fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow
indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system.
This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry().
Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by fnd_push() in indx_find().
The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was missed.
---
Found during a broader arch/um/ and filesystem security audit. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 1732053c8a6b ("fs: ntfs3: check return value of indx_find to avoid infinite loop"), which added a depth limit to indx_find() but missed indx_find_buffer().
Reproduced on UML (ARCH=um) with a crafted NTFS image containing a circular B+ tree directory index. Mounting the image and deleting a specific file triggers indx_delete_entry() -> indx_find_buffer() -> unbounded recursion -> stack overflow:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel tried to access user memory
at addr 0x606128c4, ip 0x6012907e
Call Trace:
[<60611ec2>] ? indx_read_ra+0x0/0x677At 168+ bytes per frame, ~97 recursions overflow the 16KB kernel stack. Desktop automount (udisks2 + ntfs3) means a crafted USB drive can trigger this without privilege.
Note: the pre-existing indx_node allocated by indx_read() during the DFS is leaked when the new depth limit fires. This is a pre-existing issue (the node was also leaked on any other error return from indx_find_buffer); fixing it cleanly requires restructuring the node ownership model and is left for a follow-up patch.
Reproducer script and crafted image builder available on request.
fs/ntfs3/index.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/index.c +12 -3
@@ -2013,13 +2013,21 @@ int indx_insert_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer (struct ntfs_index *indx,struct ntfs_inode *ni,const struct INDEX_ROOT *root, -__le64 vbn,struct indx_node *n) +__le64 vbn,struct indx_node *n, +int depth) {int err;const struct NTFS_DE *e;struct indx_node *r;const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr = n ? &n->index->ihdr : &root->ihdr; +/* +* Limit recursion depth to prevent stack overflow from crafted +* images. Use the same bound as the fnd->nodes array (20). +*/ +if (depth >ARRAY_SIZE (((struct ntfs_fnd *)NULL )->nodes)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +/* Step 1: Scan one level. */ for (e =hdr_first_de (hdr);; e =hdr_next_de (hdr, e)) {if (!e)
@@ -2040,7 +2048,8 @@ static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer(struct ntfs_index *indx,if (err)return ERR_PTR (err); - r =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, vbn, n); + r =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, vbn, n, + depth +1 );if (r)return r; }
@@ -2446,7 +2455,7 @@ int indx_delete_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,fnd_clear (fnd); - in =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, sub_vbn,NULL ); + in =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, sub_vbn,NULL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (in)) { err =PTR_ERR (in); goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Konstantin Komarov
maintainerQuoted 104 lines · Michael Bommarito
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indx_find_buffer()recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system.This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in
indx_delete_entry().Add a depth parameter and bail out with
-EINVALwhen it reaches thefnd->nodesarray bound, matching the constraint already enforced byfnd_push()inindx_find().The related function
indx_find()was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit1732053c8a6b), butindx_find_buffer()was missed.Fixes 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>---
Found during a broaderarch/um/and filesystem security audit. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit1732053c8a6b("fs: ntfs3: check return value ofindx_findto avoid infinite loop"), which added a depth limit toindx_find()but missedindx_find_buffer().Reproduced on UML (ARCH=um) with a crafted NTFS image containing a circular B+ tree directory index. Mounting the image and deleting a specific file triggers
indx_delete_entry()->indx_find_buffer()-> unbounded recursion -> stack overflow:Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel tried to access user memory at addr 0x606128c4, ip 0x6012907e Call Trace: [<60611ec2>] ? indx_read_ra+0x0/0x677At 168+ bytes per frame, ~97 recursions overflow the 16KB kernel stack. Desktop automount (udisks2 + ntfs3) means a crafted USB drive can trigger this without privilege.
Note: the pre-existing
indx_nodeallocated byindx_read()during the DFS is leaked when the new depth limit fires. This is a pre-existing issue (the node was also leaked on any other error return fromindx_find_buffer); fixing it cleanly requires restructuring the node ownership model and is left for a follow-up patch.Reproducer script and crafted image builder available on request.
fs/ntfs3/index.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/ntfs3/index.c +12
-4@@ -2013,13 +2013,21 @@ int indx_insert_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer (struct ntfs_index *indx,struct ntfs_inode *ni,const struct INDEX_ROOT *root, -__le64 vbn,struct indx_node *n) +__le64 vbn,struct indx_node *n, +int depth) {int err;const struct NTFS_DE *e;struct indx_node *r;const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr = n ? &n->index->ihdr : &root->ihdr; +/* +* Limit recursion depth to prevent stack overflow from crafted +* images. Use the same bound as the fnd->nodes array (20). +*/ +if (depth >ARRAY_SIZE (((struct ntfs_fnd *)NULL )->nodes)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +/* Step 1: Scan one level. */ for (e =hdr_first_de (hdr);; e =hdr_next_de (hdr, e)) {if (!e)@@ -2040,7 +2048,8 @@ static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer(struct ntfs_index *indx,if (err)return ERR_PTR (err); - r =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, vbn, n); + r =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, vbn, n, + depth +1 );if (r)return r; }@@ -2446,7 +2455,7 @@ int indx_delete_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,fnd_clear (fnd); - in =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, sub_vbn,NULL ); + in =indx_find_buffer (indx, ni, root, sub_vbn,NULL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (in)) { err =PTR_ERR (in); goto out; --
Quoted 2 lines
2.53.0
Hello,
Sorry for the delay.
Your patch was applied, thanks.
Regards,
Konstantin