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openssh: Fix CVE-2026-35414

PATCH In review Ashish Sharma 2 participants 3 messages Apr 6 – May 7

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PATCH 1/1 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-35414

The match_principals_option() function in auth2-pubkeyfile.c used match_list() (which performs glob-based, comma-separated matching) instead of exact string comparison. When a certificate principal name contains a comma, match_list() splits it into multiple patterns, allowing an attacker to craft a principal name that gains unauthorized access.

Fix by replacing match_list() with a strsep+strcmp loop for exact principal matching.

Backport of commit fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa from openssh-portable 10.3p1.

CVE: CVE-2026-35414

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch      | 78 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch new file +78 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbc0968a3f
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2026 07:48:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix matching of authorized_keys principals
+ option against certificate principals containing commas
+
+When matching an authorized_keys principals="" option against a list
+of principals in a certificate, an incorrect algorithm (match_list)
+was used that could allow inappropriate matching in cases where a
+principal name in the certificate contains a comma character.
+
+Exploitation requires an authorized_keys principals="" option listing
+more than one principal AND a CA that will issue a certificate encoding
+more than one of those principal names separated by a comma. Typical
+CAs strongly constrain which principal names they will place in a
+certificate. This condition only applies to user-trusted CA keys in
+authorized_keys; the main certificate authentication path
+(TrustedUserCAKeys/AuthorizedPrincipalsFile) is not affected.
+
+Reported by Vladimir Tokarev.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c790e2687c35989ae34a00e709be935c55b16a86
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa]
+CVE: CVE-2026-35414
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <[email protected]>
+---
+ auth2-pubkeyfile.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
+index 896ea19..e729cc5 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include "authfile.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ int
+ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+@@ -146,20 +147,23 @@ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+ static int
+ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+ {
+-	char *result;
++	char *list, *olist, *entry;
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+-	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
+-
+-	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+-		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
+-		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
+-			    result);
+-			free(result);
+-			return 1;
++	olist = list = xstrdup(principal_list);
++	for (;;) {
++		if ((entry = strsep(&list, ",")) == NULL || *entry == '\0')
++			break;
++		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			if (strcmp(entry, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
++				debug3("matched principal from key i"
++				    "options \"%.100s\"", entry);
++				free(olist);
++				return 1;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	free(olist);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 1cdd888ccb..4d0b9afca0 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-35414.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Ashish Sharma via lists.openembedded.org

The match_principals_option() function in auth2-pubkeyfile.c used match_list() (which performs glob-based, comma-separated matching) instead of exact string comparison. When a certificate principal name contains a comma, match_list() splits it into multiple patterns, allowing an attacker to craft a principal name that gains unauthorized access.

Fix by replacing match_list() with a strsep+strcmp loop for exact principal matching.

Quoted 6 lines

Backport of commit fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa from openssh-portable 10.3p1.

CVE: CVE-2026-35414

---

Hello,

Please add a justification in the commit message as to why you think this is the proper patch to handle this CVE.
I would need a trail from a trusted source (Usualy, NVD or the Debian security tracker) to the patch to merge this and I could not find it.

Thanks!

Quoted 101 lines
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch      | 78 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch new file +78 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbc0968a3f
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2026 07:48:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix matching of authorized_keys principals
+ option against certificate principals containing commas
+
+When matching an authorized_keys principals="" option against a list
+of principals in a certificate, an incorrect algorithm (match_list)
+was used that could allow inappropriate matching in cases where a
+principal name in the certificate contains a comma character.
+
+Exploitation requires an authorized_keys principals="" option listing
+more than one principal AND a CA that will issue a certificate encoding
+more than one of those principal names separated by a comma. Typical
+CAs strongly constrain which principal names they will place in a
+certificate. This condition only applies to user-trusted CA keys in
+authorized_keys; the main certificate authentication path
+(TrustedUserCAKeys/AuthorizedPrincipalsFile) is not affected.
+
+Reported by Vladimir Tokarev.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c790e2687c35989ae34a00e709be935c55b16a86
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa]
+CVE: CVE-2026-35414
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <[email protected]>
+---
+ auth2-pubkeyfile.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
+index 896ea19..e729cc5 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include "authfile.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ int
+ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+@@ -146,20 +147,23 @@ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+ static int
+ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+ {
+-	char *result;
++	char *list, *olist, *entry;
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+-	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
+-
+-	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+-		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
+-		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
+-			    result);
+-			free(result);
+-			return 1;
++	olist = list = xstrdup(principal_list);
++	for (;;) {
++		if ((entry = strsep(&list, ",")) == NULL || *entry == '\0')
++			break;
++		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			if (strcmp(entry, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
++				debug3("matched principal from key i"
++				    "options \"%.100s\"", entry);
++				free(olist);
++				return 1;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	free(olist);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 1cdd888ccb..4d0b9afca0 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-35414.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
#2 lore raw
In reply to Ashish Sharma
Quoted 41 lines · Ashish Sharma via lists.openembedded.org

The match_principals_option() function in auth2-pubkeyfile.c used match_list() (which performs glob-based, comma-separated matching) instead of exact string comparison. When a certificate principal name contains a comma, match_list() splits it into multiple patterns, allowing an attacker to craft a principal name that gains unauthorized access.

Fix by replacing match_list() with a strsep+strcmp loop for exact principal matching.

Backport of commit fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa from openssh-portable 10.3p1.

CVE: CVE-2026-35414

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch      | 78 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch new file +14 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbc0968a3f
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2026 07:48:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix matching of authorized_keys principals
+ option against certificate principals containing commas
+
+When matching an authorized_keys principals="" option against a list
+of principals in a certificate, an incorrect algorithm (match_list)
+was used that could allow inappropriate matching in cases where a
+principal name in the certificate contains a comma character.
+
+Exploitation requires an authorized_keys principals="" option listing
+more than one principal AND a CA that will issue a certificate encoding
+more than one of those principal names separated by a comma. Typical

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch line 24

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch new file +10 -0
+CAs strongly constrain which principal names they will place in a
+certificate. This condition only applies to user-trusted CA keys in
+authorized_keys; the main certificate authentication path
+(TrustedUserCAKeys/AuthorizedPrincipalsFile) is not affected.
+
+Reported by Vladimir Tokarev.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c790e2687c35989ae34a00e709be935c55b16a86
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa]

This URL point to a commit quite different than this one (message changed, not the same set of changed files, only one part seem common). Backport differences are expected but non-trivial ones should be explained in the patch body.

Thanks!

Quoted 66 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35414.patch new file +54 -0
+CVE: CVE-2026-35414
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <[email protected]>
+---
+ auth2-pubkeyfile.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
+index 896ea19..e729cc5 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include "authfile.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ int
+ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+@@ -146,20 +147,23 @@ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+ static int
+ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+ {
+-	char *result;
++	char *list, *olist, *entry;
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+-	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
+-
+-	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+-		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
+-		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
+-			    result);
+-			free(result);
+-			return 1;
++	olist = list = xstrdup(principal_list);
++	for (;;) {
++		if ((entry = strsep(&list, ",")) == NULL || *entry == '\0')
++			break;
++		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			if (strcmp(entry, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
++				debug3("matched principal from key i"
++				    "options \"%.100s\"", entry);
++				free(olist);
++				return 1;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	free(olist);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 1cdd888ccb..4d0b9afca0 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-35414.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS