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libvncserver: fix CVE-2026-32853

PATCH In review [email protected] 2 participants 10 messages Apr 9 – Apr 15

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 libvncserver: fix CVE-2026-32853

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32853

---
 .../libvncserver/CVE-2026-32853.patch         | 76 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libvncserver/libvncserver_0.9.14.bb       |  4 +-
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/libvncserver/libvncserver/CVE-2026-32853.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/libvncserver/libvncserver/CVE-2026-32853.patch new file +76 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be426932db
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 24cac3821d1665a4ed0501e6056925ef9ee53b99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kazuma Matsumoto <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2026 20:35:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] libvncclient: add bounds checks to UltraZip subrectangle
+ parsing
+
+HandleUltraZipBPP() iterates over sub-rectangles using numCacheRects
+(derived from the attacker-controlled rect.r.x) without validating
+that the pointer stays within the decompressed data buffer. A malicious
+server can set a large numCacheRects value, causing heap out-of-bounds
+reads via the memcpy calls in the parsing loop.
+
+Add bounds checks before reading the 12-byte subrect header and before
+advancing the pointer by the raw pixel data size. Use uint64_t for the
+raw data size calculation to prevent integer overflow on 32-bit platforms.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 009008e2f4d5a54dd71f422070df3af7b3dbc931)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32853
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/commit/009008e2f4d5a54dd71f422070df3af7b3dbc931]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ libvncclient/ultra.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libvncclient/ultra.c b/libvncclient/ultra.c
+index 1d3aaba6..5633b8cb 100644
+--- a/libvncclient/ultra.c
++++ b/libvncclient/ultra.c
+@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ HandleUltraZipBPP (rfbClient* client, int rx, int ry, int rw, int rh)
+   int toRead=0;
+   int inflateResult=0;
+   unsigned char *ptr=NULL;
++  unsigned char *ptr_end=NULL;
+   lzo_uint uncompressedBytes = ry + (rw * 65535);
+   unsigned int numCacheRects = rx;
+ 
+@@ -194,11 +195,18 @@ HandleUltraZipBPP (rfbClient* client, int rx, int ry, int rw, int rh)
+   
+   /* Put the uncompressed contents of the update on the screen. */
+   ptr = (unsigned char *)client->raw_buffer;
++  ptr_end = ptr + uncompressedBytes;
+   for (i=0; i<numCacheRects; i++)
+   {
+     unsigned short sx, sy, sw, sh;
+     unsigned int se;
+ 
++    /* subrect header: sx(2) + sy(2) + sw(2) + sh(2) + se(4) = 12 bytes */
++    if (ptr + 12 > ptr_end) {
++      rfbClientLog("UltraZip: subrect %d header exceeds decompressed data bounds\n", i);
++      return FALSE;
++    }
++
+     memcpy((char *)&sx, ptr, 2); ptr += 2;
+     memcpy((char *)&sy, ptr, 2); ptr += 2;
+     memcpy((char *)&sw, ptr, 2); ptr += 2;
+@@ -213,8 +221,13 @@ HandleUltraZipBPP (rfbClient* client, int rx, int ry, int rw, int rh)
+ 
+     if (se == rfbEncodingRaw)
+     {
++        uint64_t rawBytes = (uint64_t)sw * sh * (BPP / 8);
++        if (rawBytes > (size_t)(ptr_end - ptr)) {
++          rfbClientLog("UltraZip: subrect %d raw data exceeds decompressed data bounds\n", i);
++          return FALSE;
++        }
+         client->GotBitmap(client, (unsigned char *)ptr, sx, sy, sw, sh);
+-        ptr += ((sw * sh) * (BPP / 8));
++        ptr += (size_t)rawBytes;
+     }
+   }  
+ 
+@@ -222,3 +235,4 @@ HandleUltraZipBPP (rfbClient* client, int rx, int ry, int rw, int rh)
+ }
+ 
+ #undef CARDBPP
++
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/libvncserver/libvncserver_0.9.14.bb +3 -1
index 6f271ee0d3..11efd7cc0f 100644
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ FILES:libvncclient = "${libdir}/libvncclient.*"
 
 inherit cmake pkgconfig
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver;branch=master;protocol=https"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver;branch=master;protocol=https \
+           file://CVE-2026-32853.patch \
+"
 SRCREV = "10e9eb75f73e973725dc75c373de5d89807af028"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 libvncserver: fix CVE-2026-32854

