@ int xe_sync_entry_parse(struct xe_device sync->timeline_value = sync_in.timeline_value;return 0 ; + +free_sync: +xe_sync_entry_cleanup (sync); +return err; }ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION (xe_sync_entry_parse,ERRNO );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/333 s390/pfault: Fix virtual vs physical address confusion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
commit d879ac6756b662a085a743e76023c768c3241579 upstream.
When Linux is running as guest, runs a user space process and the user space process accesses a page that the host has paged out, the guest gets a pfault interrupt and schedules a different process. Without this mechanism the host would have to suspend the whole virtual CPU until the page has been paged in.
To setup the pfault interrupt the real address of parameter list should be passed to DIAGNOSE 0x258, but a virtual address is passed instead.
That has a performance impact, since the pfault setup never succeeds, the interrupt is never delivered to a guest and the whole virtual CPU is suspended as result.
--- arch/s390/mm/pfault.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/mm/pfault.c +2 -2
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int __pfault_init(void)"0: nopr %%r7\n" EX_TABLE (0b ,0b ) : [rc] "+d" (rc) - : [refbk] "a" (&pfault_init_refbk), "m" (pfault_init_refbk) + : [refbk] "a" (virt_to_phys(&pfault_init_refbk)), "m" (pfault_init_refbk) : "cc"); return rc; }
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void __pfault_fini(void)"0: nopr %%r7\n" EX_TABLE (0b ,0b ) : - : [refbk] "a" (&pfault_fini_refbk), "m" (pfault_fini_refbk) + : [refbk] "a" (virt_to_phys(&pfault_fini_refbk)), "m" (pfault_fini_refbk) : "cc"); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/333 bpf: Fix kprobe_multi cookies access in show_fdinfo callback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
commit ad6fface76da42721c15e8fb281570aaa44a2c01 upstream.
We don't check if cookies are available on the kprobe_multi link before accessing them in show_fdinfo callback, we should.
--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +3 -1
@@ -2441,8 +2441,10 @@ static void bpf_kprobe_multi_show_fdinfo struct seq_file *seq) {struct bpf_kprobe_multi_link *kmulti_link; +bool has_cookies; kmulti_link = container_of(link, struct bpf_kprobe_multi_link, link); + has_cookies = !!kmulti_link->cookies;seq_printf (seq, "kprobe_cnt:\t%u\n"
@@ -2454,7 +2456,7 @@ static void bpf_kprobe_multi_show_fdinfofor (int i =0 ; i < kmulti_link->cnt; i++) {seq_printf (seq,"%llu\t %pS\n" , - kmulti_link->cookies[i], + has_cookies ? kmulti_link->cookies[i] :0 , (void *)kmulti_link->addrs[i]); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/333 arm64: gcs: Honour mprotect(PROT_NONE) on shadow stack mappings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
commit 47a8aad135ac1aed04b7b0c0a8157fd208075827 upstream.
vm_get_page_prot() short-circuits the protection_map[] lookup for a VM_SHADOW_STACK mapping since it uses a different PIE index from the typical read/write/exec permissions. However, the side effect is that it also ignores mprotect(PROT_NONE) by creating an accessible PTE.
Special-case the !(vm_flags & VM_ACCESS_FLAGS) flags to use the protection_map[VM_NONE] permissions instead. No GCS attributes are required for an inaccessible PTE.
--- arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c +5 -1
@@ -91,7 +91,11 @@ pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags_t vm_/* Short circuit GCS to avoid bloating the table. */ if (system_supports_gcs () && (vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK )) { - prot = gcs_page_prot; +/* Honour mprotect(PROT_NONE) on shadow stack mappings */ +if (vm_flags &VM_ACCESS_FLAGS ) + prot = gcs_page_prot; +else + prot =pgprot_val (protection_map[VM_NONE ]); }else { prot =pgprot_val (protection_map[vm_flags & (VM_READ |VM_WRITE |VM_EXEC |VM_SHARED )]);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/333 nfsd: Fix cred ref leak in nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit().
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 92978c83bb4eef55d02a6c990c01c423131eefa7 upstream.
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() uses get_current_cred() without put_cred().
As we can see from other callers, svc_xprt_create_from_sa() does not require the extra refcount.
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() is always in the process context, sendmsg(), and current->cred does not go away.
Let's use current_cred() in nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit().
--- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +1 -1
@@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_ } ret =svc_xprt_create_from_sa (serv, xcl_name, net, sa,0 , -get_current_cred ()); +current_cred ());/* always save the latest error */ if (ret <0 ) err = ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/333 device property: Allow secondary lookup in fwnode_get_next_child_node()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit 2692c614f8f05929d692b3dbfd3faef1f00fbaf0 upstream.
When device_get_child_node_count() got split to the fwnode and device respective APIs, the fwnode didn't inherit the ability to traverse over the secondary fwnode. Hence any user, that switches from device to fwnode API misses this feature. In particular, this was revealed by the commit 1490cbb9dbfd ("device property: Split fwnode_get_child_node_count()") that effectively broke the GPIO enumeration on Intel Galileo boards. Fix this by moving the secondary lookup from device to fwnode API.
Note, in general no device_*() API should go into the depth of the fwnode implementation.
--- drivers/base/property.c | 27 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/base/property.c +13 -14
@@ -797,7 +797,18 @@ struct fwnode_handle * fwnode_get_next_child_node(const struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, struct fwnode_handle *child) { - return fwnode_call_ptr_op(fwnode, get_next_child_node, child); + struct fwnode_handle *next; + +if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (fwnode)) +return NULL ; + +/* Try to find a child in primary fwnode */ + next =fwnode_call_ptr_op (fwnode, get_next_child_node, child); +if (next) +return next; + +/* When no more children in primary, continue with secondary */ +return fwnode_call_ptr_op (fwnode->secondary, get_next_child_node, child); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fwnode_get_next_child_node);
@@ -841,19 +852,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fwnode_get_next_availastruct fwnode_handle *device_get_next_child_node (const struct device *dev,struct fwnode_handle *child) { -const struct fwnode_handle *fwnode =dev_fwnode (dev); -struct fwnode_handle *next; - -if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (fwnode)) -return NULL ; - -/* Try to find a child in primary fwnode */ - next =fwnode_get_next_child_node (fwnode, child); -if (next) -return next; - -/* When no more children in primary, continue with secondary */ -return fwnode_get_next_child_node (fwnode->secondary, child); +return fwnode_get_next_child_node (dev_fwnode (dev), child); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (device_get_next_child_node);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/333 irqchip/gic-v3-its: Limit number of per-device MSIs to the range the ITS supports
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit ce9e40a9a5e5cff0b1b0d2fa582b3d71a8ce68e8 upstream.
The ITS driver blindly assumes that EventIDs are in abundant supply, to the point where it never checks how many the hardware actually supports.
It turns out that some pretty esoteric integrations make it so that only a few bits are available, all the way down to a single bit.
Enforce the advertised limitation at the point of allocating the device structure, and hope that the endpoint driver can deal with such limitation.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +4 -0
@@ -3475,6 +3475,7 @@ static struct its_device *its_create_devint lpi_base;int nr_lpis;int nr_ites; +int id_bits;int sz;if (!its_alloc_device_table (its, dev_id))
@@ -3486,7 +3487,10 @@ static struct its_device *its_create_dev/* * Even if the device wants a single LPI, the ITT must be * sized as a power of two (and you need at least one bit...). +* Also honor the ITS's own EID limit. */ + id_bits =FIELD_GET (GITS_TYPER_IDBITS , its->typer) +1 ; + nvecs = min_t(unsigned int, nvecs, BIT(id_bits)); nr_ites =max (2 , nvecs); sz = nr_ites * (FIELD_GET (GITS_TYPER_ITT_ENTRY_SIZE , its->typer) +1 ); sz =max (sz,ITS_ITT_ALIGN );
include/linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h +1 -0
@@ -394,6 +394,7 @@#define GITS_TYPER_VLPIS (1UL << 1)#define GITS_TYPER_ITT_ENTRY_SIZE_SHIFT 4#define GITS_TYPER_ITT_ENTRY_SIZE GENMASK_ULL(7, 4) +#define GITS_TYPER_IDBITS GENMASK_ULL(12, 8)#define GITS_TYPER_IDBITS_SHIFT 8#define GITS_TYPER_DEVBITS_SHIFT 13#define GITS_TYPER_DEVBITS GENMASK_ULL(17, 13)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/333 btrfs: fix chunk map leak in btrfs_map_block() after btrfs_chunk_map_num_copies()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Harmstone <[email protected]>
commit f15fb3d41543244d1179f423da4a4832a55bc050 upstream.
Fix a chunk map leak in btrfs_map_block(): if we return early with -EINVAL, we're not freeing the chunk map that we've just looked up.
--- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +4 -2
@@ -6759,8 +6759,10 @@ int btrfs_map_block(struct btrfs_fs_inforeturn PTR_ERR (map); num_copies =btrfs_chunk_map_num_copies (map); -if (io_geom.mirror_num > num_copies) -return -EINVAL ; +if (io_geom.mirror_num > num_copies) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } map_offset = logical - map->start; io_geom.raid56_full_stripe_start = (u64)-1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/333 iomap: reject delalloc mappings during writeback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
commit d320f160aa5ff36cdf83c645cca52b615e866e32 upstream.
Filesystems should never provide a delayed allocation mapping to writeback; they're supposed to allocate the space before replying. This can lead to weird IO errors and crashes in the block layer if the filesystem is being malicious, or if it hadn't set iomap->dev because it's a delalloc mapping.
Fix this by failing writeback on delalloc mappings. Currently no filesystems actually misbehave in this manner, but we ought to be stricter about things like that.
--- fs/iomap/ioend.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/iomap/ioend.c +7 -6
@@ -163,17 +163,18 @@ ssize_t iomap_add_to_ioend(struct iomap_WARN_ON_ONCE (!folio->private && map_len < dirty_len);switch (wpc->iomap.type) { -case IOMAP_INLINE : -WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); -return -EIO ; +case IOMAP_UNWRITTEN : + ioend_flags |=IOMAP_IOEND_UNWRITTEN ; +break ; +case IOMAP_MAPPED : +break ;case IOMAP_HOLE :return map_len;default : -break ; +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +return -EIO ; } -if (wpc->iomap.type ==IOMAP_UNWRITTEN ) - ioend_flags |=IOMAP_IOEND_UNWRITTEN ;if (wpc->iomap.flags &IOMAP_F_SHARED ) ioend_flags |=IOMAP_IOEND_SHARED ;if (folio_test_dropbehind (folio))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/333 ice: reintroduce retry mechanism for indirect AQ
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Staniszewski <[email protected]>
commit 326256c0a72d4877cec1d4df85357da106233128 upstream.
Add retry mechanism for indirect Admin Queue (AQ) commands. To do so we need to keep the command buffer.
This technically reverts commit 43a630e37e25
("ice: remove unused buffer copy code in ice_sq_send_cmd_retry()"), but combines it with a fix in the logic by using a kmemdup() call, making it more robust and less likely to break in the future due to programmer error.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c +9 -3
@@ -1879,6 +1879,7 @@ ice_sq_send_cmd_retry(struct ice_hw *hw, {struct libie_aq_desc desc_cpy;bool is_cmd_for_retry; +u8 *buf_cpy =NULL ;u8 idx =0 ;u16 opcode;int status;
@@ -1888,8 +1889,11 @@ ice_sq_send_cmd_retry(struct ice_hw *hw,memset (&desc_cpy,0 ,sizeof (desc_cpy));if (is_cmd_for_retry) { -/* All retryable cmds are direct, without buf. */ -WARN_ON (buf); +if (buf) { + buf_cpy =kmemdup (buf, buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buf_cpy) +return -ENOMEM ; + }memcpy (&desc_cpy, desc,sizeof (desc_cpy)); }
@@ -1901,12 +1905,14 @@ ice_sq_send_cmd_retry(struct ice_hw *hw, hw->adminq.sq_last_status != LIBIE_AQ_RC_EBUSY) break; +if (buf_cpy) +memcpy (buf, buf_cpy, buf_size);memcpy (desc, &desc_cpy,sizeof (desc_cpy)); -msleep (ICE_SQ_SEND_DELAY_TIME_MS ); }while (++idx <ICE_SQ_SEND_MAX_EXECUTE ); +kfree (buf_cpy);return status; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/333 kunit: irq: Ensure timer doesnt fire too frequently
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 201ceb94aa1def0024a7c18ce643e5f65026be06 upstream.
Fix a bug where kunit_run_irq_test() could hang if the system is too slow. This was noticed with the crypto library tests in certain VMs.
Specifically, if kunit_irq_test_timer_func() and the associated hrtimer code took over 5us to run, then the CPU would spend all its time executing that code in hardirq context. As a result, the task executing kunit_run_irq_test() never had a chance to run, exit the loop, and cancel the timer.
To fix it, make kunit_irq_test_timer_func() increase the timer interval when the other contexts aren't having a chance to run.
--- include/kunit/run-in-irq-context.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/kunit/run-in-irq-context.h +28 -16
@@ -12,16 +12,16 @@#include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> -#define KUNIT_IRQ_TEST_HRTIMER_INTERVAL us_to_ktime(5) -struct kunit_irq_test_state {bool (*func)(void *test_specific_state);void *test_specific_state;bool task_func_reported_failure;bool hardirq_func_reported_failure;bool softirq_func_reported_failure; +atomic_t task_func_calls;atomic_t hardirq_func_calls;atomic_t softirq_func_calls; +ktime_t interval;struct hrtimer timer;struct work_struct bh_work; };
@@ -30,14 +30,25 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart kunit_irq_test_timer_func(struct hrtimer *timer) {struct kunit_irq_test_state *state =container_of (timer,typeof (*state), timer); +int task_calls, hardirq_calls, softirq_calls;WARN_ON_ONCE (!in_hardirq ()); -atomic_inc (&state->hardirq_func_calls); + task_calls =atomic_read (&state->task_func_calls); + hardirq_calls =atomic_inc_return (&state->hardirq_func_calls); + softirq_calls =atomic_read (&state->softirq_func_calls); + +/* +* If the timer is firing too often for the softirq or task to ever have +* a chance to run, increase the timer interval. This is needed on very +* slow systems. +*/ +if (hardirq_calls >=20 && (softirq_calls ==0 || task_calls ==0 )) + state->interval =ktime_add_ns (state->interval,250 );if (!state->func (state->test_specific_state)) state->hardirq_func_reported_failure = true; -hrtimer_forward_now (&state->timer,KUNIT_IRQ_TEST_HRTIMER_INTERVAL ); +hrtimer_forward_now (&state->timer, state->interval);queue_work (system_bh_wq, &state->bh_work);return HRTIMER_RESTART ; }
@@ -86,10 +97,14 @@ static inline void kunit_run_irq_test(struct kunit *test, bool (*func)(void *),struct kunit_irq_test_state state = { .func = func, .test_specific_state = test_specific_state, +/* +* Start with a 5us timer interval. If the system can't keep +* up, kunit_irq_test_timer_func() will increase it. +*/ + .interval =us_to_ktime (5 ), };unsigned long end_jiffies; -int hardirq_calls, softirq_calls; -bool allctx = false; +int task_calls, hardirq_calls, softirq_calls;/* * Set up a hrtimer (the way we access hardirq context) and a work
@@ -104,21 +119,18 @@ static inline void kunit_run_irq_test(struct kunit *test, bool (*func)(void *),* and hardirq), or 1 second, whichever comes first. */ end_jiffies = jiffies +HZ ; -hrtimer_start (&state.timer,KUNIT_IRQ_TEST_HRTIMER_INTERVAL , -HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD ); -for (int task_calls =0 , calls =0 ; - ((calls < max_iterations) || !allctx) && - !time_after (jiffies, end_jiffies); - task_calls++) { +hrtimer_start (&state.timer, state.interval,HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD ); +do {if (!func (test_specific_state)) state.task_func_reported_failure = true; + task_calls =atomic_inc_return (&state.task_func_calls); hardirq_calls =atomic_read (&state.hardirq_func_calls); softirq_calls =atomic_read (&state.softirq_func_calls); - calls = task_calls + hardirq_calls + softirq_calls; - allctx = (task_calls >0 ) && (hardirq_calls >0 ) && - (softirq_calls >0 ); - } + }while ((task_calls + hardirq_calls + softirq_calls < max_iterations || + (task_calls ==0 || hardirq_calls ==0 || + softirq_calls ==0 )) && + !time_after (jiffies, end_jiffies));/* Cancel the timer and work. */ hrtimer_cancel (&state.timer);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/333 ixgbevf: fix link setup issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jedrzej Jagielski <[email protected]>
commit feae40a6a178bb525a15f19288016e5778102a99 upstream.
It may happen that VF spawned for E610 adapter has problem with setting link up. This happens when ixgbevf supporting mailbox API 1.6 cooperates with PF driver which doesn't support this version of API, and hence doesn't support new approach for getting PF link data.
In that case VF asks PF to provide link data but as PF doesn't support it, returns -EOPNOTSUPP what leads to early bail from link configuration sequence.
Avoid such situation by using legacy VFLINKS approach whenever negotiated API version is less than 1.6.
To reproduce the issue just create VF and set its link up - adapter must be any from the E610 family, ixgbevf must support API 1.6 or higher while ixgbevf must not.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c +2 -1
@@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ static s32 ixgbevf_check_mac_link_vf(strif (!mac->get_link_status) goto out; -if (hw->mac.type == ixgbe_mac_e610_vf) { +if (hw->mac.type == ixgbe_mac_e610_vf && + hw->api_version >= ixgbe_mbox_api_16) { ret_val =ixgbevf_get_pf_link_state (hw, speed, link_up);if (ret_val) goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/333 mm/damon/core: clear walk_control on inactive context in damos_walk()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raul Pazemecxas De Andrade <[email protected]>
commit d210fdcac9c0d1380eab448aebc93f602c1cd4e6 upstream.
damos_walk() sets ctx->walk_control to the caller-provided control structure before checking whether the context is running. If the context is inactive (damon_is_running() returns false), the function returns -EINVAL without clearing ctx->walk_control. This leaves a dangling pointer to a stack-allocated structure that will be freed when the caller returns.
This is structurally identical to the bug fixed in commit f9132fbc2e83 ("mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts") for damon_call(), which had the same pattern of linking a control object and returning an error without unlinking it.
The dangling walk_control pointer can cause:
1. Use-after-free if the context is later started and kdamond dereferences ctx->walk_control (e.g., in damos_walk_cancel() which writes to control->canceled and calls complete())
2. Permanent -EBUSY from subsequent damos_walk() calls, since the stale pointer is non-NULL
Nonetheless, the real user impact is quite restrictive. The use-after-free is impossible because there is no damos_walk() callers who starts the context later. The permanent -EBUSY can actually confuse users, as DAMON is not running. But the symptom is kept only while the context is turned off. Turning it on again will make DAMON internally uses a newly generated damon_ctx object that doesn't have the invalid damos_walk_control pointer, so everything will work fine again.
Fix this by clearing ctx->walk_control under walk_control_lock before returning -EINVAL, mirroring the fix pattern from f9132fbc2e83.
--- mm/damon/core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/damon/core.c +6 -1
@@ -1526,8 +1526,13 @@ int damos_walk(struct damon_ctx *ctx, st } ctx->walk_control = control;mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); -if (!damon_is_running (ctx)) +if (!damon_is_running (ctx)) { +mutex_lock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); +if (ctx->walk_control == control) + ctx->walk_control =NULL ; +mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock);return -EINVAL ; + }wait_for_completion (&control->completion);if (control->canceled)return -ECANCELED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/333 mm/slab: fix an incorrect check in obj_exts_alloc_size()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Yoo <[email protected]>
commit 8dafa9f5900c4855a65dbfee51e3bd00636deee1 upstream.
obj_exts_alloc_size() prevents recursive allocation of slabobj_ext array from the same cache, to avoid creating slabs that are never freed.
There is one mistake that returns the original size when memory allocation profiling is disabled. The assumption was that memcg-triggered slabobj_ext allocation is always served from KMALLOC_CGROUP type. But this is wrong [1]: when the caller specifies both __GFP_RECLAIMABLE and __GFP_ACCOUNT with SLUB_TINY enabled, the allocation is served from normal kmalloc. This is because kmalloc_type() prioritizes __GFP_RECLAIMABLE over __GFP_ACCOUNT, and SLUB_TINY aliases KMALLOC_RECLAIM with KMALLOC_NORMAL.
As a result, the recursion guard is bypassed and the problematic slabs can be created. Fix this by removing the mem_alloc_profiling_enabled() check entirely. The remaining is_kmalloc_normal() check is still sufficient to detect whether the cache is of KMALLOC_NORMAL type and avoid bumping the size if it's not.
Without SLUB_TINY, no functional change intended.
With SLUB_TINY, allocations with __GFP_ACCOUNT|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE now allocate a larger array if the sizes equal.
--- mm/slub.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +0 -7
@@ -2113,13 +2113,6 @@ static inline size_t obj_exts_alloc_sizesize_t sz =sizeof (struct slabobj_ext ) * slab->objects;struct kmem_cache *obj_exts_cache; -/* -* slabobj_ext array for KMALLOC_CGROUP allocations -* are served from KMALLOC_NORMAL caches. -*/ -if (!mem_alloc_profiling_enabled ()) -return sz; -if (sz >KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE )return sz;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/333 staging: sm750fb: add missing pci_release_region on error and removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Artem Lytkin <[email protected]>
commit 8225489ddb900656cc21573b4e1b00c9181fd777 upstream.
hw_sm750_map() calls pci_request_region() but never releases the region on error paths or in lynxfb_pci_remove(). This causes a resource leak that prevents the PCI region from being mapped again after driver removal or a failed probe. A TODO comment in the code acknowledges this missing cleanup.
Restructure the error handling in hw_sm750_map() to properly release the PCI region on ioremap failures, and add pci_release_region() to lynxfb_pci_remove().
