staging: rtl8723bs: fix multiple security vulnerabilities
Subsystems (2)
v4 cover staging: rtl8723bs: fix multiple security vulnerabilities
This series fixes five remotely-triggerable memory safety issues in the rtl8723bs driver. All of them are reachable from the air by an attacker within WiFi radio range, without authentication, via crafted management or data frames:
1. Heap buffer overflow in recvframe_defrag() when reassembling fragmented frames whose total payload exceeds the receive buffer capacity.
2. Integer underflow in TKIP MIC verification when a frame is shorter than the sum of header, IV, ICV and MIC sizes.
3. Out-of-bounds read in portctrl() when a non-EAPOL frame is shorter than the 802.11 header + IV + LLC + ether_type.
4. Out-of-bounds reads in three IE walkers (rtw_get_wapi_ie(), rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wps_ie()) due to missing validation of the TLV length byte.
5. Integer underflow in rtw_wep_decrypt() when a WEP frame is shorter than the header + IV.
Each patch was found by code review and is not tested on hardware.
Changes since v3:
- Patch 1/5 (recvframe_defrag): check the return values of recvframe_pull() and recvframe_pull_tail(); on failure those helpers revert their pointer updates and return NULL, so the subsequent rx_end - rx_tail bounds check must not run on stale pointers (Dan Carpenter).
- Patch 1/5: drop the unnecessary (uint) cast in the bounds check (Dan Carpenter).
- All patches: add Fixes: tag pointing at the driver import and add the stable backport tag, per Dan Carpenter's request.
- Patches 2-5: carry Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak. Patch 1/5 lost Luka's tag because the code changed.
Changes since v2:
- Sent as numbered series with cover letter.
- Cc list regenerated from scripts/get_maintainer.pl.
Changes since v1:
- Rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not apply).
Delene Tchio Romuald (5):
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in recvframe_defrag()
staging: rtl8723bs: fix integer underflow in TKIP MIC verification
staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds read in portctrl()
staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds reads in IE parsing functions
staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption
.../staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c | 15 ++++- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 55 ++++++++++++++----- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 6 ++ 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
base-commit: bf9c95f3eeefb7fc4b4a6380cc23f1dca744e379 --
2.43.0
PATCH v4 1/5 staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in recvframe_defrag()
In recvframe_defrag(), a memcpy() copies fragment data into the reassembly buffer before validating that the buffer has sufficient space. If the total reassembled payload exceeds the receive buffer capacity, this results in a heap buffer overflow.
Additionally, the return values of recvframe_pull() and recvframe_pull_tail() were ignored. On failure those helpers revert their pointer updates and return NULL; continuing past such a failure would leave pfhdr->rx_tail at its pre-strip value, so the subsequent bounds check against rx_end - rx_tail would operate on stale pointers.
An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending crafted 802.11 fragmented frames. No authentication is required.
Check the return values of recvframe_pull() and recvframe_pull_tail(), then verify that the fragment payload fits within the remaining buffer space before the memcpy().
Found by reviewing memory operations in the driver and tracing buffer pointer manipulation through rtw_recv.h inline helpers. Not tested on hardware.
---
v4: check return values of recvframe_pull() and recvframe_pull_tail();
drop unnecessary (uint) cast; add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter). Luka Gejak's Reviewed-by dropped because the code changed.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not
apply).
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +17 -3
@@ -1127,12 +1127,26 @@ static union recv_frame *recvframe_defrag(struct adapter *adapter, wlanhdr_offset = pnfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pnfhdr->attrib.iv_len; -recvframe_pull (pnextrframe, wlanhdr_offset); +if (!recvframe_pull (pnextrframe, wlanhdr_offset)) { +rtw_free_recvframe (prframe, pfree_recv_queue); +rtw_free_recvframe_queue (defrag_q, pfree_recv_queue); +return NULL ; + }/* append to first fragment frame's tail (if privacy frame, pull the ICV) */ -recvframe_pull_tail (prframe, pfhdr->attrib.icv_len); +if (!recvframe_pull_tail (prframe, pfhdr->attrib.icv_len)) { +rtw_free_recvframe (prframe, pfree_recv_queue); +rtw_free_recvframe_queue (defrag_q, pfree_recv_queue); +return NULL ; + } + +/* Verify the receiving buffer has enough space for the fragment */ +if (pnfhdr->len > pfhdr->rx_end - pfhdr->rx_tail) { +rtw_free_recvframe (prframe, pfree_recv_queue); +rtw_free_recvframe_queue (defrag_q, pfree_recv_queue); +return NULL ; + } -/* memcpy */ memcpy (pfhdr->rx_tail, pnfhdr->rx_data, pnfhdr->len);recvframe_put (prframe, pnfhdr->len);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v4 1/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in recvframe_defrag()
Quoted 44 lines · Delene Tchio Romuald
In
recvframe_defrag(), amemcpy()copies fragment data into the reassembly buffer before validating that the buffer has sufficient space. If the total reassembled payload exceeds the receive buffer capacity, this results in a heap buffer overflow.Additionally, the return values of
recvframe_pull()andrecvframe_pull_tail()were ignored. On failure those helpers revert their pointer updates and return NULL; continuing past such a failure would leavepfhdr->rx_tailat its pre-strip value, so the subsequent bounds check againstrx_end-rx_tailwould operate on stale pointers.An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending crafted 802.11 fragmented frames. No authentication is required.
Check the return values of
recvframe_pull()andrecvframe_pull_tail(), then verify that the fragment payload fits within the remaining buffer space before thememcpy().Found by reviewing memory operations in the driver and tracing buffer pointer manipulation through
rtw_recv.hinline helpers. Not tested on hardware.Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")Signed-off-by Delene Tchio Romuald <[email protected]>---
v4: check return values ofrecvframe_pull()andrecvframe_pull_tail();
drop unnecessary (uint) cast; add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter). Luka Gejak's Reviewed-by dropped because the code changed.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did notapply).drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +0
-0
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c static union recv_frame *recvframe_defrag(struct adapter *adapter, · line 1133
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +4
-1@@ -1127,12 +1127,26 @@ static union recv_frame *recvframe_defrag(struct adapter *adapter, wlanhdr_offset = pnfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pnfhdr->attrib.iv_len; -recvframe_pull (pnextrframe, wlanhdr_offset); +if (!recvframe_pull (pnextrframe, wlanhdr_offset)) { +rtw_free_recvframe (prframe, pfree_recv_queue); +rtw_free_recvframe_queue (defrag_q, pfree_recv_queue); +return NULL ;
We have four blocks now that do exactly this... Add a cleanup at the end of the function:
return pframe;
out_err:
rtw_free_recvframe(prframe, pfree_recv_queue); rtw_free_recvframe_queue(defrag_q, pfree_recv_queue); return NULL;
Btw, I'm planning to review the other patches in the series so hold off a day before resending. If I haven't reviewed them by End Of Day on Thursday, then I have gotten busy and feel free to resend at that point.
regards,
dan carpenter
PATCH v4 2/5 staging: rtl8723bs: fix integer underflow in TKIP MIC verification
In reply to Delene Tchio RomualdIn recvframe_chkmic(), the payload length is computed as:
datalen = precvframe->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen
- prxattrib->iv_len - prxattrib->icv_len - 8;
All operands are unsigned. If the receive frame is shorter than the sum of the header, IV, ICV and MIC sizes, this subtraction wraps around and datalen becomes a huge unsigned value. That value is then passed to rtw_secmicappend(), which reads past the end of the receive buffer and can leak kernel memory or trigger a crash.
An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short TKIP-encrypted frame. No authentication is required.
Validate that the frame is large enough for the TKIP MIC computation before the subtraction.
Found by reviewing length arithmetic in the TKIP receive path. Not tested on hardware.
---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not
apply).
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +7 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,13 @@ static signed int recvframe_chkmic(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *p mickey = &stainfo->dot11tkiprxmickey.skey[0 ]; } +/* Ensure the frame is large enough for TKIP MIC verification */ +if (precvframe->u.hdr.len <= prxattrib->hdrlen + + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->icv_len +8 ) { + res = _FAIL; + goto exit; + } + datalen = precvframe->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len - prxattrib->icv_len -8 ;/* icv_len included the mic code */ pframe = precvframe->u.hdr.rx_data; payload = pframe + prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 3/5 staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds read in portctrl()
In reply to Delene Tchio RomualdIn portctrl(), when 802.1X port control is enabled and a non-EAPOL frame is received, the ether_type is read from the LLC header without verifying that the frame actually contains enough bytes to hold the MAC header, IV and the LLC header plus two bytes of ether_type. For sufficiently short frames, the memcpy() that loads be_tmp reads past the end of the receive buffer.
An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short frame. No authentication is required.
Validate the frame length before dereferencing the LLC header; drop the frame if it is too short.
Found by reviewing length validation in the receive path. Not tested on hardware.
---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not
apply).
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +18 -10
@@ -539,17 +539,25 @@ static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre prtnframe = precv_frame; -/* get ether_type */ - ptr = ptr + pfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pfhdr->attrib.iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH ; -memcpy (&be_tmp, ptr,2 ); - ether_type =ntohs (be_tmp); - -if (ether_type == eapol_type) - prtnframe = precv_frame; -else { -/* free this frame */ -rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); +/* Ensure frame has LLC header and ether_type */ +if (pfhdr->len < pattrib->hdrlen + + pattrib->iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH +2 ) { +rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, + &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); prtnframe =NULL ; + }else { +/* get ether_type */ + ptr += pattrib->hdrlen + + pattrib->iv_len + +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH ; +memcpy (&be_tmp, ptr,2 ); + ether_type =ntohs (be_tmp); + +if (ether_type != eapol_type) { +rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, + &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); + prtnframe =NULL ; + } } }else {/* allowed */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds read in portctrl()
Quoted 45 lines · Delene Tchio Romuald
In
portctrl(), when 802.1X port control is enabled and a non-EAPOL frame is received, theether_typeis read from the LLC header without verifying that the frame actually contains enough bytes to hold the MAC header, IV and the LLC header plus two bytes ofether_type. For sufficiently short frames, thememcpy()that loadsbe_tmpreads past the end of the receive buffer.An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short frame. No authentication is required.
Validate the frame length before dereferencing the LLC header; drop the frame if it is too short.
Found by reviewing length validation in the receive path. Not tested on hardware.
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")Reviewed-by Luka Gejak <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Delene Tchio Romuald <[email protected]>---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did notapply).drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +0
-6@@ -539,17 +539,25 @@ static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre prtnframe = precv_frame; -/* get ether_type */ - ptr = ptr + pfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pfhdr->attrib.iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH ; -memcpy (&be_tmp, ptr,2 ); - ether_type =ntohs (be_tmp); - -if (ether_type == eapol_type)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre · line 547
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +5
-4- prtnframe = precv_frame; - else { -/* free this frame */ -rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); +/* Ensure frame has LLC header and ether_type */ +if (pfhdr->len < pattrib->hdrlen + + pattrib->iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH +2 ) { +rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, + &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); prtnframe =NULL ;
I feel like it's sort of weird to write this as a pfhdr->len < condition. I feel like the untrusted part of the condition is the pattrib->hdrlen stuff and normally you would put the untrusted parts on the left. I kind of see what you're saying that the packet is too small, but to me I see it as the hdrlen is too big... But, also since you found the bug then you get to choose the style on this, so do which ever way you feel is best.
It would be better if instead of setting "prtnframe = NULL;" here, you just did "return NULL;" instead. You've followed the pattern of the existing code, but the rule is that if the function has a 100 lines of bad style code, you should add 1 line of good style even if it's inconsistent.
It makes the code slightly better and it makes the diff a lot smaller and clearer.
regards,
dan carpenter
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +7 -0
@@ -531,6 +531,13 @@ static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre/* only accept EAPOL frame */ prtnframe = precv_frame; +/* Ensure frame has LLC header and ether_type */ +if (pfhdr->len < pattrib->hdrlen + + pattrib->iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH +2 ) { +rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, + &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); +return NULL ; + }/* get ether_type */ ptr = ptr + pfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pfhdr->attrib.iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH ;
Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds read in portctrl()
Quoted 65 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 45 lines · Delene Tchio Romuald
In
portctrl(), when 802.1X port control is enabled and a non-EAPOL frame is received, theether_typeis read from the LLC header without verifying that the frame actually contains enough bytes to hold the MAC header, IV and the LLC header plus two bytes ofether_type. For sufficiently short frames, thememcpy()that loadsbe_tmpreads past the end of the receive buffer.An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short frame. No authentication is required.
Validate the frame length before dereferencing the LLC header; drop the frame if it is too short.
Found by reviewing length validation in the receive path. Not tested on hardware.
