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fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow

PATCH In review Michael Bommarito 2 participants 2 messages Apr 13 – Apr 30

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PATCH 1/1 fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow

indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system.

This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry().

Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by fnd_push() in indx_find().

The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was missed.

Fixes 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4

---
Found during a broader arch/um/ and filesystem security audit. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 1732053c8a6b ("fs: ntfs3: check return value of indx_find to avoid infinite loop"), which added a depth limit to indx_find() but missed indx_find_buffer().

Reproduced on UML (ARCH=um) with a crafted NTFS image containing a circular B+ tree directory index. Mounting the image and deleting a specific file triggers indx_delete_entry() -> indx_find_buffer() -> unbounded recursion -> stack overflow:

  Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel tried to access user memory
    at addr 0x606128c4, ip 0x6012907e
  Call Trace:
   [<60611ec2>] ? indx_read_ra+0x0/0x677

At 168+ bytes per frame, ~97 recursions overflow the 16KB kernel stack. Desktop automount (udisks2 + ntfs3) means a crafted USB drive can trigger this without privilege.

Note: the pre-existing indx_node allocated by indx_read() during the DFS is leaked when the new depth limit fires. This is a pre-existing issue (the node was also leaked on any other error return from indx_find_buffer); fixing it cleanly requires restructuring the node ownership model and is left for a follow-up patch.

Reproducer script and crafted image builder available on request.

 fs/ntfs3/index.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/index.c +12 -3
index 97f06c26fe1a..2c43e7c27861 100644
@@ -2013,13 +2013,21 @@ int indx_insert_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,
 static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer(struct ntfs_index *indx,
 					  struct ntfs_inode *ni,
 					  const struct INDEX_ROOT *root,
-					  __le64 vbn, struct indx_node *n)
+					  __le64 vbn, struct indx_node *n,
+					  int depth)
 {
 	int err;
 	const struct NTFS_DE *e;
 	struct indx_node *r;
 	const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr = n ? &n->index->ihdr : &root->ihdr;
 
+	/*
+	 * Limit recursion depth to prevent stack overflow from crafted
+	 * images.  Use the same bound as the fnd->nodes array (20).
+	 */
+	if (depth > ARRAY_SIZE(((struct ntfs_fnd *)NULL)->nodes))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 	/* Step 1: Scan one level. */
 	for (e = hdr_first_de(hdr);; e = hdr_next_de(hdr, e)) {
 		if (!e)
@@ -2040,7 +2048,8 @@ static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer(struct ntfs_index *indx,
 			if (err)
 				return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-			r = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, vbn, n);
+			r = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, vbn, n,
+					     depth + 1);
 			if (r)
 				return r;
 		}
@@ -2446,7 +2455,7 @@ int indx_delete_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,
 
 		fnd_clear(fnd);
 
-		in = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, sub_vbn, NULL);
+		in = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, sub_vbn, NULL, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(in)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(in);
 			goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 104 lines · Michael Bommarito

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indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system.

This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry().

Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by fnd_push() in indx_find().

The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was missed.

Fixes 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4

---
Found during a broader arch/um/ and filesystem security audit. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 1732053c8a6b ("fs: ntfs3: check return value of indx_find to avoid infinite loop"), which added a depth limit to indx_find() but missed indx_find_buffer().

Reproduced on UML (ARCH=um) with a crafted NTFS image containing a circular B+ tree directory index. Mounting the image and deleting a specific file triggers indx_delete_entry() -> indx_find_buffer() -> unbounded recursion -> stack overflow:

   Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel tried to access user memory
     at addr 0x606128c4, ip 0x6012907e
   Call Trace:
    [<60611ec2>] ? indx_read_ra+0x0/0x677

At 168+ bytes per frame, ~97 recursions overflow the 16KB kernel stack. Desktop automount (udisks2 + ntfs3) means a crafted USB drive can trigger this without privilege.

Note: the pre-existing indx_node allocated by indx_read() during the DFS is leaked when the new depth limit fires. This is a pre-existing issue (the node was also leaked on any other error return from indx_find_buffer); fixing it cleanly requires restructuring the node ownership model and is left for a follow-up patch.

Reproducer script and crafted image builder available on request.

  fs/ntfs3/index.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/index.c +12 -4
index 97f06c26fe1a..2c43e7c27861 100644
@@ -2013,13 +2013,21 @@ int indx_insert_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,
  static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer(struct ntfs_index *indx,
                                           struct ntfs_inode *ni,
                                           const struct INDEX_ROOT *root,
-                                         __le64 vbn, struct indx_node *n)
+                                         __le64 vbn, struct indx_node *n,
+                                         int depth)
  {
         int err;
         const struct NTFS_DE *e;
         struct indx_node *r;
         const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr = n ? &n->index->ihdr : &root->ihdr;
 
+       /*
+        * Limit recursion depth to prevent stack overflow from crafted
+        * images.  Use the same bound as the fnd->nodes array (20).
+        */
+       if (depth > ARRAY_SIZE(((struct ntfs_fnd *)NULL)->nodes))
+               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
         /* Step 1: Scan one level. */
         for (e = hdr_first_de(hdr);; e = hdr_next_de(hdr, e)) {
                 if (!e)
@@ -2040,7 +2048,8 @@ static struct indx_node *indx_find_buffer(struct ntfs_index *indx,
                         if (err)
                                 return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-                       r = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, vbn, n);
+                       r = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, vbn, n,
+                                            depth + 1);
                         if (r)
                                 return r;
                 }
@@ -2446,7 +2455,7 @@ int indx_delete_entry(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni,
 
                 fnd_clear(fnd);
 
-               in = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, sub_vbn, NULL);
+               in = indx_find_buffer(indx, ni, root, sub_vbn, NULL, 0);
                 if (IS_ERR(in)) {
                         err = PTR_ERR(in);
                         goto out;
--
Quoted 2 lines

2.53.0

Hello,

Sorry for the delay.
Your patch was applied, thanks.

Regards,
Konstantin