iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs
In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.
Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already protected by different mechanisms.
1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string <= 8 bytes, so e.g. 0xffffffff isn't a valid input.
if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int and iommu->mmio_phys_end is u64
if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))
return -EINVAL;
3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and refuse to perform the read.
Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write().
--- drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c +5 -4
@@ -31,11 +31,12 @@ static ssize_t iommu_mmio_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,if (cnt >OFS_IN_SZ )return -EINVAL ; - ret =kstrtou32_from_user (ubuf, cnt,0 , &dbg_mmio_offset); + ret =kstrtos32_from_user (ubuf, cnt,0 , &dbg_mmio_offset);if (ret)return ret; -if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end -sizeof (u64)) +if (dbg_mmio_offset <0 || dbg_mmio_offset > + iommu->mmio_phys_end -sizeof (u64))return -EINVAL ; iommu->dbg_mmio_offset = dbg_mmio_offset;
@@ -71,12 +72,12 @@ static ssize_t iommu_capability_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubufif (cnt >OFS_IN_SZ )return -EINVAL ; - ret =kstrtou32_from_user (ubuf, cnt,0 , &dbg_cap_offset); + ret =kstrtos32_from_user (ubuf, cnt,0 , &dbg_cap_offset);if (ret)return ret;/* Capability register at offset 0x14 is the last IOMMU capability register. */ -if (dbg_cap_offset >0x14 ) +if (dbg_cap_offset <0 || dbg_cap_offset >0x14 )return -EINVAL ; iommu->dbg_cap_offset = dbg_cap_offset;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Jörg Rödel
maintainerQuoted 28 lines · Eder Zulian
In
iommu_mmio_write()andiommu_capability_write(), the variablesdbg_mmio_offsetanddbg_cap_offsetare declared as int. However, they are populated usingkstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already protected by different mechanisms.
1. #define
OFS_IN_SZ8 ensures the user string <= 8 bytes, so e.g.0xffffffffisn't a valid input.if (cnt >
OFS_IN_SZ)return -EINVAL;2. Implicit type promotion in
iommu_mmio_write(),dbg_mmio_offsetis int andiommu->mmio_phys_endis u64if (
dbg_mmio_offset>iommu->mmio_phys_end- sizeof(u64))return -EINVAL;3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and refuse to perform the read.
Replace
kstrtou32_from_user()withkstrtos32_from_user()to parse the input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses directly iniommu_mmio_write()andiommu_capability_write().
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Eder Zulian <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Applied for -rc, thanks.