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")Reviewed-by Luka Gejak <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Delene Tchio Romuald <[email protected]>---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did notapply).drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +0
-6@@ -539,17 +539,25 @@ static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre prtnframe = precv_frame; -/* get ether_type */ - ptr = ptr + pfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pfhdr->attrib.iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH ; -memcpy (&be_tmp, ptr,2 ); - ether_type =ntohs (be_tmp); - -if (ether_type == eapol_type)drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre · line 547
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +5
-4- prtnframe = precv_frame; - else { -/* free this frame */ -rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); +/* Ensure frame has LLC header and ether_type */ +if (pfhdr->len < pattrib->hdrlen + + pattrib->iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH +2 ) { +rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, + &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); prtnframe =NULL ;I feel like it's sort of weird to write this as a
pfhdr->len< condition. I feel like the untrusted part of the condition is thepattrib->hdrlenstuff and normally you would put the untrusted parts on the left. I kind of see what you're saying that the packet is too small, but to me I see it as the hdrlen is too big... But, also since you found the bug then you get to choose the style on this, so do which ever way you feel is best.
Quoted 5 lines
It would be better if instead of setting "prtnframe = NULL;" here, you just did "return NULL;" instead. You've followed the pattern of the existing code, but the rule is that if the function has a 100 lines of bad style code, you should add 1 line of good style even if it's inconsistent.
Hi Dan,
I wasn't aware of that. I thought in such cases you should follow the pattern of existing code. I will make sure to note that in future reviews.
Best regards,
Luka Gejak
Quoted 25 lines
It makes the code slightly better and it makes the diff a lot smaller and clearer.
regards,
dan carpenterdrivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +7
-0@@ -531,6 +531,13 @@ static union recv_frame *portctrl(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame *pre/* only accept EAPOL frame */ prtnframe = precv_frame; +/* Ensure frame has LLC header and ether_type */ +if (pfhdr->len < pattrib->hdrlen + + pattrib->iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH +2 ) { +rtw_free_recvframe (precv_frame, + &adapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); +return NULL ; + }/* get ether_type */ ptr = ptr + pfhdr->attrib.hdrlen + pfhdr->attrib.iv_len +LLC_HEADER_LENGTH ;
PATCH v4 4/5 staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds reads in IE parsing functions
In reply to Delene Tchio Romualdrtw_get_wapi_ie(), rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wps_ie() walk a buffer of Information Elements using the TLV length field without first verifying that the length byte itself is inside the buffer, and without verifying that the element's declared length fits inside the remaining buffer. Both conditions can be reached with crafted input, causing reads past the end of the buffer.
An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending crafted beacon or probe-response frames carrying truncated or oversized IEs. No authentication is required.
Ensure the length byte is inside the buffer (cnt + 1 < in_len) and break out of the loop if the declared element length would read past in_len.
Found by reviewing bounds checks in IE walkers.
Not tested on hardware.
---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not
apply).
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +12 -3
@@ -582,9 +582,12 @@ int rtw_get_wapi_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *wapi_ie, u16 *wapi_len) cnt = (_TIMESTAMP_ + _BEACON_ITERVAL_ + _CAPABILITY_); -while (cnt < in_len) { +while (cnt +1 < in_len) { authmode = in_ie[cnt]; +if (cnt +2 + in_ie[cnt +1 ] > in_len) +break ; +if (authmode ==WLAN_EID_BSS_AC_ACCESS_DELAY && (!memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +6 ], wapi_oui1,4 ) || !memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +6 ], wapi_oui2,4 ))) {
@@ -615,9 +618,12 @@ void rtw_get_sec_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *rsn_ie, u16 *rsn_len, u8 *wpa_ie cnt = (_TIMESTAMP_ + _BEACON_ITERVAL_ + _CAPABILITY_); -while (cnt < in_len) { +while (cnt +1 < in_len) { authmode = in_ie[cnt]; +if (cnt +2 + in_ie[cnt +1 ] > in_len) +break ; +if ((authmode ==WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC ) && (!memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +2 ], &wpa_oui[0 ],4 ))) {if (wpa_ie)
@@ -658,9 +664,12 @@ u8 *rtw_get_wps_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *wps_ie, uint *wps_ielen) cnt =0 ; -while (cnt < in_len) { +while (cnt +1 < in_len) { eid = in_ie[cnt]; +if (cnt +2 + in_ie[cnt +1 ] > in_len) +break ; +if ((eid ==WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC ) && (!memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +2 ], wps_oui,4 ))) { wpsie_ptr = &in_ie[cnt];
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v4 4/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds reads in IE parsing functions
Quoted 38 lines · Delene Tchio Romuald
rtw_get_wapi_ie(),rtw_get_sec_ie()andrtw_get_wps_ie()walk a buffer of Information Elements using the TLV length field without first verifying that the length byte itself is inside the buffer, and without verifying that the element's declared length fits inside the remaining buffer. Both conditions can be reached with crafted input, causing reads past the end of the buffer.An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending crafted beacon or probe-response frames carrying truncated or oversized IEs. No authentication is required.
