net/sched: act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflow
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 net/sched: act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflow
tcf_mirred_act() checks sched_mirred_nest against MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT (4) to prevent deep recursion. However, when the action uses blockcast (tcfm_blockid != 0), the function returns at the tcf_blockcast() call BEFORE reaching the counter increment. As a result, the recursion counter never advances and the limit check is entirely bypassed.
When two devices share a TC egress block with a mirred blockcast rule, a packet egressing on device A is mirrored to device B via blockcast; device B's egress TC re-enters tcf_mirred_act() via blockcast and mirrors back to A, creating an unbounded recursion loop:
tcf_mirred_act -> tcf_blockcast -> tcf_mirred_to_dev -> dev_queue_xmit -> sch_handle_egress -> tcf_classify -> tcf_mirred_act -> (repeat)
This recursion continues until the kernel stack overflows.
The bug is reachable from an unprivileged user via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET): user namespaces grant CAP_NET_ADMIN in the new network namespace, which is sufficient to create dummy devices, attach clsact qdiscs with shared blocks, and install mirred blockcast filters.
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90000b7fff8 Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 169 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-next-20260410 RIP: 0010:xas_find+0x17/0x480 Call Trace: xa_find+0x17b/0x1d0 tcf_mirred_act+0x640/0x1060 tcf_action_exec+0x400/0x530 basic_classify+0x128/0x1d0 tcf_classify+0xd83/0x1150 tc_run+0x328/0x620 __dev_queue_xmit+0x797/0x3100 tcf_mirred_to_dev+0x7b1/0xf70 tcf_mirred_act+0x68a/0x1060 [repeating ~30+ times until stack overflow] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Fix this by incrementing sched_mirred_nest before calling tcf_blockcast() and decrementing it on return, mirroring the non-blockcast path. This ensures subsequent recursive entries see the updated counter and are correctly limited by MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT.
--- net/sched/act_mirred.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sched/act_mirred.c +6 -2
@@ -444,8 +444,12 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb,tcf_action_update_bstats (&m->common, skb); blockid =READ_ONCE (m->tcfm_blockid); -if (blockid) -return tcf_blockcast (skb, m, blockid, res, retval); +if (blockid) { + xmit->sched_mirred_nest++; + retval =tcf_blockcast (skb, m, blockid, res, retval); + xmit->sched_mirred_nest--; +return retval; + } dev =rcu_dereference_bh (m->tcfm_dev);if (unlikely (!dev)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Simon Horman
reviewerFrom: 'Simon Horman' <[email protected]>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible. Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
net/sched: act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflow
This patch fixes a stack overflow bug where mirred blockcast actions would bypass the recursion limit check because the recursion counter was not incremented for blockcast actions.
net/sched/act_mirred.c TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb, · line 448
Quoted 12 lines
net/sched/act_mirred.c +2
-2@@ -444,8 +444,12 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb,tcf_action_update_bstats (&m->common, skb); blockid =READ_ONCE (m->tcfm_blockid); -if (blockid) -return tcf_blockcast (skb, m, blockid, res, retval); +if (blockid) { + xmit->sched_mirred_nest++;
Could this leave a stale pointer in sched_mirred_dev since netdev_xmit is persistent per-CPU (or per-task in PREEMPT_RT) memory?
If a nested mirred action later iterates over sched_mirred_dev up to the new nesting depth to detect routing loops, could it match a stale pointer from whatever unrelated packet previously reached this nesting level?
This might cause a false-positive loop detection and incorrectly drop a valid packet. Should we set xmit->sched_mirred_dev[xmit->sched_mirred_nest] = NULL before incrementing the counter?
net/sched/act_mirred.c TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb, · line 449
Quoted 1 line
net/sched/act_mirred.c +1
-0+ retval =tcf_blockcast (skb, m, blockid, res, retval);
This isn't a regression introduced by this patch, but it exists in the early error returns of tcf_mirred_act() (e.g., when the target device is gone, or a routing loop is detected) and in tcf_blockcast() (e.g., when xa_empty(&block->ports) is true).
