xfrm: Drop support for HMAC-RIPEMD-160
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 xfrm: Drop support for HMAC-RIPEMD-160
Drop support for HMAC-RIPEMD-160 from IPsec to reduce the UAPI surface and simplify future maintenance. It's almost certainly unused.
RIPEMD-160 received some attention in the early 2000s when SHA-* weren't quite as well established. But it never received much adoption outside of certain niches such as Bitcoin.
It's actually unclear that Linux + IPsec + HMAC-RIPEMD-160 has *ever* been used, even historically. When support for it was added in 2003, it was done so in a "cleanup" commit without any justification [1]. It didn't actually work until someone happened to fix it 5 years later [2]. That person didn't use or test it either [3]. Finally, also note that "hmac(rmd160)" is by far the slowest of the algorithms in aalg_list[].
Of course, today IPsec is usually used with an AEAD, such as AES-GCM. But even for IPsec users still using a dedicated auth algorithm, they almost certainly aren't using, and shouldn't use, HMAC-RIPEMD-160.
Thus, let's just drop support for it. Note: no kconfig update is needed, since CRYPTO_RMD160 wasn't actually being selected anyway.
References:
[1] linux-history commit d462985fc1941a47
("[IPSEC]: Clean up key manager algorithm handling.")
[2] linux commit a13366c632132bb9
("xfrm: xfrm_algo: correct usage of RIPEMD-160")
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 20 -------------------- tools/testing/selftests/net/ipsec.c | 8 ++------ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c +0 -20
@@ -288,30 +288,10 @@ static struct xfrm_algo_desc aalg_list[] = { .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, .sadb_alg_minbits = 512, .sadb_alg_maxbits = 512 } }, -{ - .name = "hmac(rmd160)", - .compat = "rmd160", - - .uinfo = { - .auth = { - .icv_truncbits = 96, - .icv_fullbits = 160, - } - }, - - .pfkey_supported = 1, - - .desc = { - .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC, - .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, - .sadb_alg_minbits = 160, - .sadb_alg_maxbits = 160 - } -}, { .name = "xcbc(aes)", .uinfo = { .auth = {
tools/testing/selftests/net/ipsec.c +2 -6
@@ -60,12 +60,10 @@#define grchild_ip (nr) (4*nr + 2)#define VETH_FMT "ktst-%d"#define VETH_LEN 12 -#define XFRM_ALGO_NR_KEYS 29 -static int nsfd_parent =-1 ;static int nsfd_childa =-1 ;static int nsfd_childb =-1 ;static long page_size;
@@ -94,11 +92,10 @@ struct xfrm_key_entry xfrm_key_entries[] = { {"cmac(aes)", 128}, {"xcbc(aes)", 128}, {"cbc(cast5)", 128}, {"cbc(serpent)", 128}, {"hmac(sha1)", 160}, - {"hmac(rmd160)", 160}, {"cbc(des3_ede)", 192}, {"hmac(sha256)", 256}, {"cbc(aes)", 256}, {"cbc(camellia)", 256}, {"cbc(twofish)", 256},
@@ -811,11 +808,11 @@ static int do_ping(int cmd_fd, char *buf, size_t buf_len, struct in_addr from,static int xfrm_fill_key (char *name,char *buf,size_t buf_len,unsigned int *key_len) {int i; -for (i =0 ; i <XFRM_ALGO_NR_KEYS ; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xfrm_key_entries); i++) {if (strncmp (name, xfrm_key_entries[i].algo_name,ALGO_LEN ) ==0 ) *key_len = xfrm_key_entries[i].key_len; }if (*key_len > buf_len) {
@@ -2059,12 +2056,11 @@ static int write_desc(int proto, int test_desc_fd, }int proto_list[] = {IPPROTO_AH ,IPPROTO_COMP ,IPPROTO_ESP };char *ah_list[] = {"digest_null" ,"hmac(md5)" ,"hmac(sha1)" ,"hmac(sha256)" , -"hmac(sha384)" ,"hmac(sha512)" ,"hmac(rmd160)" , -"xcbc(aes)" ,"cmac(aes)" +"hmac(sha384)" ,"hmac(sha512)" ,"xcbc(aes)" ,"cmac(aes)" };char *comp_list[] = {"deflate" , #if 0 /* No compression backend realization */
base-commit: be14d13625c9b070c33c423026b598ed65695225
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 21 lines · Eric Biggers
Drop support for HMAC-RIPEMD-160 from IPsec to reduce the UAPI surface and simplify future maintenance. It's almost certainly unused.
RIPEMD-160 received some attention in the early 2000s when SHA-* weren't quite as well established. But it never received much adoption outside of certain niches such as Bitcoin.
It's actually unclear that Linux + IPsec + HMAC-RIPEMD-160 has *ever* been used, even historically. When support for it was added in 2003, it was done so in a "cleanup" commit without any justification [1]. It didn't actually work until someone happened to fix it 5 years later [2]. That person didn't use or test it either [3]. Finally, also note that "hmac(rmd160)" is by far the slowest of the algorithms in aalg_list[].
Of course, today IPsec is usually used with an AEAD, such as AES-GCM. But even for IPsec users still using a dedicated auth algorithm, they almost certainly aren't using, and shouldn't use, HMAC-RIPEMD-160.
Thus, let's just drop support for it. Note: no kconfig update is needed, since
CRYPTO_RMD160wasn't actually being selected anyway.
Quoted 8 lines
References:
[1] linux-history commitd462985fc1941a47
("[IPSEC]: Clean up key manager algorithm handling.")
[2] linux commita13366c632132bb9
("xfrm:xfrm_algo: correct usage of RIPEMD-160")
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks a lot Eric!