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bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks

PATCH In review Ihor Solodrai 4 participants 6 messages Apr 7 – Apr 11

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Ihor Solodrai

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks

Sleepable build ID parsing can block in __kernel_read() [1], so the stackmap sleepable path must not call it while holding mmap_lock or a per-VMA read lock.

The issue and the fix are similar to a recent procfs patch [2].

Resolve each covered VMA with a stable read-side reference, preferring lock_vma_under_rcu() and falling back to mmap_read_lock() only long enough to acquire the VMA read lock. Take a reference to the backing file, drop the VMA lock, and then parse the build ID through (sleepable) build_id_parse_file().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Fixes 777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.4

---

Below is a sequence of events leading up to this patch.

I noticed a following deadlock splat on bpf-next, when running a subset of selftests/bpf:

#526 uprobe_multi_test:OK
#28 bpf_obj_id:OK

  [   27.561465]
  [   27.561603] ======================================================
  [   27.561899] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [   27.562193] 7.0.0-rc5-g0eeb0094ba03 #3 Tainted: G           OE
  [   27.562523] ------------------------------------------------------
  [   27.562820] uprobe_multi/561 is trying to acquire lock:
  [   27.563071] ff1100010768ba18 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}, at: netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.563556]
  [   27.563556] but task is already holding lock:
  [   27.563845] ff1100010b12a640 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0xfa/0x650
  [   27.564296]
  [   27.564296] which lock already depends on the new lock.
  [   27.564296]
  [   27.564696]
  [   27.564696] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [   27.565044]
  [   27.565044] -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
  [   27.565340]        __might_fault+0xa3/0x100
  [   27.565572]        _copy_to_iter+0xdf/0x1520
  [   27.565786]        copy_page_to_iter+0x1c6/0x2d0
  [   27.566011]        filemap_read+0x5f7/0xbf0
  [   27.566218]        netfs_file_read_iter+0x1ca/0x240
  [   27.566453]        vfs_read+0x482/0x9e0
  [   27.566658]        ksys_read+0x115/0x1f0
  [   27.566852]        do_syscall_64+0xde/0x390
  [   27.567057]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [   27.567322]
  [   27.567322] -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
  [   27.567701]        __lock_acquire+0x1529/0x2a10
  [   27.567923]        lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.568124]        down_read_interruptible+0x55/0x340
  [   27.568368]        netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.568622]        netfs_file_read_iter+0x191/0x240
  [   27.568858]        __kernel_read+0x401/0x850
  [   27.569068]        freader_fetch+0x19b/0x790
  [   27.569279]        __build_id_parse+0xde/0x580
  [   27.569528]        stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x248/0x650
  [   27.569802]        __bpf_get_stack+0x653/0x890
  [   27.570019]        bpf_get_stack_sleepable+0x1d/0x30
  [   27.570257]        bpf_prog_51bb4c0f31ae471b_uprobe_sleepable+0x2d/0x42
  [   27.570594]        uprobe_prog_run+0x425/0x870
  [   27.570816]        uprobe_multi_link_handler+0x58/0xb0
  [   27.571062]        handler_chain+0x234/0x1270
  [   27.571275]        uprobe_notify_resume+0x4de/0xd60
  [   27.571542]        exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xe0/0x480
  [   27.571785]        exc_int3+0x1bd/0x260
  [   27.571973]        asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
  [   27.572169]
  [   27.572169] other info that might help us debug this:
  [   27.572169]
  [   27.572571]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [   27.572571]
  [   27.572854]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [   27.573074]        ----                    ----
  [   27.573293]   rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
  [   27.573502]                                lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
  [   27.573846]                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
  [   27.574135]   rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
  [   27.574364]
  [   27.574364]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [   27.574364]
  [   27.574671] 3 locks held by uprobe_multi/561:
  [   27.574884]  #0: ffffffff852e0038 (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: uprobe_notify_resume+0x229/0xd60
  [   27.575371]  #1: ffffffff852e0038 (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: uprobe_prog_run+0x239/0x870
  [   27.575874]  #2: ff1100010b12a640 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0xfa/0x650
  [   27.576342]
  [   27.576342] stack backtrace:
  [   27.576578] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 561 Comm: uprobe_multi Tainted: G           OE       7.0.0-rc5-g0eeb0094ba03 #3 PREEMPT(full)
  [   27.576586] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  [   27.576588] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-5.el9 11/05/2023
  [   27.576591] Call Trace:
  [   27.576595]  <TASK>
  [   27.576598]  dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
  [   27.576606]  print_circular_bug+0x2e8/0x300
  [   27.576616]  check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150
  [   27.576628]  __lock_acquire+0x1529/0x2a10
  [   27.576642]  ? __pfx_walk_pgd_range+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576651]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576656]  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.576661]  ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x38/0x1f0
  [   27.576672]  lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.576677]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576685]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576693]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576698]  down_read_interruptible+0x55/0x340
  [   27.576702]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576707]  ? __pfx_cmp_ex_search+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576716]  netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576723]  netfs_file_read_iter+0x191/0x240
  [   27.576731]  __kernel_read+0x401/0x850
  [   27.576741]  ? __pfx___kernel_read+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576752]  ? __pfx_fixup_exception+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576761]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576766]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x76/0x100
  [   27.576773]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576777]  ? mtree_range_walk+0x421/0x6c0
  [   27.576785]  freader_fetch+0x19b/0x790
  [   27.576793]  ? mt_find+0x14b/0x340
  [   27.576801]  ? __pfx_freader_fetch+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576805]  ? mt_find+0x29a/0x340
  [   27.576810]  ? mt_find+0x14b/0x340
  [   27.576820]  __build_id_parse+0xde/0x580
  [   27.576832]  ? __pfx___build_id_parse+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576850]  stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x248/0x650
  [   27.576863]  __bpf_get_stack+0x653/0x890
  [   27.576867]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576880]  ? __pfx___bpf_get_stack+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576884]  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.576889]  ? uprobe_prog_run+0x239/0x870
  [   27.576895]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576899]  ? stack_trace_save+0xae/0x100
  [   27.576908]  bpf_get_stack_sleepable+0x1d/0x30
  [   27.576913]  bpf_prog_51bb4c0f31ae471b_uprobe_sleepable+0x2d/0x42
  [   27.576919]  uprobe_prog_run+0x425/0x870
  [   27.576927]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576933]  ? __pfx_uprobe_prog_run+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576937]  ? uprobe_notify_resume+0x413/0xd60
  [   27.576952]  uprobe_multi_link_handler+0x58/0xb0
  [   27.576960]  handler_chain+0x234/0x1270
  [   27.576976]  ? __pfx_handler_chain+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576988]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576992]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
  [   27.576998]  ? __pfx_ri_timer+0x10/0x10
  [   27.577003]  ? timer_init_key+0xf5/0x200
  [   27.577013]  uprobe_notify_resume+0x4de/0xd60
  [   27.577025]  ? uprobe_notify_resume+0x229/0xd60
  [   27.577030]  ? __pfx_uprobe_notify_resume+0x10/0x10
  [   27.577035]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.577039]  ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xfc/0x110
  [   27.577047]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.577051]  ? notify_die+0xe5/0x130
  [   27.577056]  ? __pfx_notify_die+0x10/0x10
  [   27.577063]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.577071]  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xe0/0x480
  [   27.577076]  ? asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
  [   27.577083]  exc_int3+0x1bd/0x260
  [   27.577090]  asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
  [   27.577095] RIP: 0033:0x6c4180
  [   27.577100] Code: c6 05 0b 6f 32 00 01 5d c3 90 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa eb 8a 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <cc> 48 89 e5 31 c0 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 31 c0
  [   27.577104] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbf71ada8 EFLAGS: 00000246
  [   27.577109] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fec9163db7b
  [   27.577112] RDX: 00007ffcbf71adbf RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 00000000007f0000
  [   27.577115] RBP: 00007ffcbf71add0 R08: 00007fec91731330 R09: 00007fec9178d060
  [   27.577118] R10: 00007fec9153ad98 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcbf71af08
  [   27.577120] R13: 0000000000787760 R14: 00000000009eade8 R15: 00007fec917bf000
  [   27.577135]  </TASK>
  #54/1    build_id/nofault-paged-out:OK

It was reproducable, which allowed me to bisect to commit 777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")

Then I used Codex for analysis of the splat, patch and relevant lore discussions, and then asked it to produce a patch draft.

I then asked Puranjay to review the draft, and he advised to use lock_vma_under_rcu() here, which seems appropriate. I also did a bit of refactoring of the LLM-produced code.

I verified the resulting patch fixes the deadlock splat.

---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +71 -9
index da3d328f5c15..017ecbc22c96 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
 #include <linux/buildid.h>
+#include <linux/mmap_lock.h>
 #include "percpu_freelist.h"
 #include "mmap_unlock_work.h"
 
@@ -152,6 +153,65 @@ static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b
 			 : build_id_parse_nofault(vma, build_id, NULL);
 }
 
+static inline void stack_map_build_id_set_ip(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs)
+{
+	id_offs->status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP;
+	memset(id_offs->build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
+}
+
+static struct vm_area_struct *stack_map_lock_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+	vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, ip);
+	if (vma)
+		return vma;
+
+	mmap_read_lock(mm);
+	vma = find_vma(mm, ip);
+	if (range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) && vma_start_read_locked(vma))
+		goto out;
+
+	vma = NULL;
+out:
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+
+	return vma;
+}
+
+static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
+						    u32 trace_nr)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct file *file;
+	u64 ip;
+
+	for (u32 i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
+		ip = READ_ONCE(id_offs[i].ip);
+		vma = stack_map_lock_vma(mm, ip);
+		if (!range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) || !vma->vm_file) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+			if (vma)
+				vma_end_read(vma);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+		vma_end_read(vma);
+
+		/* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
+		if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+		} else {
+			id_offs[i].offset = (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + ip - vma->vm_start;
+			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID;
+		}
+
+		fput(file);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Expects all id_offs[i].ip values to be set to correct initial IPs.
  * They will be subsequently:
@@ -165,23 +225,26 @@ static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b
 static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
 					  u32 trace_nr, bool user, bool may_fault)
 {
-	int i;
 	struct mmap_unlock_irq_work *work = NULL;
 	bool irq_work_busy = bpf_mmap_unlock_get_irq_work(&work);
+	bool has_user_ctx = user && current && current->mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev_vma = NULL;
 	const char *prev_build_id;
+	int i;
+
+	if (may_fault && has_user_ctx) {
+		stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(id_offs, trace_nr);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	/* If the irq_work is in use, fall back to report ips. Same
 	 * fallback is used for kernel stack (!user) on a stackmap with
 	 * build_id.
 	 */
-	if (!user || !current || !current->mm || irq_work_busy ||
-	    !mmap_read_trylock(current->mm)) {
+	if (!has_user_ctx || irq_work_busy || !mmap_read_trylock(current->mm)) {
 		/* cannot access current->mm, fall back to ips */
-		for (i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
-			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP;
-			memset(id_offs[i].build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
-		}
+		for (i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++)
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -196,8 +259,7 @@ static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
 		vma = find_vma(current->mm, ip);
 		if (!vma || fetch_build_id(vma, id_offs[i].build_id, may_fault)) {
 			/* per entry fall back to ips */
-			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP;
-			memset(id_offs[i].build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
 			continue;
 		}
 build_id_valid:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#1 lore raw
After vma_end_read(vma) drops the per-VMA read lock, can vma->vm_pgoff and vma->vm_start still be safely accessed here? It looks like the VMA could be split, merged, or freed by another thread while…
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +0 -0
index da3d328f5c15..017ecbc22c96 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 18 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +18 -0
+static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
+						    u32 trace_nr)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct file *file;
+	u64 ip;
+
+	for (u32 i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
+		ip = READ_ONCE(id_offs[i].ip);
+		vma = stack_map_lock_vma(mm, ip);
+		if (!range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) || !vma->vm_file) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+			if (vma)
+				vma_end_read(vma);
+			continue;
+		}
+

