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netfilter: validate values parsed by try_number

PATCH In review Cyber-JA 1 participant 1 message Apr 10

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PATCH 2/2 netfilter: validate values parsed by try_number

try_number() parses comma-separated decimal values from FTP PORT and EPRT commands into a u_int32_t array, but does not validate that each value fits in a single octet. RFC 959 specifies that PORT parameters are decimal integers in the range 0-255, representing the four octets of an IP address followed by two octets encoding the port number.

Values exceeding 255 are silently accepted. In try_rfc959(), the raw u32 values are combined via shift-and-OR to form the IP and port:

  cmd->u3.ip = htonl((array[0] << 24) | (array[1] << 16) |
                     (array[2] << 8) | array[3]);
  cmd->u.tcp.port = htons((array[4] << 8) | array[5]);

When array elements exceed 255, bits from one field bleed into adjacent fields after shifting, producing IP addresses and port numbers that differ from what the text representation suggests. For example, "PORT 10,0,1,2,256,22" yields port (256<<8)|22 = 65558, truncated to u16 = 22. This mismatch between the textual and computed values can confuse network monitoring tools that parse FTP commands independently.

Reject the command by returning 0 (no match) when any accumulated value exceeds 255.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c +4 -0
index 5e00f9123c38..12a6d9dd16a5 100644
@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ static int try_number(const char *data, size_t dlen, u_int32_t array[],
 	for (i = 0, len = 0; len < dlen && i < array_size; len++, data++) {
 		if (*data >= '0' && *data <= '9') {
 			array[i] = array[i]*10 + *data - '0';
+			if (array[i] > 255) {
+				pr_debug("try_number: %u > 255\n", array[i]);
+				return 0;
+			}
 		}
 		else if (*data == sep)
 			i++;
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