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32854

---
 .../libvncserver/CVE-2026-32854.patch         | 66 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libvncserver/libvncserver_0.9.14.bb       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/libvncserver/libvncserver/CVE-2026-32854.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/libvncserver/libvncserver/CVE-2026-32854.patch new file +66 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a89026951b
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From df092d3a89460be3b14a2a07859493a7afafcd1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kazuma Matsumoto <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 17:42:00 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] libvncserver: fix NULL pointer dereferences in httpd proxy
+ handlers
+
+httpProcessInput() passes the return value of strchr() to atoi()
+and strncmp() without checking for NULL. If a CONNECT request
+contains no colon, or a GET request contains no slash, strchr()
+returns NULL, leading to a segmentation fault.
+
+Add NULL checks before using the strchr() return values.
+
+(cherry picked from commit dc78dee51a7e270e537a541a17befdf2073f5314)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32854
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/commit/dc78dee51a7e270e537a541a17befdf2073f5314]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ libvncserver/httpd.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libvncserver/httpd.c b/libvncserver/httpd.c
+index 96a6eb2b..c066de47 100644
+--- a/libvncserver/httpd.c
++++ b/libvncserver/httpd.c
+@@ -331,10 +331,11 @@ httpProcessInput(rfbScreenInfoPtr rfbScreen)
+ 
+ 
+     /* Process the request. */
+-    if(rfbScreen->httpEnableProxyConnect) {
++if(rfbScreen->httpEnableProxyConnect) {
+ 	const static char* PROXY_OK_STR = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: octet-stream\r\nPragma: no-cache\r\n\r\n";
+ 	if(!strncmp(buf, "CONNECT ", 8)) {
+-	    if(atoi(strchr(buf, ':')+1)!=rfbScreen->port) {
++	    char *colon = strchr(buf, ':');
++	    if(colon == NULL || atoi(colon+1)!=rfbScreen->port) {
+ 		rfbErr("httpd: CONNECT format invalid.\n");
+ 		rfbWriteExact(&cl,INVALID_REQUEST_STR, strlen(INVALID_REQUEST_STR));
+ 		httpCloseSock(rfbScreen);
+@@ -347,14 +348,17 @@ httpProcessInput(rfbScreenInfoPtr rfbScreen)
+ 	    rfbScreen->httpSock = RFB_INVALID_SOCKET;
+ 	    return;
+ 	}
+-	if (!strncmp(buf, "GET ",4) && !strncmp(strchr(buf,'/'),"/proxied.connection HTTP/1.", 27)) {
+-	    /* proxy connection */
+-	    rfbLog("httpd: client asked for /proxied.connection\n");
+-	    rfbWriteExact(&cl,PROXY_OK_STR,strlen(PROXY_OK_STR));
+-	    rfbNewClientConnection(rfbScreen,rfbScreen->httpSock);
+-	    rfbScreen->httpSock = RFB_INVALID_SOCKET;
+-	    return;
+-	}	   
++	if (!strncmp(buf, "GET ",4)) {
++	    char *slash = strchr(buf, '/');
++	    if (slash != NULL && !strncmp(slash,"/proxied.connection HTTP/1.", 27)) {
++		/* proxy connection */
++		rfbLog("httpd: client asked for /proxied.connection\n");
++		rfbWriteExact(&cl,PROXY_OK_STR,strlen(PROXY_OK_STR));
++		rfbNewClientConnection(rfbScreen,rfbScreen->httpSock);
++		rfbScreen->httpSock = RFB_INVALID_SOCKET;
++		return;
++	    }
++	}
+     }
+ 
+     if (strncmp(buf, "GET ", 4)) {
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/libvncserver/libvncserver_0.9.14.bb +1 -0
index 11efd7cc0f..6ef10b5037 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ inherit cmake pkgconfig
 
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://CVE-2026-32853.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32854.patch \
 "
 SRCREV = "10e9eb75f73e973725dc75c373de5d89807af028"
 
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 mbedtls: upgrade 3.6.5 -> 3.6.6

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Contains fixes for CVE-2026-25833, CVE-2026-25834, CVE-2026-25835, CVE-2026-34872, CVE-2026-34873, CVE-2026-34874 and CVE-2026-34875.