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 209

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +10 -0
+		file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+		vma_end_read(vma);
+
+		/* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
+		if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+		} else {
+			id_offs[i].offset = (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + ip - vma->vm_start;
+			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID;
+		}

After vma_end_read(vma) drops the per-VMA read lock, can vma->vm_pgoff and vma->vm_start still be safely accessed here? It looks like the VMA could be split, merged, or freed by another thread while build_id_parse_file() blocks on filesystem I/O.

The non-sleepable path in stack_map_get_build_id_offset() reads these same fields under mmap_read_lock, which keeps the VMA stable. Here the lock is already gone.

Saving vm_pgoff and vm_start to local variables before vma_end_read() would close the window, similar to the approach in the procfs patch referenced in the commit message.

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 213

Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +4 -0
+
+		fput(file);
+	}
+}

---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24111574515

author reviewer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 41 lines · On 4/7/26 6:05 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +0 -0
index da3d328f5c15..017ecbc22c96 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 18 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +18 -0
+static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
+						    u32 trace_nr)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct file *file;
+	u64 ip;
+
+	for (u32 i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
+		ip = READ_ONCE(id_offs[i].ip);
+		vma = stack_map_lock_vma(mm, ip);
+		if (!range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) || !vma->vm_file) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+			if (vma)
+				vma_end_read(vma);
+			continue;
+		}
+

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 209

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +10 -0
+		file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+		vma_end_read(vma);
+
+		/* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
+		if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+		} else {
+			id_offs[i].offset = (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + ip - vma->vm_start;
+			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID;
+		}

After vma_end_read(vma) drops the per-VMA read lock, can vma->vm_pgoff and vma->vm_start still be safely accessed here? It looks like the VMA could be split, merged, or freed by another thread while build_id_parse_file() blocks on filesystem I/O.

Quoted 7 lines

The non-sleepable path in stack_map_get_build_id_offset() reads these same fields under mmap_read_lock, which keeps the VMA stable. Here the lock is already gone.

Saving vm_pgoff and vm_start to local variables before vma_end_read() would close the window, similar to the approach in the procfs patch referenced in the commit message.

I think AI is right here. Will wait a bit for feedback before sending v2.

Quoted 12 lines

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 213

Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +4 -0
+
+		fput(file);
+	}
+}

---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24111574515

#3 lore raw
In reply to Ihor Solodrai
Quoted 207 lines · Ihor Solodrai

Sleepable build ID parsing can block in __kernel_read() [1], so the stackmap sleepable path must not call it while holding mmap_lock or a per-VMA read lock.

The issue and the fix are similar to a recent procfs patch [2].

Resolve each covered VMA with a stable read-side reference, preferring lock_vma_under_rcu() and falling back to mmap_read_lock() only long enough to acquire the VMA read lock. Take a reference to the backing file, drop the VMA lock, and then parse the build ID through (sleepable) build_id_parse_file().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Fixes 777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.4

---

Below is a sequence of events leading up to this patch.