--- drivers/staging/sm750fb/sm750.c | 1 + drivers/staging/sm750fb/sm750_hw.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/sm750fb/sm750.c +1 -0
@@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ static void lynxfb_pci_remove(struct pciiounmap (sm750_dev->pvReg);iounmap (sm750_dev->pvMem); +pci_release_region (pdev,1 );kfree (g_settings); }
drivers/staging/sm750fb/sm750_hw.c +11 -11
@@ -36,16 +36,11 @@ int hw_sm750_map(struct sm750_dev *sm750pr_info ("mmio phyAddr = %lx\n" , sm750_dev->vidreg_start); -/* -* reserve the vidreg space of smi adaptor -* if you do this, you need to add release region code -* in lynxfb_remove, or memory will not be mapped again -* successfully -*/ +/* reserve the vidreg space of smi adaptor */ ret =pci_request_region (pdev,1 ,"sm750fb" );if (ret) {pr_err ("Can not request PCI regions.\n" ); - goto exit; +return ret; }/* now map mmio and vidmem */
@@ -54,7 +49,7 @@ int hw_sm750_map(struct sm750_dev *sm750if (!sm750_dev->pvReg) {pr_err ("mmio failed\n" ); ret = -EFAULT ; - goto exit; + goto err_release_region; }pr_info ("mmio virtual addr = %p\n" , sm750_dev->pvReg);
@@ -79,13 +74,18 @@ int hw_sm750_map(struct sm750_dev *sm750 sm750_dev->pvMem =ioremap_wc (sm750_dev->vidmem_start, sm750_dev->vidmem_size);if (!sm750_dev->pvMem) { -iounmap (sm750_dev->pvReg);pr_err ("Map video memory failed\n" ); ret = -EFAULT ; - goto exit; + goto err_unmap_reg; }pr_info ("video memory vaddr = %p\n" , sm750_dev->pvMem); -exit: + +return 0 ; + +err_unmap_reg: +iounmap (sm750_dev->pvReg); +err_release_region: +pci_release_region (pdev,1 );return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/333 staging: rtl8723bs: properly validate the data in rtw_get_ie_ex()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit f0109b9d3e1e455429279d602f6276e34689750a upstream.
Just like in commit 154828bf9559 ("staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds read in rtw_get_ie() parser"), we don't trust the data in the frame so we should check the length better before acting on it
--- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +10 -5
@@ -187,20 +187,25 @@ u8 *rtw_get_ie_ex(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len cnt =0 ; -while (cnt < in_len) { +while (cnt +2 <= in_len) { +u8 ie_len = in_ie[cnt +1 ]; + +if (cnt +2 + ie_len > in_len) +break ; +if (eid == in_ie[cnt] - && (!oui || !memcmp (&in_ie[cnt+2 ], oui, oui_len))) { + && (!oui || (ie_len >= oui_len && !memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +2 ], oui, oui_len)))) { target_ie = &in_ie[cnt];if (ie) -memcpy (ie, &in_ie[cnt], in_ie[cnt+1 ]+2 ); +memcpy (ie, &in_ie[cnt], ie_len +2 );if (ielen) - *ielen = in_ie[cnt+1 ]+2 ; + *ielen = ie_len +2 ;break ; } - cnt += in_ie[cnt+1 ]+2 ;/* goto next */ + cnt += ie_len +2 ;/* goto next */ }return target_ie;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/333 staging: rtl8723bs: fix potential out-of-bounds read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luka Gejak <[email protected]>
commit a75281626fc8fa6dc6c9cc314ee423e8bc45203b upstream.
The current code checks 'i + 5 < in_len' at the end of the if statement. However, it accesses 'in_ie[i + 5]' before that check, which can lead to an out-of-bounds read. Move the length check to the beginning of the conditional to ensure the index is within bounds before accessing the array.
--- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme.c +4 -1
@@ -2008,7 +2008,10 @@ int rtw_restruct_wmm_ie(struct adapter *while (i < in_len) { ielength = initial_out_len; -if (in_ie[i] ==0xDD && in_ie[i+2 ] ==0x00 && in_ie[i+3 ] ==0x50 && in_ie[i+4 ] ==0xF2 && in_ie[i+5 ] ==0x02 && i+5 < in_len) {/* WMM element ID and OUI */ +if (i +5 < in_len && + in_ie[i] ==0xDD && in_ie[i +2 ] ==0x00 && + in_ie[i +3 ] ==0x50 && in_ie[i +4 ] ==0xF2 && + in_ie[i +5 ] ==0x02 ) {for (j = i; j < i +9 ; j++) { out_ie[ielength] = in_ie[j]; ielength++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/333 pinctrl: cy8c95x0: Dont miss reading the last bank registers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit b6c3af46c26f2d07c10a1452adc34b821719327e upstream.
When code had been changed to use for_each_set_clump8(), it mistakenly switched from chip->nport to chip->tpin since the cy8c9540 and cy8c9560 have a 4-pin gap. This, in particular, led to the missed read of the last bank interrupt status register and hence missing interrupts on those pins. Restore the upper limit in for_each_set_clump8() to take into consideration that gap.
--- drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-cy8c95x0.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-cy8c95x0.c +2 -2
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static int cy8c95x0_write_regs_mask(strubitmap_scatter (tmask, mask, chip->map,MAX_LINE );bitmap_scatter (tval, val, chip->map,MAX_LINE ); -for_each_set_clump8 (offset, bits, tmask, chip->tpin) { +for_each_set_clump8 (offset, bits, tmask, chip->nport *BANK_SZ ) {unsigned int i = offset /8 ; write_val =bitmap_get_value8 (tval, offset);
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static int cy8c95x0_read_regs_mask(strucbitmap_scatter (tmask, mask, chip->map,MAX_LINE );bitmap_scatter (tval, val, chip->map,MAX_LINE ); -for_each_set_clump8 (offset, bits, tmask, chip->tpin) { +for_each_set_clump8 (offset, bits, tmask, chip->nport *BANK_SZ ) {unsigned int i = offset /8 ; ret =cy8c95x0_regmap_read_bits (chip, reg, i, bits, &read_val);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/333 selftests: fix mntns iteration selftests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
commit 4c7b2ec23cc5d880e3ffe35e8c2aad686b67723a upstream.
Now that we changed permission checking make sure that we reflect that in the selftests.
--- tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/nsfs/iterate_mntns.c | 25 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/nsfs/iterate_mntns.c +15 -10
@@ -37,17 +37,20 @@ FIXTURE(iterate_mount_namespaces) {__u64 mnt_ns_id[MNT_NS_COUNT ]; }; +static inline bool mntns_in_list (__u64 *mnt_ns_id,struct mnt_ns_info *info) +{ +for (int i =0 ; i <MNT_NS_COUNT ; i++) { +if (mnt_ns_id[i] == info->mnt_ns_id) +return true; + } +return false; +} +FIXTURE_SETUP (iterate_mount_namespaces) {for (int i =0 ; i <MNT_NS_COUNT ; i++) self->fd_mnt_ns[i] = -EBADF ; -/* -* Creating a new user namespace let's us guarantee that we only see -* mount namespaces that we did actually create. -*/ -ASSERT_EQ (unshare (CLONE_NEWUSER ),0 ); -for (int i =0 ; i <MNT_NS_COUNT ; i++) {struct mnt_ns_info info = {};
@@ -75,13 +78,15 @@ TEST_F(iterate_mount_namespaces, iterate fd_mnt_ns_cur =fcntl (self->fd_mnt_ns[0 ],F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC );ASSERT_GE (fd_mnt_ns_cur,0 ); -for (;; count++) { +for (;;) {struct mnt_ns_info info = {};int fd_mnt_ns_next; fd_mnt_ns_next =ioctl (fd_mnt_ns_cur,NS_MNT_GET_NEXT , &info);if (fd_mnt_ns_next <0 && errno ==ENOENT )break ; +if (mntns_in_list (self->mnt_ns_id, &info)) + count++;ASSERT_GE (fd_mnt_ns_next,0 );ASSERT_EQ (close (fd_mnt_ns_cur),0 ); fd_mnt_ns_cur = fd_mnt_ns_next;
@@ -96,13 +101,15 @@ TEST_F(iterate_mount_namespaces, iterate fd_mnt_ns_cur =fcntl (self->fd_mnt_ns[MNT_NS_LAST_INDEX ],F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC );ASSERT_GE (fd_mnt_ns_cur,0 ); -for (;; count++) { +for (;;) {struct mnt_ns_info info = {};int fd_mnt_ns_prev; fd_mnt_ns_prev =ioctl (fd_mnt_ns_cur,NS_MNT_GET_PREV , &info);if (fd_mnt_ns_prev <0 && errno ==ENOENT )break ; +if (mntns_in_list (self->mnt_ns_id, &info)) + count++;ASSERT_GE (fd_mnt_ns_prev,0 );ASSERT_EQ (close (fd_mnt_ns_cur),0 ); fd_mnt_ns_cur = fd_mnt_ns_prev;
@@ -125,7 +132,6 @@ TEST_F(iterate_mount_namespaces, iterateASSERT_GE (fd_mnt_ns_next,0 );ASSERT_EQ (close (fd_mnt_ns_cur),0 ); fd_mnt_ns_cur = fd_mnt_ns_next; -ASSERT_EQ (info.mnt_ns_id, self->mnt_ns_id[i]); } }
@@ -144,7 +150,6 @@ TEST_F(iterate_mount_namespaces, iterateASSERT_GE (fd_mnt_ns_prev,0 );ASSERT_EQ (close (fd_mnt_ns_cur),0 ); fd_mnt_ns_cur = fd_mnt_ns_prev; -ASSERT_EQ (info.mnt_ns_id, self->mnt_ns_id[i]); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/333 media: dvb-net: fix OOB access in ULE extension header tables
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ariel Silver <[email protected]>
commit 24d87712727a5017ad142d63940589a36cd25647 upstream.
The ule_mandatory_ext_handlers[] and ule_optional_ext_handlers[] tables in handle_one_ule_extension() are declared with 255 elements (valid indices 0-254), but the index htype is derived from network-controlled data as (ule_sndu_type & 0x00FF), giving a range of 0-255. When htype equals 255, an out-of-bounds read occurs on the function pointer table, and the OOB value may be called as a function pointer.
Add a bounds check on htype against the array size before either table is accessed. Out-of-range values now cause the SNDU to be discarded.
--- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c +3 -0
@@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ static int handle_one_ule_extension( strunsigned char hlen = (p->ule_sndu_type &0x0700 ) >>8 ;unsigned char htype = p->ule_sndu_type &0x00FF ; +if (htype >=ARRAY_SIZE (ule_mandatory_ext_handlers)) +return -1 ; +/* Discriminate mandatory and optional extension headers. */ if (hlen ==0 ) {/* Mandatory extension header */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 216/333 net: mana: Ring doorbell at 4 CQ wraparounds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Long Li <[email protected]>
commit dabffd08545ffa1d7183bc45e387860984025291 upstream.
MANA hardware requires at least one doorbell ring every 8 wraparounds of the CQ. The driver rings the doorbell as a form of flow control to inform hardware that CQEs have been consumed.
The NAPI poll functions mana_poll_tx_cq() and mana_poll_rx_cq() can poll up to CQE_POLLING_BUFFER (512) completions per call. If the CQ has fewer than 512 entries, a single poll call can process more than 4 wraparounds without ringing the doorbell. The doorbell threshold check also uses ">" instead of ">=", delaying the ring by one extra CQE beyond 4 wraparounds. Combined, these issues can cause the driver to exceed the 8-wraparound hardware limit, leading to missed completions and stalled queues.
Fix this by capping the number of CQEs polled per call to 4 wraparounds of the CQ in both TX and RX paths. Also change the doorbell threshold from ">" to ">=" so the doorbell is rung as soon as 4 wraparounds are reached.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c +18 -5
@@ -1645,8 +1645,14 @@ static void mana_poll_tx_cq(struct mana_ ndev = txq->ndev; apc =netdev_priv (ndev); +/* Limit CQEs polled to 4 wraparounds of the CQ to ensure the +* doorbell can be rung in time for the hardware's requirement +* of at least one doorbell ring every 8 wraparounds. +*/ comp_read =mana_gd_poll_cq (cq->gdma_cq, completions, -CQE_POLLING_BUFFER ); +min ((cq->gdma_cq->queue_size / +COMP_ENTRY_SIZE ) *4 , +CQE_POLLING_BUFFER ));if (comp_read <1 )return ;
@@ -2031,7 +2037,14 @@ static void mana_poll_rx_cq(struct mana_struct mana_rxq *rxq = cq->rxq;int comp_read, i; - comp_read =mana_gd_poll_cq (cq->gdma_cq, comp,CQE_POLLING_BUFFER ); +/* Limit CQEs polled to 4 wraparounds of the CQ to ensure the +* doorbell can be rung in time for the hardware's requirement +* of at least one doorbell ring every 8 wraparounds. +*/ + comp_read =mana_gd_poll_cq (cq->gdma_cq, comp, +min ((cq->gdma_cq->queue_size / +COMP_ENTRY_SIZE ) *4 , +CQE_POLLING_BUFFER ));WARN_ON_ONCE (comp_read >CQE_POLLING_BUFFER ); rxq->xdp_flush = false;
@@ -2076,11 +2089,11 @@ static int mana_cq_handler(void *contextmana_gd_ring_cq (gdma_queue,SET_ARM_BIT ); cq->work_done_since_doorbell =0 ;napi_complete_done (&cq->napi, w); - }else if (cq->work_done_since_doorbell > - cq->gdma_cq->queue_size /COMP_ENTRY_SIZE *4 ) { + }else if (cq->work_done_since_doorbell >= + (cq->gdma_cq->queue_size /COMP_ENTRY_SIZE ) *4 ) {/* MANA hardware requires at least one doorbell ring every 8 * wraparounds of CQ even if there is no need to arm the CQ. -* This driver rings the doorbell as soon as we have exceeded +* This driver rings the doorbell as soon as it has processed * 4 wraparounds. */ mana_gd_ring_cq (gdma_queue,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 217/333 ice: fix retry for AQ command 0x06EE
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Staniszewski <[email protected]>
commit fb4903b3354aed4a2301180cf991226f896c87ed upstream.
Executing ethtool -m can fail reporting a netlink I/O error while firmware link management holds the i2c bus used to communicate with the module.
According to Intel(R) Ethernet Controller E810 Datasheet Rev 2.8 [1] Section 3.3.10.4 Read/Write SFF EEPROM (0x06EE)
request should to be retried upon receiving EBUSY from firmware.
Commit e9c9692c8a81 ("ice: Reimplement module reads used by ethtool") implemented it only for part of ice_get_module_eeprom(), leaving all other calls to ice_aq_sff_eeprom() vulnerable to returning early on getting EBUSY without retrying.
Remove the retry loop from ice_get_module_eeprom() and add Admin Queue (AQ) command with opcode 0x06EE to the list of commands that should be retried on receiving EBUSY from firmware.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c | 1 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 35 ++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_common.c +1 -0
@@ -1854,6 +1854,7 @@ static bool ice_should_retry_sq_send_cmdcase ice_aqc_opc_lldp_stop:case ice_aqc_opc_lldp_start:case ice_aqc_opc_lldp_filter_ctrl: +case ice_aqc_opc_sff_eeprom:return true; }
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c +14 -21
@@ -4495,7 +4495,7 @@ ice_get_module_eeprom(struct net_devicestruct ice_pf *pf = vsi->back;struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw;bool is_sfp = false; -unsigned int i, j; +unsigned int i;u16 offset =0 ;u8 page =0 ;int status;
@@ -4537,26 +4537,19 @@ ice_get_module_eeprom(struct net_deviceif (page ==0 || !(data[0x2 ] &0x4 )) {u32 copy_len; -/* If i2c bus is busy due to slow page change or -* link management access, call can fail. This is normal. -* So we retry this a few times. -*/ -for (j =0 ; j <4 ; j++) { - status =ice_aq_sff_eeprom (hw,0 , addr, offset, page, - !is_sfp, value, -SFF_READ_BLOCK_SIZE , -0 ,NULL ); -netdev_dbg (netdev,"SFF %02X %02X %02X %X = %02X%02X%02X%02X.%02X%02X%02X%02X (%X)\n" , - addr, offset, page, is_sfp, - value[0 ], value[1 ], value[2 ], value[3 ], - value[4 ], value[5 ], value[6 ], value[7 ], - status); -if (status) { -usleep_range (1500 ,2500 ); -memset (value,0 ,SFF_READ_BLOCK_SIZE ); -continue ; - } -break ; + status =ice_aq_sff_eeprom (hw,0 , addr, offset, page, + !is_sfp, value, +SFF_READ_BLOCK_SIZE , +0 ,NULL ); +netdev_dbg (netdev,"SFF %02X %02X %02X %X = %02X%02X%02X%02X.%02X%02X%02X%02X (%pe)\n" , + addr, offset, page, is_sfp, + value[0 ], value[1 ], value[2 ], value[3 ], + value[4 ], value[5 ], value[6 ], value[7 ], +ERR_PTR (status)); +if (status) { +netdev_err (netdev,"%s: error reading module EEPROM: status %pe\n" , + __func__,ERR_PTR (status)); +return status; }/* Make sure we have enough room for the new block */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 218/333 tracing: Fix syscall events activation by ensuring refcount hits zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Huiwen He <[email protected]>
commit 0a663b764dbdf135a126284f454c9f01f95a87d4 upstream.
When multiple syscall events are specified in the kernel command line (e.g., trace_event=syscalls:sys_enter_openat,syscalls:sys_enter_close), they are often not captured after boot, even though they appear enabled in the tracing/set_event file.
The issue stems from how syscall events are initialized. Syscall tracepoints require the global reference count (sys_tracepoint_refcount) to transition from 0 to 1 to trigger the registration of the syscall work (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT) for tasks, including the init process (pid 1).
The current implementation of early_enable_events() with disable_first=true used an interleaved sequence of "Disable A -> Enable A -> Disable B -> Enable B". If multiple syscalls are enabled, the refcount never drops to zero, preventing the 0->1 transition that triggers actual registration.
Fix this by splitting early_enable_events() into two distinct phases:
1. Disable all events specified in the buffer.
2. Enable all events specified in the buffer.
This ensures the refcount hits zero before re-enabling, allowing syscall events to be properly activated during early boot.
The code is also refactored to use a helper function to avoid logic duplication between the disable and enable phases.
--- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_events.c +37 -15
@@ -4513,26 +4513,22 @@ static __init int event_trace_memsetup(vreturn 0 ; } -__init void -early_enable_events (struct trace_array *tr,char *buf,bool disable_first) +/* +* Helper function to enable or disable a comma-separated list of events +* from the bootup buffer. +*/ +static __init void __early_set_events (struct trace_array *tr,char *buf,bool enable) {char *token; -int ret; - -while (true) { - token =strsep (&buf,"," ); - -if (!token) -break ; +while ((token =strsep (&buf,"," ))) {if (*token) { -/* Restarting syscalls requires that we stop them first */ -if (disable_first) +if (enable) { +if (ftrace_set_clr_event (tr, token,1 )) +pr_warn ("Failed to enable trace event: %s\n" , token); + }else {ftrace_set_clr_event (tr, token,0 ); - - ret =ftrace_set_clr_event (tr, token,1 ); -if (ret) -pr_warn ("Failed to enable trace event: %s\n" , token); + } }/* Put back the comma to allow this to be called again */
@@ -4541,6 +4537,32 @@ early_enable_events(struct trace_array * } } +/** +* early_enable_events - enable events from the bootup buffer +* @tr: The trace array to enable the events in +* @buf: The buffer containing the comma separated list of events +* @disable_first: If true, disable all events in @buf before enabling them +* +* This function enables events from the bootup buffer. If @disable_first +* is true, it will first disable all events in the buffer before enabling +* them. +* +* For syscall events, which rely on a global refcount to register the +* SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT flag (especially for pid 1), we must +* ensure the refcount hits zero before re-enabling them. A simple +* "disable then enable" per-event is not enough if multiple syscalls are +* used, as the refcount will stay above zero. Thus, we need a two-phase +* approach: disable all, then enable all. +*/ +__init void +early_enable_events (struct trace_array *tr,char *buf,bool disable_first) +{ +if (disable_first) +__early_set_events (tr, buf, false); + +__early_set_events (tr, buf, true); +} +static __init int event_trace_enable (void ) {struct trace_array *tr =top_trace_array ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 219/333 net/tcp-ao: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 67edfec516d30d3e62925c397be4a1e5185802fc upstream.
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this.
--- net/ipv4/Kconfig | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -748,6 +748,7 @@ config TCP_SIGPOOL config TCP_AO bool "TCP: Authentication Option (RFC5925)" select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS select TCP_SIGPOOL depends on 64BIT && IPV6 != m # seq-number extension needs WRITE_ONCE(u64) help
net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +2 -1
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#define pr_fmt (fmt) "TCP: " fmt#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/inetdevice.h> #include <linux/tcp.h>
@@ -922,7 +923,7 @@ tcp_ao_verify_hash(const struct sock *sk/* XXX: make it per-AF callback? */ tcp_ao_hash_skb (family, hash_buf, key, sk, skb, traffic_key, (phash - (u8 *)th), sne); -if (memcmp (phash, hash_buf, maclen)) { +if (crypto_memneq (phash, hash_buf, maclen)) {NET_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),LINUX_MIB_TCPAOBAD );atomic64_inc (&info->counters.pkt_bad);atomic64_inc (&key->pkt_bad);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 220/333 batman-adv: Avoid double-rtnl_lock ELP metric worker
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
commit cfc83a3c71517b59c1047db57da31e26a9dc2f33 upstream.
batadv_v_elp_get_throughput() might be called when the RTNL lock is already held. This could be problematic when the work queue item is cancelled via cancel_delayed_work_sync() in batadv_v_elp_iface_disable(). In this case, an rtnl_lock() would cause a deadlock.
To avoid this, rtnl_trylock() was used in this function to skip the retrieval of the ethtool information in case the RTNL lock was already held.
But for cfg80211 interfaces, batadv_get_real_netdev() was called - which also uses rtnl_lock(). The approach for __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() must also be used instead and the lockless version __batadv_get_real_netdev() has to be called.
--- net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c | 10 +++++++++- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 8 ++++---- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c +9 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,15 @@ static bool batadv_v_elp_get_throughput(/* unsupported WiFi driver version */ goto default_throughput; - real_netdev =batadv_get_real_netdev (hard_iface->net_dev); +/* only use rtnl_trylock because the elp worker will be cancelled while +* the rntl_lock is held. the cancel_delayed_work_sync() would otherwise +* wait forever when the elp work_item was started and it is then also +* trying to rtnl_lock +*/ +if (!rtnl_trylock ()) +return false; + real_netdev =__batadv_get_real_netdev (hard_iface->net_dev); +rtnl_unlock ();if (!real_netdev) goto default_throughput;
net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c +4 -4
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static bool batadv_is_valid_iface(const }/** -* batadv_get_real_netdevice() - check if the given netdev struct is a virtual +* __batadv_get_real_netdev() - check if the given netdev struct is a virtual * interface on top of another 'real' interface * @netdev: the device to check *
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static bool batadv_is_valid_iface(const* Return: the 'real' net device or the original net device and NULL in case * of an error. */ -static struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdevice (struct net_device *netdev) +struct net_device *__batadv_get_real_netdev (struct net_device *netdev) {struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface =NULL ;struct net_device *real_netdev =NULL ;
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdestruct net_device *real_netdev;rtnl_lock (); - real_netdev =batadv_get_real_netdevice (net_device); + real_netdev =__batadv_get_real_netdev (net_device);rtnl_unlock ();return real_netdev;
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static u32 batadv_wifi_flags_evaluate(stif (batadv_is_cfg80211_netdev (net_device)) wifi_flags |=BATADV_HARDIF_WIFI_CFG80211_DIRECT ; - real_netdev =batadv_get_real_netdevice (net_device); + real_netdev =__batadv_get_real_netdev (net_device);if (!real_netdev)return wifi_flags;
net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h +1 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum batadv_hard_if_bcast {extern struct notifier_block batadv_hard_if_notifier; +struct net_device *__batadv_get_real_netdev (struct net_device *net_device);struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdev (struct net_device *net_device);bool batadv_is_cfg80211_hardif (struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface);bool batadv_is_wifi_hardif (struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 221/333 drm/xe/xe2_hpg: Correct implementation of Wa_16025250150
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Roper <[email protected]>
commit 89865e6dc8487b627302bdced3f965cd0c406835 upstream.