Changelog: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.6

Ptests passed:

root@qemux86:~# ptest-runner mbedtls
START: ptest-runner
2026-04-09T10:41
BEGIN: /usr/lib/mbedtls/ptest
...
...
DURATION: 508
END: /usr/lib/mbedtls/ptest
2026-04-09T10:49
STOP: ptest-runner
TOTAL: 1 FAIL: 0
(cherry picked from commit fe1b038cd814102b317c6896f265019909a67de8)
---
 .../mbedtls/{mbedtls_3.6.5.bb => mbedtls_3.6.6.bb}              | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/mbedtls/{mbedtls_3.6.5.bb => mbedtls_3.6.6.bb} (98%)
meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/mbedtls/mbedtls_3.6.6.bb renamed from meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/mbedtls/mbedtls_3.6.5.bb +1 -1
similarity index 98%
rename from meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/mbedtls/mbedtls_3.6.5.bb
rename to meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/mbedtls/mbedtls_3.6.6.bb
index eec39ac85e..cedbc90ccf 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git;protocol=https;branch=mbedtls
            file://run-ptest \
            "
 
-SRCREV = "e185d7fd85499c8ce5ca2a54f5cf8fe7dbe3f8df"
+SRCREV = "0bebf8b8c7f07abe3571ded48a11aa907a1ffb20"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "v(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
 
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 nodejs: upgrade 20.20.0 -> 20.20.2

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

License Update: Update minimatch to the Blue Oak Model License[1]

nodejs LTS releases containing security and bugfixes.

https://nodejs.org/en/blog/release/v20.20.1
https://nodejs.org/en/blog/release/v20.20.2

[1] https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/f0ef221b0d458d9358c6e6e49094da475e86c229

Ptests passed:

root@qemux86:~# ptest-runner nodejs
START: ptest-runner
2026-04-09T10:37
BEGIN: /usr/lib/nodejs/ptest
Running main() from /usr/src/debug/nodejs/20.20.2/deps/googletest/src/gtest_main.cc
[==========] Running 152 tests from 23 test suites.
[----------] Global test environment set-up.
...
...
[----------] Global test environment tear-down
[==========] 152 tests from 23 test suites ran. (30533 ms total)
[  PASSED  ] 152 tests.
PASS: nodejs
DURATION: 31
END: /usr/lib/nodejs/ptest
2026-04-09T10:37
STOP: ptest-runner
TOTAL: 1 FAIL: 0
---
 .../nodejs/{nodejs_20.20.0.bb => nodejs_20.20.2.bb}           | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 rename meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/{nodejs_20.20.0.bb => nodejs_20.20.2.bb} (98%)
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_20.20.2.bb renamed from meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_20.20.0.bb +2 -2
similarity index 98%
rename from meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_20.20.0.bb
rename to meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_20.20.2.bb
index 5882319804..aa6189da60 100644
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 DESCRIPTION = "nodeJS Evented I/O for V8 JavaScript"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://nodejs.org"
 LICENSE = "MIT & ISC & BSD-2-Clause & BSD-3-Clause & Artistic-2.0 & Apache-2.0"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=ac91fab5dbaf757274d2b29888f943ef"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=b8b1791ae7a2ae99e12e2caf6218c890"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "nodejs node.js"
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \
 SRC_URI:append:toolchain-clang:powerpc64le = " \
            file://0001-ppc64-Do-not-use-mminimal-toc-with-clang.patch \
            "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5294d9d2915620e819e6892fd7e545b98d650bad36dae54e6527eaac482add98"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7aeeacdb858299e09a3e0510d4bb8b266923894a9e3ac0058ba89d4ecf4a4cca"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/node-v${PV}"
 
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 nginx: fix CVE-2026-27651

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix. Backport the commit[3] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160383
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27651
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/0f71dd8ea94ab8c123413b2e465be12a35392e9c

