perf dso: Fix kallsyms DSO detection with fallback logic
PATCH v2 1/1 perf dso: Fix kallsyms DSO detection with fallback logic
The current kallsyms detection in dso__is_kallsyms() uses the dso_binary_type enum which fixes the issue of kallsyms being cached in the build-id cache for out-of-tree modules.
However, during build-id injection in perf record/inject, dso_binary_type has not been explicitly set yet,so dso__binary_type() returns DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND instead of DSO_BINARY_TYPE__KALLSYMS for the kernel DSO. The current check then fails to identify it as kallsyms, causing build-id symlinks to not be created in ~/.debug/.build-id/ and perf archive to fail with "Cannot stat" errors.
Steps to reproduce the issue:
1. rm -rf ~/.debug/.build-id
2. perf record sleep 1
3. perf archive
Fix by falling back to matching long_name against the known kallsyms strings explicitly when binary_type is not yet set
(== DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND).
---
v1 -> v2: Rename DSO__NAME_GUEST_KALLSYMS to DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS
to reflect that it is a prefix, not a full name.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
tools/perf/util/dso.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/dso.h +10 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <stdbool.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <string.h> #include "build-id.h" #include "debuginfo.h" #include "mutex.h"
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct perf_env;#define DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS "[kernel.kallsyms]"#define DSO__NAME_KCORE "[kernel.kcore]" +#define DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS "[guest.kernel.kallsyms"/** * enum dso_binary_type - The kind of DSO generally associated with a memory
@@ -915,6 +917,14 @@ static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) {enum dso_binary_type bt =dso__binary_type (dso); +if (bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND ) { +return RC_CHK_ACCESS (dso)->kernel && + ((strncmp (RC_CHK_ACCESS (dso)->long_name,DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS , +strlen (DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS )) ==0 ) || + (strncmp (RC_CHK_ACCESS (dso)->long_name,DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS , +strlen (DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS )) ==0 )); + } +return bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__KALLSYMS || bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__GUEST_KALLSYMS ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
[email protected]
AI reviewSashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s): - [High] Path Traversal and Information Disclosure due to `strncmp` matching any prefix. - [Medium] Incomplete fix: Fallback logic is missing from…
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [High] Path Traversal and Information Disclosure due to strncmp matching any prefix.
- [Medium] Incomplete fix: Fallback logic is missing from dso__is_kcore() and dso__is_vmlinux(). --
commit 9ee80283f13c6a0a5235a2add7a94736c1dfcbba
Author: Tanushree Shah <[email protected]>
perf dso: Fix kallsyms DSO detection with fallback logic
This commit fixes an issue where kallsyms DSOs are not correctly identified during build-id injection because the dso_binary_type is not yet set. It adds a fallback string matching check against the DSO's long_name.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 920
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +1
-0@@ -915,6 +917,14 @@ static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) {enum dso_binary_type bt =dso__binary_type (dso); +if (bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND ) {
Since the fallback logic was added here because dso_binary_type(dso) is DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND during perf record and inject, do dso__is_kcore() and dso__is_vmlinux() require a similar fallback?
Looking at dso__cache_build_id(), it relies on dso__is_kcore() to flag the DSO for special caching logic. If dso__is_kcore() returns false during build-id caching, kcore DSOs are treated as regular files, which causes nsinfo__realpath() to fail and breaks perf archive for kcore sessions.
tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 923
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +3
-0+ return RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->kernel && + ((strncmp(RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->long_name, DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS, + strlen(DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS)) == 0) ||
Does using strncmp() here allow a path traversal if long_name is intentionally crafted?
If a malicious perf.data file contains an MMAP event with a filename like "[kernel.kallsyms]/../../../../tmp/leak", this prefix check evaluates to true.
Could this allow build_id_cache__cachedir() to construct a cache directory using this malicious path, causing build_id_cache__add() to unconditionally copy the host's /proc/kallsyms into an attacker-controlled directory?
Quoted 6 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +4
-0+ (strncmp (RC_CHK_ACCESS (dso)->long_name,DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS , + strlen(DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS)) == 0)); + } +return bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__KALLSYMS || bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__GUEST_KALLSYMS ; }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 43 lines · On 16/04/26 16:39, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [High] Path Traversal and Information Disclosure due tostrncmpmatching any prefix.
- [Medium] Incomplete fix: Fallback logic is missing fromdso__is_kcore()anddso__is_vmlinux(). --commit
9ee80283f13c6a0a5235a2add7a94736c1dfcbba
Author: Tanushree Shah <[email protected]>perf dso: Fix kallsyms DSO detection with fallback logic
This commit fixes an issue where kallsyms DSOs are not correctly identified during build-id injection because the
dso_binary_typeis not yet set. It adds a fallback string matching check against the DSO'slong_name.Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +0
-0[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 920
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +1
-0@@ -915,6 +917,14 @@ static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) {enum dso_binary_type bt =dso__binary_type (dso); +if (bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND ) {Since the fallback logic was added here because
dso_binary_type(dso)isDSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUNDduring perf record and inject, dodso__is_kcore()anddso__is_vmlinux()require a similar fallback?Looking at
dso__cache_build_id(), it relies ondso__is_kcore()to flag the DSO for special caching logic. Ifdso__is_kcore()returns false during build-id caching, kcore DSOs are treated as regular files, which causesnsinfo__realpath()to fail and breaks perf archive for kcore sessions.tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 923
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +3
-0+ return RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->kernel && + ((strncmp(RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->long_name, DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS, + strlen(DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS)) == 0) ||Does using
strncmp()here allow a path traversal iflong_nameis intentionally crafted?
Quoted 7 lines
If a malicious perf.data file contains an MMAP event with a filename like "[kernel.kallsyms]/../../../../tmp/leak", this prefix check evaluates to true.
Could this allow
build_id_cache__cachedir()to construct a cache directory using this malicious path, causingbuild_id_cache__add()to unconditionally copy the host's/proc/kallsymsinto an attacker-controlled directory?
Hello,
The current code relies on dso_binary_type to check if its a kallsyms dso. While running perf archive, the code calls dso__is_kallsyms check to create a build-id dir. But till that time, dso_binary_type is not getting set yet. Hence, this patch introduced usage of dso->long_name to check if it is kallsyms. But based on the above review from Sashiko, it seems that this may create a security concern.
I tried to check for the possibility to set the dso binary type beforedso__is_kallsyms gets called. But, I found that dso binary type is getting set based on dso__is_kallsyms only.
So, I am looking for suggestions/approach that we can take here.
Thanks
Tanushree Shah
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +4
-0+ (strncmp (RC_CHK_ACCESS (dso)->long_name,DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS , + strlen(DSO__PREFIX_GUEST_KALLSYMS)) == 0)); + } +return bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__KALLSYMS || bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__GUEST_KALLSYMS ; }
Namhyung Kim
maintainerQuoted 61 lines · Tanushree Shah
Quoted 42 lines · On 16/04/26 16:39, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [High] Path Traversal and Information Disclosure due tostrncmpmatching any prefix.
- [Medium] Incomplete fix: Fallback logic is missing fromdso__is_kcore()anddso__is_vmlinux(). --commit
9ee80283f13c6a0a5235a2add7a94736c1dfcbba
Author: Tanushree Shah <[email protected]>perf dso: Fix kallsyms DSO detection with fallback logic
This commit fixes an issue where kallsyms DSOs are not correctly identified during build-id injection because the
dso_binary_typeis not yet set. It adds a fallback string matching check against the DSO'slong_name.Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +0
-0[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 919
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +1
-0@@ -915,6 +917,14 @@ static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) {enum dso_binary_type bt =dso__binary_type (dso); +if (bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND ) {Since the fallback logic was added here because
dso_binary_type(dso)isDSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUNDduring perf record and inject, dodso__is_kcore()anddso__is_vmlinux()require a similar fallback?Looking at
dso__cache_build_id(), it relies ondso__is_kcore()to flag the DSO for special caching logic. Ifdso__is_kcore()returns false during build-id caching, kcore DSOs are treated as regular files, which causesnsinfo__realpath()to fail and breaks perf archive for kcore sessions.tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 923
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +3
-0+ return RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->kernel && + ((strncmp(RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->long_name, DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS, + strlen(DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS)) == 0) ||Does using
strncmp()here allow a path traversal iflong_nameis intentionally crafted?Quoted 7 lines
If a malicious perf.data file contains an MMAP event with a filename like "[kernel.kallsyms]/../../../../tmp/leak", this prefix check evaluates to true.