Wa_16025250150 asks us to set five register fields of the register to 0x1 each. However we were just OR'ing this into the existing register value (which has a default of 0x4 for each nibble-sized field) resulting in final field values of 0x5 instead of the desired 0x1. Correct the RTP programming (use FIELD_SET instead of SET) to ensure each field is assigned to exactly the value we want.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_wa.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_wa.c +7 -6
@@ -255,12 +255,13 @@ static const struct xe_rtp_entry_sr gt_w {XE_RTP_NAME ("16025250150" ),XE_RTP_RULES (GRAPHICS_VERSION (2001 )), -XE_RTP_ACTIONS (SET (LSN_VC_REG2 , -LSN_LNI_WGT (1 ) | -LSN_LNE_WGT (1 ) | -LSN_DIM_X_WGT (1 ) | -LSN_DIM_Y_WGT (1 ) | -LSN_DIM_Z_WGT (1 ))) +XE_RTP_ACTIONS (FIELD_SET (LSN_VC_REG2 , +LSN_LNI_WGT_MASK |LSN_LNE_WGT_MASK | +LSN_DIM_X_WGT_MASK |LSN_DIM_Y_WGT_MASK | +LSN_DIM_Z_WGT_MASK , +LSN_LNI_WGT (1 ) |LSN_LNE_WGT (1 ) | +LSN_DIM_X_WGT (1 ) |LSN_DIM_Y_WGT (1 ) | +LSN_DIM_Z_WGT (1 ))) },/* Xe2_HPM */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 222/333 pmdomain: rockchip: Fix PD_VCODEC for RK3588
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
commit 0fb59eaca18f1254ecdce34354eec3cb1b3b5e10 upstream.
Quoted 1 line
From the RK3588 TRM Table 7-1 RK3588 Voltage Domain and Power Domain Summary,
PD_RKVDEC0/1 and PD_VENC0/1 rely on VD_VCODEC which require extra voltages to be applied, otherwise it breaks RK3588-evb1-v10 board after vdec support landed[1]. The panic looks like below:
rockchip-pm-domain fd8d8000.power-management:power-controller: failed to set domain 'rkvdec0' on, val=0 rockchip-pm-domain fd8d8000.power-management:power-controller: failed to set domain 'rkvdec1' on, val=0
...
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3588S EVB1 V10 Board (DT) Workqueue: pm genpd_power_off_work_fn Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 vpanic+0x1ec/0x4fc vpanic+0x0/0x4fc check_panic_on_warn+0x0/0x94 arm64_serror_panic+0x6c/0x78 do_serror+0xc4/0xcc el1h_64_error_handler+0x3c/0x5c el1h_64_error+0x6c/0x70 regmap_mmio_read32le+0x18/0x24 (P) regmap_bus_reg_read+0xfc/0x130 regmap_read+0x188/0x1ac regmap_read+0x54/0x78 rockchip_pd_power+0xcc/0x5f0 rockchip_pd_power_off+0x1c/0x4c genpd_power_off+0x84/0x120 genpd_power_off+0x1b4/0x260 genpd_power_off_work_fn+0x38/0x58 process_scheduled_works+0x194/0x2c4 worker_thread+0x2ac/0x3d8 kthread+0x104/0x124 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x3000000,000e0005,40230521,0400720b Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt ]---
Chaoyi pointed out the PD_VCODEC is the parent of PD_RKVDEC0/1 and PD_VENC0/1, so checking the PD_VCODEC is enough.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rockchip/[email protected]/
--- drivers/pmdomain/rockchip/pm-domains.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pmdomain/rockchip/pm-domains.c +1 -1
@@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ static const struct rockchip_domain_infostatic const struct rockchip_domain_info rk3588_pm_domains[] = { [RK3588_PD_GPU ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("gpu" ,0x0 ,BIT (0 ),0 ,0x0 ,0 ,BIT (1 ),0x0 ,BIT (0 ),BIT (0 ), false, true), [RK3588_PD_NPU ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("npu" ,0x0 ,BIT (1 ),BIT (1 ),0x0 ,0 ,0 ,0x0 ,0 ,0 , false, true), - [RK3588_PD_VCODEC ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("vcodec" ,0x0 ,BIT (2 ),BIT (2 ),0x0 ,0 ,0 ,0x0 ,0 ,0 , false, false), + [RK3588_PD_VCODEC ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("vcodec" ,0x0 ,BIT (2 ),BIT (2 ),0x0 ,0 ,0 ,0x0 ,0 ,0 , false, true), [RK3588_PD_NPUTOP ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("nputop" ,0x0 ,BIT (3 ),0 ,0x0 ,BIT (11 ),BIT (2 ),0x0 ,BIT (1 ),BIT (1 ), false, false), [RK3588_PD_NPU1 ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("npu1" ,0x0 ,BIT (4 ),0 ,0x0 ,BIT (12 ),BIT (3 ),0x0 ,BIT (2 ),BIT (2 ), false, false), [RK3588_PD_NPU2 ] =DOMAIN_RK3588 ("npu2" ,0x0 ,BIT (5 ),0 ,0x0 ,BIT (13 ),BIT (4 ),0x0 ,BIT (3 ),BIT (3 ), false, false),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 223/333 parisc: Increase initial mapping to 64 MB with KALLSYMS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 8e732934fb81282be41602550e7e07baf265e972 upstream.
The 32MB initial kernel mapping can become too small when CONFIG_KALLSYMS is used. Increase the mapping to 64 MB in this case.
--- arch/parisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ extern void __update_cache(pte_t pte);printk ("%s:%d: bad pgd %08lx.\n" , __FILE__, __LINE__, (unsigned long )pgd_val (e)) /* This is the size of the initially mapped kernel memory */ -#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT ) +#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT ) || defined(CONFIG_KALLSYMS )#define KERNEL_INITIAL_ORDER 26/* 1<<26 = 64MB */ #else #define KERNEL_INITIAL_ORDER 25/* 1<<25 = 32MB */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 224/333 nouveau/dpcd: return EBUSY for aux xfer if the device is asleep
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
commit 8f3c6f08ababad2e3bdd239728cf66a9949446b4 upstream.
If we have runtime suspended, and userspace wants to use /dev/drm_dp_* then just tell it the device is busy instead of crashing in the GSP code.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 565741 at drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/gsp/rm/r535/rpc.c:164 r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0x9a/0xb0 [nouveau] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 565741 Comm: fwupd Not tainted 6.18.10-200.fc43.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: LENOVO 20QTS0PQ00/20QTS0PQ00, BIOS N2OET65W (1.52 ) 08/05/2024 RIP: 0010:r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0x9a/0xb0 [nouveau]
This is a simple fix to get backported. We should probably engineer a proper power domain solution to wake up devices and keep them awake while fw updates are happening.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c +3 -0
@@ -1230,6 +1230,9 @@ nouveau_connector_aux_xfer(struct drm_dpu8 size = msg->size;int ret; +if (pm_runtime_suspended (nv_connector->base.dev->dev)) +return -EBUSY ; + nv_encoder =find_encoder (&nv_connector->base,DCB_OUTPUT_DP );if (!nv_encoder)return -ENODEV ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 225/333 arm64: mm: Add PTE_DIRTY back to PAGE_KERNEL* to fix kexec/hibernation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
commit c25c4aa3f79a488cc270507935a29c07dc6bddfc upstream.
Commit 143937ca51cc ("arm64, mm: avoid always making PTE dirty in pte_mkwrite()") changed pte_mkwrite_novma() to only clear PTE_RDONLY when PTE_DIRTY is set. This was to allow writable-clean PTEs for swap pages that haven't actually been written.
However, this broke kexec and hibernation for some platforms. Both go through trans_pgd_create_copy() -> _copy_pte(), which calls pte_mkwrite_novma() to make the temporary linear-map copy fully writable. With the updated pte_mkwrite_novma(), read-only kernel pages (without PTE_DIRTY) remain read-only in the temporary mapping. While such behaviour is fine for user pages where hardware DBM or trapping will make them writeable, subsequent in-kernel writes by the kexec relocation code will fault.
Add PTE_DIRTY back to all _PAGE_KERNEL* protection definitions. This was the case prior to 5.4, commit aa57157be69f ("arm64: Ensure VM_WRITE|VM_SHARED ptes are clean by default"). With the kernel linear-map PTEs always having PTE_DIRTY set, pte_mkwrite_novma() correctly clears PTE_RDONLY.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h +5 -5
@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@#define _PAGE_DEFAULT (_PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL)) -#define _PAGE_KERNEL (PROT_NORMAL) -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RO ((PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_WRITE) | PTE_RDONLY) -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX ((PROT_NORMAL & ~(PTE_WRITE | PTE_PXN)) | PTE_RDONLY) -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC (PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_PXN) -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_CONT ((PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_PXN) | PTE_CONT) +#define _PAGE_KERNEL (PROT_NORMAL | PTE_DIRTY) +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RO ((PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_WRITE) | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_DIRTY) +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX ((PROT_NORMAL & ~(PTE_WRITE | PTE_PXN)) | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_DIRTY) +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC ((PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_PXN) | PTE_DIRTY) +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_CONT ((PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_PXN) | PTE_CONT | PTE_DIRTY)#define _PAGE_SHARED (_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE)#define _PAGE_SHARED_EXEC (_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 226/333 hwmon: (pmbus/q54sj108a2) fix stack overflow in debugfs read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>
commit 25dd70a03b1f5f3aa71e1a5091ecd9cd2a13ee43 upstream.
The q54sj108a2_debugfs_read function suffers from a stack buffer overflow due to incorrect arguments passed to bin2hex(). The function currently passes 'data' as the destination and 'data_char' as the source.
Because bin2hex() converts each input byte into two hex characters, a 32-byte block read results in 64 bytes of output. Since 'data' is only 34 bytes (I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2), this writes 30 bytes past the end of the buffer onto the stack.
Additionally, the arguments were swapped: it was reading from the zero-initialized 'data_char' and writing to 'data', resulting in all-zero output regardless of the actual I2C read.
Fix this by:
1. Expanding 'data_char' to 66 bytes to safely hold the hex output.
2. Correcting the bin2hex() argument order and using the actual read count.
3. Using a pointer to select the correct output buffer for the final simple_read_from_buffer call.
--- drivers/hwmon/pmbus/q54sj108a2.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/pmbus/q54sj108a2.c +10 -9
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static ssize_t q54sj108a2_debugfs_read(sint idx = *idxp;struct q54sj108a2_data *psu =to_psu (idxp, idx);char data[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX +2 ] = {0 }; -char data_char[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX +2 ] = {0 }; +char data_char[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX *2 +2 ] = {0 }; +char *out = data;char *res;switch (idx) {
@@ -149,27 +150,27 @@ static ssize_t q54sj108a2_debugfs_read(sif (rc <0 )return rc; - res =bin2hex (data, data_char,32 ); - rc = res - data; - + res =bin2hex (data_char, data, rc); + rc = res - data_char; + out = data_char;break ;case Q54SJ108A2_DEBUGFS_FLASH_KEY : rc =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (psu->client,PMBUS_FLASH_KEY_WRITE , data);if (rc <0 )return rc; - res =bin2hex (data, data_char,4 ); - rc = res - data; - + res =bin2hex (data_char, data, rc); + rc = res - data_char; + out = data_char;break ;default :return -EINVAL ; } - data[rc] ='\n' ; + out[rc] ='\n' ; rc +=2 ; -return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, data, rc); +return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, out, rc); } static ssize_t q54sj108a2_debugfs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 227/333 io_uring/zcrx: use READ_ONCE with user shared RQEs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
commit 531bb98a030cc1073bd7ed9a502c0a3a781e92ee upstream.
Refill queue entries are shared with the user space, use READ_ONCE when reading them.
--- io_uring/zcrx.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
io_uring/zcrx.c +3 -2
@@ -767,11 +767,12 @@ static inline bool io_parse_rqe(struct istruct io_zcrx_ifq *ifq, struct net_iov **ret_niov) { + __u64 off = READ_ONCE(rqe->off);unsigned niov_idx, area_idx;struct io_zcrx_area *area; - area_idx = rqe->off >>IORING_ZCRX_AREA_SHIFT ; - niov_idx = (rqe->off & ~IORING_ZCRX_AREA_MASK ) >> ifq->niov_shift; + area_idx = off >>IORING_ZCRX_AREA_SHIFT ; + niov_idx = (off & ~IORING_ZCRX_AREA_MASK ) >> ifq->niov_shift;if (unlikely (rqe->__pad || area_idx))return false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 228/333 parisc: Fix initial page table creation for boot
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 8475d8fe21ec9c7eb2faca555fbc5b68cf0d2597 upstream.
The KERNEL_INITIAL_ORDER value defines the initial size (usually 32 or 64 MB) of the page table during bootup. Up until now the whole area was initialized with PTE entries, but there was no check if we filled too many entries. Change the code to fill up with so many entries that the "_end" symbol can be reached by the kernel, but not more entries than actually fit into the initial PTE tables.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/head.S | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/head.S +6 -1
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ ENTRY(parisc_kernel_start) .import __bss_start,data .import __bss_stop,data + .import __end,data load32 PA(__bss_start),%r3 load32 PA(__bss_stop),%r4
@@ -149,7 +150,11 @@ $cpu_ok: * everything ... it will get remapped correctly later */ ldo 0+_PAGE_KERNEL_RWX(%r0),%r3 /* Hardwired 0 phys addr start */ load32 (1<<(KERNEL_INITIAL_ORDER-PAGE_SHIFT)),%r11 /* PFN count */ - load32 PA(pg0),%r1 + load32 PA(_end),%r1 + SHRREG %r1,PAGE_SHIFT,%r1 /* %r1 is PFN count for _end symbol */ + cmpb,<<,n %r11,%r1,1f + copy %r1,%r11 /* %r1 PFN count smaller than %r11 */ +1: load32 PA(pg0),%r1 $pgt_fill_loop: STREGM %r3,ASM_PTE_ENTRY_SIZE(%r1)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 229/333 arm64: contpte: fix set_access_flags() no-op check for SMMU/ATS faults
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Piotr Jaroszynski <[email protected]>
commit 97c5550b763171dbef61e6239cab372b9f9cd4a2 upstream.
contpte_ptep_set_access_flags() compared the gathered ptep_get() value against the requested entry to detect no-ops. ptep_get() ORs AF/dirty from all sub-PTEs in the CONT block, so a dirty sibling can make the target appear already-dirty. When the gathered value matches entry, the function returns 0 even though the target sub-PTE still has PTE_RDONLY set in hardware.
For a CPU with FEAT_HAFDBS this gathered view is fine, since hardware may set AF/dirty on any sub-PTE and CPU TLB behavior is effectively gathered across the CONT range. But page-table walkers that evaluate each descriptor individually (e.g. a CPU without DBM support, or an SMMU without HTTU, or with HA/HD disabled in CD.TCR) can keep faulting on the unchanged target sub-PTE, causing an infinite fault loop.
Gathering can therefore cause false no-ops when only a sibling has been updated:
- write faults: target still has PTE_RDONLY (needs PTE_RDONLY cleared)
- read faults: target still lacks PTE_AF
Fix by checking each sub-PTE against the requested AF/dirty/write state (the same bits consumed by __ptep_set_access_flags()), using raw per-PTE values rather than the gathered ptep_get() view, before returning no-op. Keep using the raw target PTE for the write-bit unfold decision.
Per Arm ARM (DDI 0487) D8.7.1 ("The Contiguous bit"), any sub-PTE in a CONT range may become the effective cached translation and software must maintain consistent attributes across the range.
--- arch/arm64/mm/contpte.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/contpte.c +49 -4
@@ -581,6 +581,27 @@ void contpte_clear_young_dirty_ptes(stru }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (contpte_clear_young_dirty_ptes); +static bool contpte_all_subptes_match_access_flags (pte_t *ptep,pte_t entry) +{ +pte_t *cont_ptep =contpte_align_down (ptep); +/* +* PFNs differ per sub-PTE. Match only bits consumed by +* __ptep_set_access_flags(): AF, DIRTY and write permission. +*/ +const pteval_t cmp_mask =PTE_RDONLY |PTE_AF |PTE_WRITE |PTE_DIRTY ; +pteval_t entry_cmp =pte_val (entry) & cmp_mask; +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <CONT_PTES ; i++) { +pteval_t pte_cmp =pte_val (__ptep_get (cont_ptep + i)) & cmp_mask; + +if (pte_cmp != entry_cmp) +return false; + } + +return true; +} +int contpte_ptep_set_access_flags (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long addr,pte_t *ptep,pte_t entry,int dirty)
@@ -590,14 +611,38 @@ int contpte_ptep_set_access_flags(structint i;/* -* Gather the access/dirty bits for the contiguous range. If nothing has -* changed, its a noop. +* Check whether all sub-PTEs in the CONT block already match the +* requested access flags/write permission, using raw per-PTE values +* rather than the gathered ptep_get() view. +* +* __ptep_set_access_flags() can update AF, dirty and write +* permission, but only to make the mapping more permissive. +* +* ptep_get() gathers AF/dirty state across the whole CONT block, +* which is correct for a CPU with FEAT_HAFDBS. But page-table +* walkers that evaluate each descriptor individually (e.g. a CPU +* without DBM support, or an SMMU without HTTU, or with HA/HD +* disabled in CD.TCR) can keep faulting on the target sub-PTE if +* only a sibling has been updated. Gathering can therefore cause +* false no-ops when only a sibling has been updated: +* - write faults: target still has PTE_RDONLY (needs PTE_RDONLY cleared) +* - read faults: target still lacks PTE_AF +* +* Per Arm ARM (DDI 0487) D8.7.1, any sub-PTE in a CONT range may +* become the effective cached translation, so all entries must have +* consistent attributes. Check the full CONT block before returning +* no-op, and when any sub-PTE mismatches, proceed to update the whole +* range. */ - orig_pte =pte_mknoncont (ptep_get (ptep)); -if (pte_val (orig_pte) ==pte_val (entry)) +if (contpte_all_subptes_match_access_flags (ptep, entry))return 0 ;/* +* Use raw target pte (not gathered) for write-bit unfold decision. +*/ + orig_pte =pte_mknoncont (__ptep_get (ptep)); + +/* * We can fix up access/dirty bits without having to unfold the contig * range. But if the write bit is changing, we must unfold. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 230/333 parisc: Check kernel mapping earlier at bootup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 17c144f1104bfc29a3ce3f7d0931a1bfb7a3558c upstream.
The check if the initial mapping is sufficient needs to happen much earlier during bootup. Move this test directly to the start_parisc() function and use native PDC iodc functions to print the warning, because panic() and printk() are not functional yet.
This fixes boot when enabling various KALLSYSMS options which need much more space.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/setup.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/setup.c +12 -8
@@ -120,14 +120,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)#endif printk (KERN_CONT ".\n" ); -/* -* Check if initial kernel page mappings are sufficient. -* panic early if not, else we may access kernel functions -* and variables which can't be reached. -*/ -if (__pa ((unsigned long ) &_end) >=KERNEL_INITIAL_SIZE ) -panic ("KERNEL_INITIAL_ORDER too small!" ); -#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT if (parisc_narrow_firmware) {printk (KERN_INFO "Kernel is using PDC in 32-bit mode.\n" );
@@ -279,6 +271,18 @@ void __init start_parisc(void)int ret, cpunum;struct pdc_coproc_cfg coproc_cfg; +/* +* Check if initial kernel page mapping is sufficient. +* Print warning if not, because we may access kernel functions and +* variables which can't be reached yet through the initial mappings. +* Note that the panic() and printk() functions are not functional +* yet, so we need to use direct iodc() firmware calls instead. +*/ +const char warn1[] ="CRITICAL: Kernel may crash because " +"KERNEL_INITIAL_ORDER is too small.\n" ; +if (__pa ((unsigned long ) &_end) >=KERNEL_INITIAL_SIZE ) +pdc_iodc_print (warn1,sizeof (warn1) -1 ); +/* check QEMU/SeaBIOS marker in PAGE0 */ running_on_qemu = (memcmp (&PAGE0 ->pad0,"SeaBIOS" ,8 ) ==0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 231/333 io_uring/net: reject SEND_VECTORIZED when unsupported
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
commit c36e28becd0586ac98318fd335e5e91d19cd2623 upstream.
IORING_SEND_VECTORIZED with registered buffers is not implemented but could be. Don't silently ignore the flag in this case but reject it with an error. It only affects sendzc as normal sends don't support registered buffers.
--- io_uring/net.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
io_uring/net.c +2 -0
@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ static int io_send_setup(struct io_kiocb kmsg->msg.msg_namelen = addr_len; }if (sr->flags &IORING_RECVSEND_FIXED_BUF ) { +if (sr->flags &IORING_SEND_VECTORIZED ) +return -EINVAL ; req->flags |=REQ_F_IMPORT_BUFFER ;return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 232/333 regulator: pf9453: Respect IRQ trigger settings from firmware
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>
commit 2d85ecd6fb0eb2fee0ffa040ec1ddea57b09bc38 upstream.
The datasheet specifies, that the IRQ_B pin is pulled low when any unmasked interrupt bit status is changed, and it is released high once the application processor reads the INT1 register. As it specifies a level-low behavior, it should not force a falling-edge interrupt.
Remove the IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING to not force the falling-edge interrupt and instead rely on the flag from the device tree.
