ntfs3: bound to_move in indx_insert_into_root before hdr_insert_head
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 ntfs3: bound to_move in indx_insert_into_root before hdr_insert_head
indx_insert_into_root() promotes a full resident $INDEX_ROOT into $INDEX_ALLOCATION and copies all non-last resident root entries into a newly allocated INDEX_BUFFER via hdr_insert_head(). The source byte count 'to_move' is summed from the on-disk resident entry sizes and is independent of the destination buffer size, which comes from root->index_block_size (via indx->index_bits).
A crafted NTFS image that keeps a valid, full resident root but shrinks root->index_block_size down to 512 after the root has been populated makes hdr_insert_head() memcpy attacker-controlled resident entry bytes past the end of the kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits) allocation returned by indx_new(). For a 512-byte destination and a resident root whose non-last entries total 560 bytes, the memcpy overruns by 120 bytes and a following memmove extends the highest written offset to 136 bytes past the allocation. The overflow bytes are a direct copy of on-disk entries (via kmemdup), so they are fully attacker-controlled.
The write is reachable from unprivileged open(O_CREAT) on a mounted crafted NTFS image: a single sufficiently long create in a directory whose resident root is already full forces root promotion and triggers the copy.
This is a controlled out-of-bounds write of 120-136 bytes past a kmalloc(index_block_size) allocation, with attacker-controlled content. It is a bounded adjacent-heap corruption primitive; it is not an arbitrary-address write. Successful exploitation into a named victim object depends on the surrounding slab layout.
Reject the copy at the sink. The destination's INDEX_HDR already reports hdr_total (the payload capacity of the new buffer) and hdr_used (the bytes already consumed by the terminal END entry installed by indx_new()); require that to_move fits in the remaining payload before calling hdr_insert_head(). On mismatch, fail with -EINVAL and mark the filesystem as having a detected on-disk inconsistency, which is the same behaviour as the surrounding validation in this function.
---
- FYI, like the sp_size patch, I have a larger refactor that might make this easier to avoid long term. It's a mount-time variant that adds the cross-check between root->index_block_size and the resident root attribute size to indx_init() instead of the sink, closing the whole "root entries do not fit declared index_block_size" class for any future caller that reaches hdr_insert_head from elsewhere. Happy to send it as v2 if you prefer the wider change; otherwise, this minimal guard is scoped to the minimal memcpy overrun site and is easier to backport.
fs/ntfs3/index.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/index.c +16 -0
@@ -1740,6 +1740,22 @@ static int indx_insert_into_root(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni, hdr_used =le32_to_cpu (hdr->used); hdr_total =le32_to_cpu (hdr->total); +/* +* The destination INDEX_BUFFER has 'hdr_total' bytes of payload +* available after the header, of which 'hdr_used' are already +* consumed by the single terminal END entry installed by +* indx_new(). A crafted image can present a resident root whose +* non-last entries (summing to 'to_move') exceed what fits in +* this buffer; copying them unchecked would overrun the +* kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits) allocation backing the new +* buffer. Reject the copy in that case. +*/ +if (to_move > hdr_total - hdr_used) { + err = -EINVAL ; +ntfs_set_state (sbi,NTFS_DIRTY_ERROR ); + goto out_put_n; + } +/* Copy root entries into new buffer. */ hdr_insert_head (hdr, re, to_move);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Konstantin Komarov
maintainerQuoted 75 lines · Michael Bommarito
indx_insert_into_root()promotes a full resident $INDEX_ROOT into $INDEX_ALLOCATION and copies all non-last resident root entries into a newly allocatedINDEX_BUFFERviahdr_insert_head(). The source byte count 'to_move' is summed from the on-disk resident entry sizes and is independent of the destination buffer size, which comes fromroot->index_block_size(viaindx->index_bits).A crafted NTFS image that keeps a valid, full resident root but shrinks
root->index_block_sizedown to 512 after the root has been populated makeshdr_insert_head()memcpy attacker-controlled resident entry bytes past the end of thekmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits)allocation returned byindx_new(). For a 512-byte destination and a resident root whose non-last entries total 560 bytes, the memcpy overruns by 120 bytes and a following memmove extends the highest written offset to 136 bytes past the allocation. The overflow bytes are a direct copy of on-disk entries (via kmemdup), so they are fully attacker-controlled.The write is reachable from unprivileged
open(O_CREAT)on a mounted crafted NTFS image: a single sufficiently long create in a directory whose resident root is already full forces root promotion and triggers the copy.This is a controlled out-of-bounds write of 120-136 bytes past a
kmalloc(index_block_size)allocation, with attacker-controlled content. It is a bounded adjacent-heap corruption primitive; it is not an arbitrary-address write. Successful exploitation into a named victim object depends on the surrounding slab layout.Reject the copy at the sink. The destination's
INDEX_HDRalready reportshdr_total(the payload capacity of the new buffer) andhdr_used(the bytes already consumed by the terminal END entry installed byindx_new()); require thatto_movefits in the remaining payload before callinghdr_insert_head(). On mismatch, fail with-EINVALand mark the filesystem as having a detected on-disk inconsistency, which is the same behaviour as the surrounding validation in this function.Fixes 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>---
- FYI, like the
sp_sizepatch, I have a larger refactor that might make this easier to avoid long term. It's a mount-time variant that adds the cross-check betweenroot->index_block_sizeand the resident root attribute size toindx_init()instead of the sink, closing the whole "root entries do not fit declaredindex_block_size" class for any future caller that reacheshdr_insert_headfrom elsewhere. Happy to send it as v2 if you prefer the wider change; otherwise, this minimal guard is scoped to the minimal memcpy overrun site and is easier to backport.fs/ntfs3/index.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)fs/ntfs3/index.c +9
-0@@ -1740,6 +1740,22 @@ static int indx_insert_into_root(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni, hdr_used =le32_to_cpu (hdr->used); hdr_total =le32_to_cpu (hdr->total); +/* +* The destination INDEX_BUFFER has 'hdr_total' bytes of payload +* available after the header, of which 'hdr_used' are already +* consumed by the single terminal END entry installed by +* indx_new(). A crafted image can present a resident root whose +* non-last entries (summing to 'to_move') exceed what fits in +* this buffer; copying them unchecked would overrun the +* kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits) allocation backing the new +* buffer. Reject the copy in that case.
fs/ntfs3/index.c static int indx_insert_into_root(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni, · line 1761
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ntfs3/index.c +7
-0+*/ +if (to_move > hdr_total - hdr_used) { + err = -EINVAL ; +ntfs_set_state (sbi,NTFS_DIRTY_ERROR ); + goto out_put_n; + } +/* Copy root entries into new buffer. */ hdr_insert_head (hdr, re, to_move);
Hello,
Sorry for the delay.
Your patch is queued for the next merge window, thanks.
Regards,
Konstantin