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iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs

PATCH In review Eder Zulian 2 participants 2 messages Apr 10 – May 11

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs

In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.

Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already protected by different mechanisms.

1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string <= 8 bytes, so e.g. 0xffffffff isn't a valid input.

if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ)

     return -EINVAL;

2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int and iommu->mmio_phys_end is u64

if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))

      return -EINVAL;

3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and refuse to perform the read.

Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write().

---
 drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c +5 -4
index 4e66473d7cea..4c53b6361314 100644
@@ -31,11 +31,12 @@ static ssize_t iommu_mmio_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
 	if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = kstrtou32_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 0, &dbg_mmio_offset);
+	ret = kstrtos32_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 0, &dbg_mmio_offset);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))
+	if (dbg_mmio_offset < 0 || dbg_mmio_offset >
+			iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	iommu->dbg_mmio_offset = dbg_mmio_offset;
@@ -71,12 +72,12 @@ static ssize_t iommu_capability_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf
 	if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = kstrtou32_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 0, &dbg_cap_offset);
+	ret = kstrtos32_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 0, &dbg_cap_offset);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	/* Capability register at offset 0x14 is the last IOMMU capability register. */
-	if (dbg_cap_offset > 0x14)
+	if (dbg_cap_offset < 0 || dbg_cap_offset > 0x14)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	iommu->dbg_cap_offset = dbg_cap_offset;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · Eder Zulian

In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.

Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already protected by different mechanisms.

1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string <= 8 bytes, so e.g. 0xffffffff isn't a valid input.

if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ)

     return -EINVAL;

2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int and iommu->mmio_phys_end is u64

if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))

      return -EINVAL;

3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and refuse to perform the read.

Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write().

Quoted 4 lines
---
 drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Applied for -rc, thanks.