--- drivers/regulator/pf9453-regulator.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/regulator/pf9453-regulator.c +1 -1
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ static int pf9453_i2c_probe(struct i2c_c } ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (pf9453->dev, pf9453->irq,NULL , pf9453_irq_handler, - (IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING |IRQF_ONESHOT ), +IRQF_ONESHOT ,"pf9453-irq" , pf9453);if (ret)return dev_err_probe (pf9453->dev, ret,"Failed to request IRQ: %d\n" , pf9453->irq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 233/333 pmdomain: bcm: bcm2835-power: Fix broken reset status read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>
commit 550bae2c0931dbb664a61b08c21cf156f0a5362a upstream.
bcm2835_reset_status() has a misplaced parenthesis on every PM_READ() call. Since PM_READ(reg) expands to readl(power->base + (reg)), the expression:
PM_READ(PM_GRAFX & PM_V3DRSTN)
computes the bitwise AND of the register offset PM_GRAFX with the bitmask PM_V3DRSTN before using the result as a register offset, reading from the wrong MMIO address instead of the intended PM_GRAFX register. The same issue affects the PM_IMAGE cases.
Fix by moving the closing parenthesis so PM_READ() receives only the register offset, and the bitmask is applied to the value returned by the read.
--- drivers/pmdomain/bcm/bcm2835-power.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/pmdomain/bcm/bcm2835-power.c +3 -3
@@ -573,11 +573,11 @@ static int bcm2835_reset_status(struct rswitch (id) {case BCM2835_RESET_V3D : -return !PM_READ (PM_GRAFX &PM_V3DRSTN ); +return !(PM_READ (PM_GRAFX ) &PM_V3DRSTN );case BCM2835_RESET_H264 : -return !PM_READ (PM_IMAGE &PM_H264RSTN ); +return !(PM_READ (PM_IMAGE ) &PM_H264RSTN );case BCM2835_RESET_ISP : -return !PM_READ (PM_IMAGE &PM_ISPRSTN ); +return !(PM_READ (PM_IMAGE ) &PM_ISPRSTN );default :return -EINVAL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 234/333 crypto: ccp - allow callers to use HV-Fixed page API when SEV is disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
commit 8168a7b72bdee3790b126f63bd30306759206b15 upstream.
When SEV is disabled, the HV-Fixed page allocation call fails, which in turn causes SFS initialization to fail.
Fix the HV-Fixed API so callers (for example, SFS) can use it even when SEV is disabled by performing normal page allocation and freeing.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +4 -6
@@ -1109,15 +1109,12 @@ struct page *snp_alloc_hv_fixed_pages(un {struct psp_device *psp_master =psp_get_master_device ();struct snp_hv_fixed_pages_entry *entry; -struct sev_device *sev;unsigned int order;struct page *page; -if (!psp_master || !psp_master->sev_data) +if (!psp_master)return NULL ; - sev = psp_master->sev_data; - order =get_order (PMD_SIZE * num_2mb_pages);/*
@@ -1130,7 +1127,8 @@ struct page *snp_alloc_hv_fixed_pages(un* This API uses SNP_INIT_EX to transition allocated pages to HV_Fixed * page state, fail if SNP is already initialized. */ -if (sev->snp_initialized) +if (psp_master->sev_data && + ((struct sev_device *)psp_master->sev_data)->snp_initialized)return NULL ;/* Re-use freed pages that match the request */
@@ -1166,7 +1164,7 @@ void snp_free_hv_fixed_pages(struct pagestruct psp_device *psp_master =psp_get_master_device ();struct snp_hv_fixed_pages_entry *entry, *nentry; -if (!psp_master || !psp_master->sev_data) +if (!psp_master)return ;/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 235/333 s390/stackleak: Fix __stackleak_poison() inline assembly constraint
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
commit 674c5ff0f440a051ebf299d29a4c013133d81a65 upstream.
The __stackleak_poison() inline assembly comes with a "count" operand where the "d" constraint is used. "count" is used with the exrl instruction and "d" means that the compiler may allocate any register from 0 to 15.
If the compiler would allocate register 0 then the exrl instruction would not or the value of "count" into the executed instruction - resulting in a stackframe which is only partially poisoned.
Use the correct "a" constraint, which excludes register 0 from register allocation.
--- arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_" j 4f\n" "3: mvc 8(1,%[addr]),0(%[addr])\n" "4:" - : [addr] "+&a" (erase_low), [count] "+&d" (count), [tmp] "=&a" (tmp) + : [addr] "+&a" (erase_low), [count] "+&a" (count), [tmp] "=&a" (tmp) : [poison] "d" (poison) : "memory", "cc" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 236/333 ata: libata-core: Disable LPM on ST1000DM010-2EP102
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maximilian Pezzullo <[email protected]>
commit b3b1d3ae1d87bc9398fb715c945968bf4c75a09a upstream.
According to a user report, the ST1000DM010-2EP102 has problems with LPM, causing random system freezes. The drive belongs to the same BarraCuda family as the ST2000DM008-2FR102 which has the same issue.
--- drivers/ata/libata-core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/ata/libata-core.c +1 -0
@@ -4157,6 +4157,7 @@ static const struct ata_dev_quirks_entry ATA_QUIRK_FIRMWARE_WARN },/* Seagate disks with LPM issues */ + { "ST1000DM010-2EP102", NULL, ATA_QUIRK_NOLPM }, { "ST2000DM008-2FR102", NULL, ATA_QUIRK_NOLPM },/* drives which fail FPDMA_AA activation (some may freeze afterwards)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 237/333 s390/xor: Fix xor_xc_2() inline assembly constraints
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
commit f775276edc0c505dc0f782773796c189f31a1123 upstream.
The inline assembly constraints for xor_xc_2() are incorrect. "bytes", "p1", and "p2" are input operands, while all three of them are modified within the inline assembly. Given that the function consists only of this inline assembly it seems unlikely that this may cause any problems, however fix this in any case.
--- arch/s390/lib/xor.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/lib/xor.c +2 -2
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static void xor_xc_2(unsigned long bytes" j 3f\n" "2: xc 0(1,%1),0(%2)\n" "3:" - : : "d" (bytes), "a" (p1), "a" (p2) - : "0", "cc", "memory"); + : "+d" (bytes), "+a" (p1), "+a" (p2) + : : "0", "cc", "memory"); } static void xor_xc_3(unsigned long bytes, unsigned long * __restrict p1,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 238/333 drm/amd/display: Fallback to boot snapshot for dispclk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dillon Varone <[email protected]>
commit 30d937f63bd19bbcaafa4b892eb251f8bbbf04ef upstream.
[WHY & HOW]
If the dentist is unavailable, fallback to reading CLKIP via the boot snapshot to get the current dispclk.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c +5 -1
@@ -68,7 +68,11 @@ void dcn401_initialize_min_clocks(struct* audio corruption. Read current DISPCLK from DENTIST and request the same * freq to ensure that the timing is valid and unchanged. */ - clocks->dispclk_khz = dc->clk_mgr->funcs->get_dispclk_from_dentist (dc->clk_mgr); +if (dc->clk_mgr->funcs->get_dispclk_from_dentist) { + clocks->dispclk_khz = dc->clk_mgr->funcs->get_dispclk_from_dentist (dc->clk_mgr); + }else { + clocks->dispclk_khz = dc->clk_mgr->boot_snapshot.dispclk *1000 ; + } } clocks->ref_dtbclk_khz = dc->clk_mgr->bw_params->clk_table.entries[0 ].dtbclk_mhz *1000 ; clocks->fclk_p_state_change_support = true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 239/333 s390/xor: Fix xor_xc_5() inline assembly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
commit 5f25805303e201f3afaff0a90f7c7ce257468704 upstream.
xor_xc_5() contains a larl 1,2f that is not used by the asm and is not declared as a clobber. This can corrupt a compiler-allocated value in %r1 and lead to miscompilation. Remove the instruction.
--- arch/s390/lib/xor.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/lib/xor.c +0 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ static void xor_xc_5(unsigned long bytes const unsigned long * __restrict p5) { asmvolatile ( -" larl 1,2f\n" " aghi %0,-1\n" " jm 6f\n" " srlg 0,%0,8\n"
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 240/333 slab: distinguish lock and trylock for sheaf_flush_main()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
commit 48647d3f9a644d1e81af6558102d43cdb260597b upstream.
sheaf_flush_main() can be called from __pcs_replace_full_main() where it's fine if the trylock fails, and pcs_flush_all() where it's not expected to and for some flush callers (when destroying the cache or memory hotremove) it would be actually a problem if it failed and left the main sheaf not flushed. The flush callers can however safely use local_lock() instead of trylock.
The trylock failure should not happen in practice on !PREEMPT_RT, but can happen on PREEMPT_RT. The impact is limited in practice because when a trylock fails in the kmem_cache_destroy() path, it means someone is using the cache while destroying it, which is a bug on its own. The memory hotremove path is unlikely to be employed in a production RT config, but it's possible.
To fix this, split the function into sheaf_flush_main() (using local_lock()) and sheaf_try_flush_main() (using local_trylock()) where both call __sheaf_flush_main_batch() to flush a single batch of objects. This will also allow lockdep to verify our context assumptions.
The problem was raised in an off-list question by Marcelo.
--- mm/slub.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +37 -10
@@ -2713,19 +2713,19 @@ static void __kmem_cache_free_bulk(struc* object pointers are moved to a on-stack array under the lock. To bound the * stack usage, limit each batch to PCS_BATCH_MAX. * -* returns true if at least partially flushed +* Must be called with s->cpu_sheaves->lock locked, returns with the lock +* unlocked. +* +* Returns how many objects are remaining to be flushed */ -static bool sheaf_flush_main (struct kmem_cache *s) +static unsigned int __sheaf_flush_main_batch (struct kmem_cache *s) {struct slub_percpu_sheaves *pcs;unsigned int batch, remaining;void *objects[PCS_BATCH_MAX ];struct slab_sheaf *sheaf; -bool ret = false; -next_batch: -if (!local_trylock (&s->cpu_sheaves->lock)) -return ret; +lockdep_assert_held (this_cpu_ptr (&s->cpu_sheaves->lock)); pcs =this_cpu_ptr (s->cpu_sheaves); sheaf = pcs->main;
@@ -2743,10 +2743,37 @@ next_batch:stat_add (s,SHEAF_FLUSH , batch); - ret = true; +return remaining; +} -if (remaining) - goto next_batch; +static void sheaf_flush_main (struct kmem_cache *s) +{ +unsigned int remaining; + +do { +local_lock (&s->cpu_sheaves->lock); + + remaining =__sheaf_flush_main_batch (s); + + }while (remaining); +} + +/* +* Returns true if the main sheaf was at least partially flushed. +*/ +static bool sheaf_try_flush_main (struct kmem_cache *s) +{ +unsigned int remaining; +bool ret = false; + +do { +if (!local_trylock (&s->cpu_sheaves->lock)) +return ret; + + ret = true; + remaining =__sheaf_flush_main_batch (s); + + }while (remaining);return ret; }
@@ -6140,7 +6167,7 @@ alloc_empty:if (put_fail)stat (s,BARN_PUT_FAIL ); -if (!sheaf_flush_main (s)) +if (!sheaf_try_flush_main (s))return NULL ;if (!local_trylock (&s->cpu_sheaves->lock))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 241/333 memcg: fix slab accounting in refill_obj_stock() trylock path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hao Li <[email protected]>
commit dccd5ee2625d50239510bcd73ed78559005e00a3 upstream.
In the trylock path of refill_obj_stock(), mod_objcg_mlstate() should use the real alloc/free bytes (i.e., nr_acct) for accounting, rather than nr_bytes.
The user-visible impact is that the NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE_B and NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B stats can end up being incorrect.
For example, if a user allocates a 6144-byte object, then before this fix efill_obj_stock() calls mod_objcg_mlstate(..., nr_bytes=2048), even though it should account for 6144 bytes (i.e., nr_acct).
When the user later frees the same object with kfree(), refill_obj_stock() calls mod_objcg_mlstate(..., nr_bytes=6144). This ends up adding 6144 to the stats, but it should be applying -6144 (i.e., nr_acct) since the object is being freed.
--- mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/memcontrol.c +1 -1
@@ -3028,7 +3028,7 @@ static void refill_obj_stock(struct obj_if (!local_trylock (&obj_stock.lock)) {if (pgdat) -mod_objcg_mlstate (objcg, pgdat, idx, nr_bytes); +mod_objcg_mlstate (objcg, pgdat, idx, nr_acct); nr_pages = nr_bytes >>PAGE_SHIFT ; nr_bytes = nr_bytes & (PAGE_SIZE -1 );atomic_add (nr_bytes, &objcg->nr_charged_bytes);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 242/333 ksmbd: fix use-after-free in smb_lazy_parent_lease_break_close()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit eac3361e3d5dd8067b3258c69615888eb45e9f25 upstream.
opinfo pointer obtained via rcu_dereference(fp->f_opinfo) is being accessed after rcu_read_unlock() has been called. This creates a race condition where the memory could be freed by a concurrent writer between the unlock and the subsequent pointer dereferences (opinfo->is_lease, etc.), leading to a use-after-free.
--- fs/smb/server/oplock.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/oplock.c +4 -2
@@ -1123,10 +1123,12 @@ void smb_lazy_parent_lease_break_close(srcu_read_lock (); opinfo =rcu_dereference (fp->f_opinfo); -rcu_read_unlock (); -if (!opinfo || !opinfo->is_lease || opinfo->o_lease->version !=2 ) +if (!opinfo || !opinfo->is_lease || opinfo->o_lease->version !=2 ) { +rcu_read_unlock ();return ; + } +rcu_read_unlock (); p_ci =ksmbd_inode_lookup_lock (fp->filp->f_path.dentry->d_parent);if (!p_ci)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 243/333 smb: server: fix use-after-free in smb2_open()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marios Makassikis <[email protected]>
commit 1e689a56173827669a35da7cb2a3c78ed5c53680 upstream.
The opinfo pointer obtained via rcu_dereference(fp->f_opinfo) is dereferenced after rcu_read_unlock(), creating a use-after-free window.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +2 -3
@@ -3625,10 +3625,8 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) reconnected_fp: rsp->StructureSize =cpu_to_le16 (89 ); -rcu_read_lock (); - opinfo =rcu_dereference (fp->f_opinfo); + opinfo =opinfo_get (fp); rsp->OplockLevel = opinfo !=NULL ? opinfo->level :0 ; -rcu_read_unlock (); rsp->Flags =0 ; rsp->CreateAction =cpu_to_le32 (file_info); rsp->CreationTime =cpu_to_le64 (fp->create_time);
@@ -3669,6 +3667,7 @@ reconnected_fp: next_ptr = &lease_ccontext->Next; next_off = conn->vals->create_lease_size; } +opinfo_put (opinfo);if (maximal_access_ctxt) {struct create_context *mxac_ccontext;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 244/333 ksmbd: fix use-after-free by using call_rcu() for oplock_info
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 1dfd062caa165ec9d7ee0823087930f3ab8a6294 upstream.
ksmbd currently frees oplock_info immediately using kfree(), even though it is accessed under RCU read-side critical sections in places like opinfo_get() and proc_show_files().
Since there is no RCU grace period delay between nullifying the pointer and freeing the memory, a reader can still access oplock_info structure after it has been freed. This can leads to a use-after-free especially in opinfo_get() where atomic_inc_not_zero() is called on already freed memory.
Fix this by switching to deferred freeing using call_rcu().
--- fs/smb/server/oplock.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/smb/server/oplock.h | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/oplock.c +21 -8
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static void free_lease(struct oplock_infkfree (lease); } -static void free_opinfo (struct oplock_info *opinfo) +static void __free_opinfo (struct oplock_info *opinfo) {if (opinfo->is_lease)free_lease (opinfo);
@@ -129,6 +129,18 @@ static void free_opinfo(struct oplock_inkfree (opinfo); } +static void free_opinfo_rcu (struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct oplock_info *opinfo = container_of(rcu, struct oplock_info, rcu); + +__free_opinfo (opinfo); +} + +static void free_opinfo (struct oplock_info *opinfo) +{ +call_rcu (&opinfo->rcu, free_opinfo_rcu); +} +struct oplock_info *opinfo_get (struct ksmbd_file *fp) {struct oplock_info *opinfo;
@@ -176,9 +188,9 @@ void opinfo_put(struct oplock_info *opinfree_opinfo (opinfo); } -static void opinfo_add (struct oplock_info *opinfo) +static void opinfo_add (struct oplock_info *opinfo,struct ksmbd_file *fp) { -struct ksmbd_inode *ci = opinfo->o_fp->f_ci; +struct ksmbd_inode *ci = fp->f_ci;down_write (&ci->m_lock);list_add (&opinfo->op_entry, &ci->m_op_list);
@@ -1279,20 +1291,21 @@ set_lev:set_oplock_level (opinfo, req_op_level, lctx); out: -rcu_assign_pointer (fp->f_opinfo, opinfo); - opinfo->o_fp = fp; -opinfo_count_inc (fp); -opinfo_add (opinfo); +opinfo_add (opinfo, fp); +if (opinfo->is_lease) { err =add_lease_global_list (opinfo);if (err) goto err_out; } +rcu_assign_pointer (fp->f_opinfo, opinfo); + opinfo->o_fp = fp; +return 0 ; err_out: -free_opinfo (opinfo); +__free_opinfo (opinfo);return err; }
fs/smb/server/oplock.h +3 -2
@@ -69,8 +69,9 @@ struct oplock_info {struct lease *o_lease;struct list_head op_entry;struct list_head lease_entry; -wait_queue_head_t oplock_q;/* Other server threads */ -wait_queue_head_t oplock_brk;/* oplock breaking wait */ +wait_queue_head_t oplock_q;/* Other server threads */ +wait_queue_head_t oplock_brk;/* oplock breaking wait */ +struct rcu_head rcu; };struct lease_break_info {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 245/333 net: mctp: fix device leak on probe failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 224a0d284c3caf1951302d1744a714784febed71 upstream.
Driver core holds a reference to the USB interface and its parent USB device while the interface is bound to a driver and there is no need to take additional references unless the structures are needed after disconnect.
This driver takes a reference to the USB device during probe but does not to release it on probe failures.
Drop the redundant device reference to fix the leak, reduce cargo culting, make it easier to spot drivers where an extra reference is needed, and reduce the risk of further memory leaks.
--- drivers/net/mctp/mctp-usb.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/mctp/mctp-usb.c +1 -2
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int mctp_usb_probe(struct usb_intSET_NETDEV_DEV (netdev, &intf->dev); dev =netdev_priv (netdev); dev->netdev = netdev; - dev->usbdev =usb_get_dev (interface_to_usbdev (intf)); + dev->usbdev =interface_to_usbdev (intf); dev->intf = intf;usb_set_intfdata (intf, dev);
@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ static void mctp_usb_disconnect(struct umctp_unregister_netdev (dev->netdev);usb_free_urb (dev->tx_urb);usb_free_urb (dev->rx_urb); -usb_put_dev (dev->usbdev);free_netdev (dev->netdev); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 246/333 net: nexthop: fix percpu use-after-free in remove_nh_grp_entry
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mehul Rao <[email protected]>
commit b2662e7593e94ae09b1cf7ee5f09160a3612bcb2 upstream.
When removing a nexthop from a group, remove_nh_grp_entry() publishes the new group via rcu_assign_pointer() then immediately frees the removed entry's percpu stats with free_percpu(). However, the synchronize_net() grace period in the caller remove_nexthop_from_groups() runs after the free. RCU readers that entered before the publish still see the old group and can dereference the freed stats via nh_grp_entry_stats_inc() -> get_cpu_ptr(nhge->stats), causing a use-after-free on percpu memory.
Fix by deferring the free_percpu() until after synchronize_net() in the caller. Removed entries are chained via nh_list onto a local deferred free list. After the grace period completes and all RCU readers have finished, the percpu stats are safely freed.
--- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/nexthop.c +11 -3
@@ -2005,7 +2005,8 @@ static void nh_hthr_group_rebalance(stru }static void remove_nh_grp_entry (struct net *net,struct nh_grp_entry *nhge, -struct nl_info *nlinfo) +struct nl_info *nlinfo, +struct list_head *deferred_free) {struct nh_grp_entry *nhges, *new_nhges;struct nexthop *nhp = nhge->nh_parent;
@@ -2065,8 +2066,8 @@ static void remove_nh_grp_entry(struct nrcu_assign_pointer (nhp->nh_grp, newg);list_del (&nhge->nh_list); -free_percpu (nhge->stats);nexthop_put (nhge->nh); +list_add (&nhge->nh_list, deferred_free);/* Removal of a NH from a resilient group is notified through * bucket notifications.
@@ -2086,6 +2087,7 @@ static void remove_nexthop_from_groups(s struct nl_info *nlinfo) {struct nh_grp_entry *nhge, *tmp; +LIST_HEAD (deferred_free);/* If there is nothing to do, let's avoid the costly call to * synchronize_net()
@@ -2094,10 +2096,16 @@ static void remove_nexthop_from_groups(sreturn ;list_for_each_entry_safe (nhge, tmp, &nh->grp_list, nh_list) -remove_nh_grp_entry (net, nhge, nlinfo); +remove_nh_grp_entry (net, nhge, nlinfo, &deferred_free);/* make sure all see the newly published array before releasing rtnl */ synchronize_net (); + +/* Now safe to free percpu stats — all RCU readers have finished */ +list_for_each_entry_safe (nhge, tmp, &deferred_free, nh_list) { +list_del (&nhge->nh_list); +free_percpu (nhge->stats); + } }static void remove_nexthop_group (struct nexthop *nh,struct nl_info *nlinfo)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 247/333 net: ncsi: fix skb leak in error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jian Zhang <[email protected]>
commit 5c3398a54266541610c8d0a7082e654e9ff3e259 upstream.
Early return paths in NCSI RX and AEN handlers fail to release the received skb, resulting in a memory leak.
Specifically, ncsi_aen_handler() returns on invalid AEN packets without consuming the skb. Similarly, ncsi_rcv_rsp() exits early when failing to resolve the NCSI device, response handler, or request, leaving the skb unfreed.
--- net/ncsi/ncsi-aen.c | 3 ++- net/ncsi/ncsi-rsp.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ncsi/ncsi-aen.c +2 -1
@@ -224,7 +224,8 @@ int ncsi_aen_handler(struct ncsi_dev_priif (!nah) {netdev_warn (ndp->ndev.dev,"Invalid AEN (0x%x) received\n" , h->type); -return -ENOENT ; + ret = -ENOENT ; + goto out; } ret =ncsi_validate_aen_pkt (h, nah->payload);
net/ncsi/ncsi-rsp.c +12 -4
@@ -1176,8 +1176,10 @@ int ncsi_rcv_rsp(struct sk_buff *skb, st/* Find the NCSI device */ nd =ncsi_find_dev (orig_dev); ndp = nd ?TO_NCSI_DEV_PRIV (nd) :NULL ; -if (!ndp) -return -ENODEV ; +if (!ndp) { + ret = -ENODEV ; + goto err_free_skb; + }/* Check if it is AEN packet */ hdr = (struct ncsi_pkt_hdr *)skb_network_header (skb);
@@ -1199,7 +1201,8 @@ int ncsi_rcv_rsp(struct sk_buff *skb, stif (!nrh) {netdev_err (nd->dev,"Received unrecognized packet (0x%x)\n" , hdr->type); -return -ENOENT ; + ret = -ENOENT ; + goto err_free_skb; }/* Associate with the request */
@@ -1207,7 +1210,8 @@ int ncsi_rcv_rsp(struct sk_buff *skb, st nr = &ndp->requests[hdr->id];if (!nr->used) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ndp->lock, flags); -return -ENODEV ; + ret = -ENODEV ; + goto err_free_skb; } nr->rsp = skb;
@@ -1261,4 +1265,8 @@ out_netlink: out:ncsi_free_request (nr);return ret; + +err_free_skb: +kfree_skb (skb); +return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 248/333 net: ethernet: arc: emac: quiesce interrupts before requesting IRQ
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>
commit 2503d08f8a2de618e5c3a8183b250ff4a2e2d52c upstream.