I noticed a following deadlock splat on bpf-next, when running a subset of selftests/bpf:

#526 uprobe_multi_test:OK
#28 bpf_obj_id:OK

  [   27.561465]
  [   27.561603] ======================================================
  [   27.561899] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [   27.562193] 7.0.0-rc5-g0eeb0094ba03 #3 Tainted: G           OE
  [   27.562523] ------------------------------------------------------
  [   27.562820] uprobe_multi/561 is trying to acquire lock:
  [   27.563071] ff1100010768ba18 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}, at: netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.563556]
  [   27.563556] but task is already holding lock:
  [   27.563845] ff1100010b12a640 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0xfa/0x650
  [   27.564296]
  [   27.564296] which lock already depends on the new lock.
  [   27.564296]
  [   27.564696]
  [   27.564696] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [   27.565044]
  [   27.565044] -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
  [   27.565340]        __might_fault+0xa3/0x100
  [   27.565572]        _copy_to_iter+0xdf/0x1520
  [   27.565786]        copy_page_to_iter+0x1c6/0x2d0
  [   27.566011]        filemap_read+0x5f7/0xbf0
  [   27.566218]        netfs_file_read_iter+0x1ca/0x240
  [   27.566453]        vfs_read+0x482/0x9e0
  [   27.566658]        ksys_read+0x115/0x1f0
  [   27.566852]        do_syscall_64+0xde/0x390
  [   27.567057]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [   27.567322]
  [   27.567322] -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
  [   27.567701]        __lock_acquire+0x1529/0x2a10
  [   27.567923]        lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.568124]        down_read_interruptible+0x55/0x340
  [   27.568368]        netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.568622]        netfs_file_read_iter+0x191/0x240
  [   27.568858]        __kernel_read+0x401/0x850
  [   27.569068]        freader_fetch+0x19b/0x790
  [   27.569279]        __build_id_parse+0xde/0x580
  [   27.569528]        stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x248/0x650
  [   27.569802]        __bpf_get_stack+0x653/0x890
  [   27.570019]        bpf_get_stack_sleepable+0x1d/0x30
  [   27.570257]        bpf_prog_51bb4c0f31ae471b_uprobe_sleepable+0x2d/0x42
  [   27.570594]        uprobe_prog_run+0x425/0x870
  [   27.570816]        uprobe_multi_link_handler+0x58/0xb0
  [   27.571062]        handler_chain+0x234/0x1270
  [   27.571275]        uprobe_notify_resume+0x4de/0xd60
  [   27.571542]        exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xe0/0x480
  [   27.571785]        exc_int3+0x1bd/0x260
  [   27.571973]        asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
  [   27.572169]
  [   27.572169] other info that might help us debug this:
  [   27.572169]
  [   27.572571]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [   27.572571]
  [   27.572854]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [   27.573074]        ----                    ----
  [   27.573293]   rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
  [   27.573502]                                lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
  [   27.573846]                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
  [   27.574135]   rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
  [   27.574364]
  [   27.574364]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [   27.574364]
  [   27.574671] 3 locks held by uprobe_multi/561:
  [   27.574884]  #0: ffffffff852e0038 (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: uprobe_notify_resume+0x229/0xd60
  [   27.575371]  #1: ffffffff852e0038 (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: uprobe_prog_run+0x239/0x870
  [   27.575874]  #2: ff1100010b12a640 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0xfa/0x650
  [   27.576342]
  [   27.576342] stack backtrace:
  [   27.576578] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 561 Comm: uprobe_multi Tainted: G           OE       7.0.0-rc5-g0eeb0094ba03 #3 PREEMPT(full)
  [   27.576586] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  [   27.576588] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-5.el9 11/05/2023
  [   27.576591] Call Trace:
  [   27.576595]  <TASK>
  [   27.576598]  dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
  [   27.576606]  print_circular_bug+0x2e8/0x300
  [   27.576616]  check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150
  [   27.576628]  __lock_acquire+0x1529/0x2a10
