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perf header: Validate build_id filename length to prevent buffer overflow

PATCH Applied SeungJu Cheon 2 participants 2 messages Apr 2 – Apr 4 perf events

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PATCH v3 1/1 perf header: Validate build_id filename length to prevent buffer overflow

The build_id parsing functions calculate a filename length from the event header size and read directly into a stack buffer of PATH_MAX bytes without bounds checking. A malformed perf.data file with a crafted header.size can cause the length to be negative or exceed PATH_MAX, resulting in a stack buffer overflow.

Add bounds checking for the filename length in both perf_header__read_build_ids() and the ABI quirk variant. Print a warning message when invalid length is detected.

---
v3:
- Fix printf format specifier: %d -> %zd for ssize_t (Sashiko)
v2:
- Add warning message when invalid filename length detected

---
 tools/perf/util/header.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/header.c +10 -0
index 9142a8ba4019..9ffc0f4ca6d1 100644
@@ -2545,6 +2545,11 @@ static int perf_header__read_build_ids_abi_quirk(struct perf_header *header,
 			perf_event_header__bswap(&old_bev.header);
 
 		len = old_bev.header.size - sizeof(old_bev);
+		if (len < 0 || len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			pr_warning("invalid build_id filename length %zd\n", len);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
 		if (readn(input, filename, len) != len)
 			return -1;
 
@@ -2587,6 +2592,11 @@ static int perf_header__read_build_ids(struct perf_header *header,
 			perf_event_header__bswap(&bev.header);
 
 		len = bev.header.size - sizeof(bev);
+		if (len < 0 || len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			pr_warning("invalid build_id filename length %zd\n", len);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		if (readn(input, filename, len) != len)
 			goto out;
 		/*
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
maintainer Applied
#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · SeungJu Cheon

The build_id parsing functions calculate a filename length from the event header size and read directly into a stack buffer of PATH_MAX bytes without bounds checking. A malformed perf.data file with a crafted header.size can cause the length to be negative or exceed PATH_MAX, resulting in a stack buffer overflow.

Add bounds checking for the filename length in both perf_header__read_build_ids() and the ABI quirk variant. Print a warning message when invalid length is detected.

[...]

Applied to perf-tools-next, thanks!

Best regards,
Namhyung