erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.
If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.
--- fs/erofs/dir.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/dir.c +14 -12
@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx,const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;unsigned int de_namelen; -/* the last dirent in the block? */ -if (de +1 >= end) - de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -else +/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ +if (de +1 < end) de_namelen =le16_to_cpu (de[1 ].nameoff) - nameoff; +else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; +else + de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -/* a corrupted entry is found */ -if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen >EROFS_NAME_LEN ) { -erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" , -EROFS_I (dir)->nid); -DBG_BUGON (1 ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } +/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ + if (!clamp_t(unsigned int, de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),
@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos +=sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ); }return 0 ; +err_bogus: +erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" ,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); +DBG_BUGON (1 ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; }static int erofs_readdir (struct file *f,struct dir_context *ctx)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
PATCH v2 1/1 erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.
If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.
---
v2:
- should use in_range32() instead.
fs/erofs/dir.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/dir.c +14 -12
@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx,const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;unsigned int de_namelen; -/* the last dirent in the block? */ -if (de +1 >= end) - de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -else +/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ +if (de +1 < end) de_namelen =le16_to_cpu (de[1 ].nameoff) - nameoff; +else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; +else + de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -/* a corrupted entry is found */ -if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen >EROFS_NAME_LEN ) { -erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" , -EROFS_I (dir)->nid); -DBG_BUGON (1 ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } +/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ +if (!in_range32 (de_namelen,1 ,EROFS_NAME_LEN ) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),
@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos +=sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ); }return 0 ; +err_bogus: +erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" ,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); +DBG_BUGON (1 ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; }static int erofs_readdir (struct file *f,struct dir_context *ctx)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
PATCH v3 1/1 erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.
If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.
nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) as well [1].
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
---
v3:
- Disallow unaligned nameoff0 to avoid petential oob reads as well.
fs/erofs/dir.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/dir.c +16 -13
@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx,const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;unsigned int de_namelen; -/* the last dirent in the block? */ -if (de +1 >= end) - de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -else +/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ +if (de +1 < end) de_namelen =le16_to_cpu (de[1 ].nameoff) - nameoff; +else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; +else + de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -/* a corrupted entry is found */ -if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen >EROFS_NAME_LEN ) { -erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" , -EROFS_I (dir)->nid); -DBG_BUGON (1 ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } +/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ +if (!in_range32 (de_namelen,1 ,EROFS_NAME_LEN ) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),
@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos +=sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ); }return 0 ; +err_bogus: +erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" ,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); +DBG_BUGON (1 ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; }static int erofs_readdir (struct file *f,struct dir_context *ctx)
@@ -88,7 +90,8 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) } nameoff =le16_to_cpu (de->nameoff); -if (nameoff <sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ) || nameoff >= bsz) { +if (nameoff <sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ) || nameoff >= bsz || + (nameoff %sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ))) {erofs_err (sb,"invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu" , nameoff,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); err = -EFSCORRUPTED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
Chao Yu
maintainerQuoted 73 lines · Gao Xiang
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with
strnlen()with unchecked nameoffs.If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing
strnlen()to read past the directory block.nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of
sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)as well [1].[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
Fixes 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations")Fixes 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()")Reported-by Yuhao Jiang <[email protected]>Reported-by Junrui Luo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Gao Xiang <[email protected]>---
v3:
- Disallow unaligned nameoff0 to avoid petential oob reads as well.fs/erofs/dir.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/erofs/dir.c +14
-12@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx,const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;unsigned int de_namelen; -/* the last dirent in the block? */ -if (de +1 >= end) - de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -else +/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ +if (de +1 < end) de_namelen =le16_to_cpu (de[1 ].nameoff) - nameoff; +else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; +else + de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -/* a corrupted entry is found */ -if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen >EROFS_NAME_LEN ) { -erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" , -EROFS_I (dir)->nid); -DBG_BUGON (1 ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } +/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ +if (!in_range32 (de_namelen,1 ,EROFS_NAME_LEN ) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos +=sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ); }return 0 ; +err_bogus: +erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" ,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); +DBG_BUGON (1 ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; }static int erofs_readdir (struct file *f,struct dir_context *ctx)
fs/erofs/dir.c static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) · line 91
Quoted 4 lines
fs/erofs/dir.c +0
-1@@ -88,7 +90,8 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) } nameoff =le16_to_cpu (de->nameoff); -if (nameoff <sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ) || nameoff >= bsz) {
You mean?
if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || nameoff % sizeof(struct erofs_dirent))
Thanks,
Quoted 5 lines
fs/erofs/dir.c +2
-0+if (nameoff <sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ) || nameoff >= bsz || + (nameoff %sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ))) {erofs_err (sb,"invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu" , nameoff,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); err = -EFSCORRUPTED ;
Quoted 76 lines · Chao Yu
Quoted 69 lines · Gao Xiang
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with
strnlen()with unchecked nameoffs.If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing
strnlen()to read past the directory block.nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of
sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)as well [1].[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
Fixes 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations")Fixes 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()")Reported-by Yuhao Jiang <[email protected]>Reported-by Junrui Luo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Gao Xiang <[email protected]>---
v3:
- Disallow unaligned nameoff0 to avoid petential oob reads as well.