Normal RX/TX interrupts are enabled later, in arc_emac_open(), so probe should not see interrupt delivery in the usual case. However, hardware may still present stale or latched interrupt status left by firmware or the bootloader.
If probe later unwinds after devm_request_irq() has installed the handler, such a stale interrupt can still reach arc_emac_intr() during teardown and race with release of the associated net_device.
Avoid that window by putting the device into a known quiescent state before requesting the IRQ: disable all EMAC interrupt sources and clear any pending EMAC interrupt status bits. This keeps the change hardware-focused and minimal, while preventing spurious IRQ delivery from leftover state.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_main.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_main.c +11 -0
@@ -934,6 +934,17 @@ int arc_emac_probe(struct net_device *nd/* Set poll rate so that it polls every 1 ms */ arc_reg_set (priv,R_POLLRATE , clock_frequency /1000000 ); +/* +* Put the device into a known quiescent state before requesting +* the IRQ. Clear only EMAC interrupt status bits here; leave the +* MDIO completion bit alone and avoid writing TXPL_MASK, which is +* used to force TX polling rather than acknowledge interrupts. +*/ +arc_reg_set (priv,R_ENABLE ,0 ); +arc_reg_set (priv,R_STATUS ,RXINT_MASK |TXINT_MASK |ERR_MASK | +TXCH_MASK |MSER_MASK |RXCR_MASK | +RXFR_MASK |RXFL_MASK ); + ndev->irq = irq;dev_info (dev,"IRQ is %d\n" , ndev->irq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 249/333 net: dsa: microchip: Fix error path in PTP IRQ setup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bastien Curutchet (Schneider Electric) <[email protected]>
commit 99c8c16a4aad0b37293cae213e15957c573cf79b upstream.
If request_threaded_irq() fails during the PTP message IRQ setup, the newly created IRQ mapping is never disposed. Indeed, the ksz_ptp_irq_setup()'s error path only frees the mappings that were successfully set up.
Dispose the newly created mapping if the associated request_threaded_irq() fails at setup.
--- drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c +8 -3
@@ -1095,6 +1095,7 @@ static int ksz_ptp_msg_irq_setup(structconst struct ksz_dev_ops *ops = port->ksz_dev->dev_ops;struct ksz_irq *ptpirq = &port->ptpirq;struct ksz_ptp_irq *ptpmsg_irq; +int ret; ptpmsg_irq = &port->ptpmsg_irq[n]; ptpmsg_irq->num =irq_create_mapping (ptpirq->domain, n);
@@ -1106,9 +1107,13 @@ static int ksz_ptp_msg_irq_setup(structstrscpy (ptpmsg_irq->name, name[n]); -return request_threaded_irq (ptpmsg_irq->num,NULL , - ksz_ptp_msg_thread_fn,IRQF_ONESHOT , - ptpmsg_irq->name, ptpmsg_irq); + ret =request_threaded_irq (ptpmsg_irq->num,NULL , + ksz_ptp_msg_thread_fn,IRQF_ONESHOT , + ptpmsg_irq->name, ptpmsg_irq); +if (ret) +irq_dispose_mapping (ptpmsg_irq->num); + +return ret; }int ksz_ptp_irq_setup (struct dsa_switch *ds,u8 p)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 250/333 drm/amd/pm: remove invalid gpu_metrics.energy_accumulator on smu v13.0.x
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yang Wang <[email protected]>
commit 68785c5e79e0fc1eacf63026fbba32be3867f410 upstream.
v1:
The metrics->EnergyAccumulator field has been deprecated on newer pmfw.
v2:
add smu 13.0.0/13.0.7/13.0.10 support.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_0_ppt.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_7_ppt.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_0_ppt.c +7 -1
@@ -2109,6 +2109,7 @@ static ssize_t smu_v13_0_0_get_gpu_metri (struct gpu_metrics_v1_3 *)smu_table->gpu_metrics_table;SmuMetricsExternal_t metrics_ext;SmuMetrics_t *metrics = &metrics_ext.SmuMetrics; +uint32_t mp1_ver =amdgpu_ip_version (smu->adev,MP1_HWIP ,0 );int ret =0 ; ret = smu_cmn_get_metrics_table(smu,
@@ -2133,7 +2134,12 @@ static ssize_t smu_v13_0_0_get_gpu_metri metrics->Vcn1ActivityPercentage); gpu_metrics->average_socket_power = metrics->AverageSocketPower; - gpu_metrics->energy_accumulator = metrics->EnergyAccumulator; + +if ((mp1_ver ==IP_VERSION (13 ,0 ,0 ) && smu->smc_fw_version <=0x004e1e00 ) || + (mp1_ver ==IP_VERSION (13 ,0 ,10 ) && smu->smc_fw_version <=0x00500800 )) + gpu_metrics->energy_accumulator = metrics->EnergyAccumulator; +else + gpu_metrics->energy_accumulator =UINT_MAX ;if (metrics->AverageGfxActivity <=SMU_13_0_0_BUSY_THRESHOLD ) gpu_metrics->average_gfxclk_frequency = metrics->AverageGfxclkFrequencyPostDs;
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_7_ppt.c +2 -1
@@ -2119,7 +2119,8 @@ static ssize_t smu_v13_0_7_get_gpu_metri metrics->Vcn1ActivityPercentage); gpu_metrics->average_socket_power = metrics->AverageSocketPower; - gpu_metrics->energy_accumulator = metrics->EnergyAccumulator; + gpu_metrics->energy_accumulator = smu->smc_fw_version <=0x00521400 ? + metrics->EnergyAccumulator :UINT_MAX ;if (metrics->AverageGfxActivity <=SMU_13_0_7_BUSY_THRESHOLD ) gpu_metrics->average_gfxclk_frequency = metrics->AverageGfxclkFrequencyPostDs;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 251/333 drm/amdgpu: Fix use-after-free race in VM acquire
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alysa Liu <[email protected]>
commit 2c1030f2e84885cc58bffef6af67d5b9d2e7098f upstream.
Replace non-atomic vm->process_info assignment with cmpxchg() to prevent race when parent/child processes sharing a drm_file both try to acquire the same VM after fork().
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c +5 -1
@@ -1421,7 +1421,10 @@ static int init_kfd_vm(struct amdgpu_vm *process_info = info; } - vm->process_info = *process_info; +if (cmpxchg (&vm->process_info,NULL , *process_info) !=NULL ) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto already_acquired; + }/* Validate page directory and attach eviction fence */ ret =amdgpu_bo_reserve (vm->root.bo, true);
@@ -1461,6 +1464,7 @@ validate_pd_fail:amdgpu_bo_unreserve (vm->root.bo); reserve_pd_fail: vm->process_info =NULL ; +already_acquired:if (info) {dma_fence_put (&info->eviction_fence->base); *process_info =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 252/333 drm/amd: Set num IP blocks to 0 if discovery fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
commit 3646ff28780b4c52c5b5081443199e7a430110e5 upstream.
If discovery has failed for any reason (such as no support for a block) then there is no need to unwind all the IP blocks in fini. In this condition there can actually be failures during the unwind too.
Reset num_ip_blocks to zero during failure path and skip the unnecessary cleanup path.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 4 +++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +3 -1
@@ -2814,8 +2814,10 @@ static int amdgpu_device_ip_early_init(sbreak ;default : r =amdgpu_discovery_set_ip_blocks (adev); -if (r) +if (r) { + adev->num_ip_blocks =0 ;return r; + }break ; }
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c +1 -1
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void amdgpu_driver_unload_kms(struct drm {struct amdgpu_device *adev =drm_to_adev (dev); -if (adev ==NULL ) +if (adev ==NULL || !adev->num_ip_blocks)return ;amdgpu_unregister_gpu_instance (adev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/333 drm/amd: Fix NULL pointer dereference in device cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
commit 062ea905fff7756b2e87143ffccaece5cdb44267 upstream.
When GPU initialization fails due to an unsupported HW block IP blocks may have a NULL version pointer. During cleanup in amdgpu_device_fini_hw, the code calls amdgpu_device_set_pg_state and amdgpu_device_set_cg_state which iterate over all IP blocks and access adev->ip_blocks[i].version without NULL checks, leading to a kernel NULL pointer dereference.
Add NULL checks for adev->ip_blocks[i].version in both amdgpu_device_set_cg_state and amdgpu_device_set_pg_state to prevent dereferencing NULL pointers during GPU teardown when initialization has failed.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +4 -0
@@ -3375,6 +3375,8 @@ int amdgpu_device_set_cg_state(struct am i = state ==AMD_CG_STATE_GATE ? j : adev->num_ip_blocks - j -1 ;if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].status.late_initialized)continue ; +if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version) +continue ;/* skip CG for GFX, SDMA on S0ix */ if (adev->in_s0ix && (adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type == AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_GFX ||
@@ -3414,6 +3416,8 @@ int amdgpu_device_set_pg_state(struct am i = state ==AMD_PG_STATE_GATE ? j : adev->num_ip_blocks - j -1 ;if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].status.late_initialized)continue ; +if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version) +continue ;/* skip PG for GFX, SDMA on S0ix */ if (adev->in_s0ix && (adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type == AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_GFX ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/333 drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi83: fix CHA_DSI_CLK_RANGE rounding
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luca Ceresoli <[email protected]>
commit 2f22702dc0fee06a240404e0f7ead5b789b253d8 upstream.
The DSI frequency must be in the range:
(CHA_DSI_CLK_RANGE * 5 MHz) <= DSI freq < ((CHA_DSI_CLK_RANGE + 1) * 5 MHz)
So the register value should point to the lower range value, but DIV_ROUND_UP() rounds the division to the higher range value, resulting in an excess of 1 (unless the frequency is an exact multiple of 5 MHz).
For example for a 437100000 MHz clock CHA_DSI_CLK_RANGE should be 87 (0x57):
(87 * 5 = 435) <= 437.1 < (88 * 5 = 440)
but current code returns 88 (0x58).
Fix the computation by removing the DIV_ROUND_UP().
--- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c +3 -3
@@ -351,9 +351,9 @@ static u8 sn65dsi83_get_dsi_range(struct* DSI_CLK = mode clock * bpp / dsi_data_lanes / 2 * the 2 is there because the bus is DDR. */ -return DIV_ROUND_UP (clamp ((unsigned int )mode->clock * -mipi_dsi_pixel_format_to_bpp (ctx->dsi->format) / - ctx->dsi->lanes /2 ,40000U ,500000U ),5000U ); +return clamp ((unsigned int )mode->clock * +mipi_dsi_pixel_format_to_bpp (ctx->dsi->format) / + ctx->dsi->lanes /2 ,40000U ,500000U ) /5000U ; }static u8 sn65dsi83_get_dsi_div (struct sn65dsi83 *ctx)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/333 drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi83: halve horizontal syncs for dual LVDS output
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luca Ceresoli <[email protected]>
commit d0d727746944096a6681dc6adb5f123fc5aa018d upstream.
Dual LVDS output (available on the SN65DSI84) requires HSYNC_PULSE_WIDTH and HORIZONTAL_BACK_PORCH to be divided by two with respect to the values used for single LVDS output.
While not clearly stated in the datasheet, this is needed according to the DSI Tuner [0] output. It also makes sense intuitively because in dual LVDS output two pixels at a time are output and so the output clock is half of the pixel clock.
Some dual-LVDS panels refuse to show any picture without this fix.
Divide by two HORIZONTAL_FRONT_PORCH too, even though this register is used only for test pattern generation which is not currently implemented by this driver.
[0] https://www.ti.com/tool/DSI-TUNER
--- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c +4 -3
@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static void sn65dsi83_atomic_pre_enable( struct drm_atomic_state *state) {struct sn65dsi83 *ctx =bridge_to_sn65dsi83 (bridge); +const unsigned int dual_factor = ctx->lvds_dual_link ?2 :1 ;const struct drm_bridge_state *bridge_state;const struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state;const struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@ -606,18 +607,18 @@ static void sn65dsi83_atomic_pre_enable(/* 32 + 1 pixel clock to ensure proper operation */ le16val =cpu_to_le16 (32 +1 );regmap_bulk_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_SYNC_DELAY_LOW , &le16val,2 ); - le16val =cpu_to_le16 (mode->hsync_end - mode->hsync_start); + le16val =cpu_to_le16 ((mode->hsync_end - mode->hsync_start) / dual_factor);regmap_bulk_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_HSYNC_PULSE_WIDTH_LOW , &le16val,2 ); le16val =cpu_to_le16 (mode->vsync_end - mode->vsync_start);regmap_bulk_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_VSYNC_PULSE_WIDTH_LOW , &le16val,2 );regmap_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_HORIZONTAL_BACK_PORCH , - mode->htotal - mode->hsync_end); + (mode->htotal - mode->hsync_end) / dual_factor);regmap_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_VERTICAL_BACK_PORCH , mode->vtotal - mode->vsync_end);regmap_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_HORIZONTAL_FRONT_PORCH , - mode->hsync_start - mode->hdisplay); + (mode->hsync_start - mode->hdisplay) / dual_factor);regmap_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_VERTICAL_FRONT_PORCH , mode->vsync_start - mode->vdisplay);regmap_write (ctx->regmap,REG_VID_CHA_TEST_PATTERN ,0x00 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/333 drm/i915: Fix potential overflow of shmem scatterlist length
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]>
commit 029ae067431ab9d0fca479bdabe780fa436706ea upstream.
When a scatterlists table of a GEM shmem object of size 4 GB or more is populated with pages allocated from a folio, unsigned int .length attribute of a scatterlist may get overflowed if total byte length of pages allocated to that single scatterlist happens to reach or cross the 4GB limit. As a consequence, users of the object may suffer from hitting unexpected, premature end of the object's backing pages.
[278.780187] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [278.780377] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2326 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_mm.c:55 remap_sg+0x199/0x1d0 [i915] ... [278.780654] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2326 Comm: gem_mmap_offset Tainted: G S U 6.17.0-rc1-CI_DRM_16981-ged823aaa0607+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [278.780656] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER [278.780658] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Meteor Lake Client Platform/MTL-P LP5x T3 RVP, BIOS MTLPFWI1.R00.3471.D91.2401310918 01/31/2024 [278.780659] RIP: 0010:remap_sg+0x199/0x1d0 [i915] ... [278.780786] Call Trace: [278.780787] <TASK> [278.780788] ? __apply_to_page_range+0x3e6/0x910 [278.780795] ? __pfx_remap_sg+0x10/0x10 [i915] [278.780906] apply_to_page_range+0x14/0x30 [278.780908] remap_io_sg+0x14d/0x260 [i915] [278.781013] vm_fault_cpu+0xd2/0x330 [i915] [278.781137] __do_fault+0x3a/0x1b0 [278.781140] do_fault+0x322/0x640 [278.781143] __handle_mm_fault+0x938/0xfd0 [278.781150] handle_mm_fault+0x12c/0x300 [278.781152] ? lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x4b/0x760 [278.781155] do_user_addr_fault+0x2d6/0x8e0 [278.781160] exc_page_fault+0x96/0x2c0 [278.781165] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
...
That issue was apprehended by the author of a change that introduced it, and potential risk even annotated with a comment, but then never addressed.
When adding folio pages to a scatterlist table, take care of byte length of any single scatterlist not exceeding max_segment.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c +9 -3
@@ -151,8 +151,12 @@ int shmem_sg_alloc_table(struct drm_i915 } }while (1 ); - nr_pages = min_t(unsigned long, -folio_nr_pages (folio), page_count - i); + nr_pages =min_array (((unsigned long []) { +folio_nr_pages (folio), + page_count - i, + max_segment /PAGE_SIZE , + }),3 ); +if (!i || sg->length >= max_segment ||folio_pfn (folio) != next_pfn) {
@@ -162,7 +166,9 @@ int shmem_sg_alloc_table(struct drm_i915 st->nents++;sg_set_folio (sg, folio, nr_pages *PAGE_SIZE ,0 ); }else { -/* XXX: could overflow? */ + nr_pages = min_t(unsigned long, nr_pages, + (max_segment - sg->length) /PAGE_SIZE ); + sg->length += nr_pages *PAGE_SIZE ; } next_pfn =folio_pfn (folio) + nr_pages;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 257/333 drm/i915/psr: Repeat Selective Update area alignment
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit 1be2fca84f520105413d0d89ed04bb0ff742ab16 upstream.
Currently we are aligning Selective Update area to cover cursor fully if needed only once. It may happen that cursor is in Selective Update area after pipe alignment and after that covering cursor plane only partially. Fix this by looping alignment as long as alignment isn't needed anymore.
v2:
- do not unecessarily loop if cursor was already fully covered
- rename aligned as su_area_changed
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +38 -12
@@ -2559,11 +2559,12 @@ static void clip_area_update(struct drm_ overlap_damage_area->y2 = damage_area->y2; } -static void intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) +static bool intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) {struct intel_display *display =to_intel_display (crtc_state);const struct drm_dsc_config *vdsc_cfg = &crtc_state->dsc.config;u16 y_alignment; +bool su_area_changed = false;/* ADLP aligns the SU region to vdsc slice height in case dsc is enabled */ if (crtc_state->dsc.compression_enable &&
@@ -2572,10 +2573,18 @@ static void intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alelse y_alignment = crtc_state->su_y_granularity; - crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 -= crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 % y_alignment; -if (crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 % y_alignment) +if (crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 % y_alignment) { + crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 -= crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 % y_alignment; + su_area_changed = true; + } + +if (crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 % y_alignment) { crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 = ((crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 / y_alignment) +1 ) * y_alignment; + su_area_changed = true; + } + +return su_area_changed; }/*
@@ -2708,7 +2717,7 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct istruct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state =intel_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, crtc);struct intel_plane_state *new_plane_state, *old_plane_state;struct intel_plane *plane; -bool full_update = false, cursor_in_su_area = false; +bool full_update = false, su_area_changed;int i, ret;if (!crtc_state->enable_psr2_sel_fetch)
@@ -2815,15 +2824,32 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct iif (ret)return ret; -/* -* Adjust su area to cover cursor fully as necessary (early -* transport). This needs to be done after -* drm_atomic_add_affected_planes to ensure visible cursor is added into -* affected planes even when cursor is not updated by itself. -*/ -intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (state, crtc, &cursor_in_su_area); +do { +bool cursor_in_su_area; -intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (crtc_state); +/* +* Adjust su area to cover cursor fully as necessary +* (early transport). This needs to be done after +* drm_atomic_add_affected_planes to ensure visible +* cursor is added into affected planes even when +* cursor is not updated by itself. +*/ +intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (state, crtc, &cursor_in_su_area); + + su_area_changed =intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (crtc_state); + +/* +* If the cursor was outside the SU area before +* alignment, the alignment step (which only expands +* SU) may pull the cursor partially inside, so we +* must run ET alignment again to fully cover it. But +* if the cursor was already fully inside before +* alignment, expanding the SU area won't change that, +* so no further work is needed. +*/ +if (cursor_in_su_area) +break ; + }while (su_area_changed);/* * Now that we have the pipe damaged area check if it intersect with
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 258/333 drm/msm: Fix dma_free_attrs() buffer size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
commit e4eb6e4dd6348dd00e19c2275e3fbaed304ca3bd upstream.
The gpummu->table buffer is alloc'd with size TABLE_SIZE + 32 in a2xx_gpummu_new() but freed with size TABLE_SIZE in a2xx_gpummu_destroy().
Change the free size to match the allocation.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/707340/
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a2xx_gpummu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a2xx_gpummu.c +1 -1
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static void a2xx_gpummu_destroy(struct m {struct a2xx_gpummu *gpummu =to_a2xx_gpummu (mmu); -dma_free_attrs (mmu->dev,TABLE_SIZE , gpummu->table, gpummu->pt_base, +dma_free_attrs (mmu->dev,TABLE_SIZE +32 , gpummu->table, gpummu->pt_base,DMA_ATTR_FORCE_CONTIGUOUS );kfree (gpummu);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 259/333 drm/amd: Fix a few more NULL pointer dereference in device cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
commit 72ecb1dae72775fa9fea0159d8445d620a0a2295 upstream.
I found a few more paths that cleanup fails due to a NULL version pointer on unsupported hardware.
Add NULL checks as applicable.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +6 -0
@@ -3625,6 +3625,8 @@ static int amdgpu_device_ip_fini_early(sint i, r;for (i =0 ; i < adev->num_ip_blocks; i++) { +if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version) +continue ;if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version->funcs->early_fini)continue ;
@@ -3687,6 +3689,8 @@ static int amdgpu_device_ip_fini(structif (!adev->ip_blocks[i].status.sw)continue ; +if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version) +continue ;if (adev->ip_blocks[i].version->type ==AMD_IP_BLOCK_TYPE_GMC ) {amdgpu_ucode_free_bo (adev);amdgpu_free_static_csa (&adev->virt.csa_obj);
@@ -3713,6 +3717,8 @@ static int amdgpu_device_ip_fini(structfor (i = adev->num_ip_blocks -1 ; i >=0 ; i--) {if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].status.late_initialized)continue ; +if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version) +continue ;if (adev->ip_blocks[i].version->funcs->late_fini) adev->ip_blocks[i].version->funcs->late_fini (&adev->ip_blocks[i]); adev->ip_blocks[i].status.late_initialized = false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 260/333 drm/msm/dpu: Correct the SA8775P intr_underrun/intr_underrun index
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Abhinav Kumar <[email protected]>
commit 4ce71cea574658f5c5c7412b1a3cc54efe4f9b50 upstream.