Could this allow
build_id_cache__cachedir()to construct a cache directory using this malicious path, causingbuild_id_cache__add()to unconditionally copy the host's/proc/kallsymsinto an attacker-controlled directory?Hello,
The current code relies ondso_binary_typeto check if its a kallsyms dso. While running perf archive, the code callsdso__is_kallsymscheck to create a build-id dir. But till that time,dso_binary_typeis not getting set yet. Hence, this patch introduced usage ofdso->long_nameto check if it is kallsyms. But based on the above review from Sashiko, it seems that this may create a security concern.
Quoted 5 lines
I tried to check for the possibility to set the dso binary type before
dso__is_kallsymsgets called. But, I found that dso binary type is getting set based ondso__is_kallsymsonly.So, I am looking for suggestions/approach that we can take here.
Can we simply check with strcmp() for the whole string?
Thanks,
Namhyung
Thank you for the suggestion. The reason strcmp() was not used before was due to different variations of guest kallsyms. I further did a bit more analysis and identified that kallsyms can be in three formats:
"[kernel.kallsyms]"
"[guest.kernel.kallsyms]"
"[guest.kernel.kallsyms.<pid>]"
I will implement v3 based on this.
Thanks,
Tanushree Shah
Quoted 68 lines · Namhyung Kim
Quoted 56 lines · Tanushree Shah
Quoted 39 lines · On 16/04/26 16:39,[email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [High] Path Traversal and Information Disclosure due tostrncmpmatching any prefix.
- [Medium] Incomplete fix: Fallback logic is missing fromdso__is_kcore()anddso__is_vmlinux(). --commit
9ee80283f13c6a0a5235a2add7a94736c1dfcbba
Author: Tanushree Shah<[email protected]>perf dso: Fix kallsyms DSO detection with fallback logic
This commit fixes an issue where kallsyms DSOs are not correctly identified during build-id injection because the
dso_binary_typeis not yet set. It adds a fallback string matching check against the DSO'slong_name.Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +0
-0[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 919
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +1
-0@@ -915,6 +917,14 @@ static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) {enum dso_binary_type bt =dso__binary_type (dso); +if (bt ==DSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUND ) {Since the fallback logic was added here because
dso_binary_type(dso)isDSO_BINARY_TYPE__NOT_FOUNDduring perf record and inject, dodso__is_kcore()anddso__is_vmlinux()require a similar fallback?Looking at
dso__cache_build_id(), it relies ondso__is_kcore()to flag the DSO for special caching logic. Ifdso__is_kcore()returns false during build-id caching, kcore DSOs are treated as regular files, which causesnsinfo__realpath()to fail and breaks perf archive for kcore sessions.tools/perf/util/dso.h static inline bool dso__is_kallsyms(const struct dso *dso) · line 923
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.h +3
-0+ return RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->kernel && + ((strncmp(RC_CHK_ACCESS(dso)->long_name, DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS, + strlen(DSO__NAME_KALLSYMS)) == 0) ||Does using
strncmp()here allow a path traversal iflong_nameis intentionally crafted?Quoted 7 lines
If a malicious perf.data file contains an MMAP event with a filename like "[kernel.kallsyms]/../../../../tmp/leak", this prefix check evaluates to true.
Could this allow
build_id_cache__cachedir()to construct a cache directory using this malicious path, causingbuild_id_cache__add()to unconditionally copy the host's/proc/kallsymsinto an attacker-controlled directory?Hello,
The current code relies ondso_binary_typeto check if its a kallsyms dso. While running perf archive, the code callsdso__is_kallsymscheck to create a build-id dir. But till that time,dso_binary_typeis not getting set yet. Hence, this patch introduced usage ofdso->long_nameto check if it is kallsyms. But based on the above review from Sashiko, it seems that this may create a security concern.Quoted 5 lines
I tried to check for the possibility to set the dso binary type before
dso__is_kallsymsgets called. But, I found that dso binary type is getting set based ondso__is_kallsymsonly.So, I am looking for suggestions/approach that we can take here.
Can we simply check with
strcmp()for the whole string?Thanks,
Namhyung