x86/fpu: Disable shstk if no CET_USER state
PATCH v2 1/1 x86/fpu: Disable shstk if no CET_USER state
Some hypervisors (including QEMU 10.1.5) may report CET_SS support in CPUID Fn7 but fail to report that CET_USER state is supported in supervisor xstate. Linux relies on XSAVES/XRSTORS to swap CET state during context switch and assumes it is supported when CET_SS is present.
As a result, if a user process is run with shadow stacks enabled and then is switched away from, the system may crash because the new process may be incorrectly run with shadow stacks enabled.
Detect this broken configuration and disable user shadow stacks unless CET_USER is supported in xstate.
v2:
- Moved check to later location after fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features is finalized.
--- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +11 -0
@@ -878,6 +878,17 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size) fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &=XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED |XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED ; +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && + !(fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER )) { +/* +* The kernel relies on XSAVES/XRSTORS to context switch shadow +* stack state. If this isn't present, disable user shadow +* stacks. +*/ +pr_err ("x86/fpu: CET_USER not supported in xstate when CET is supported. Disabling shadow stacks.\n" ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ); + } + fpu_user_cfg.max_features = fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features; fpu_user_cfg.max_features &=XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED ;
base-commit: 6c927e5ca9d238f8ae40b453a8382eb9cf4ee855
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size) · line 890
Quoted 10 lines · David Kaplan
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +10
-0+if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && + !(fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER )) { +/* +* The kernel relies on XSAVES/XRSTORS to context switch shadow +* stack state. If this isn't present, disable user shadow +* stacks. +*/ +pr_err ("x86/fpu: CET_USER not supported in xstate when CET is supported. Disabling shadow stacks.\n" ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ); + }
Are there any more of these? I'm wondering if we want a table that's effectively the reverse of xsave_cpuid_features[].
Maybe X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD at least?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Dave Hansen
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size) · line 890
Quoted 10 lines · David Kaplan
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +10
-0+if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && + !(fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER )) { +/* +* The kernel relies on XSAVES/XRSTORS to context switch shadow +* stack state. If this isn't present, disable user shadow +* stacks. +*/ +pr_err ("x86/fpu: CET_USER not supported in xstate when CET is supported. Disabling shadow stacks.\n" ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ); + }Are there any more of these? I'm wondering if we want a table that's effectively the reverse of xsave_cpuid_features[].
Quoted 1 line
Maybe
X86_FEATURE_ENQCMDat least?
Frankly, I'd like to not do anything here. If the HV is misconfigured, then it crashing and burning as early is possible is better than us going out of our way to try to fix up things...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteBorislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Borislav Petkov
Frankly, I'd like to not do anything here. If the HV is misconfigured, then it crashing and burning as early is possible is better than us going out of our way to try to fix up things...
I guess we can do this (after talking to tglx):
pr_err("x86/fpu: CET_USER not supported in xstate when CET is supported. Disabling shadow stacks.\n");
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK);
add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);the firmware workaround thing is to mean, *something* - HV or fw or whatever
- has made this nonsensical configuration so we taint.
When more "smart" configurations appear, we can do something like what validate*xstate*() does to do some more checking.
And looking at the other checks in that code there in fpu__init_system_xstate() why aren't we simply disabling XSAVE like we do for XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE and XFEATURE_MASK_APXX + FEATURE_MASK_BND* ?
This case looks exactly like those...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette