glib-networking: backport fix for CVE-2026-2574
PATCH v3 1/4 glib-networking: backport fix for CVE-2026-2574
CVE-2026-2574:
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read via improper handling of certificate authority data in the OpenSSL backend. An attacker can cause application crashes and potentially disclose limited heap memory by enticing a client to connect to a malicious TLS server that advertises a specially crafted client-CA list.
--- ...of-bounds-read-in-accepted-cas-prope.patch | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ .../glib-networking/glib-networking_2.80.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-networking/glib-networking/0004-openssl-fix-out-of-bounds-read-in-accepted-cas-prope.patch
meta/recipes-core/glib-networking/glib-networking/0004-openssl-fix-out-of-bounds-read-in-accepted-cas-prope.patch new file +48 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From be2173eb9b769255df9474a9128e642b60894f10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Catanzaro <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 12:47:00 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] openssl: fix out of bounds read in accepted-cas property + getter + +The d2i and i2d functions are quite dangerous because they advance the +provided pointer, so we have to pass a temporary pointer if we're later +going to do anything with the original pointer. + +I've audited the codebase and found this is our only such mistake. + +Fixes #228 (CVE-2026-2574) + +Part-of: <https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib-networking/-/merge_requests/269> + + +(cherry picked from commit c3c84b269165f2a312d47fa15c5cbc7f8ead7631) + +Co-authored-by: Michael Catanzaro <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-2574 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <[email protected]> +--- + tls/openssl/gtlsclientconnection-openssl.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/tls/openssl/gtlsclientconnection-openssl.c b/tls/openssl/gtlsclientconnection-openssl.c +index e98fb0b..e2ff0d4 100644 +--- a/tls/openssl/gtlsclientconnection-openssl.c ++++ b/tls/openssl/gtlsclientconnection-openssl.c +@@ -141,9 +141,11 @@ g_tls_client_connection_openssl_get_property (GObject *object, + if (size > 0) + { + unsigned char *ca; ++ unsigned char *tmp; + + ca = g_malloc (size); +- size = i2d_X509_NAME (sk_X509_NAME_value (openssl->ca_list, i), &ca); ++ tmp = ca; ++ size = i2d_X509_NAME (sk_X509_NAME_value (openssl->ca_list, i), &tmp); + if (size > 0) + accepted_cas = g_list_prepend (accepted_cas, g_byte_array_new_take ( + ca, size)); +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-core/glib-networking/glib-networking_2.80.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ inherit gnomebase gettext upstream-version-is-even gio-module-cache ptest-gnome SRC_URI += "file://0001-openssl-properly-check-return-value-when-writing-to-.patch \ file://0002-openssl-check-return-value-of-g_tls_bio_alloc.patch \ file://0003-openssl-check-return-values-of-BIO_new.patch \ + file://0004-openssl-fix-out-of-bounds-read-in-accepted-cas-prope.patch \ file://run-ptest" FILES:${PN} += "\
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2.43.0
PATCH v3 2/4 libsoup: actually apply patches for CVE-2025-32049 and CVE-2026-1539
The patches were added to SRC_URI before inheriting gnomebase, which does SRC_URI = "...". This means the patches were never actually part of SRC_URI, so never applied.
--- meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.6.6.bb | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.6.6.bb +2 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5f30f0716dfdd0d91eb439ebec522ec2" DEPENDS = "glib-2.0 glib-2.0-native libxml2 sqlite3 libpsl nghttp2" +inherit gettext gnomebase upstream-version-is-even gobject-introspection gi-docgen vala + SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "51ed0ae06f9d5a40f401ff459e2e5f652f9a510b7730e1359ee66d14d4872740" SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2025-32049-1.patch \
@@ -20,8 +22,6 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2025-32049-1.patch \ PROVIDES = "libsoup-3.0" -inherit gettext gnomebase upstream-version-is-even gobject-introspection gi-docgen vala - GIR_MESON_ENABLE_FLAG = 'enabled' GIR_MESON_DISABLE_FLAG = 'disabled'
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2.43.0
PATCH v3 3/4 libsoup: mark CVEs which have been resolved upstream
In reply to Ross BurtonThese issues have all been fixed in the 3.6.6 release that we have, but the CPEs are unversioned. I've contacted NIST to update the database but until that happens we can mark them as fixed.
--- meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.6.6.bb | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.6.6.bb +5 -0
@@ -58,3 +58,8 @@ DEBIAN_NOAUTONAME:${PN} = "1" RRECOMMENDS:${PN} = "glib-networking" BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk" + +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-1467] = "fixed-version: fixed in 3.6.6" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-1536] = "fixed-version: fixed in 3.6.6" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-1801] = "fixed-version: fixed in 3.6.6" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-2443] = "fixed-version: fixed in 3.6.6"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 4/4 python3-requests: backport fix for CVE-2026-25645
In reply to Ross BurtonWhen unpacking zip files requests uses predictable paths. Backport a fix to use randomly generated pathnames to mitigate injection attacks.
--- .../python3-requests/CVE-2026-25645.patch | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-requests_2.32.5.bb | 7 ++- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-requests/CVE-2026-25645.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-requests/CVE-2026-25645.patch new file +46 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nate Prewitt <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:57:56 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork + +Prior to version 2.33.0, the `requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths()` utility function +uses a predictable filename when extracting files from zip archives into the system +temporary directory. If the target file already exists, it is reused without validation. +A local attacker with write access to the temp directory could pre-create a malicious +file that would be loaded in place of the legitimate one. Standard usage of the Requests +library is not affected by this vulnerability. Only applications that call +`extract_zipped_paths()` directly are impacted. Starting in version 2.33.0, the library +extracts files to a non-deterministic location. If developers are unable to upgrade, +they can set `TMPDIR` in their environment to a directory with restricted write access. + +CVE: CVE-2026-25645 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7] +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <[email protected]> +--- + src/requests/utils.py | 13 +++++++------ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/requests/utils.py b/src/requests/utils.py +index d8803e6e91..54959bb8ab 100644 +--- a/src/requests/utils.py ++++ b/src/requests/utils.py +@@ -282,12 +282,13 @@ def extract_zipped_paths(path): + return path + + # we have a valid zip archive and a valid member of that archive +- tmp = tempfile.gettempdir() +- extracted_path = os.path.join(tmp, member.split("/")[-1]) +- if not os.path.exists(extracted_path): +- # use read + write to avoid the creating nested folders, we only want the file, avoids mkdir racing condition +- with atomic_open(extracted_path) as file_handler: +- file_handler.write(zip_file.read(member)) ++ suffix = os.path.splitext(member.split("/")[-1])[-1] ++ fd, extracted_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=suffix) ++ try: ++ os.write(fd, zip_file.read(member)) ++ finally: ++ os.close(fd) ++ + return extracted_path + +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-requests_2.32.5.bb +3 -4
@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://requests.readthedocs.io" LICENSE = "Apache-2.0" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=34400b68072d710fecd0a2940a0d1658" -SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ - file://environment.d-python3-requests.sh \ -" +inherit pypi python_setuptools_build_meta SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dbba0bac56e100853db0ea71b82b4dfd5fe2bf6d3754a8893c3af500cec7d7cf" -inherit pypi python_setuptools_build_meta +SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-25645.patch" +SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " file://environment.d-python3-requests.sh" do_install:append:class-nativesdk() { mkdir -p ${D}${SDKPATHNATIVE}/environment-setup.d
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2.43.0