net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
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PATCH 1/1 net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields (gso_type, gso_size, flags, csum_start, csum_offset) between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.
This can lead to:
- Out-of-bounds checksum writes via crafted csum_start/csum_offset
- Malicious GSO segmentation parameters
- Kernel memory corruption and potential local privilege escalation
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
Exploitation requires CAP_NET_RAW, which can be obtained without special privileges via user namespaces.
Confirmed with a PoC on Linux 6.8.0 (Ubuntu): kprobe tracing on skb_partial_csum_set captured 77 race wins in 500,000 iterations.
Affects all kernels since PACKET_VNET_HDR support was added to the TPACKET TX path (~v3.14).
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -1
@@ -2725,7 +2725,8 @@ static int tpacket_parse_header(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame,static int tpacket_snd (struct packet_sock *po,struct msghdr *msg) {struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;struct net_device *dev; -struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr =NULL ; +struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; +bool has_vnet_hdr = false;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;__be16 proto;
int err, reserve = 0;
@@ -2828,16 +2829,17 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
- vnet_hdr = data;
- data += sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
- tp_len -= sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
+ memcpy(&vnet_hdr, data, sizeof(vnet_hdr));
+ data += sizeof(vnet_hdr);
+ tp_len -= sizeof(vnet_hdr);
if (tp_len < 0 ||
- __packet_snd_vnet_parse(vnet_hdr, tp_len)) {
+ __packet_snd_vnet_parse(&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) {
tp_len = -EINVAL;
goto tpacket_error;
}
copylen = __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(),
- vnet_hdr->hdr_len);
+ vnet_hdr.hdr_len);
+ has_vnet_hdr = true;
}
copylen = max_t(int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len);
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
@@ -2875,11 +2877,11 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
}
- if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
- if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, vnet_hdr, vio_le())) {
+ if (has_vnet_hdr) {
+ if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, &vnet_hdr, vio_le())) {
tp_len = -EINVAL; goto tpacket_error;
}
- virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, vnet_hdr);
+ virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, &vnet_hdr);
}
skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
--
2.43.0
Willem de Bruijn
maintainerQuoted 23 lines · Zero Mark
In
tpacket_snd(), whenPACKET_VNET_HDRis enabled,vnet_hdrpoints directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via__packet_snd_vnet_parse()but then re-reads all fields later invirtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify thevnet_hdrfields (gso_type,gso_size, flags,csum_start,csum_offset) between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.This can lead to:
- Out-of-bounds checksum writes via crafted csum_start/csum_offset
- Malicious GSO segmentation parameters
- Kernel memory corruption and potential local privilege escalationThe non-TPACKET path (
packet_snd()) already correctly copiesvnet_hdrto a stack-local variable. All othervnet_hdrconsumers in the kernel (tun.c,tap.c,virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller ofvirtio_net_hdr_to_skb()that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.Fix this by copying
vnet_hdrfrom the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used inpacket_snd()and all other callers.
Quoted 5 lines
Exploitation requires
CAP_NET_RAW, which can be obtained without special privileges via user namespaces.Confirmed with a PoC on Linux 6.8.0 (Ubuntu): kprobe tracing on
skb_partial_csum_setcaptured 77 race wins in 500,000 iterations.
No need to add such details on exploitability of bugs.
Quoted 4 lines
Affects all kernels since
PACKET_VNET_HDRsupport was added to the TPACKET TX path (~v3.14).Fixes 9ed988e5 ("packet: add vnet_hdr support for tpacket_snd")
This patch does not exist. Also 12-char SHA1.
I think this should be
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Zero Mark <[email protected]>
Thanks for the fix!
Only it does not apply cleanly. Please mark fixes [PATCH net] and ensure that they apply to current netdev-net/main
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-netdev.html
Quoted 20 lines
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)net/packet/af_packet.c +2
-1@@ -2725,7 +2725,8 @@ static int tpacket_parse_header(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame,static int tpacket_snd (struct packet_sock *po,struct msghdr *msg) {struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;struct net_device *dev; -struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr =NULL ; +struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; +bool has_vnet_hdr = false;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;__be16 proto;net/packet/af_packet.c +0
-0int err, reserve =0 ;
net/packet/af_packet.c static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) · line 2830
Quoted 5 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +1
-3@@ -2828,16 +2829,17 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)if (po->has_vnet_hdr) { - vnet_hdr = data; - data +=sizeof (*vnet_hdr); - tp_len -=sizeof (*vnet_hdr); +memcpy (&vnet_hdr, data,sizeof (vnet_hdr));
Move the tp_len < 0 check before memcpy
Quoted 33 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +8
-6+ data +=sizeof (vnet_hdr); + tp_len -=sizeof (vnet_hdr);if (tp_len <0 || -__packet_snd_vnet_parse (vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { +__packet_snd_vnet_parse (&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } copylen =__virtio16_to_cpu (vio_le (), - vnet_hdr->hdr_len); + vnet_hdr.hdr_len); + has_vnet_hdr = true; } copylen =max_t (int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len); skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,@@ -2875,11 +2877,11 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) } -if (po->has_vnet_hdr) { -if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { +if (has_vnet_hdr) { +if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, &vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } -virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, vnet_hdr); +virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, &vnet_hdr); } skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb; --2.43.0
PATCH 1/1 net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +13 -8
@@ -2718,7 +2718,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) {struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;struct net_device *dev; -struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr =NULL ; +struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; +bool has_vnet_hdr = false;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;__be16 proto;int err, reserve =0 ;
@@ -2819,16 +2820,20 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) hlen =LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dev); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;if (vnet_hdr_sz) { - vnet_hdr = data; data += vnet_hdr_sz; tp_len -= vnet_hdr_sz; -if (tp_len <0 || -__packet_snd_vnet_parse (vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { +if (tp_len <0 ) { + tp_len = -EINVAL ; + goto tpacket_error; + } +memcpy (&vnet_hdr, data - vnet_hdr_sz,sizeof (vnet_hdr)); +if (__packet_snd_vnet_parse (&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } copylen =__virtio16_to_cpu (vio_le (), - vnet_hdr->hdr_len); + vnet_hdr.hdr_len); + has_vnet_hdr = true; } copylen =max_t (int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len); skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
@@ -2865,12 +2870,12 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) } } -if (vnet_hdr_sz) { -if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { +if (has_vnet_hdr) { +if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, &vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } -virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, vnet_hdr); +virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, &vnet_hdr); } skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 13 lines · Zero Mark
In
tpacket_snd(), whenPACKET_VNET_HDRis enabled,vnet_hdrpoints directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via__packet_snd_vnet_parse()but then re-reads all fields later invirtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify thevnet_hdrfields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.The non-TPACKET path (
packet_snd()) already correctly copiesvnet_hdrto a stack-local variable. All othervnet_hdrconsumers in the kernel (tun.c,tap.c,virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller ofvirtio_net_hdr_to_skb()that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Quoted 6 lines
Fix this by copying
vnet_hdrfrom the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used inpacket_snd()and all other callers.Fixes 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")Signed-off-by Zero Mark <[email protected]>