---
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27651.patch   | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb       |  4 ++-
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27651.patch
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27651.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b639b1a158
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 4f32484e99671d107d0d6c27c0c674f528d8c9ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sergey Kandaurov <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 16:39:37 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mail: fixed clearing s->passwd in auth http requests.
+
+Previously, it was not properly cleared retaining length as part of
+authenticating with CRAM-MD5 and APOP methods that expect to receive
+password in auth response.  This resulted in null pointer dereference
+and worker process crash in subsequent auth attempts with CRAM-MD5.
+
+Reported by Arkadi Vainbrand.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0f71dd8ea94ab8c123413b2e465be12a35392e9c)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-27651
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/0f71dd8ea94ab8c123413b2e465be12a35392e9c]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c b/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c
+index 27f64b92e..d931183ae 100644
+--- a/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c
++++ b/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c
+@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ ngx_mail_auth_http_create_request(ngx_mail_session_t *s, ngx_pool_t *pool,
+         b->last = ngx_cpymem(b->last, "Auth-Salt: ", sizeof("Auth-Salt: ") - 1);
+         b->last = ngx_copy(b->last, s->salt.data, s->salt.len);
+ 
+-        s->passwd.data = NULL;
++        ngx_str_null(&s->passwd);
+     }
+ 
+     b->last = ngx_cpymem(b->last, "Auth-Protocol: ",
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb +3 -1
index e5666f6fe6..d99dd873c6 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ require nginx.inc
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=175abb631c799f54573dc481454c8632"
 
-SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch"
+SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch \
+                   file://CVE-2026-27651.patch \
+"
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77a2541637b92a621e3ee76776c8b7b40cf6d707e69ba53a940283e30ff2f55d"
 
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 nginx: fix CVE-2026-27654

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix. Backport the commit[3] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160382
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27654
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a1d18284e0a173c4ef2b28425535d0f640ae0a82

---
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27654.patch   | 81 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27654.patch
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-27654.patch new file +81 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b85c6621e9
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From be39034fa93a4d44b52de9b7a463754eda56e712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 20:13:03 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Dav: destination length validation for COPY and MOVE.
+
+Previously, when alias was used in a location with Dav COPY or MOVE
+enabled, and the destination URI was shorter than the alias, integer
+underflow could happen in ngx_http_map_uri_to_path(), which could
+result in heap buffer overwrite, followed by a possible segfault.
+With some implementations of memcpy(), the segfault could be avoided
+and the overwrite could result in a change of the source or destination
+file names to be outside of the location root.
+
+Reported by Calif.io in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a1d18284e0a173c4ef2b28425535d0f640ae0a82)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-27654
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a1d18284e0a173c4ef2b28425535d0f640ae0a82]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c
+index cfb98929e..4619b139a 100644
+--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c
++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c
+@@ -535,19 +535,20 @@ ngx_http_dav_mkcol_handler(ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t *dlcf)
+ static ngx_int_t
+ ngx_http_dav_copy_move_handler(ngx_http_request_t *r)
+ {
+-    u_char                   *p, *host, *last, ch;
+-    size_t                    len, root;
+-    ngx_err_t                 err;
+-    ngx_int_t                 rc, depth;
+-    ngx_uint_t                overwrite, slash, dir, flags;
+-    ngx_str_t                 path, uri, duri, args;
+-    ngx_tree_ctx_t            tree;
+-    ngx_copy_file_t           cf;
+-    ngx_file_info_t           fi;
+-    ngx_table_elt_t          *dest, *over;
+-    ngx_ext_rename_file_t     ext;
+-    ngx_http_dav_copy_ctx_t   copy;
+-    ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t  *dlcf;
++    u_char                    *p, *host, *last, ch;
++    size_t                     len, root;
++    ngx_err_t                  err;
++    ngx_int_t                  rc, depth;
++    ngx_uint_t                 overwrite, slash, dir, flags;
++    ngx_str_t                  path, uri, duri, args;
++    ngx_tree_ctx_t             tree;
++    ngx_copy_file_t            cf;
++    ngx_file_info_t            fi;
++    ngx_table_elt_t           *dest, *over;
++    ngx_ext_rename_file_t      ext;
++    ngx_http_dav_copy_ctx_t    copy;
++    ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t   *dlcf;
++    ngx_http_core_loc_conf_t  *clcf;
+ 
+     if (r->headers_in.content_length_n > 0 || r->headers_in.chunked) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0,
+@@ -644,6 +645,18 @@ destination_done:
+         return NGX_HTTP_CONFLICT;
+     }
+ 
++    clcf = ngx_http_get_module_loc_conf(r, ngx_http_core_module);
++
++    if (clcf->alias
++        && clcf->alias != NGX_MAX_SIZE_T_VALUE
++        && duri.len < clcf->alias)
++    {
++        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0,
++                      "client sent invalid \"Destination\" header: \"%V\"",
++                      &dest->value);
++        return NGX_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
+     depth = ngx_http_dav_depth(r, NGX_HTTP_DAV_INFINITY_DEPTH);
+ 
+     if (depth != NGX_HTTP_DAV_INFINITY_DEPTH) {
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb +1 -0
index d99dd873c6..b1f4f8d009 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=175abb631c799f54573dc481454c8632"
 
 SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch \
                    file://CVE-2026-27651.patch \
+                   file://CVE-2026-27654.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77a2541637b92a621e3ee76776c8b7b40cf6d707e69ba53a940283e30ff2f55d"
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/8 nginx: fix CVE-2026-28753

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix. Backport the commit[3] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160367
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28753
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6a8513761fb327f67fcc6cfcf1ad216887e2589f

---
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-28753.patch   | 93 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-28753.patch
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-28753.patch new file +93 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de27ffad2a
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 7e705808a8568a091a8ecf418ed9f77914304fcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 11:52:53 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mail: host validation.
+
+Now host name resolved from client address is validated to only contain
+the characters specified in RFC 1034, Section 3.5.  The validation allows
+to avoid injections when using the resolved host name in auth_http and
+smtp proxy.
+
+Reported by Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada, Colin Warren,
+Xiao Liu (Yunnan University), Yuan Tan (UC Riverside), and
+Bird Liu (Lanzhou University).
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6a8513761fb327f67fcc6cfcf1ad216887e2589f)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-28753
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6a8513761fb327f67fcc6cfcf1ad216887e2589f]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/mail/ngx_mail_smtp_handler.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/mail/ngx_mail_smtp_handler.c b/src/mail/ngx_mail_smtp_handler.c
+index e68ceedfd..e477741c8 100644
+--- a/src/mail/ngx_mail_smtp_handler.c
++++ b/src/mail/ngx_mail_smtp_handler.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ 
+ 
+ static void ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_addr_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx);
++static ngx_int_t ngx_mail_smtp_validate_host(ngx_str_t *name);
+ static void ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_name(ngx_event_t *rev);
+ static void ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_name_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx);
+ static void ngx_mail_smtp_block_reading(ngx_event_t *rev);
+@@ -127,6 +128,20 @@ ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_addr_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx)
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    if (ngx_mail_smtp_validate_host(&ctx->name) != NGX_OK) {
++        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, c->log, 0,
++                      "%V resolved to invalid host name \"%V\"",
++                      &c->addr_text, &ctx->name);
++
++        s->host = smtp_tempunavail;
++
++        ngx_resolve_addr_done(ctx);
++
++        ngx_mail_smtp_greeting(s, s->connection);
++
++        return;
++    }
++
+     c->log->action = "in resolving client hostname";
+ 
+     s->host.data = ngx_pstrdup(c->pool, &ctx->name);
+@@ -149,6 +164,36 @@ ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_addr_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static ngx_int_t
++ngx_mail_smtp_validate_host(ngx_str_t *name)
++{
++    u_char      ch;
++    ngx_uint_t  i;
++
++    if (name->len == 0) {
++        return NGX_DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    for (i = 0; i < name->len; i++) {
++        ch = name->data[i];
++
++        /* allow only characters from RFC 1034, Section 3.5 */
++
++        if ((ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z')
++            || (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z')
++            || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')
++            || ch == '-' || ch == '.')
++        {
++            continue;
++        }
++
++        return NGX_DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    return NGX_OK;
++}
++
++
+ static void
+ ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_name(ngx_event_t *rev)
+ {
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb +1 -0
index b1f4f8d009..80cd5e1609 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=175abb631c799f54573dc481454c8632"
 SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch \
                    file://CVE-2026-27651.patch \
                    file://CVE-2026-27654.patch \
+                   file://CVE-2026-28753.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77a2541637b92a621e3ee76776c8b7b40cf6d707e69ba53a940283e30ff2f55d"
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 nginx: fix CVE-2026-32647

