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staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption

PATCH In review Delene Tchio Romuald 2 participants 2 messages Apr 4 – Apr 5

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption

In rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is declared as signed int and computed as:

  length = len - hdrlen - iv_len;

If the received frame is shorter than the combined header and IV lengths, length becomes negative. It is then passed to arc4_crypt() which takes a u32 parameter, causing the negative value to be implicitly cast to a very large unsigned value (e.g., -8 becomes 4294967288). This results in a massive out-of-bounds read and write on the heap via arc4_crypt(), and a similar overflow at the subsequent crc32_le() call using length - 4.

Add a minimum frame length check before the subtraction to ensure length is always positive.

---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c +6 -0
index b489babe7..807f4f3c7 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,12 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter  *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 		memcpy(&wepkey[0], iv, 3);
 		/* memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength); */
 		memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[keyindex].skey[0], keylength);
+
+		/* Ensure the frame is long enough for WEP decryption */
+		if (((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len <=
+		    prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len)
+			return;
+
 		length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
 
 		payload = pframe + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->hdrlen;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Delene Tchio Romuald

In rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is declared as signed int and computed as:

  length = len - hdrlen - iv_len;

If the received frame is shorter than the combined header and IV lengths, length becomes negative. It is then passed to arc4_crypt() which takes a u32 parameter, causing the negative value to be implicitly cast to a very large unsigned value (e.g., -8 becomes 4294967288). This results in a massive out-of-bounds read and write on the heap via arc4_crypt(), and a similar overflow at the subsequent crc32_le() call using length - 4.

Quoted 4 lines

Add a minimum frame length check before the subtraction to ensure length is always positive.

since you cc'd stable, a Fixes tag is needed.

...

--
regards,
jose a. p-a