The intr_underrun and intr_vsync indices have been swapped, just simply corrects them.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/709209/
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/catalog/dpu_8_4_sa8775p.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/catalog/dpu_8_4_sa8775p.h +2 -2
@@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ static const struct dpu_intf_cfg sa8775p .type = INTF_NONE, .controller_id = MSM_DP_CONTROLLER_0, /* pair with intf_0 for DP MST */ .prog_fetch_lines_worst_case = 24, - .intr_underrun = DPU_IRQ_IDX(MDP_SSPP_TOP0_INTR, 17), - .intr_vsync = DPU_IRQ_IDX(MDP_SSPP_TOP0_INTR, 16), + .intr_underrun = DPU_IRQ_IDX(MDP_SSPP_TOP0_INTR, 16), + .intr_vsync = DPU_IRQ_IDX(MDP_SSPP_TOP0_INTR, 17), }, { .name = "intf_7", .id = INTF_7, .base = 0x3b000, .len = 0x280,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 261/333 tracing: Fix enabling multiple events on the kernel command line and bootconfig
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrei-Alexandru Tachici <[email protected]>
commit 3b1679e086bb869ca02722f6bd29b3573a6a0e7e upstream.
Multiple events can be enabled on the kernel command line via a comma separator. But if the are specified one at a time, then only the last event is enabled. This is because the event names are saved in a temporary buffer, and each call by the init cmdline code will reset that buffer.
This also affects names in the boot config file, as it may call the callback multiple times with an example of:
kernel.trace_event = ":mod:rproc_qcom_common", ":mod:qrtr", ":mod:qcom_aoss"
Change the cmdline callback function to append a comma and the next value if the temporary buffer already has content.
--- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace_events.c +5 -1
@@ -4342,7 +4342,11 @@ static char bootup_event_buf[COMMAND_LINstatic __init int setup_trace_event (char *str) { -strscpy (bootup_event_buf, str,COMMAND_LINE_SIZE ); +if (bootup_event_buf[0 ] !='\0' ) +strlcat (bootup_event_buf,"," ,COMMAND_LINE_SIZE ); + +strlcat (bootup_event_buf, str,COMMAND_LINE_SIZE ); +trace_set_ring_buffer_expanded (NULL );disable_tracing_selftest ("running event tracing" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 262/333 tracing: Fix trace_buf_size= cmdline parameter with sizes >= 2G
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Calvin Owens <[email protected]>
commit d008ba8be8984760e36d7dcd4adbd5a41a645708 upstream.
Some of the sizing logic through tracer_alloc_buffers() uses int internally, causing unexpected behavior if the user passes a value that does not fit in an int (on my x86 machine, the result is uselessly tiny buffers).
Fix by plumbing the parameter's real type (unsigned long) through to the ring buffer allocation functions, which already use unsigned long.
It has always been possible to create larger ring buffers via the sysfs
interface: this only affects the cmdline parameter.
--- kernel/trace/trace.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +3 -3
@@ -9849,7 +9849,7 @@ static void setup_trace_scratch(struct t }static int -allocate_trace_buffer (struct trace_array *tr,struct array_buffer *buf,int size) +allocate_trace_buffer (struct trace_array *tr,struct array_buffer *buf,unsigned long size) {enum ring_buffer_flags rb_flags;struct trace_scratch *tscratch;
@@ -9904,7 +9904,7 @@ static void free_trace_buffer(struct arr } } -static int allocate_trace_buffers (struct trace_array *tr,int size) +static int allocate_trace_buffers (struct trace_array *tr,unsigned long size) {int ret;
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ __init static void enable_instances(void__init static int tracer_alloc_buffers (void ) { -int ring_buf_size; +unsigned long ring_buf_size;int ret = -ENOMEM ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 263/333 net-shapers: dont free reply skb after genlmsg_reply()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Moses <[email protected]>
commit 57885276cc16a2e2b76282c808a4e84cbecb3aae upstream.
genlmsg_reply() hands the reply skb to netlink, and netlink_unicast() consumes it on all return paths, whether the skb is queued successfully or freed on an error path.
net_shaper_nl_get_doit() and net_shaper_nl_cap_get_doit() currently jump to free_msg after genlmsg_reply() fails and call nlmsg_free(msg), which can hit the same skb twice.
Return the genlmsg_reply() error directly and keep free_msg only for pre-reply failures.
--- net/shaper/shaper.c | 11 ++--------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/shaper/shaper.c +2 -9
@@ -759,11 +759,7 @@ int net_shaper_nl_get_doit(struct sk_bufif (ret) goto free_msg; - ret =genlmsg_reply (msg, info); -if (ret) - goto free_msg; - -return 0 ; +return genlmsg_reply (msg, info); free_msg:nlmsg_free (msg);
@@ -1314,10 +1310,7 @@ int net_shaper_nl_cap_get_doit(struct skif (ret) goto free_msg; - ret =genlmsg_reply (msg, info); -if (ret) - goto free_msg; -return 0 ; +return genlmsg_reply (msg, info); free_msg:nlmsg_free (msg);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 264/333 qmi_wwan: allow max_mtu above hard_mtu to control rx_urb_size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]>
commit 55f854dd5bdd8e19b936a00ef1f8d776ac32c7b0 upstream.
Commit c7159e960f14 ("usbnet: limit max_mtu based on device's hard_mtu") capped net->max_mtu to the device's hard_mtu in usbnet_probe(). While this correctly prevents oversized packets on standard USB network devices, it breaks the qmi_wwan driver.
qmi_wwan relies on userspace (e.g. ModemManager) setting a large MTU on the wwan0 interface to configure rx_urb_size via usbnet_change_mtu(). QMI modems negotiate USB transfer sizes of 16,383 or 32,767 bytes, and the USB receive buffers must be sized accordingly. With max_mtu capped to hard_mtu (~1500 bytes), userspace can no longer raise the MTU, the receive buffers remain small, and download speeds drop from >300 Mbps to ~0.8 Mbps.
Introduce a FLAG_NOMAXMTU driver flag that allows individual usbnet drivers to opt out of the max_mtu cap. Set this flag in qmi_wwan's driver_info structures to restore the previous behavior for QMI devices, while keeping the safety fix in place for all other usbnet drivers.
--- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/usb/usbnet.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +2 -2
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ err:static const struct driver_info qmi_wwan_info = { .description ="WWAN/QMI device" , - .flags =FLAG_WWAN |FLAG_SEND_ZLP , + .flags =FLAG_WWAN |FLAG_NOMAXMTU |FLAG_SEND_ZLP , .bind = qmi_wwan_bind, .unbind = qmi_wwan_unbind, .manage_power = qmi_wwan_manage_power,
@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ static const struct driver_info qmi_wwanstatic const struct driver_info qmi_wwan_info_quirk_dtr = { .description ="WWAN/QMI device" , - .flags =FLAG_WWAN |FLAG_SEND_ZLP , + .flags =FLAG_WWAN |FLAG_NOMAXMTU |FLAG_SEND_ZLP , .bind = qmi_wwan_bind, .unbind = qmi_wwan_unbind, .manage_power = qmi_wwan_manage_power,
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +4 -3
@@ -1803,11 +1803,12 @@ usbnet_probe (struct usb_interface *udevif ((dev->driver_info->flags &FLAG_NOARP ) !=0 ) net->flags |=IFF_NOARP ; -if (net->max_mtu > (dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len)) +if ((dev->driver_info->flags &FLAG_NOMAXMTU ) ==0 && + net->max_mtu > (dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len)) net->max_mtu = dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len; -if (net->mtu > net->max_mtu) - net->mtu = net->max_mtu; +if (net->mtu > (dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len)) + net->mtu = dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len; }else if (!info->in || !info->out) status =usbnet_get_endpoints (dev, udev);
include/linux/usb/usbnet.h +1 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct driver_info {#define FLAG_MULTI_PACKET 0x2000#define FLAG_RX_ASSEMBLE 0x4000/* rx packets may span >1 frames */ #define FLAG_NOARP 0x8000/* device can't do ARP */ +#define FLAG_NOMAXMTU 0x10000/* allow max_mtu above hard_mtu */ /* init device ... can sleep, or cause probe() failure */ int (*bind)(struct usbnet *,struct usb_interface *);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 265/333 io_uring/kbuf: check if target buffer list is still legacy on recycle
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit c2c185be5c85d37215397c8e8781abf0a69bec1f upstream.
There's a gap between when the buffer was grabbed and when it potentially gets recycled, where if the list is empty, someone could've upgraded it to a ring provided type. This can happen if the request is forced via io-wq. The legacy recycling is missing checking if the buffer_list still exists, and if it's of the correct type. Add those checks.
--- io_uring/kbuf.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
io_uring/kbuf.c +11 -2
@@ -111,9 +111,18 @@ bool io_kbuf_recycle_legacy(struct io_ki buf = req->kbuf; bl =io_buffer_get_list (ctx, buf->bgid); -list_add (&buf->list, &bl->buf_list); - bl->nbufs++; +/* +* If the buffer list was upgraded to a ring-based one, or removed, +* while the request was in-flight in io-wq, drop it. +*/ +if (bl && !(bl->flags &IOBL_BUF_RING )) { +list_add (&buf->list, &bl->buf_list); + bl->nbufs++; + }else { +kfree (buf); + } req->flags &= ~REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED ; + req->kbuf =NULL ;io_ring_submit_unlock (ctx, issue_flags);return true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 266/333 cifs: make default value of retrans as zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>
commit e3beefd3af09f8e460ddaf39063d3d7664d7ab59 upstream.
When retrans mount option was introduced, the default value was set as 1. However, in the light of some bugs that this has exposed recently we should change it to 0 and retain the old behaviour before this option was introduced.
--- fs/smb/client/fs_context.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/fs_context.c +1 -1
@@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ int smb3_init_fs_context(struct fs_conte ctx->backupuid_specified = false;/* no backup intent for a user */ ctx->backupgid_specified = false;/* no backup intent for a group */ - ctx->retrans =1 ; + ctx->retrans =0 ; ctx->reparse_type =CIFS_REPARSE_TYPE_DEFAULT ; ctx->symlink_type =CIFS_SYMLINK_TYPE_DEFAULT ; ctx->nonativesocket =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 267/333 xfs: fix integer overflow in bmap intent sort comparator
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Long Li <[email protected]>
commit 362c490980867930a098b99f421268fbd7ca05fd upstream.
xfs_bmap_update_diff_items() sorts bmap intents by inode number using a subtraction of two xfs_ino_t (uint64_t) values, with the result truncated to int. This is incorrect when two inode numbers differ by more than INT_MAX (2^31 - 1), which is entirely possible on large XFS filesystems.
Fix this by replacing the subtraction with cmp_int().
--- fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +1 -1
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ xfs_bmap_update_diff_items(struct xfs_bmap_intent *ba =bi_entry (a);struct xfs_bmap_intent *bb =bi_entry (b); -return ba->bi_owner->i_ino - bb->bi_owner->i_ino; +return cmp_int (ba->bi_owner->i_ino, bb->bi_owner->i_ino); }/* Log bmap updates in the intent item. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 268/333 xfs: fix returned valued from xfs_defer_can_append
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
commit 54fcd2f95f8d216183965a370ec69e1aab14f5da upstream.
xfs_defer_can_append returns a bool, it shouldn't be returning a NULL.
Found by code inspection.
--- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c +1 -1
@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ xfs_defer_can_append(/* Paused items cannot absorb more work */ if (dfp->dfp_flags &XFS_DEFER_PAUSED ) -return NULL ; +return false;/* Already full? */ if (ops->max_items && dfp->dfp_count >= ops->max_items)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 269/333 xfs: fix undersized l_iclog_roundoff values
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
commit 52a8a1ba883defbfe3200baa22cf4cd21985d51a upstream.
If the superblock doesn't list a log stripe unit, we set the incore log roundoff value to 512. This leads to corrupt logs and unmountable filesystems in generic/617 on a disk with 4k physical sectors...
XFS (sda1): Mounting V5 Filesystem ff3121ca-26e6-4b77-b742-aaff9a449e1c
XFS (sda1): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x318e. Truncating head block from 0x3197. XFS (sda1): failed to locate log tail
XFS (sda1): log mount/recovery failed: error -74
XFS (sda1): log mount failed
XFS (sda1): Mounting V5 Filesystem ff3121ca-26e6-4b77-b742-aaff9a449e1c
XFS (sda1): Ending clean mount
...on the current xfsprogs for-next which has a broken mkfs. xfs_info shows this...
meta-data=/dev/sda1 isize=512 agcount=4, agsize=644992 blks
= sectsz=4096 attr=2, projid32bit=1
= crc=1 finobt=1, sparse=1, rmapbt=1
= reflink=1 bigtime=1 inobtcount=1 nrext64=1
= exchange=1 metadir=1
data = bsize=4096 blocks=2579968, imaxpct=25
= sunit=0 swidth=0 blks
naming =version 2 bsize=4096 ascii-ci=0, ftype=1, parent=1
log =internal log bsize=4096 blocks=16384, version=2
= sectsz=4096 sunit=0 blks, lazy-count=1
realtime =none extsz=4096 blocks=0, rtextents=0
= rgcount=0 rgsize=268435456 extents
= zoned=0 start=0 reserved=0...observe that the log section has sectsz=4096 sunit=0, which means that the roundoff factor is 512, not 4096 as you'd expect. We should fix mkfs not to generate broken filesystems, but anyone can fuzz the ondisk superblock so we should be more cautious. I think the inadequate logic predates commit a6a65fef5ef8d0, but that's clearly going to require a different backport.
--- fs/xfs/xfs_log.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +2 -0
@@ -1397,6 +1397,8 @@ xlog_alloc_log(if (xfs_has_logv2 (mp) && mp->m_sb.sb_logsunit >1 ) log->l_iclog_roundoff = mp->m_sb.sb_logsunit; +else if (mp->m_sb.sb_logsectsize >0 ) + log->l_iclog_roundoff = mp->m_sb.sb_logsectsize;else log->l_iclog_roundoff =BBSIZE ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 270/333 xfs: ensure dquot item is deleted from AIL only after log shutdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Long Li <[email protected]>
commit 186ac39b8a7d3ec7ce9c5dd45e5c2730177f375c upstream.
In xfs_qm_dqflush(), when a dquot flush fails due to corruption (the out_abort error path), the original code removed the dquot log item from the AIL before calling xfs_force_shutdown(). This ordering introduces a subtle race condition that can lead to data loss after a crash.
The AIL tracks the oldest dirty metadata in the journal. The position of the tail item in the AIL determines the log tail LSN, which is the oldest LSN that must be preserved for crash recovery. When an item is removed from the AIL, the log tail can advance past the LSN of that item.
The race window is as follows: if the dquot item happens to be at the tail of the log, removing it from the AIL allows the log tail to advance. If a concurrent log write is sampling the tail LSN at the same time and subsequently writes a complete checkpoint (i.e., one containing a commit record) to disk before the shutdown takes effect, the journal will no longer protect the dquot's last modification. On the next mount, log recovery will not replay the dquot changes, even though they were never written back to disk, resulting in silent data loss.
Fix this by calling xfs_force_shutdown() before xfs_trans_ail_delete() in the out_abort path. Once the log is shut down, no new log writes can complete with an updated tail LSN, making it safe to remove the dquot item from the AIL.
--- fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c +7 -1
@@ -1464,9 +1464,15 @@ xfs_qm_dqflush(return 0 ; out_abort: +/* +* Shut down the log before removing the dquot item from the AIL. +* Otherwise, the log tail may advance past this item's LSN while +* log writes are still in progress, making these unflushed changes +* unrecoverable on the next mount. +*/ +xfs_force_shutdown (mp,SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE ); dqp->q_flags &= ~XFS_DQFLAG_DIRTY ;xfs_trans_ail_delete (lip,0 ); -xfs_force_shutdown (mp,SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE );xfs_dqfunlock (dqp);return error; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 271/333 sched_ext: Fix enqueue_task_scx() truncation of upper enqueue flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 57ccf5ccdc56954f2a91a7f66684fd31c566bde5 upstream.
enqueue_task_scx() takes int enq_flags from the sched_class interface. SCX enqueue flags starting at bit 32 (SCX_ENQ_PREEMPT and above) are silently truncated when passed through activate_task(). extra_enq_flags was added as a workaround - storing high bits in rq->scx.extra_enq_flags and OR-ing them back in enqueue_task_scx(). However, the OR target is still the int parameter, so the high bits are lost anyway.
The current impact is limited as the only affected flag is SCX_ENQ_PREEMPT which is informational to the BPF scheduler - its loss means the scheduler doesn't know about preemption but doesn't cause incorrect behavior.
Fix by renaming the int parameter to core_enq_flags and introducing a u64 enq_flags local that merges both sources. All downstream functions already take u64 enq_flags.
--- kernel/sched/ext.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/ext.c +2 -3
@@ -1358,16 +1358,15 @@ static void clr_task_runnable(struct tas p->scx.flags |=SCX_TASK_RESET_RUNNABLE_AT ; } -static void enqueue_task_scx (struct rq *rq,struct task_struct *p,int enq_flags) +static void enqueue_task_scx (struct rq *rq,struct task_struct *p,int core_enq_flags) {struct scx_sched *sch = scx_root;int sticky_cpu = p->scx.sticky_cpu; +u64 enq_flags = core_enq_flags | rq->scx.extra_enq_flags;if (enq_flags &ENQUEUE_WAKEUP ) rq->scx.flags |=SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP ; - enq_flags |= rq->scx.extra_enq_flags; -if (sticky_cpu >=0 ) p->scx.sticky_cpu =-1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 272/333 s390/zcrypt: Enable AUTOSEL_DOM for CCA serialnr sysfs attribute
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
commit 598bbefa8032cc58b564a81d1ad68bd815c8dc0f upstream.
The serialnr sysfs attribute for CCA cards when queried always used the default domain for sending the request down to the card. If for any reason exactly this default domain is disabled then the attribute code fails to retrieve the CCA info and the sysfs entry shows an empty string. Works as designed but the serial number is a card attribute and thus it does not matter which domain is used for the query. So if there are other domains on this card available, these could be used.
So extend the code to use AUTOSEL_DOM for the domain value to address any online domain within the card for querying the cca info and thus show the serialnr as long as there is one domain usable regardless of the default domain setting.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 12 +++++++----- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -5
@@ -1640,11 +1640,13 @@ int cca_get_info(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,memset (ci,0 ,sizeof (*ci)); -/* get first info from zcrypt device driver about this apqn */ - rc =zcrypt_device_status_ext (cardnr, domain, &devstat); -if (rc) -return rc; - ci->hwtype = devstat.hwtype; +/* if specific domain given, fetch status and hw info for this apqn */ +if (domain !=AUTOSEL_DOM ) { + rc =zcrypt_device_status_ext (cardnr, domain, &devstat); +if (rc) +return rc; + ci->hwtype = devstat.hwtype; + }/* * Prep memory for rule array and var array use.
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c +1 -2
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ static ssize_t cca_serialnr_show(structmemset (&ci,0 ,sizeof (ci)); -if (ap_domain_index >=0 ) -cca_get_info (ac->id, ap_domain_index, &ci,0 ); +cca_get_info (ac->id,AUTOSEL_DOM , &ci,0 );return sysfs_emit (buf,"%s\n" , ci.serial); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 273/333 s390/dasd: Move quiesce state with pprc swap
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]>
commit 40e9cd4ae8ec43b107ed2bff422a8fa39dcf4e4b upstream.
Quiesce and resume is a mechanism to suspend operations on DASD devices. In the context of a controlled copy pair swap operation, the quiesce operation is usually issued before the actual swap and a resume afterwards.
During the swap operation, the underlying device is exchanged. Therefore, the quiesce flag must be moved to the secondary device to ensure a consistent quiesce state after the swap.
The secondary device itself cannot be suspended separately because there is no separate block device representation for it.
--- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +5 -0
@@ -6193,6 +6193,11 @@ static int dasd_eckd_copy_pair_swap(stru dev_name(&secondary->cdev->dev), rc); } +if (primary->stopped &DASD_STOPPED_QUIESCE ) { +dasd_device_set_stop_bits (secondary,DASD_STOPPED_QUIESCE ); +dasd_device_remove_stop_bits (primary,DASD_STOPPED_QUIESCE ); + } +/* re-enable device */ dasd_device_remove_stop_bits (primary,DASD_STOPPED_PPRC );dasd_device_remove_stop_bits (secondary,DASD_STOPPED_PPRC );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 274/333 s390/dasd: Copy detected format information to secondary device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]>
commit 4c527c7e030672efd788d0806d7a68972a7ba3c1 upstream.
During online processing for a DASD device an IO operation is started to determine the format of the device. CDL format contains specifically sized blocks at the beginning of the disk.
For a PPRC secondary device no real IO operation is possible therefore this IO request can not be started and this step is skipped for online processing of secondary devices. This is generally fine since the secondary is a copy of the primary device.
In case of an additional partition detection that is run after a swap operation the format information is needed to properly drive partition detection IO.
Currently the information is not passed leading to IO errors during partition detection and a wrongly detected partition table which in turn might lead to data corruption on the disk with the wrong partition table.
Fix by passing the format information from primary to secondary device.
--- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +11 -0
@@ -6146,6 +6146,7 @@ static void copy_pair_set_active(structstatic int dasd_eckd_copy_pair_swap (struct dasd_device *device,char *prim_busid,char *sec_busid) { +struct dasd_eckd_private *prim_priv, *sec_priv;struct dasd_device *primary, *secondary;struct dasd_copy_relation *copy;struct dasd_block *block;
@@ -6166,6 +6167,9 @@ static int dasd_eckd_copy_pair_swap(struif (!secondary)return DASD_COPYPAIRSWAP_SECONDARY ; + prim_priv = primary->private; + sec_priv = secondary->private; +/* * usually the device should be quiesced for swap * for paranoia stop device and requeue requests again
@@ -6198,6 +6202,13 @@ static int dasd_eckd_copy_pair_swap(strudasd_device_remove_stop_bits (primary,DASD_STOPPED_QUIESCE ); } +/* +* The secondary device never got through format detection, but since it +* is a copy of the primary device, the format is exactly the same; +* therefore, the detected layout can simply be copied. +*/ + sec_priv->uses_cdl = prim_priv->uses_cdl; +/* re-enable device */ dasd_device_remove_stop_bits (primary,DASD_STOPPED_PPRC );dasd_device_remove_stop_bits (secondary,DASD_STOPPED_PPRC );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 275/333 powerpc/pseries: Correct MSI allocation tracking
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nam Cao <[email protected]>
commit 35e4f2a17eb40288f9bcdb09549fa04a63a96279 upstream.
The per-device MSI allocation calculation in pseries_irq_domain_alloc() is clearly wrong. It can still happen to work when nr_irqs is 1.
Correct it.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c +1 -1
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int pseries_irq_domain_alloc(stru &pseries_msi_irq_chip, pseries_dev); } - pseries_dev->msi_used++; + pseries_dev->msi_used += nr_irqs;return 0 ; out:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 276/333 powerpc64/bpf: fix kfunc call support
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hari Bathini <[email protected]>
commit 01b6ac72729610ae732ca2a66e3a642e23f6cd60 upstream.
