x86/pv: Adjust the save_segments() comment regarding MSR_GS_SHADOW
PATCH 1/1 x86/pv: Adjust the save_segments() comment regarding MSR_GS_SHADOW
This is slightly stale mentioning SWAPGS and not LKGS. However, take the opportunity to make the comment more general and less likely to bitrot.
It would be a serious vulnerability for operating systems generally if CPL3 could modify GS_SHADOW at all.
No functional change.
---
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
CC: Teddy Astie <[email protected]>
--- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/domain.c +2 -3
@@ -1952,9 +1952,8 @@ static void load_segments(struct vcpu *n)* changes to bases can also be made with the WR{FS,GS}BASE instructions, when * enabled. * -* Guests however cannot use SWAPGS, so there is no mechanism to modify the -* inactive GS base behind Xen's back. Therefore, Xen's copy of the inactive -* GS base is still accurate, and doesn't need reading back from hardware. +* Guests cannot modify the inactive GS base behind Xen's back. Therefore +* Xen's copy is still accurate and doesn't need reading back. * * Under FRED, hardware automatically swaps GS for us, so SHADOW_GS is the * active GS from the guest's point of view.
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Le 09/04/2026 à 11:21, Andrew Cooper a écrit :
Quoted 23 lines
This is slightly stale mentioning SWAPGS and not LKGS. However, take the opportunity to make the comment more general and less likely to bitrot.
It would be a serious vulnerability for operating systems generally if CPL3 could modify
GS_SHADOWat all.No functional change.
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>---
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
CC: Teddy Astie <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/domain.c +0
-0@@ -1952,9 +1952,8 @@ static void load_segments(struct vcpu *n)* changes to bases can also be made with the WR{FS,GS}BASE instructions, when
xen/arch/x86/domain.c static void load_segments(struct vcpu *n) · line 1959
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/domain.c +2
-3* enabled. * -* Guests however cannot use SWAPGS, so there is no mechanism to modify the -* inactive GS base behind Xen's back. Therefore, Xen's copy of the inactive -* GS base is still accurate, and doesn't need reading back from hardware. +* Guests cannot modify the inactive GS base behind Xen's back. Therefore +* Xen's copy is still accurate and doesn't need reading back. * * Under FRED, hardware automatically swaps GS for us, so SHADOW_GS is the * active GS from the guest's point of view.
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Teddy Astie | Vates XCP-ng Developer
XCP-ng & Xen Orchestra - Vates solutions
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