FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026032010-shredding-stargazer-b481@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 11:33:35 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache
The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).
When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner, nfsd4_encode_operation() copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer via read_bytes_from_xdr_buf() with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.
This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.
We could fix this by increasing NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE to allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.
Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE before copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, set rp_buflen to 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +7 -2
@@ -6281,9 +6281,14 @@ nfsd4_encode_operation(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, struct nfsd4_op *op)int len = xdr->buf->len - (op_status_offset +XDR_UNIT ); so->so_replay.rp_status = op->status; - so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len; -read_bytes_from_xdr_buf (xdr->buf, op_status_offset +XDR_UNIT , +if (len <=NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE ) { + so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len; +read_bytes_from_xdr_buf (xdr->buf, + op_status_offset +XDR_UNIT , so->so_replay.rp_buf, len); + }else { + so->so_replay.rp_buflen =0 ; + } } status: op->status = nfsd4_map_status(op->status,
fs/nfsd/state.h +12 -5
@@ -541,11 +541,18 @@ struct nfs4_client_reclaim {struct xdr_netobj cr_princhash; }; -/* A reasonable value for REPLAY_ISIZE was estimated as follows: -* The OPEN response, typically the largest, requires -* 4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) + 8(verifier) + -* 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + 4(deleg. recall flag) + -* 20(deleg. space limit) + ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes +/* +* REPLAY_ISIZE is sized for an OPEN response with delegation: +* 4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) + +* 8(verifier) + 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + +* 4(deleg. recall flag) + 20(deleg. space limit) + +* ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes +* +* Some responses can exceed this. A LOCK denial includes the conflicting +* lock owner, which can be up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT). Responses +* larger than REPLAY_ISIZE are not cached in rp_ibuf; only rp_status is +* saved. Enlarging this constant increases the size of every +* nfs4_stateowner. */ #define NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE 112
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2 ]
The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).
When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner, nfsd4_encode_operation() copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer via read_bytes_from_xdr_buf() with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.
This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.
We could fix this by increasing NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE to allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.
Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE before copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, set rp_buflen to 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 9 +++++++-- fs/nfsd/state.h | 17 ++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +7 -2
@@ -5439,9 +5439,14 @@ nfsd4_encode_operation(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, struct nfsd4_op *op)int len = xdr->buf->len - post_err_offset; so->so_replay.rp_status = op->status; - so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len; -read_bytes_from_xdr_buf (xdr->buf, post_err_offset, +if (len <=NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE ) { + so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len; +read_bytes_from_xdr_buf (xdr->buf, + post_err_offset, so->so_replay.rp_buf, len); + }else { + so->so_replay.rp_buflen =0 ; + } } status: *p = op->status;
fs/nfsd/state.h +12 -5
@@ -430,11 +430,18 @@ struct nfs4_client_reclaim {struct xdr_netobj cr_princhash; }; -/* A reasonable value for REPLAY_ISIZE was estimated as follows: -* The OPEN response, typically the largest, requires -* 4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) + 8(verifier) + -* 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + 4(deleg. recall flag) + -* 20(deleg. space limit) + ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes +/* +* REPLAY_ISIZE is sized for an OPEN response with delegation: +* 4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) + +* 8(verifier) + 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + +* 4(deleg. recall flag) + 20(deleg. space limit) + +* ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes +* +* Some responses can exceed this. A LOCK denial includes the conflicting +* lock owner, which can be up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT). Responses +* larger than REPLAY_ISIZE are not cached in rp_ibuf; only rp_status is +* saved. Enlarging this constant increases the size of every +* nfs4_stateowner. */ #define NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE 112
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache
Hi,
Quoted 30 lines · Sasha Levin
From: Jeff Layton<[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2]The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (
NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner,
nfsd4_encode_operation()copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer viaread_bytes_from_xdr_buf()with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.
We could fix this by increasing
NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZEto allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against
NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZEbefore copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, setrp_buflento 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.
Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Reported-by Nicholas Carlini<[email protected]>Tested-by Nicholas Carlini<[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton<[email protected]>Signed-off-by Chuck Lever<[email protected]>[ replaced `op_status_offset + XDR_UNIT` with existing `post_err_offset` variable ]Signed-off-by Sasha Levin<[email protected]>
This patch does not appear to be queued in 5.15.y yet, although it is already present in 5.10.y and 6.1.y.
Could this please also be queued for 5.15.y?
It seems it may have been missed inadvertently.
Thanks,
Alok
Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache
Quoted 43 lines · ALOK TIWARI
Hi,
Quoted 30 lines · Sasha Levin
From: Jeff Layton<[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2]The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (
NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner,
nfsd4_encode_operation()copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer viaread_bytes_from_xdr_buf()with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.
We could fix this by increasing
NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZEto allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against
NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZEbefore copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, setrp_buflento 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Reported-by Nicholas Carlini<[email protected]>Tested-by Nicholas Carlini<[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton<[email protected]>Signed-off-by Chuck Lever<[email protected]>[ replaced `op_status_offset + XDR_UNIT` with existing `post_err_offset` variable ]Signed-off-by Sasha Levin<[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
This patch does not appear to be queued in 5.15.y yet, although it is already present in 5.10.y and 6.1.y.
Could this please also be queued for 5.15.y?
It seems it may have been missed inadvertently.
Odd, I did miss it, now added, thanks!
greg k-h