Commit 61688a82e047 ("powerpc/bpf: enable kfunc call") inadvertently enabled kfunc call support for 32-bit powerpc but that support will not be possible until ABI mismatch between 32-bit powerpc and eBPF is handled in 32-bit powerpc JIT code. Till then, advertise support only for 64-bit powerpc. Also, in powerpc ABI, caller needs to extend the arguments properly based on signedness. The JIT code is responsible for handling this explicitly for kfunc calls as verifier can't handle this for each architecture-specific ABI needs. But this was not taken care of while kfunc call support was enabled for powerpc. Fix it by handling this with bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model() and using zero_extend() & sign_extend() helper functions.
--- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1 -1
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)bool bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call (void ) { -return true; +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC64 ); }bool bpf_jit_supports_arena (void )
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c +93 -8
119 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 277/333 powerpc64/bpf: fix the address returned by bpf_get_func_ip
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hari Bathini <[email protected]>
commit 157820264ac3dadfafffad63184b883eb28f9ae0 upstream.
bpf_get_func_ip() helper function returns the address of the traced function. It relies on the IP address stored at ctx - 16 by the bpf trampoline. On 64-bit powerpc, this address is recovered from LR accounting for OOL trampoline. But the address stored here was off by 4-bytes. Ensure the address is the actual start of the traced function.
--- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +19 -9
@@ -722,9 +722,9 @@ static int __arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline* retval_off [ return value ] * [ reg argN ] * [ ... ] -* regs_off [ reg_arg1 ] prog ctx context -* nregs_off [ args count ] -* ip_off [ traced function ] +* regs_off [ reg_arg1 ] prog_ctx +* nregs_off [ args count ] ((u64 *)prog_ctx)[-1] +* ip_off [ traced function ] ((u64 *)prog_ctx)[-2] * [ ... ] * run_ctx_off [ bpf_tramp_run_ctx ] * [ reg argN ]
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static int __arch_prepare_bpf_trampolinebpf_trampoline_save_args (image, ctx, func_frame_offset, nr_regs, regs_off); -/* Save our return address */ +/* Save our LR/return address */ EMIT (PPC_RAW_MFLR (_R3));if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC_FTRACE_OUT_OF_LINE ))EMIT (PPC_RAW_STL (_R3, _R1, alt_lr_off));
@@ -832,24 +832,34 @@ static int __arch_prepare_bpf_trampolineEMIT (PPC_RAW_STL (_R3, _R1, bpf_frame_size +PPC_LR_STKOFF ));/* -* Save ip address of the traced function. -* We could recover this from LR, but we will need to address for OOL trampoline, -* and optional GEP area. +* Derive IP address of the traced function. +* In case of CONFIG_PPC_FTRACE_OUT_OF_LINE or BPF program, LR points to the instruction +* after the 'bl' instruction in the OOL stub. Refer to ftrace_init_ool_stub() and +* bpf_arch_text_poke() for OOL stub of kernel functions and bpf programs respectively. +* Relevant stub sequence: +* +* bl <tramp> +* LR (R3) => mtlr r0 +* b <func_addr+4> +* +* Recover kernel function/bpf program address from the unconditional +* branch instruction at the end of OOL stub. */ if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC_FTRACE_OUT_OF_LINE ) || flags &BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG ) {EMIT (PPC_RAW_LWZ (_R4, _R3,4 ));EMIT (PPC_RAW_SLWI (_R4, _R4,6 ));EMIT (PPC_RAW_SRAWI (_R4, _R4,6 ));EMIT (PPC_RAW_ADD (_R3, _R3, _R4)); -EMIT (PPC_RAW_ADDI (_R3, _R3,4 )); }if (flags &BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG )EMIT (PPC_RAW_STL (_R3, _R1, ip_off)); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC_FTRACE_OUT_OF_LINE )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC_FTRACE_OUT_OF_LINE )) {/* Fake our LR for unwind */ +EMIT (PPC_RAW_ADDI (_R3, _R3,4 ));EMIT (PPC_RAW_STL (_R3, _R1, bpf_frame_size +PPC_LR_STKOFF )); + }/* Save function arg count -- see bpf_get_func_arg_cnt() */ EMIT (PPC_RAW_LI (_R3, nr_regs));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 278/333 lib/bootconfig: fix off-by-one in xbc_verify_tree() unclosed brace error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Law <[email protected]>
commit 39ebc8d7f561e1b64eca87353ef9b18e2825e591 upstream.
__xbc_open_brace() pushes entries with post-increment (open_brace[brace_index++]), so brace_index always points one past the last valid entry. xbc_verify_tree() reads open_brace[brace_index] to report which brace is unclosed, but this is one past the last pushed entry and contains stale/zero data, causing the error message to reference the wrong node.
Use open_brace[brace_index - 1] to correctly identify the unclosed brace. brace_index is known to be > 0 here since we are inside the if (brace_index) guard.
--- lib/bootconfig.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/bootconfig.c +1 -1
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static int __init xbc_verify_tree(void)/* Brace closing */ if (brace_index) { - n = &xbc_nodes[open_brace[brace_index]]; + n = &xbc_nodes[open_brace[brace_index -1 ]];return xbc_parse_error ("Brace is not closed" ,xbc_node_get_data (n)); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 279/333 scsi: core: Fix error handling for scsi_alloc_sdev()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
commit 4ce7ada40c008fa21b7e52ab9d04e8746e2e9325 upstream.
After scsi_sysfs_device_initialize() was called, error paths must call __scsi_remove_device().
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c +2 -6
@@ -355,12 +355,8 @@ static struct scsi_device *scsi_alloc_sd* default device queue depth to figure out sbitmap shift * since we use this queue depth most of times. */ -if (scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map (sdev, depth)) { -kref_put (&sdev->host->tagset_refcnt, scsi_mq_free_tags); -put_device (&starget->dev); -kfree (sdev); - goto out; - } +if (scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map (sdev, depth)) + goto out_device_destroy;scsi_change_queue_depth (sdev, depth);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 280/333 x86/apic: Disable x2apic on resume if the kernel expects so
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shashank Balaji <[email protected]>
commit 8cc7dd77a1466f0ec58c03478b2e735a5b289b96 upstream.
When resuming from s2ram, firmware may re-enable x2apic mode, which may have been disabled by the kernel during boot either because it doesn't support IRQ remapping or for other reasons. This causes the kernel to continue using the xapic interface, while the hardware is in x2apic mode, which causes hangs. This happens on defconfig + bare metal + s2ram.
Fix this in lapic_resume() by disabling x2apic if the kernel expects it to be disabled, i.e. when x2apic_mode = 0.
The ACPI v6.6 spec, Section 16.3 [1] says firmware restores either the pre-sleep configuration or initial boot configuration for each CPU, including MSR state:
When executing from the power-on reset vector as a result of waking from an S2 or S3 sleep state, the platform firmware performs only the hardware initialization required to restore the system to either the state the platform was in prior to the initial operating system boot, or to the pre-sleep configuration state. In multiprocessor systems, non-boot processors should be placed in the same state as prior to the initial operating system boot.
(further ahead)
If this is an S2 or S3 wake, then the platform runtime firmware restores minimum context of the system before jumping to the waking vector. This includes:
CPU configuration. Platform runtime firmware restores the pre-sleep configuration or initial boot configuration of each CPU (MSR, MTRR, firmware update, SMBase, and so on). Interrupts must be disabled (for IA-32 processors, disabled by CLI instruction).
(and other things)
So at least as per the spec, re-enablement of x2apic by the firmware is allowed if "x2apic on" is a part of the initial boot configuration.
[1] https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.6/16_Waking_and_Sleeping.html#initialization
[ bp: Massage. ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +6 -0
@@ -1890,6 +1890,7 @@ void __init check_x2apic(void)static inline void try_to_enable_x2apic (int remap_mode) { }static inline void __x2apic_enable (void ) { } +static inline void __x2apic_disable (void ) { }#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_X2APIC */ void __init enable_IR_x2apic (void )
@@ -2452,6 +2453,11 @@ static void lapic_resume(void)if (x2apic_mode) {__x2apic_enable (); }else { +if (x2apic_enabled ()) { +pr_warn_once ("x2apic: re-enabled by firmware during resume. Disabling\n" ); +__x2apic_disable (); + } +/* * Make sure the APICBASE points to the right address *
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 281/333 kprobes: Remove unneeded warnings from __arm_kprobe_ftrace()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
commit 5ef268cb7a0aac55521fd9881f1939fa94a8988e upstream.
Remove unneeded warnings for handled errors from __arm_kprobe_ftrace() because all caller handled the error correctly.
--- kernel/kprobes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +2 -2
@@ -1070,12 +1070,12 @@ static int __arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kplockdep_assert_held (&kprobe_mutex); ret =ftrace_set_filter_ip (ops, (unsigned long )p->addr,0 ,0 ); -if (WARN_ONCE (ret <0 ,"Failed to arm kprobe-ftrace at %pS (error %d)\n" , p->addr, ret)) +if (ret <0 )return ret;if (*cnt ==0 ) { ret =register_ftrace_function (ops); -if (WARN (ret <0 ,"Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n" , ret)) { +if (ret <0 ) {/* * At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from * registering empty filter.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 282/333 lib/bootconfig: fix snprintf truncation check in xbc_node_compose_key_after()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Law <[email protected]>
commit 1120a36bb1e9b9e22de75ecb4ef0b998f73a97f1 upstream.
snprintf() returns the number of characters that would have been written excluding the NUL terminator. Output is truncated when the return value is >= the buffer size, not just > the buffer size.
When ret == size, the current code takes the non-truncated path, advancing buf by ret and reducing size to 0. This is wrong because the output was actually truncated (the last character was replaced by NUL). Fix by using >= so the truncation path is taken correctly.
--- lib/bootconfig.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/bootconfig.c +1 -1
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ int __init xbc_node_compose_key_after(st depth ? "." : "");if (ret <0 )return ret; -if (ret > size) { +if (ret >= size) { size =0 ; }else { size -= ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 283/333 lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Law <[email protected]>
commit 560f763baa0f2c9a44da4294c06af071405ac46f upstream.
The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write. While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds access (the previous call would have returned an error), the write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated.
Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior.
--- lib/bootconfig.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/bootconfig.c +1 -1
@@ -532,9 +532,9 @@ static char *skip_spaces_until_newline(cstatic int __init __xbc_open_brace (char *p) {/* Push the last key as open brace */ - open_brace[brace_index++] =xbc_node_index (last_parent);if (brace_index >=XBC_DEPTH_MAX )return xbc_parse_error ("Exceed max depth of braces" , p); + open_brace[brace_index++] =xbc_node_index (last_parent);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 284/333 smb: client: fix atomic open with O_DIRECT & O_SYNC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
commit 4a7d2729dc99437dbb880a64c47828c0d191b308 upstream.
When user application requests O_DIRECT|O_SYNC along with O_CREAT on open(2), CREATE_NO_BUFFER and CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH bits were missed in CREATE request when performing an atomic open, thus leading to potentially data integrity issues.
Fix this by setting those missing bits in CREATE request when O_DIRECT|O_SYNC has been specified in cifs_do_create().
--- fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h | 11 +++++++++++ fs/smb/client/dir.c | 1 + fs/smb/client/file.c | 18 +++--------------- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h +11 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/netfs.h> +#include <linux/fcntl.h> #include "cifs_fs_sb.h" #include "cifsacl.h" #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
@@ -2396,4 +2397,14 @@ static inline void mid_execute_callback( (le32_to_cpu((tcon)->fsAttrInfo.Attributes) & \ FILE_SUPPORTS_REPARSE_POINTS)) +static inline int cifs_open_create_options (unsigned int oflags,int opts) +{ +/* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */ +if (oflags &O_SYNC ) + opts |=CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH ; +if (oflags &O_DIRECT ) + opts |=CREATE_NO_BUFFER ; +return opts; +} +#endif /* _CIFS_GLOB_H */
fs/smb/client/dir.c +1 -0
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ static int cifs_do_create(struct inode * goto out; } + create_options |=cifs_open_create_options (oflags, create_options);/* * if we're not using unix extensions, see if we need to set * ATTR_READONLY on the create call
fs/smb/client/file.c +3 -15
@@ -584,15 +584,8 @@ static int cifs_nt_open(const char *full*********************************************************************/ disposition =cifs_get_disposition (f_flags); -/* BB pass O_SYNC flag through on file attributes .. BB */ - -/* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */ -if (f_flags &O_SYNC ) - create_options |=CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH ; - -if (f_flags &O_DIRECT ) - create_options |=CREATE_NO_BUFFER ; + create_options |=cifs_open_create_options (f_flags, create_options); retry_open: oparms = (struct cifs_open_parms ) {
@@ -1318,13 +1311,8 @@ cifs_reopen_file(struct cifsFileInfo *cf rdwr_for_fscache =1 ; desired_access =cifs_convert_flags (cfile->f_flags, rdwr_for_fscache); - -/* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */ -if (cfile->f_flags &O_SYNC ) - create_options |=CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH ; - -if (cfile->f_flags &O_DIRECT ) - create_options |=CREATE_NO_BUFFER ; + create_options |=cifs_open_create_options (cfile->f_flags, + create_options);if (server->ops->get_lease_key) server->ops->get_lease_key (inode, &cfile->fid);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 285/333 smb: client: fix in-place encryption corruption in SMB2_write()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bharath SM <[email protected]>
commit d78840a6a38d312dc1a51a65317bb67e46f0b929 upstream.
SMB2_write() places write payload in iov[1..n] as part of rq_iov. smb3_init_transform_rq() pointer-shares rq_iov, so crypt_message() encrypts iov[1] in-place, replacing the original plaintext with ciphertext. On a replayable error, the retry sends the same iov[1] which now contains ciphertext instead of the original data, resulting in corruption.
The corruption is most likely to be observed when connections are unstable, as reconnects trigger write retries that re-send the already-encrypted data.
This affects SFU mknod, MF symlinks, etc. On kernels before 6.10 (prior to the netfs conversion), sync writes also used this path and were similarly affected. The async write path wasn't unaffected as it uses rq_iter which gets deep-copied.
Fix by moving the write payload into rq_iter via iov_iter_kvec(), so smb3_init_transform_rq() deep-copies it before encryption.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +4 -1
@@ -5172,7 +5172,10 @@ replay_again:memset (&rqst,0 ,sizeof (struct smb_rqst )); rqst.rq_iov = iov; - rqst.rq_nvec = n_vec +1 ; +/* iov[0] is the SMB header; move payload to rq_iter for encryption safety */ + rqst.rq_nvec =1 ; +iov_iter_kvec (&rqst.rq_iter,ITER_SOURCE , &iov[1 ], n_vec, + io_parms->length);if (retries)smb2_set_replay (server, &rqst);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 286/333 smb: client: fix iface port assignment in parse_server_interfaces
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Henrique Carvalho <[email protected]>
commit d4c7210d2f3ea481a6481f03040a64d9077a6172 upstream.
parse_server_interfaces() initializes interface socket addresses with CIFS_PORT. When the mount uses a non-default port this overwrites the configured destination port.
Later, cifs_chan_update_iface() copies this sockaddr into server->dstaddr, causing reconnect attempts to use the wrong port after server interface updates.
Use the existing port from server->dstaddr instead.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +12 -2
@@ -628,6 +628,7 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_istruct iface_info_ipv6 *p6;struct cifs_server_iface *info =NULL , *iface =NULL , *niface =NULL ;struct cifs_server_iface tmp_iface; +__be16 port;ssize_t bytes_left;size_t next =0 ;int nb_iface =0 ;
@@ -662,6 +663,15 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_i goto out; } +spin_lock (&ses->server->srv_lock); +if (ses->server->dstaddr.ss_family ==AF_INET ) + port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)&ses->server->dstaddr)->sin_port; +else if (ses->server->dstaddr.ss_family ==AF_INET6 ) + port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ses->server->dstaddr)->sin6_port; +else + port =cpu_to_be16 (CIFS_PORT ); +spin_unlock (&ses->server->srv_lock); +while (bytes_left >= (ssize_t )sizeof (*p)) {memset (&tmp_iface,0 ,sizeof (tmp_iface));/* default to 1Gbps when link speed is unset */
@@ -682,7 +692,7 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_imemcpy (&addr4->sin_addr, &p4->IPv4Address,4 );/* [MS-SMB2] 2.2.32.5.1.1 Clients MUST ignore these */ - addr4->sin_port =cpu_to_be16 (CIFS_PORT ); + addr4->sin_port = port;cifs_dbg (FYI ,"%s: ipv4 %pI4\n" , __func__, &addr4->sin_addr);
@@ -696,7 +706,7 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_i/* [MS-SMB2] 2.2.32.5.1.2 Clients MUST ignore these */ addr6->sin6_flowinfo =0 ; addr6->sin6_scope_id =0 ; - addr6->sin6_port =cpu_to_be16 (CIFS_PORT ); + addr6->sin6_port = port;cifs_dbg (FYI ,"%s: ipv6 %pI6\n" , __func__, &addr6->sin6_addr);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 287/333 btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit e1b18b959025e6b5dbad668f391f65d34b39595a upstream.
Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system.
Reproducer script:
$ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster. mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV mount $DEV $MNT
# Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send. btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv
touch $MNT/sv/foo
btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true
# Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv.
mkdir $MNT/snaps
btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps
# Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a
# lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow.
total=500
for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do
echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total"
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null
done
echoumount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./test.sh (...) Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv' At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv At subvol sv Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
And in dmesg/syslog:
$ dmesg (...) [251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252! [251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75) [251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235 [251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...) [251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN [251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs] [251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...) [251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292 [251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3 [251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750 [251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820 [251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0 [251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5 [251067.659019] FS: 00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [251067.660115] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [251067.661972] Call Trace: [251067.662292] <TASK> [251067.662653] create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs] [251067.663413] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs] [251067.664257] ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs] [251067.665238] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30 [251067.665837] ? record_root_in_trans+0xa2/0xd0 [btrfs] [251067.666531] btrfs_mksubvol+0x330/0x580 [btrfs] [251067.667145] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x74/0xa0 [btrfs] [251067.667827] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x194/0x1d0 [btrfs] [251067.668595] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x107/0x130 [btrfs] [251067.669479] btrfs_ioctl+0x1580/0x2690 [btrfs] [251067.670093] ? count_memcg_events+0x6d/0x180 [251067.670849] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1a0/0x2a0 [251067.671652] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xe0 [251067.672406] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20 [251067.673129] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [251067.674096] RIP: 0033:0x7f2a495648db [251067.674812] Code: 00 48 89 (...) [251067.678227] RSP: 002b:00007ffc5aa57840 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [251067.679691] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2a495648db [251067.681145] RDX: 00007ffc5aa588b0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000004 [251067.682511] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [251067.683842] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc5aa59910 [251067.685176] R13: 00007ffc5aa588b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000006 [251067.686524] </TASK> [251067.686972] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [251067.687890] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1907: errno=-75 unknown [251067.689049] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly [251067.689054] BTRFS warning (device sdi state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. [251067.690119] BTRFS: error (device sdi state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2043: errno=-75 unknown [251067.702028] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): last unmount of filesystem 46dc3975-30a2-4a69-a18f-418b859cccda
Fix this by ignoring -EOVERFLOW errors from btrfs_uuid_tree_add() in the snapshot creation code when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item. This is OK because it's not critical and we are still able to delete the snapshot, as snapshot/subvolume deletion ignores if a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL is missing (see inode.c:btrfs_delete_subvolume()). As for send/receive, we can still do send/receive operations since it always peeks the first root ID in the existing BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL (it could peek any since all snapshots have the same content), and even if the key is missing, it falls back to searching by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL key.
A test case for fstests will be sent soon.
--- fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/transaction.c +16 -0
@@ -1890,6 +1890,22 @@ static noinline int create_pending_snaps ret =btrfs_uuid_tree_add (trans, new_root_item->received_uuid,BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL , objectid); +/* +* We are creating of lot of snapshots of the same root that was +* received (has a received UUID) and reached a leaf's limit for +* an item. We can safely ignore this and avoid a transaction +* abort. A deletion of this snapshot will still work since we +* ignore if an item with a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL key +* is missing (see btrfs_delete_subvolume()). Send/receive will +* work too since it peeks the first root id from the existing +* item (it could peek any), and in case it's missing it +* falls back to search by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL keys. +* Creation of a snapshot does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so +* we don't want users triggering transaction aborts, either +* intentionally or not. +*/ +if (ret == -EOVERFLOW ) + ret =0 ;if (unlikely (ret && ret != -EEXIST )) {btrfs_abort_transaction (trans, ret); goto fail;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 288/333 btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collision
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 2d1ababdedd4ba38867c2500eb7f95af5ddeeef7 upstream.
If we attempt to create several files with names that result in the same hash, we have to pack them in same dir item and that has a limit inherent to the leaf size. However if we reach that limit, we trigger a transaction abort and turns the filesystem into RO mode. This allows for a malicious user to disrupt a system, without the need to have administration privileges/capabilities.
