nfc: hci: fix OOB heap read on short HCP frames.
Subsystems (3)
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Quoted 11 lines · ashutosh desai
Both
nfc_hci_recv_from_llc()andnfc_hci_msg_rx_work()read byte 1 of ansk_buff(the HCP message header field) without first verifying the buffer contains at leastNFC_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN(2) bytes.The SHDLC LLC layer only filters zero-length frames; a single-byte I-frame from a malicious NFC peer therefore reaches the HCI reassembly path where
packet->message.headeris read one byte past the valid data. The same issue is present in the NCI HCI implementation (nci/hci.c) vianci_hci_data_received_cb()andnci_hci_msg_rx_work().
Quoted 5 lines
Add an explicit length check before accessing the message header at all four locations, freeing the skb on malformed input.
Signed-off-by Ashutosh Desai <[email protected]>---
Same answer: Testing skb->len alone is not enough.
skbs can have fragments, pskb_may_pull() or skb_linearize() would be needed.
PATCH v2 1/1 nfc: hci: fix OOB heap read on short HCP frames
Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nfc_hci_msg_rx_work() cast skb->data to struct hcp_packet and read the message header byte without verifying the data is present in the linear sk_buff area. The same issue exists in the NCI HCI path via nci_hci_data_received_cb() and nci_hci_msg_rx_work().
The initial fix checked skb->len, but that counts bytes in non-linear fragments too. skb->data only covers the linear head, so a fragmented skb with len >= 2 but the payload in a fragment would still result in an out-of-bounds read. Eric Dumazet pointed this out.
Switch to pskb_may_pull() which validates that the requested bytes are available and pulls fragment data into the linear area if needed, which is the correct approach here.
--- net/nfc/hci/core.c | 9 +++++++++ net/nfc/nci/hci.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
net/nfc/hci/core.c +9 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static void nfc_hci_msg_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)u8 instruction;while ((skb =skb_dequeue (&hdev->msg_rx_queue)) !=NULL ) { +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,NFC_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (skb); +continue ; + } pipe = skb->data[0 ];skb_pull (skb,NFC_HCI_HCP_PACKET_HEADER_LEN ); message = (struct hcp_message *)skb->data;
@@ -904,6 +908,11 @@ static void nfc_hci_recv_from_llc(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)* unblock waiting cmd context. Otherwise, enqueue to dispatch * in separate context where handler can also execute command. */ +if (!pskb_may_pull (hcp_skb,NFC_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (hcp_skb); +return ; + } + packet = (struct hcp_packet *)hcp_skb->data; type =HCP_MSG_GET_TYPE (packet->message.header);if (type ==NFC_HCI_HCP_RESPONSE ) {
net/nfc/nci/hci.c +9 -0
@@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ static void nci_hci_msg_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)for (; (skb =skb_dequeue (&hdev->msg_rx_queue));kcov_remote_stop ()) {kcov_remote_start_common (skb_get_kcov_handle (skb)); +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,NCI_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (skb); +continue ; + } pipe =NCI_HCP_MSG_GET_PIPE (skb->data[0 ]);skb_pull (skb,NCI_HCI_HCP_PACKET_HEADER_LEN ); message = (struct nci_hcp_message *)skb->data;
@@ -482,6 +486,11 @@ void nci_hci_data_received_cb(void *context,* unblock waiting cmd context. Otherwise, enqueue to dispatch * in separate context where handler can also execute command. */ +if (!pskb_may_pull (hcp_skb,NCI_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (hcp_skb); +return ; + } + packet = (struct nci_hcp_packet *)hcp_skb->data; type =NCI_HCP_MSG_GET_TYPE (packet->message.header);if (type ==NCI_HCI_HCP_RESPONSE ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2] nfc: hci: fix OOB heap read on short HCP frames
Quoted 1 line · On Thu, 9 Apr 2026 15:08:25 +0000 Ashutosh Desai wrote:
Suggested-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
As Eric mentioned elsewhere - he did not suggest any of this, merely reviewed your submission.
net/nfc/hci/core.c static void nfc_hci_msg_rx_work(struct work_struct *work) · line 139
Quoted 8 lines
+++
b/net/nfc/hci/core.cnet/nfc/hci/core.c +3
-0@@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static void nfc_hci_msg_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)u8 instruction;while ((skb =skb_dequeue (&hdev->msg_rx_queue)) !=NULL ) { +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,NFC_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (skb); +continue ;
How did a broken packet get enqueued in the first place?
Re: [PATCH v2] nfc: hci: fix OOB heap read on short HCP frames
Quoted 2 lines · On Sun, 12 Apr 2026 13:42:18 -0700 Jakub Kicinski wrote:
As Eric mentioned elsewhere - he did not suggest any of this, merely reviewed your submission.
Agree, that tag was incorrect on my part. Will remove it in the next version.
Quoted 1 line
How did a broken packet get enqueued in the first place?
You are right to point that out. nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() already gates the queue with pskb_may_pull(), so a short skb cannot reach nfc_hci_msg_rx_work() to begin with. The same holds for the nci path. Those two checks are redundant and will be dropped in v3.
PATCH v3 1/1 nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing
nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() cast skb->data to struct hcp_packet and read the message header byte without checking that enough data is present in the linear sk_buff area. A malicious NFC peer can send a 1-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read.
Fix this by adding pskb_may_pull() before each cast to ensure the full 2-byte HCP header is pulled into the linear area before it is accessed.
---
v3: drop redundant pskb_may_pull checks from msg_rx_work functions,
remove incorrect Suggested-by tag
v2: switch skb->len check to pskb_may_pull
net/nfc/hci/core.c | 5 +++++ net/nfc/nci/hci.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/nfc/hci/core.c +5 -0
@@ -904,6 +904,11 @@ static void nfc_hci_recv_from_llc(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)* unblock waiting cmd context. Otherwise, enqueue to dispatch * in separate context where handler can also execute command. */ +if (!pskb_may_pull (hcp_skb,NFC_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (hcp_skb); +return ; + } + packet = (struct hcp_packet *)hcp_skb->data; type =HCP_MSG_GET_TYPE (packet->message.header);if (type ==NFC_HCI_HCP_RESPONSE ) {
net/nfc/nci/hci.c +5 -0
@@ -482,6 +482,11 @@ void nci_hci_data_received_cb(void *context,* unblock waiting cmd context. Otherwise, enqueue to dispatch * in separate context where handler can also execute command. */ +if (!pskb_may_pull (hcp_skb,NCI_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN )) { +kfree_skb (hcp_skb); +return ; + } + packet = (struct nci_hcp_packet *)hcp_skb->data; type =NCI_HCP_MSG_GET_TYPE (packet->message.header);if (type ==NCI_HCI_HCP_RESPONSE ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3] nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing
Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, 13 Apr 2026 02:43:29 +0000 Ashutosh Desai wrote:
nfc_hci_recv_from_llc()andnci_hci_data_received_cb()castskb->datato structhcp_packetand read the message header byte without checking that enough data is present in the linearsk_buffarea. A malicious NFC peer can send a 1-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read.Fix this by adding
pskb_may_pull()before each cast to ensure the full 2-byte HCP header is pulled into the linear area before it is accessed.
This is missing a Fixes tag.
Also please do not post new revision of a patch in response to the previous one
Signature · 3 lines
pw-bot: cr pv-bot: fixes pv-bot: thread