bpf: Drop pkt_end markers on arithmetic to prevent is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken
Subsystems (4)
Daniel Borkmann
maintainerPATCH 1/2 bpf: Drop pkt_end markers on arithmetic to prevent is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken
When a pkt pointer acquires AT_PKT_END or BEYOND_PKT_END range from a comparison, and then, known-constant arithmetic is performed, adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() copies the stale range via dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw without clearing the negative reg->range sentinel values.
This lets is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken() choose one branch direction and skip going through the other. Fix this by clearing negative pkt range values (that is, AT_PKT_END and BEYOND_PKT_END) after arithmetic on pkt pointers. This ensures is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken() returns unknown and both branches are properly verified.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +22 -8
@@ -15448,10 +15448,17 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } dst_reg->var_off =tnum_add (ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; -if (!known &®_is_pkt_pointer (ptr_reg)) { - dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; -/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ -memset (&dst_reg->raw,0 ,sizeof (dst_reg->raw)); +if (reg_is_pkt_pointer (ptr_reg)) { +if (!known) + dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; +/* +* Clear range for unknown addends since we can't know +* where the pkt pointer ended up. Also clear AT_PKT_END / +* BEYOND_PKT_END from prior comparison as any pointer +* arithmetic invalidates them. +*/ +if (!known || dst_reg->range <0 ) +memset (&dst_reg->raw,0 ,sizeof (dst_reg->raw)); }break ;case BPF_SUB :
@@ -15490,10 +15497,17 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } dst_reg->var_off =tnum_sub (ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; -if (!known &®_is_pkt_pointer (ptr_reg)) { - dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; -/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ -if (smin_val <0 ) +if (reg_is_pkt_pointer (ptr_reg)) { +if (!known) + dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; +/* +* Clear range if the subtrahend may be negative since +* pkt pointer could move past its bounds. A positive +* subtrahend moves it backwards keeping positive range +* intact. Also clear AT_PKT_END / BEYOND_PKT_END from +* prior comparison as arithmetic invalidates them. +*/ +if ((!known && smin_val <0 ) || dst_reg->range <0 )memset (&dst_reg->raw,0 ,sizeof (dst_reg->raw)); }break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Daniel Borkmann
maintainerPATCH 2/2 selftests/bpf: Add test for stale pkt range after scalar arithmetic
Extend the verifier_direct_packet_access BPF selftests to exercise the verifier code paths which ensure that the pkt range is cleared after add/sub alu with a known scalar. The tests reject the invalid access.
# LDLIBS=-static PKG_CONFIG='pkg-config --static' ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t verifier_direct [...]
#592/35 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after sub with known scalar:OK #592/36 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after add with known scalar:OK #592/37 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test3:OK #592/38 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test3 @unpriv:OK #592/39 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test34 (non-linear, cgroup_skb/ingress, too short eth):OK #592/40 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test35 (non-linear, cgroup_skb/ingress, too short 1):OK #592/41 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test36 (non-linear, cgroup_skb/ingress, long enough):OK #592 verifier_direct_packet_access:OK
[...]
Summary: 2/47 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
--- .../bpf/progs/verifier_direct_packet_access.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_direct_packet_access.c +61 -0
@@ -859,4 +859,65 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 1; \ : __clobber_all); } +SEC("tc") +__description("direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after sub with known scalar") +__failure __msg("invalid access to packet") +__naked void pkt_range_clear_after_sub(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r9 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data]); \ +r8 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data_end]); \ +r9 += 256; \ +if r9 >= r8 goto l0_%=; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +l0_%=: /* r9 has AT_PKT_END (pkt + 256 >= pkt_end) */ \ +r9 -= 256; \ +/* \ +* AT_PKT_END must not survive the arithmetic. \ +* is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken must validate both \ +* branches when visiting the next condition. \ +*/ \ +if r9 < r8 goto l1_%=; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +l1_%=: r0 = *(u8*)(r9 + 0); \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm_const(__sk_buff_data, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), +__imm_const (__sk_buff_data_end, offsetof(struct __sk_buff , data_end)) + : __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("tc") +__description("direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after add with known scalar") +__failure __msg("invalid access to packet") +__naked void pkt_range_clear_after_add(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r9 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data]); \ +r8 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data_end]); \ +r9 += 256; \ +if r9 >= r8 goto l0_%=; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +l0_%=: /* r9 has AT_PKT_END (pkt + 256 >= pkt_end) */ \ +r9 += -256; \ +/* \ +* Same as sub, but goes through BPF_ADD path. \ +* AT_PKT_END must not survive the arithmetic. \ +*/ \ +if r9 < r8 goto l1_%=; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +l1_%=: r0 = *(u8*)(r9 + 0); \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm_const(__sk_buff_data, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), +__imm_const (__sk_buff_data_end, offsetof(struct __sk_buff , data_end)) + : __clobber_all); +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:
Quoted 5 lines · On Thu, 9 Apr 2026 17:50:15 +0200 you wrote:
When a pkt pointer acquires
AT_PKT_ENDorBEYOND_PKT_ENDrange from a comparison, and then, known-constant arithmetic is performed,adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()copies the stale range viadst_reg->raw=ptr_reg->rawwithout clearing the negativereg->rangesentinel values.
Quoted 7 lines
This lets
is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken()choose one branch direction and skip going through the other. Fix this by clearing negative pkt range values (that is,AT_PKT_ENDandBEYOND_PKT_END) after arithmetic on pkt pointers. This ensuresis_pkt_ptr_branch_taken()returns unknown and both branches are properly verified.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf-next,1/2] bpf: Drop pkt_end markers on arithmetic to prevent is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/9f118095dd34 - [bpf-next,2/2] selftests/bpf: Add test for stale pkt range after scalar arithmetic https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/8697bdd67be8
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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