In these error paths, the functions simply return retval. For mirred redirect actions, retval is initialized to m->tcf_action, which is typically TC_ACT_STOLEN.
When TC_ACT_STOLEN is returned, the TC framework assumes the action has taken ownership of the packet and will not free the sk_buff. Since the code does not free the sk_buff before returning in these error paths, does this leak the sk_buff?
Could an unprivileged user inside a network namespace trigger this intentionally by creating a routing loop with mirred redirect rules, leading to continuous sk_buff leaks and system memory exhaustion?
Should these error paths ensure the sk_buff is freed or force the return value to TC_ACT_SHOT if the action is a redirect, mirroring the existing behavior in tcf_mirred_to_dev()?
Quoted 3 lines
net/sched/act_mirred.c +3
-0+ xmit->sched_mirred_nest--; +return retval; + }
Jamal Hadi Salim
maintainerQuoted 53 lines · Simon Horman
From: 'Simon Horman' <[email protected]>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible. Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
net/sched:act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflowThis patch fixes a stack overflow bug where mirred blockcast actions would bypass the recursion limit check because the recursion counter was not incremented for blockcast actions.
net/sched/act_mirred.c TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb, · line 448
Quoted 12 lines
net/sched/act_mirred.c +2
-2@@ -444,8 +444,12 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb,tcf_action_update_bstats (&m->common, skb); blockid =READ_ONCE (m->tcfm_blockid); -if (blockid) -return tcf_blockcast (skb, m, blockid, res, retval); +if (blockid) { + xmit->sched_mirred_nest++;Could this leave a stale pointer in
sched_mirred_devsincenetdev_xmitis persistent per-CPU (or per-task inPREEMPT_RT) memory?If a nested mirred action later iterates over
sched_mirred_devup to the new nesting depth to detect routing loops, could it match a stale pointer from whatever unrelated packet previously reached this nesting level?This might cause a false-positive loop detection and incorrectly drop a valid packet. Should we set xmit->sched_mirred_dev[xmit->sched_mirred_nest] = NULL before incrementing the counter?
net/sched/act_mirred.c TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb, · line 449
Quoted 1 line
net/sched/act_mirred.c +1
-0+ retval =tcf_blockcast (skb, m, blockid, res, retval);This isn't a regression introduced by this patch, but it exists in the early error returns of
tcf_mirred_act()(e.g., when the target device is gone, or a routing loop is detected) and intcf_blockcast()(e.g., whenxa_empty(&block->ports)is true).In these error paths, the functions simply return retval. For mirred redirect actions, retval is initialized to
m->tcf_action, which is typicallyTC_ACT_STOLEN.When
TC_ACT_STOLENis returned, the TC framework assumes the action has taken ownership of the packet and will not free thesk_buff. Since the code does not free thesk_buffbefore returning in these error paths, does this leak thesk_buff?
Quoted 11 lines
Could an unprivileged user inside a network namespace trigger this intentionally by creating a routing loop with mirred redirect rules, leading to continuous
sk_buffleaks and system memory exhaustion?Should these error paths ensure the
sk_buffis freed or force the return value toTC_ACT_SHOTif the action is a redirect, mirroring the existing behavior intcf_mirred_to_dev()?Quoted 3 lines
net/sched/act_mirred.c +3
-0+ xmit->sched_mirred_nest--; +return retval; + }
There's a dependency with the skb bits patch[1] with this one. Stephen, I will take this set and consider what Sashiko is saying here [2]. I just became aware of this - but it seems to have some merit. I will also review this patch and sashiko's input from that perspective. If it merits it, I will resend the set incorporating this fix and Sashiko's suggestions.
cheers,
jamal
[1]https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
[2] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260326181701.308275-1-stephen%40networkplumber.org