Reproducer:
$ cat exploit-hash-collisions.sh #!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster and require fewer file # names that result in hash collision. mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV mount $DEV $MNT
# List of names that result in the same crc32c hash for btrfs.
declare -a names=(
'foobar' '%a8tYkxfGMLWRGr55QSeQc4PBNH9PCLIvR6jZnkDtUUru1t@RouaUe_L:@xGkbO3nCwvLNYeK9vhE628gss:T$yZjZ5l-Nbd6CbC$M=hqE-ujhJICXyIxBvYrIU9-TDC' 'AQci3EUB%shMsg-N%frgU:02ByLs=IPJU0OpgiWit5nexSyxZDncY6WB:=zKZuk5Zy0DD$Ua78%MelgBuMqaHGyKsJUFf9s=UW80PcJmKctb46KveLSiUtNmqrMiL9-Y0I_l5Fnam04CGIg=8@U:Z' 'CvVqJpJzueKcuA$wqwePfyu7VxuWNN3ho$p0zi2H8QFYK$7YlEqOhhb%:hHgjhIjW5vnqWHKNP4' 'ET:vk@rFU4tsvMB0$C_p=xQHaYZjvoF%-BTc%wkFW8yaDAPcCYoR%x$FH5O:' 'HwTon%v7SGSP4FE08jBwwiu5aot2CFKXHTeEAa@38fUcNGOWvE@Mz6WBeDH_VooaZ6AgsXPkVGwy9l@@ZbNXabUU9csiWrrOp0MWUdfi$EZ3w9GkIqtz7I_eOsByOkBOO' 'Ij%2VlFGXSuPvxJGf5UWy6O@1svxGha%b@=%wjkq:CIgE6u7eJOjmQY5qTtxE2Rjbis9@us' 'KBkjG5%9R8K9sOG8UTnAYjxLNAvBmvV5vz3IiZaPmKuLYO03-6asI9lJ_j4@6Xo$KZicaLWJ3Pv8XEwVeUPMwbHYWwbx0pYvNlGMO9F:ZhHAwyctnGy%_eujl%WPd4U2BI7qooOSr85J-C2V$LfY' 'NcRfDfuUQ2=zP8K3CCF5dFcpfiOm6mwenShsAb_F%n6GAGC7fT2JFFn:c35X-3aYwoq7jNX5$ZJ6hI3wnZs$7KgGi7wjulffhHNUxAT0fRRLF39vJ@NvaEMxsMO' 'Oj42AQAEzRoTxa5OuSKIr=A_lwGMy132v4g3Pdq1GvUG9874YseIFQ6QU'
'Ono7avN5GjC:_6dBJ_'
'WHmN2gnmaN-9dVDy4aWo:yNGFzz8qsJyJhWEWcud7$QzN2D9R0efIWWEdu5kwWr73NZm4=@CoCDxrrZnRITr-kGtU_cfW2:%2_am' 'WiFnuTEhAG9FEC6zopQmj-A-$LDQ0T3WULz%ox3UZAPybSV6v1Z$b4L_XBi4M4BMBtJZpz93r9xafpB77r:lbwvitWRyo$odnAUYlYMmU4RvgnNd--e=I5hiEjGLETTtaScWlQp8mYsBovZwM2k' 'XKyH=OsOAF3p%uziGF_ZVr$ivrvhVgD@1u%5RtrV-gl_vqAwHkK@x7YwlxX3qT6WKKQ%PR56NrUBU2dOAOAdzr2=5nJuKPM-T-$ZpQfCL7phxQbUcb:BZOTPaFExc-qK-gDRCDW2' 'd3uUR6OFEwZr%ns1XH_@tbxA@cCPmbBRLdyh7p6V45H$P2$F%w0RqrD3M0g8aGvWpoTFMiBdOTJXjD:JF7=h9a_43xBywYAP%r$SPZi%zDg%ql-KvkdUCtF9OLaQlxmd' 'ePTpbnit%hyNm@WELlpKzNZYOzOTf8EQ$sEfkMy1VOfIUu3coyvIr13-Y7Sv5v-Ivax2Go_GQRFMU1b3362nktT9WOJf3SpT%z8sZmM3gvYQBDgmKI%%RM-G7hyrhgYflOw%z::ZRcv5O:lDCFm' 'evqk743Y@dvZAiG5J05L_ROFV@$2%rVWJ2%3nxV72-W7$e$-SK3tuSHA2mBt$qloC5jwNx33GmQUjD%akhBPu=VJ5g$xhlZiaFtTrjeeM5x7dt4cHpX0cZkmfImndYzGmvwQG:$euFYmXn$_2rA9mKZ' 'gkgUtnihWXsZQTEkrMAWIxir09k3t7jk_IK25t1:cy1XWN0GGqC%FrySdcmU7M8MuPO_ppkLw3=Dfr0UuBAL4%GFk2$Ma10V1jDRGJje%Xx9EV2ERaWKtjpwiZwh0gCSJsj5UL7CR8RtW5opCVFKGGy8Cky' 'hNgsG_8lNRik3PvphqPm0yEH3P%%fYG:kQLY=6O-61Wa6nrV_WVGR6TLB09vHOv%g4VQRP8Gzx7VXUY1qvZyS' 'isA7JVzN12xCxVPJZ_qoLm-pTBuhjjHMvV7o=F:EaClfYNyFGlsfw-Kf%uxdqW-kwk1sPl2vhbjyHU1A6$hz' 'kiJ_fgcdZFDiOptjgH5PN9-PSyLO4fbk_:u5_2tz35lV_iXiJ6cx7pwjTtKy-XGaQ5IefmpJ4N_ZqGsqCsKuqOOBgf9LkUdffHet@Wu' 'lvwtxyhE9:%Q3UxeHiViUyNzJsy:fm38pg_b6s25JvdhOAT=1s0$pG25x=LZ2rlHTszj=gN6M4zHZYr_qrB49i=pA--@WqWLIuX7o1S_SfS@2FSiUZN' 'rC24cw3UBDZ=5qJBUMs9e$=S4Y94ni%Z8639vnrGp=0Hv4z3dNFL0fBLmQ40=EYIY:Z=SLc@QLMSt2zsss2ZXrP7j4=' 'uwGl2s-fFrf@GqS=DQqq2I0LJSsOmM%xzTjS:lzXguE3wChdMoHYtLRKPvfaPOZF2fER@j53evbKa7R%A7r4%YEkD=kicJe@SFiGtXHbKe4gCgPAYbnVn' 'UG37U6KKua2bgc:IHzRs7BnB6FD:2Mt5Cc5NdlsW%$1tyvnfz7S27FvNkroXwAW:mBZLA1@qa9WnDbHCDmQmfPMC9z-Eq6QT0jhhPpqyymaD:R02ghwYo%yx7SAaaq-:x33LYpei$5g8DMl3C' 'y2vjek0FE1PDJC0qpfnN:x8k2wCFZ9xiUF2ege=JnP98R%wxjKkdfEiLWvQzmnW' '8-HCSgH5B%K7P8_jaVtQhBXpBk:pE-$P7ts58U0J@iR9YZntMPl7j$s62yAJO@_9eanFPS54b=UTw$94C-t=HLxT8n6o9P=QnIxq-f1=Ne2dvhe6WbjEQtc' 'YPPh:IFt2mtR6XWSmjHptXL_hbSYu8bMw-JP8@PNyaFkdNFsk$M=xfL6LDKCDM-mSyGA_2MBwZ8Dr4=R1D%7-mCaaKGxb990jzaagRktDTyp' '9hD2ApKa_t_7x-a@GCG28kY:7$M@5udI1myQ$x5udtggvagmCQcq9QXWRC5hoB0o-_zHQUqZI5rMcz_kbMgvN5jr63LeYA4Cj-c6F5Ugmx6DgVf@2Jqm%MafecpgooqreJ53P-QTS'
)
# Now create files with all those names in the same parent directory.
# It should not fail since a 4K leaf has enough space for them.
for name in "${names[@]}"; do
touch $MNT/$name
done# Now add one more file name that causes a crc32c hash collision. # This should fail, but it should not turn the filesystem into RO mode # (which could be exploited by malicious users) due to a transaction
# abort. touch $MNT/'W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt'
# Check that we are able to create another file, with a name that does not cause
# a crc32c hash collision. echo -n "hello world" > $MNT/baz
# Unmount and mount again, verify file baz exists and with the right content. umount $MNT mount $DEV $MNT echo "File baz content: $(cat $MNT/baz)"
umount $MNT
When running the reproducer:
$ ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh (...) touch: cannot touch '/mnt/sdi/W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt': Value too large for defined data type ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh: line 57: /mnt/sdi/baz: Read-only file system cat: /mnt/sdi/baz: No such file or directory File baz content:
And the transaction abort stack trace in dmesg/syslog:
$ dmesg (...) [758240.509761] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [758240.510668] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75) [758240.511577] WARNING: fs/btrfs/inode.c:6854 at btrfs_create_new_inode+0x805/0xb50 [btrfs], CPU#6: touch/888644 [758240.513513] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...) [758240.523221] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 888644 Comm: touch Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [758240.524621] Tainted: [W]=WARN [758240.525037] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [758240.526331] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_new_inode+0x80b/0xb50 [btrfs] [758240.527093] Code: 0f 82 cf (...) [758240.529211] RSP: 0018:ffffce64418fbb48 EFLAGS: 00010292 [758240.529935] RAX: 00000000ffffffd3 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffb5 [758240.531040] RDX: 0000000d04f33e06 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919dd0 [758240.531920] RBP: ffffce64418fbc10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffb5 [758240.532928] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8e52c0000000 R12: ffff8e53eee7d0f0 [758240.533818] R13: ffff8e57f70932a0 R14: ffff8e5417629568 R15: 0000000000000000 [758240.534664] FS: 00007f1959a2a740(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27cae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [758240.535821] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [758240.536644] CR2: 00007f1959b10ce0 CR3: 000000012a2cc005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [758240.537517] Call Trace: [758240.537828] <TASK> [758240.538099] btrfs_create_common+0xbf/0x140 [btrfs] [758240.538760] path_openat+0x111a/0x15b0 [758240.539252] do_filp_open+0xc2/0x170 [758240.539699] ? preempt_count_add+0x47/0xa0 [758240.540200] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xe4/0x1a0 [758240.540800] ? __check_object_size+0x1b3/0x230 [758240.541661] ? alloc_fd+0x118/0x180 [758240.542315] do_sys_openat2+0x70/0xd0 [758240.543012] __x64_sys_openat+0x50/0xa0 [758240.543723] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20 [758240.544462] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [758240.545397] RIP: 0033:0x7f1959abc687 [758240.546019] Code: 48 89 fa (...) [758240.548522] RSP: 002b:00007ffe16ff8690 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [758240.566278] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1959a2a740 RCX: 00007f1959abc687 [758240.567068] RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffe16ffa333 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c [758240.567860] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [758240.568707] R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561eec7c4b90 [758240.569712] R13: 0000561eec7c311f R14: 00007ffe16ffa333 R15: 0000000000000000 [758240.570758] </TASK> [758240.571040] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [758240.571681] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in btrfs_create_new_inode:6854: errno=-75 unknown [758240.572899] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly
Fix this by checking for hash collision, and if the adding a new name is possible, early in btrfs_create_new_inode() before we do any tree updates, so that we don't need to abort the transaction if we cannot add the new name due to the leaf size limit.
A test case for fstests will be sent soon.
--- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +19 -0
@@ -6478,6 +6478,25 @@ int btrfs_create_new_inode(struct btrfs_int ret;bool xa_reserved = false; +if (!args->orphan && !args->subvol) { +/* +* Before anything else, check if we can add the name to the +* parent directory. We want to avoid a dir item overflow in +* case we have an existing dir item due to existing name +* hash collisions. We do this check here before we call +* btrfs_add_link() down below so that we can avoid a +* transaction abort (which could be exploited by malicious +* users). +* +* For subvolumes we already do this in btrfs_mksubvol(). +*/ + ret =btrfs_check_dir_item_collision (BTRFS_I (dir)->root, +btrfs_ino (BTRFS_I (dir)), + name); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + } + path =btrfs_alloc_path ();if (!path)return -ENOMEM ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 289/333 btrfs: fix transaction abort on set received ioctl due to item overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 87f2c46003fce4d739138aab4af1942b1afdadac upstream.
If the set received ioctl fails due to an item overflow when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL we have to abort the transaction since we did some metadata updates before.
This means that if a user calls this ioctl with the same received UUID field for a lot of subvolumes, we will hit the overflow, trigger the transaction abort and turn the filesystem into RO mode. A malicious user could exploit this, and this ioctl does not even requires that a user has admin privileges (CAP_SYS_ADMIN), only that he/she owns the subvolume.
Fix this by doing an early check for item overflow before starting a transaction. This is also race safe because we are holding the subvol_sem semaphore in exclusive (write) mode.
A test case for fstests will follow soon.
--- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +19 -2
@@ -3984,6 +3984,25 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_su goto out; } + received_uuid_changed =memcmp (root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid, +BTRFS_UUID_SIZE ); + +/* +* Before we attempt to add the new received uuid, check if we have room +* for it in case there's already an item. If the size of the existing +* item plus this root's ID (u64) exceeds the maximum item size, we can +* return here without the need to abort a transaction. If we don't do +* this check, the btrfs_uuid_tree_add() call below would fail with +* -EOVERFLOW and result in a transaction abort. Malicious users could +* exploit this to turn the fs into RO mode. +*/ +if (received_uuid_changed && !btrfs_is_empty_uuid (sa->uuid)) { + ret =btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow (fs_info, sa->uuid, +BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; + } +/* * 1 - root item * 2 - uuid items (received uuid + subvol uuid)
@@ -3999,8 +4018,6 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_su sa->rtime.sec = ct.tv_sec; sa->rtime.nsec = ct.tv_nsec; - received_uuid_changed =memcmp (root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid, -BTRFS_UUID_SIZE );if (received_uuid_changed && !btrfs_is_empty_uuid (root_item->received_uuid)) { ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(trans, root_item->received_uuid,
fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c +38 -0
@@ -227,6 +227,44 @@ out:return ret; } +/* +* Check if we can add one root ID to a UUID key. +* If the key does not yet exists, we can, otherwise only if extended item does +* not exceeds the maximum item size permitted by the leaf size. +* +* Returns 0 on success, negative value on error. +*/ +int btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow (struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, +const u8 *uuid,u8 type) +{ +BTRFS_PATH_AUTO_FREE (path); +int ret; +u32 item_size; +struct btrfs_key key; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!fs_info->uuid_root)) +return -EINVAL ; + + path =btrfs_alloc_path (); +if (!path) +return -ENOMEM ; + +btrfs_uuid_to_key (uuid, type, &key); + ret =btrfs_search_slot (NULL , fs_info->uuid_root, &key, path,0 ,0 ); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; +if (ret >0 ) +return 0 ; + + item_size =btrfs_item_size (path->nodes[0 ], path->slots[0 ]); + +if (sizeof (struct btrfs_item ) + item_size +sizeof (u64) > +BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE (fs_info)) +return -EOVERFLOW ; + +return 0 ; +} +static int btrfs_uuid_iter_rem (struct btrfs_root *uuid_root,u8 *uuid,u8 type,u64 subid) {
fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h +2 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ int btrfs_uuid_tree_add(struct btrfs_tra u64 subid);int btrfs_uuid_tree_remove (struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,const u8 *uuid,u8 type,u64 subid); +int btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow (struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, +const u8 *uuid,u8 type);int btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate (struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);int btrfs_create_uuid_tree (struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);int btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread (void *data);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 290/333 btrfs: add missing RCU unlock in error path in try_release_subpage_extent_buffer()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit b2840e33127ce0eea880504b7f133e780f567a9b upstream.
Call rcu_read_lock() before exiting the loop in try_release_subpage_extent_buffer() because there is a rcu_read_unlock() call past the loop.
This has been detected by the Clang thread-safety analyzer.
--- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +1 -0
@@ -4478,6 +4478,7 @@ static int try_release_subpage_extent_bu*/ if (!test_and_clear_bit (EXTENT_BUFFER_TREE_REF , &eb->bflags)) {spin_unlock (&eb->refs_lock); +rcu_read_lock ();break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 291/333 btrfs: abort transaction on failure to update root in the received subvol ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 0f475ee0ebce5c9492b260027cd95270191675fa upstream.
If we failed to update the root we don't abort the transaction, which is wrong since we already used the transaction to remove an item from the uuid tree.
--- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +2 -1
@@ -4039,7 +4039,8 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_su ret =btrfs_update_root (trans, fs_info->tree_root, &root->root_key, &root->root_item); -if (ret <0 ) { +if (unlikely (ret <0 )) { +btrfs_abort_transaction (trans, ret);btrfs_end_transaction (trans); goto out; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 292/333 iio: dac: ds4424: reject -128 RAW value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>
commit 5187e03b817c26c1c3bcb2645a612ea935c4be89 upstream.
The DS442x DAC uses sign-magnitude encoding, so -128 cannot be represented in hardware (7-bit magnitude).
Previously, passing -128 resulted in a truncated value that programmed 0mA (magnitude 0) instead of the expected maximum negative current, effectively failing silently.
Reject -128 to avoid producing the wrong current.
--- drivers/iio/dac/ds4424.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/dac/ds4424.c +1 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static int ds4424_write_raw(struct iio_dswitch (mask) {case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW : -if (val <S8_MIN || val >S8_MAX ) +if (val <=S8_MIN || val >S8_MAX )return -EINVAL ;if (val >0 ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 293/333 iio: frequency: adf4377: Fix duplicated soft reset mask
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeungJu Cheon <[email protected]>
commit 6c8bf4b604a8a6346ca71f1c027fa01c2c2e04cb upstream.
The regmap_read_poll_timeout() uses ADF4377_0000_SOFT_RESET_R_MSK twice instead of checking both SOFT_RESET_MSK (bit 0) and SOFT_RESET_R_MSK (bit 7). This causes an incomplete reset status check.
The code first sets both SOFT_RESET and SOFT_RESET_R bits to 1 via regmap_update_bits(), then polls for them to be cleared. Since we set both bits before polling, we should be waiting for both to clear.
Fix by using both masks as done in regmap_update_bits() above.
--- drivers/iio/frequency/adf4377.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/frequency/adf4377.c +1 -1
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ static int adf4377_soft_reset(struct adfreturn ret;return regmap_read_poll_timeout (st->regmap,0x0 , read_val, - !(read_val & (ADF4377_0000_SOFT_RESET_R_MSK | + !(read_val & (ADF4377_0000_SOFT_RESET_MSK |ADF4377_0000_SOFT_RESET_R_MSK )),200 ,200 *100 ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 294/333 iio: chemical: sps30_serial: fix buffer size in sps30_serial_read_meas()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
commit c3914ce1963c4db25e186112c90fa5d2361e9e0a upstream.
sizeof(num) evaluates to sizeof(size_t) which is 8 bytes on 64-bit, but the buffer elements are only 4 bytes. The same function already uses sizeof(*meas) on line 312, making the mismatch evident. Use sizeof(*meas) consistently.
--- drivers/iio/chemical/sps30_serial.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/chemical/sps30_serial.c +1 -1
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int sps30_serial_read_meas(structif (msleep_interruptible (1000 ))return -EINTR ; - ret =sps30_serial_command (state,SPS30_SERIAL_READ_MEAS ,NULL ,0 , meas, num *sizeof (num)); + ret =sps30_serial_command (state,SPS30_SERIAL_READ_MEAS ,NULL ,0 , meas, num *sizeof (*meas));if (ret <0 )return ret;/* if measurements aren't ready sensor returns empty frame */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 295/333 iio: chemical: sps30_i2c: fix buffer size in sps30_i2c_read_meas()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
commit 216345f98cae7fcc84f49728c67478ac00321c87 upstream.
sizeof(num) evaluates to sizeof(size_t) (8 bytes on 64-bit) instead of the intended __be32 element size (4 bytes). Use sizeof(*meas) to correctly match the buffer element type.
--- drivers/iio/chemical/sps30_i2c.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/chemical/sps30_i2c.c +1 -1
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static int sps30_i2c_read_meas(struct spif (!sps30_i2c_meas_ready (state))return -ETIMEDOUT ; -return sps30_i2c_command (state,SPS30_I2C_READ_MEAS ,NULL ,0 , meas,sizeof (num) * num); +return sps30_i2c_command (state,SPS30_I2C_READ_MEAS ,NULL ,0 , meas,sizeof (*meas) * num); }static int sps30_i2c_clean_fan (struct sps30_state *state)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 296/333 iio: magnetometer: tlv493d: remove erroneous shift in X-axis data
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
commit 82ee91d6b15f06b6094eea2c26afe0032fe8e177 upstream.
TLV493D_BX2_MAG_X_AXIS_LSB is defined as GENMASK(7, 4). FIELD_GET() already right-shifts bits [7:4] to [3:0], so the additional >> 4 discards most of the X-axis low nibble. The Y and Z axes correctly omit this extra shift. Remove it.
--- drivers/iio/magnetometer/tlv493d.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/magnetometer/tlv493d.c +1 -1
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static s16 tlv493d_get_channel_data(u8 *b, enum tlv493d_channels ch)switch (ch) {case TLV493D_AXIS_X : val =FIELD_GET (TLV493D_BX_MAG_X_AXIS_MSB , b[TLV493D_RD_REG_BX ]) <<4 | -FIELD_GET (TLV493D_BX2_MAG_X_AXIS_LSB , b[TLV493D_RD_REG_BX2 ]) >>4 ; +FIELD_GET (TLV493D_BX2_MAG_X_AXIS_LSB , b[TLV493D_RD_REG_BX2 ]);break ;case TLV493D_AXIS_Y : val = FIELD_GET(TLV493D_BY_MAG_Y_AXIS_MSB, b[TLV493D_RD_REG_BY]) << 4 |
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 297/333 iio: potentiometer: mcp4131: fix double application of wiper shift
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Schmid <[email protected]>
commit 85e4614524dca6c0a43874f475a17de2b9725648 upstream.
The MCP4131 wiper address is shifted twice when preparing the SPI command in mcp4131_write_raw().
The address is already shifted when assigned to the local variable "address", but is then shifted again when written to data->buf[0]. This results in an incorrect command being sent to the device and breaks wiper writes to the second channel.
Remove the second shift and use the pre-shifted address directly when composing the SPI transfer.
--- drivers/iio/potentiometer/mcp4131.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/potentiometer/mcp4131.c +1 -1
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int mcp4131_write_raw(struct iio_mutex_lock (&data->lock); - data->buf[0 ] = address <<MCP4131_WIPER_SHIFT ; + data->buf[0 ] = address; data->buf[0 ] |=MCP4131_WRITE | (val >>8 ); data->buf[1 ] = val &0xFF ;/* 8 bits here */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 298/333 iio: chemical: bme680: Fix measurement wait duration calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chris Spencer <[email protected]>
commit f55b9510cd9437da3a0efa08b089caeb47595ff1 upstream.
This function refers to the Bosch BME680 API as the source of the calculation, but one of the constants does not match the Bosch implementation. This appears to be a simple transposition of two digits, resulting in a wait time that is too short. This can cause the following 'device measurement cycle incomplete' check to occasionally fail, returning EBUSY to user space.
Adjust the constant to match the Bosch implementation and resolve the EBUSY errors.
--- drivers/iio/chemical/bme680_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/chemical/bme680_core.c +1 -1
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static int bme680_wait_for_eoc(struct bm* + heater duration */ int wait_eoc_us = ((data->oversampling_temp + data->oversampling_press + - data->oversampling_humid) *1936 ) + (477 *4 ) + + data->oversampling_humid) *1963 ) + (477 *4 ) + (477 *5 ) +1000 + (data->heater_dur *1000 );fsleep (wait_eoc_us);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 299/333 iio: buffer: Fix wait_queue not being removed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>
commit 064234044056c93a3719d6893e6e5a26a94a61b6 upstream.
In the edge case where the IIO device is unregistered while we're buffering, we were directly returning an error without removing the wait queue. Instead, set 'ret' and break out of the loop.
--- drivers/iio/industrialio-buffer.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/industrialio-buffer.c +4 -2
@@ -228,8 +228,10 @@ static ssize_t iio_buffer_write(struct f written =0 ;add_wait_queue (&rb->pollq, &wait); do { - if (!indio_dev->info) - return -ENODEV; + if (!indio_dev->info) { + ret = -ENODEV; + break; + } if (!iio_buffer_space_available(rb)) { if (signal_pending(current)) {