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xfrm6: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr()

PATCH Superseded [email protected] 3 participants 5 messages Mar 28 – Apr 7

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 xfrm6: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr()

From: Nicholas Carlini <[email protected]>

The bounds check guarding sp->xvec[sp->len++] uses == where >= is required. When sp->len has already reached XFRM_MAX_DEPTH via prior ESP processing in xfrm_input(), the check (1 + 6 == 6) is false and the write goes out of bounds into the adjacent skbuff_ext_cache slab object.

An unprivileged local user can trigger this by entering a user+network namespace, configuring six transport-mode ESP SAs plus one MIP6 routing SA, and injecting an IPv6 packet with six ESP layers followed by multiple Routing Header Type 2 extensions.

The check was correct (>) when the function was introduced, but was changed to == during a refactor in 2007.

Fixes 9473e1f631de ("[XFRM] MIPv6: Fix to input RO state correctly.")
---
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +1 -1
index 9005fc156a20..a958c08589d6 100644
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
         goto drop;
     }
 
-    if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
+    if (1 + sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
         XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
         goto drop;
     }

--
2.39.5

maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · On Sat, Mar 28, 2026 at 04:35:16PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:

From: Nicholas Carlini <[email protected]>

The bounds check guarding sp->xvec[sp->len++] uses == where >= is required. When sp->len has already reached XFRM_MAX_DEPTH via prior ESP processing in xfrm_input(), the check (1 + 6 == 6) is false and the write goes out of bounds into the adjacent skbuff_ext_cache slab object.

An unprivileged local user can trigger this by entering a user+network namespace, configuring six transport-mode ESP SAs plus one MIP6 routing SA, and injecting an IPv6 packet with six ESP layers followed by multiple Routing Header Type 2 extensions.

The check was correct (>) when the function was introduced, but was changed to == during a refactor in 2007.

Fixes 9473e1f631de ("[XFRM] MIPv6: Fix to input RO state correctly.")
---
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +0 -0
index 9005fc156a20..a958c08589d6 100644

net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr, · line 252

Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +1 -1
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
         goto drop;
     }
 
-    if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
+    if (1 + sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
         XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
         goto drop;
     }

Your patch is malformed (whitespaces instead of tabs). Please fix this and rebase on top of the ipsec tree.

Thanks!

#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 xfrm6: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr()

From: Nicholas Carlini <[email protected]>

The bounds check guarding sp->xvec[sp->len++] uses == where >= is required. When sp->len has already reached XFRM_MAX_DEPTH via prior ESP processing in xfrm_input(), the check (1 + 6 == 6) is false and the write goes out of bounds into the adjacent skbuff_ext_cache slab object.

An unprivileged local user can trigger this by entering a user+network namespace, configuring six transport-mode ESP SAs plus one MIP6 routing SA, and injecting an IPv6 packet with six ESP layers followed by multiple Routing Header Type 2 extensions.

The check was correct (>) when the function was introduced, but was changed to == during a refactor in 2007.

Fixes 9473e1f631de ("[XFRM] MIPv6: Fix to input RO state correctly.")

---
v1 -> v2: fix whitespace (tabs), rebase on ipsec tree (Steffen Klassert)

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]

 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +1 -1
index 9005fc156a2..a958c08589d 100644
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
 		goto drop;
 	}
 
-	if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
+	if (1 + sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
 		XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
 		goto drop;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#3 lore raw

net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr, · line 252

Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 1 Apr 2026 at 10:26, <[email protected]> wrote:
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +1 -1
-       if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
+       if (1 + sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
                XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
                goto drop;
        }

If you look at other places where sp->len is incremented, you will notice the guard condition is always (sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH). This bug exists because in xfrm6_input.c, the greatest valid index is taken to be XFRM_MAX_DEPTH - 2 when it should be XFRM_MAX_DEPTH - 1. Therefore, The correct fix should be using the common guard not changing the guard to use >=

On a tangential note, There is no guard present before the increment in xfrm_output.c which is probably another OOB bug

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · I Viswanath

net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr, · line 252

Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 1 Apr 2026 at 10:26, <[email protected]> wrote:
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +1 -1
-       if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
+       if (1 + sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
                XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
                goto drop;
        }

If you look at other places where sp->len is incremented, you will notice the guard condition is always (sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH). This bug exists because in xfrm6_input.c, the greatest valid index is taken to be XFRM_MAX_DEPTH - 2 when it should be XFRM_MAX_DEPTH - 1. Therefore, The correct fix should be using the common guard not changing the guard to use >=

Quoted 2 lines

On a tangential note, There is no guard present before the increment in xfrm_output.c which is probably another OOB bug

Nicholas, please have a look if you can update your patch based on these comments.

Thanks!