  [   27.576642]  ? __pfx_walk_pgd_range+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576651]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576656]  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.576661]  ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x38/0x1f0
  [   27.576672]  lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.576677]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576685]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576693]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576698]  down_read_interruptible+0x55/0x340
  [   27.576702]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576707]  ? __pfx_cmp_ex_search+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576716]  netfs_start_io_read+0x24/0x110
  [   27.576723]  netfs_file_read_iter+0x191/0x240
  [   27.576731]  __kernel_read+0x401/0x850
  [   27.576741]  ? __pfx___kernel_read+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576752]  ? __pfx_fixup_exception+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576761]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576766]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x76/0x100
  [   27.576773]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576777]  ? mtree_range_walk+0x421/0x6c0
  [   27.576785]  freader_fetch+0x19b/0x790
  [   27.576793]  ? mt_find+0x14b/0x340
  [   27.576801]  ? __pfx_freader_fetch+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576805]  ? mt_find+0x29a/0x340
  [   27.576810]  ? mt_find+0x14b/0x340
  [   27.576820]  __build_id_parse+0xde/0x580
  [   27.576832]  ? __pfx___build_id_parse+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576850]  stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x248/0x650
  [   27.576863]  __bpf_get_stack+0x653/0x890
  [   27.576867]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576880]  ? __pfx___bpf_get_stack+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576884]  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x280
  [   27.576889]  ? uprobe_prog_run+0x239/0x870
  [   27.576895]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576899]  ? stack_trace_save+0xae/0x100
  [   27.576908]  bpf_get_stack_sleepable+0x1d/0x30
  [   27.576913]  bpf_prog_51bb4c0f31ae471b_uprobe_sleepable+0x2d/0x42
  [   27.576919]  uprobe_prog_run+0x425/0x870
  [   27.576927]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576933]  ? __pfx_uprobe_prog_run+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576937]  ? uprobe_notify_resume+0x413/0xd60
  [   27.576952]  uprobe_multi_link_handler+0x58/0xb0
  [   27.576960]  handler_chain+0x234/0x1270
  [   27.576976]  ? __pfx_handler_chain+0x10/0x10
  [   27.576988]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.576992]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
  [   27.576998]  ? __pfx_ri_timer+0x10/0x10
  [   27.577003]  ? timer_init_key+0xf5/0x200
  [   27.577013]  uprobe_notify_resume+0x4de/0xd60
  [   27.577025]  ? uprobe_notify_resume+0x229/0xd60
  [   27.577030]  ? __pfx_uprobe_notify_resume+0x10/0x10
  [   27.577035]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.577039]  ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xfc/0x110
  [   27.577047]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.577051]  ? notify_die+0xe5/0x130
  [   27.577056]  ? __pfx_notify_die+0x10/0x10
  [   27.577063]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  [   27.577071]  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xe0/0x480
  [   27.577076]  ? asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
  [   27.577083]  exc_int3+0x1bd/0x260
  [   27.577090]  asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
  [   27.577095] RIP: 0033:0x6c4180
  [   27.577100] Code: c6 05 0b 6f 32 00 01 5d c3 90 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa eb 8a 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <cc> 48 89 e5 31 c0 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 31 c0
  [   27.577104] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbf71ada8 EFLAGS: 00000246
  [   27.577109] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fec9163db7b
  [   27.577112] RDX: 00007ffcbf71adbf RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 00000000007f0000
  [   27.577115] RBP: 00007ffcbf71add0 R08: 00007fec91731330 R09: 00007fec9178d060
  [   27.577118] R10: 00007fec9153ad98 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcbf71af08
  [   27.577120] R13: 0000000000787760 R14: 00000000009eade8 R15: 00007fec917bf000
  [   27.577135]  </TASK>
  #54/1    build_id/nofault-paged-out:OK