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix. Backport the commits[3][4] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160366
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32647
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc
[4] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/b23ac73b00313d159a99636c21ef71b828781018

---
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch | 77 ++++++++++++++++
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb       |  2 +
 3 files changed, 166 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch new file +77 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..506a3fb887
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From c694db97c62f33d621e73937a63e7b5c206c16c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 12:04:36 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: avoid zero size buffers in output.
+
+Previously, data validation checks did not cover the cases when the output
+contained empty buffers.  Such buffers are considered illegal and produce
+"zero size buf in output" alerts.  The change rejects the mp4 files which
+produce such alerts.
+
+Also, the change fixes possible buffer overread and overwrite that could
+happen while processing empty stco and co64 atoms, as reported by
+Pavel Kohout (Aisle Research) and Tim Becker.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32647
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
+index 041ad263b..13d87cd6a 100644
+--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
+@@ -901,8 +901,11 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (end_offset < start_offset) {
+-        end_offset = start_offset;
++    if (end_offset <= start_offset) {
++        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
++                      "no data between start time and end time in \"%s\"",
++                      mp4->file.name.data);
++        return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+ 
+     mp4->moov_size += 8;
+@@ -913,7 +916,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4)
+ 
+     *prev = &mp4->mdat_atom;
+ 
+-    if (start_offset > mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) {
++    if (start_offset >= mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 mdat atom in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3416,7 +3419,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stsz_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+     if (data) {
+         entries = trak->sample_sizes_entries;
+ 
+-        if (trak->start_sample > entries) {
++        if (trak->start_sample >= entries) {
+             ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                           "start time is out mp4 stsz samples in \"%s\"",
+                           mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3591,7 +3594,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stco_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+         return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) {
++    if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 stco chunks in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3806,7 +3809,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_co64_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+         return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) {
++    if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 co64 chunks in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch new file +87 -0

87 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb +2 -0
index 80cd5e1609..ab15c10596 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch \
                    file://CVE-2026-27651.patch \
                    file://CVE-2026-27654.patch \
                    file://CVE-2026-28753.patch \
+                   file://CVE-2026-32647-1.patch \
+                   file://CVE-2026-32647-2.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77a2541637b92a621e3ee76776c8b7b40cf6d707e69ba53a940283e30ff2f55d"
#8 lore raw

Re: [oe][meta-webserver][scarthgap][PATCH 8/8] nginx: fix CVE-2026-32647

Quoted 109 lines · Ankur Tyagi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix. Backport the commits[3][4] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160366
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32647
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc
[4] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/b23ac73b00313d159a99636c21ef71b828781018

---
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch | 77 ++++++++++++++++
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb       |  2 +
 3 files changed, 166 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch new file +77 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..506a3fb887
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From c694db97c62f33d621e73937a63e7b5c206c16c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 12:04:36 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: avoid zero size buffers in output.
+
+Previously, data validation checks did not cover the cases when the output
+contained empty buffers.  Such buffers are considered illegal and produce
+"zero size buf in output" alerts.  The change rejects the mp4 files which
+produce such alerts.
+
+Also, the change fixes possible buffer overread and overwrite that could
+happen while processing empty stco and co64 atoms, as reported by
+Pavel Kohout (Aisle Research) and Tim Becker.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32647
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
+index 041ad263b..13d87cd6a 100644
+--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
+@@ -901,8 +901,11 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4)
+         }
+     }
+
+-    if (end_offset < start_offset) {
+-        end_offset = start_offset;
++    if (end_offset <= start_offset) {
++        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
++                      "no data between start time and end time in \"%s\"",
++                      mp4->file.name.data);
++        return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+
+     mp4->moov_size += 8;
+@@ -913,7 +916,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4)
+
+     *prev = &mp4->mdat_atom;
+
+-    if (start_offset > mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) {
++    if (start_offset >= mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 mdat atom in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3416,7 +3419,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stsz_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+     if (data) {
+         entries = trak->sample_sizes_entries;
+
+-        if (trak->start_sample > entries) {
++        if (trak->start_sample >= entries) {
+             ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                           "start time is out mp4 stsz samples in \"%s\"",
+                           mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3591,7 +3594,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stco_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+         return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+
+-    if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) {
++    if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 stco chunks in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3806,7 +3809,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_co64_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+         return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+
+-    if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) {
++    if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 co64 chunks in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80bf94f5f1

meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch line 5

Quoted 5 lines
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch new file +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 1742d7fe92ed355ffa5aa68609b96f00f582f3d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2026 21:12:34 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: fixed possible integer overflow on 32-bit platforms.
+

This is same as:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/126024
sent earlier for a different CVE. Can you please check and resend?

#9 lore raw

Re: [oe][meta-webserver][scarthgap][PATCH 8/8] nginx: fix CVE-2026-32647

Quoted 113 lines · Anuj Mittal
Quoted 110 lines · Ankur Tyagi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

As per the advisory[1] mentioned in NVD[2], version 1.28.3 contains the fix. Backport the commits[3][4] from 1.28.3 changelog matching the description.

[1] https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160366
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32647
[3] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc
[4] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/b23ac73b00313d159a99636c21ef71b828781018

---
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch | 77 ++++++++++++++++
 .../nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb       |  2 +
 3 files changed, 166 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-1.patch new file +77 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..506a3fb887
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From c694db97c62f33d621e73937a63e7b5c206c16c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 12:04:36 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: avoid zero size buffers in output.
+
+Previously, data validation checks did not cover the cases when the output
+contained empty buffers.  Such buffers are considered illegal and produce
+"zero size buf in output" alerts.  The change rejects the mp4 files which
+produce such alerts.
+
+Also, the change fixes possible buffer overread and overwrite that could
+happen while processing empty stco and co64 atoms, as reported by
+Pavel Kohout (Aisle Research) and Tim Becker.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32647
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a172c880cb51f882a5dc999437e8b3a4f87630cc]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
+index 041ad263b..13d87cd6a 100644
+--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c
+@@ -901,8 +901,11 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4)
+         }
+     }
+
+-    if (end_offset < start_offset) {
+-        end_offset = start_offset;
++    if (end_offset <= start_offset) {
++        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
++                      "no data between start time and end time in \"%s\"",
++                      mp4->file.name.data);
++        return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+
+     mp4->moov_size += 8;
+@@ -913,7 +916,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4)
+
+     *prev = &mp4->mdat_atom;
+
+-    if (start_offset > mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) {
++    if (start_offset >= mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 mdat atom in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3416,7 +3419,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stsz_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+     if (data) {
+         entries = trak->sample_sizes_entries;
+
+-        if (trak->start_sample > entries) {
++        if (trak->start_sample >= entries) {
+             ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                           "start time is out mp4 stsz samples in \"%s\"",
+                           mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3591,7 +3594,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stco_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+         return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+
+-    if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) {
++    if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 stco chunks in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
+@@ -3806,7 +3809,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_co64_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4,
+         return NGX_ERROR;
+     }
+
+-    if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) {
++    if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) {
+         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0,
+                       "start time is out mp4 co64 chunks in \"%s\"",
+                       mp4->file.name.data);
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch new file +1 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80bf94f5f1
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 1742d7fe92ed355ffa5aa68609b96f00f582f3d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Quoted 8 lines

meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch line 5

Quoted 4 lines
meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.24.0/CVE-2026-32647-2.patch new file +4 -0
+From: Roman Arutyunyan <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2026 21:12:34 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: fixed possible integer overflow on 32-bit platforms.
+

This is same as:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/126024
sent earlier for a different CVE. Can you please check and resend?

Thanks for the review Anuj.
Both CVE are related and unlike advisory, debian clearly tracks them separately which I missed:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-27784
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-32647

Please drop this patch and I will resend once the patch for CVE-2026-27784 is merged.

cheers
Ankur