ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
PATCH v2 1/1 ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
[BUG]
A corrupt OCFS2 xattr entry can set OCFS2_XATTR_ENTRY_LOCAL while keeping xe_value_size larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE.
Once that entry reaches namevalue_size_xe(), the filesystem trips over:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:namevalue_size_xe fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2e4/0x330 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1638 Call Trace: ocfs2_xa_wipe_namevalue fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1470 [inline] ocfs2_xa_remove_entry+0xae/0x1d0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1941 ocfs2_xa_remove fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2043 [inline] ocfs2_xa_set+0x11a8/0x30a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2247 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x302/0xc50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2795 __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x7e6/0xdb0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3416 ocfs2_xattr_set+0x1447/0x2610 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3650 ocfs2_xattr_security_set+0x37/0x50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:7241 __vfs_removexattr+0x14d/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:518 cap_inode_killpriv+0x29/0x50 security/commoncap.c:355 security_inode_killpriv+0x105/0x220 security/security.c:2724 setattr_prepare+0x147/0x8a0 fs/attr.c:219 ocfs2_setattr+0x504/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1148 notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546 do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline] path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134 do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161 do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1452 [inline] ...
[CAUSE]namevalue_size_xe() assumes on-disk xattr entries keep the local flag and value size consistent, but OCFS2 does not reject an entry that claims local storage for a value larger than the inline limit before handing that entry to namevalue_size_xe().
The exact-match lookup path can return such an entry through xs->here, and bucket defragmentation and splitting can also walk the corrupt entry directly while reorganizing metadata.
[FIX]
Add a small validator for the local/value_size invariant and call it in the paths that feed disk entries to namevalue_size_xe(): exact-match lookup, bucket lookup results, bucket defragmentation, and bucket splitting.
Corrupt metadata is now reported with ocfs2_error() and -EFSCORRUPTED instead of crashing the kernel with BUG_ON().
---
No Fixes tag was added because this is more like a defensive check that is long overdue, not a regression that can be clearly attributed to a specific introduction commit.
[CHANGELOG]
- Fix Signed-off-by email address only; no code changes since v1.
---
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +34 -0
@@ -237,6 +237,23 @@ static int namevalue_size_xe(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe)return namevalue_size (xe->xe_name_len, value_len); } +static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (struct inode *inode, +struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe) +{ +u64 value_len =le64_to_cpu (xe->xe_value_size); + +if (value_len >OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE && +ocfs2_xattr_is_local (xe)) { +ocfs2_error (inode->i_sb, +"Inode %llu has corrupt xattr entry: local value_size %llu\n" , + (unsigned long long )OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno, + value_len); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + static int ocfs2_xattr_bucket_get_name_value(struct super_block *sb, struct ocfs2_xattr_header *xh,
@@ -1099,6 +1116,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index,struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *entry;size_t name_len;int i, name_offset, cmp =1 ; +int ret;if (name ==NULL )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1121,6 +1139,11 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index,return -EFSCORRUPTED ; } cmp =memcmp (name, (xs->base + name_offset), name_len); +if (!cmp) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode, entry); +if (ret) +return ret; + } }if (cmp ==0 )break ;
@@ -3823,6 +3846,9 @@ static int ocfs2_find_xe_in_bucket(struct inode *inode, xe_name =bucket_block (bucket, block_off) + new_offset;if (!memcmp (name, xe_name, name_len)) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode, xe); +if (ret) +break ; *xe_index = i; *found =1 ; ret =0 ;
@@ -4463,6 +4489,10 @@ static int ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode, xe = xh->xh_entries; end =OCFS2_XATTR_BUCKET_SIZE ;for (i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (xh->xh_count); i++, xe++) { + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode, xe); +if (ret) + goto out; + offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset); len =namevalue_size_xe (xe);
@@ -4745,6 +4775,10 @@ static int ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode, name_value_len =0 ;for (i =0 ; i < start; i++) { xe = &xh->xh_entries[i]; + ret =ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry (inode, xe); +if (ret) + goto out; + name_value_len +=namevalue_size_xe (xe);if (le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset) < name_offset) name_offset =le16_to_cpu (xe->xe_name_offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0