fs/erofs/dir.c| 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/erofs/dir.c +14
-12@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff; unsigned int de_namelen; - /* the last dirent in the block? */ - if (de + 1 >= end) - de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - else + /* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ + if (de + 1 < end) de_namelen = le16_to_cpu(de[1].nameoff) - nameoff; + else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; + else + de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - /* a corrupted entry is found */ - if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen > EROFS_NAME_LEN) { - erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", - EROFS_I(dir)->nid); - DBG_BUGON(1); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } + /* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ + if (!in_range32(de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos += sizeof(struct erofs_dirent); } return 0; +err_bogus: + erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", EROFS_I(dir)->nid); + DBG_BUGON(1); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; } static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx)fs/erofs/dir.c static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) · line 90
Quoted 3 lines
fs/erofs/dir.c +0
-1@@ -88,7 +90,8 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) } nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff); - if (nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) || nameoff >= bsz) {You mean?
Quoted 1 line
if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || nameoff %
sizeof(struct erofs_dirent))
The explanation can be seen as:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
But I think nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) is also fine? I could also switch to your suggested version.
Thanks,
Gao Xiang
Chao Yu
maintainerQuoted 79 lines · Gao Xiang
Quoted 76 lines · Chao Yu
Quoted 69 lines · Gao Xiang
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with
strnlen()with unchecked nameoffs.If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing
strnlen()to read past the directory block.nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of
sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)as well [1].[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
Fixes 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations")Fixes 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()")Reported-by Yuhao Jiang <[email protected]>Reported-by Junrui Luo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Gao Xiang <[email protected]>---
v3:
- Disallow unaligned nameoff0 to avoid petential oob reads as well.fs/erofs/dir.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/erofs/dir.c +14
-12@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff; unsigned int de_namelen; - /* the last dirent in the block? */ - if (de + 1 >= end) - de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - else + /* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ + if (de + 1 < end) de_namelen = le16_to_cpu(de[1].nameoff) - nameoff; + else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; + else + de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - /* a corrupted entry is found */ - if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen > EROFS_NAME_LEN) { - erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", - EROFS_I(dir)->nid); - DBG_BUGON(1); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } + /* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ + if (!in_range32(de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos += sizeof(struct erofs_dirent); } return 0; +err_bogus: + erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", EROFS_I(dir)->nid); + DBG_BUGON(1); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; } static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx)fs/erofs/dir.c static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) · line 90
Quoted 3 lines
fs/erofs/dir.c +0
-1@@ -88,7 +90,8 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) } nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff); - if (nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) || nameoff >= bsz) {You mean?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || nameoff %
sizeof(struct erofs_dirent))The explanation can be seen as:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.comBut I think
nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)is also fine?
Yes, it's fine to use "nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)", it's a minor cleanup to use "!nameof".
Thanks,
Quoted 5 lines
I could also switch to your suggested version.
Thanks,
Gao Xiang
PATCH v4 1/1 erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
In reply to Chao YuCurrently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.
If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.
nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) as well [1].
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
---
v4:
- switch to if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || (nameoff % sizeof(*de))) as suggested by Chao.
fs/erofs/dir.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/dir.c +15 -13
@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx,const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;unsigned int de_namelen; -/* the last dirent in the block? */ -if (de +1 >= end) - de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -else +/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ +if (de +1 < end) de_namelen =le16_to_cpu (de[1 ].nameoff) - nameoff; +else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; +else + de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -/* a corrupted entry is found */ -if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen >EROFS_NAME_LEN ) { -erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" , -EROFS_I (dir)->nid); -DBG_BUGON (1 ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } +/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ +if (!in_range32 (de_namelen,1 ,EROFS_NAME_LEN ) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),
@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, ctx->pos +=sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ); }return 0 ; +err_bogus: +erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" ,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); +DBG_BUGON (1 ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; }static int erofs_readdir (struct file *f,struct dir_context *ctx)
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) } nameoff =le16_to_cpu (de->nameoff); -if (nameoff <sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ) || nameoff >= bsz) { +if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || (nameoff %sizeof (*de))) {erofs_err (sb,"invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu" , nameoff,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); err = -EFSCORRUPTED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
Quoted 13 lines · Gao Xiang
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with
strnlen()with unchecked nameoffs.If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing
strnlen()to read past the directory block.nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of
sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)as well [1].[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations")Fixes 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()")Reported-by Yuhao Jiang <[email protected]>Reported-by Junrui Luo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
Thanks,