Ensure the length byte is inside the buffer (cnt + 1 <
in_len) and break out of the loop if the declared element length would read pastin_len.Found by reviewing bounds checks in IE walkers.
Not tested on hardware.Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")Reviewed-by Luka Gejak <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Delene Tchio Romuald <[email protected]>---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did notapply).drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +0
-0
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c int rtw_get_wapi_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *wapi_ie, u16 *wapi_len) · line 589
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +3
-1@@ -582,9 +582,12 @@ int rtw_get_wapi_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *wapi_ie, u16 *wapi_len) cnt = (_TIMESTAMP_ + _BEACON_ITERVAL_ + _CAPABILITY_); -while (cnt < in_len) { +while (cnt +1 < in_len) { authmode = in_ie[cnt]; +if (cnt +2 + in_ie[cnt +1 ] > in_len) +break ;
It's a pity this function doesn't return negative error codes.
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c int rtw_get_wapi_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *wapi_ie, u16 *wapi_len) · line 593
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +1
-0+if (authmode ==WLAN_EID_BSS_AC_ACCESS_DELAY && (!memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +6 ], wapi_oui1,4 ) || !memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +6 ], wapi_oui2,4 ))) {
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
here we are assuming the in_len is at least "cnt + 6 + 4" so we need something like:
if (cnt + 2 + in_ie[cnt + 1] > in_len)
break;
if (authmode == WLAN_EID_BSS_AC_ACCESS_DELAY) {
if (cnt + 10 > in_len)
break;
if (!memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 6], wapi_oui1, 4) || ...drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c void rtw_get_sec_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *rsn_ie, u16 *rsn_len, u8 *wpa_ie · line 628
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +4
-1@@ -615,9 +618,12 @@ void rtw_get_sec_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *rsn_ie, u16 *rsn_len, u8 *wpa_ie cnt = (_TIMESTAMP_ + _BEACON_ITERVAL_ + _CAPABILITY_); -while (cnt < in_len) { +while (cnt +1 < in_len) { authmode = in_ie[cnt]; +if (cnt +2 + in_ie[cnt +1 ] > in_len) +break ; +if ((authmode ==WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC ) && (!memcmp (&in_ie[cnt +2 ], &wpa_oui[0 ],4 ))) {
Same in the other places as well.
regards,
dan carpenter
PATCH v4 5/5 staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption
In reply to Delene Tchio RomualdIn rtw_wep_decrypt(), the payload length is computed as:
length = frame->len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
All operands are unsigned. If the frame is shorter than the sum of the header length and the IV length, this subtraction wraps around and length becomes a huge unsigned value. That value is then used to drive an arc4_crypt() call that reads and writes past the end of the receive buffer.
An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short WEP-encrypted frame. No authentication is required.
Validate that the frame is large enough to contain a WEP payload before computing length.
Found by reviewing length arithmetic in the WEP decrypt path. Not tested on hardware.
---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not
apply).
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c +6 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,12 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)memcpy (&wepkey[0 ], iv,3 );/* memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength); */ memcpy (&wepkey[3 ], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[keyindex].skey[0 ], keylength); + +/* Ensure the frame is long enough for WEP decryption */ +if (((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len <= + prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len) +return ; + length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len; payload = pframe + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->hdrlen;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v4 5/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption
Quoted 39 lines · Delene Tchio Romuald
In
rtw_wep_decrypt(), the payload length is computed as:length = frame->len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;All operands are unsigned. If the frame is shorter than the sum of the header length and the IV length, this subtraction wraps around and length becomes a huge unsigned value. That value is then used to drive an
arc4_crypt()call that reads and writes past the end of the receive buffer.An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short WEP-encrypted frame. No authentication is required.
Validate that the frame is large enough to contain a WEP payload before computing length.
Found by reviewing length arithmetic in the WEP decrypt path. Not tested on hardware.
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")Reviewed-by Luka Gejak <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Delene Tchio Romuald <[email protected]>---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did notapply).drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c +0
-0
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe) · line 120
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c +5
-0@@ -113,6 +113,12 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)memcpy (&wepkey[0 ], iv,3 );/* memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength); */ memcpy (&wepkey[3 ], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[keyindex].skey[0 ], keylength); + +/* Ensure the frame is long enough for WEP decryption */ +if (((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len <= + prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len) +return ;
LGTM. Thanks!
regards,
dan carpenter