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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 2 participants 3 messages Apr 14 – Apr 27 Staging

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()

HT_caps_handler() loops up to pIE->length, the IE length byte taken directly from an over-the-air association response, and uses the counter to index pmlmeinfo->HT_caps.u.HT_cap[26]. A malicious AP can supply an HT capabilities IE with a length byte up to 255, AND-writing into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. This is reachable in station mode (the default) via OnAssocRsp.

HT_info_handler() already rejects oversized IEs so do the same thing in HT_caps_handler() to resolve this.

Fixes 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +3 -0
index 3242978da36c..a2e016c6a01f 100644
@@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE)
 	if (phtpriv->ht_option == false)
 		return;
 
+	if (pIE->length > sizeof(pmlmeinfo->HT_caps))
+		return;
+
 	pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < (pIE->length); i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 22 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

HT_caps_handler() loops up to pIE->length, the IE length byte taken directly from an over-the-air association response, and uses the counter to index pmlmeinfo->HT_caps.u.HT_cap[26]. A malicious AP can supply an HT capabilities IE with a length byte up to 255, AND-writing into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. This is reachable in station mode (the default) via OnAssocRsp.

HT_info_handler() already rejects oversized IEs so do the same thing in HT_caps_handler() to resolve this.

Fixes 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +0 -0
index 3242978da36c..a2e016c6a01f 100644

drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE) · line 940

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +3 -0
@@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE)
 	if (phtpriv->ht_option == false)
 		return;
 
+	if (pIE->length > sizeof(pmlmeinfo->HT_caps))
+		return;
+
 	pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < (pIE->length); i++) {

Good catch. Trusting pIE->length blindly from an unauthenticated association response is a classic oob write vector. Since HT_cap is fixed-size within the mlme_ext_info struct, this is a clear remote heap corruption risk if a malicious AP is in range.

author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Luka Gejak
Quoted 30 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

HT_caps_handler() loops up to pIE->length, the IE length byte taken directly from an over-the-air association response, and uses the counter to index pmlmeinfo->HT_caps.u.HT_cap[26]. A malicious AP can supply an HT capabilities IE with a length byte up to 255, AND-writing into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. This is reachable in station mode (the default) via OnAssocRsp.

HT_info_handler() already rejects oversized IEs so do the same thing in HT_caps_handler() to resolve this.

Fixes 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +3 -0
index 3242978da36c..a2e016c6a01f 100644
@@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE)
 	if (phtpriv->ht_option == false)
 		return;
 
+	if (pIE->length > sizeof(pmlmeinfo->HT_caps))
+		return;
+
 	pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1;
 
Quoted 7 lines

drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE) · line 940

Quoted 1 line
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +0 -0
 	for (i = 0; i < (pIE->length); i++) {

Good catch. Trusting pIE->length blindly from an unauthenticated association response is a classic oob write vector. Since HT_cap is fixed-size within the mlme_ext_info struct, this is a clear remote heap corruption risk if a malicious AP is in range.

And it's wrong, as per the AI review :(

Also, you have trailing whitespace on your review comments :)

thanks,

greg k-h