It was reproducable, which allowed me to bisect to commit 777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")

Then I used Codex for analysis of the splat, patch and relevant lore discussions, and then asked it to produce a patch draft.

I then asked Puranjay to review the draft, and he advised to use lock_vma_under_rcu() here, which seems appropriate. I also did a bit of refactoring of the LLM-produced code.

I verified the resulting patch fixes the deadlock splat.

---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +1 -0
index da3d328f5c15..017ecbc22c96 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
 #include <linux/buildid.h>
+#include <linux/mmap_lock.h>
 #include "percpu_freelist.h"
 #include "mmap_unlock_work.h"
 

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 160

Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +5 -0
@@ -152,6 +153,65 @@ static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b
 			 : build_id_parse_nofault(vma, build_id, NULL);
 }
 
+static inline void stack_map_build_id_set_ip(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs)
+{
+	id_offs->status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP;
+	memset(id_offs->build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
+}

As you will be doing another version, can you put this refactoring in a preparatory patch.

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 170

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +10 -0
+
+static struct vm_area_struct *stack_map_lock_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+	vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, ip);
+	if (vma)
+		return vma;
+
+	mmap_read_lock(mm);

This will deadlock if the caller already holds mmap_lock, shouldn't this be:

        if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm))
                return NULL;

similar to the non-sleepable path?

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 172

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +2 -0
+	vma = find_vma(mm, ip);
+	if (range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) && vma_start_read_locked(vma))

I think this will not compile for !CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK as there is no stub for vma_start_read_locked().

Also, lock_vma_under_rcu() returns NULL if address is not in vma's range, I think if replace find_vma() with vma_lookup(), you will not need any calls to range_in_vma(). (but please validate this as I am not sure)

Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +11 -0
+		goto out;
+
+	vma = NULL;
+out:
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+
+	return vma;
+}
+
+static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
+						    u32 trace_nr)

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 193

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +10 -0
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct file *file;
+	u64 ip;
+
+	for (u32 i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
+		ip = READ_ONCE(id_offs[i].ip);
+		vma = stack_map_lock_vma(mm, ip);
+		if (!range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) || !vma->vm_file) {

stack_map_lock_vma() already guarantees that any non-NULL return contains the IP as lock_vma_under_rcu() checks address < vma->vm_start
|| address >= vma->vm_end at mmap_lock.c:332 and fallback explicitly
checks range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) before returning

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 198

Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +5 -0
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+			if (vma)
+				vma_end_read(vma);
+			continue;
+		}

This is doing lock->unlock + finding vma for every ip, but the non sleepable path has an optimization which we should do here as well. As frames in the same library or executable will have the same file.

something like:

-- 8< --

                /* Snapshot VMA fields before dropping the lock */
                vm_start = vma->vm_start;
                vm_pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff;
                file = vma->vm_file;

                if (file == prev_file) {
                        /* Same backing file as previous frame, reuse build ID */
                        memcpy(id_offs[i].build_id, prev_build_id, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
                        vma_end_read(vma);
                } else {
                        get_file(file);
                        vma_end_read(vma);

                        /* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
                        if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
                                stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
                                fput(file);
                                continue;
                        }
                        memcpy(prev_build_id, id_offs[i].build_id, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
                        if (prev_file)
                                fput(prev_file);
                        prev_file = file;
                }

                id_offs[i].offset = (vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + ip - vm_start;
                id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID;
        }

        if (prev_file)
                fput(prev_file);

-- >8 --

P.S. - Above code is not even compile tested.

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b · line 201

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +2 -0
+		file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+		vma_end_read(vma);

AI is right, we need to snapshot vm_pgoff and vm_start before vma_end_read()

Quoted 61 lines
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +23 -9
+		/* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
+		if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
+		} else {
+			id_offs[i].offset = (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + ip - vma->vm_start;
+			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID;
+		}
+
+		fput(file);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Expects all id_offs[i].ip values to be set to correct initial IPs.
  * They will be subsequently:
@@ -165,23 +225,26 @@ static int fetch_build_id(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id, b
 static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
 					  u32 trace_nr, bool user, bool may_fault)
 {
-	int i;
 	struct mmap_unlock_irq_work *work = NULL;
 	bool irq_work_busy = bpf_mmap_unlock_get_irq_work(&work);
+	bool has_user_ctx = user && current && current->mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev_vma = NULL;
 	const char *prev_build_id;
+	int i;
+
+	if (may_fault && has_user_ctx) {
+		stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(id_offs, trace_nr);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	/* If the irq_work is in use, fall back to report ips. Same
 	 * fallback is used for kernel stack (!user) on a stackmap with
 	 * build_id.
 	 */
-	if (!user || !current || !current->mm || irq_work_busy ||
-	    !mmap_read_trylock(current->mm)) {
+	if (!has_user_ctx || irq_work_busy || !mmap_read_trylock(current->mm)) {
 		/* cannot access current->mm, fall back to ips */
-		for (i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
-			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP;
-			memset(id_offs[i].build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
-		}
+		for (i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++)
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -196,8 +259,7 @@ static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
 		vma = find_vma(current->mm, ip);
 		if (!vma || fetch_build_id(vma, id_offs[i].build_id, may_fault)) {
 			/* per entry fall back to ips */
-			id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP;
-			memset(id_offs[i].build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
+			stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
 			continue;
 		}
 build_id_valid:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#4 lore raw
In reply to Ihor Solodrai
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

Hi Ihor,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf/master]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ihor-Solodrai/bpf-Avoid-faultable-build-ID-reads-under-mm-locks/20260411-130435
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407223003.720428-1-ihor.solodrai%40linux.dev
patch subject: [PATCH bpf v1] bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks
config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-003-20260411 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260411/[email protected]/config)
compiler: gcc-13 (Debian 13.3.0-16) 13.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260411/[email protected]/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c: In function 'stack_map_lock_vma':

>> kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:172:42: error: implicit declaration of function 'vma_start_read_locked'; did you mean 'vma_assert_write_locked'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
     172 |         if (range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) && vma_start_read_locked(vma))
         |                                          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |                                          vma_assert_write_locked

cc1: some warnings being treated as errors

vim +172 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c

161
162 static struct vm_area_struct *stack_map_lock_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ip)
163 {
164 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
165
166 vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, ip);
167 if (vma)
168 return vma;
169
170 mmap_read_lock(mm);
171 vma = find_vma(mm, ip);

 > 172		if (range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) && vma_start_read_locked(vma))

173 goto out;
174
175 vma = NULL;
176 out:
177 mmap_read_unlock(mm);
178
179 return vma;
180 }
181

Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
#5 lore raw
In reply to Ihor Solodrai
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

Hi Ihor,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf/master]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ihor-Solodrai/bpf-Avoid-faultable-build-ID-reads-under-mm-locks/20260411-130435
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407223003.720428-1-ihor.solodrai%40linux.dev
patch subject: [PATCH bpf v1] bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks
config: i386-buildonly-randconfig-002-20260411 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260411/[email protected]/config)
compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260411/[email protected]/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:172:35: error: call to undeclared function 'vma_start_read_locked'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
     172 |         if (range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) && vma_start_read_locked(vma))
         |                                          ^

kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:172:35: note: did you mean 'vma_assert_write_locked'? include/linux/mmap_lock.h:507:20: note: 'vma_assert_write_locked' declared here
507 | static inline void vma_assert_write_locked(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
| ^
1 error generated.

vim +/vma_start_read_locked +172 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c

161
162 static struct vm_area_struct *stack_map_lock_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ip)
163 {
164 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
165
166 vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, ip);
167 if (vma)
168 return vma;
169
170 mmap_read_lock(mm);
171 vma = find_vma(mm, ip);

 > 172		if (range_in_vma(vma, ip, ip) && vma_start_read_locked(vma))

173 goto out;
174
175 vma = NULL;
176 out:
177 mmap_read_unlock(mm);
178
179 return vma;
180 }
181

Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki