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wifi: rsi: firmware trust boundary hardening

PATCH New Tristan Madani 1 participant 5 messages Apr 21 Redpine wireless driver

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#0 lore raw

v3 cover wifi: rsi: firmware trust boundary hardening

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

This series adds missing bounds checks for firmware-controlled fields in the RSI 91x driver (rsi_91x_main.c, rsi_91x_core.c, rsi_91x_mgmt.c).

Each patch addresses a specific field that the firmware can set to an out-of-range value, causing OOB reads or infinite loops in the host driver.

Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch to produce valid index hashes and clean diffs (v2 had post-processed index lines that prevented git-am application).

Changes in v2:
- Clarify firmware trust model in commit messages.

Tristan Madani (5):
wifi: rsi: fix integer underflow from firmware extended_desc in
rsi_prepare_skb()
wifi: rsi: fix OOB read from firmware-claimed length exceeding actual
frame size
wifi: rsi: fix OOB read from firmware pad_bytes in management RX path
wifi: rsi: fix infinite loop when firmware sends zero-length packet
wifi: rsi: fix OOB read from firmware offset field in SDIO RX path

 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_mgmt.c |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/5 wifi: rsi: fix integer underflow from firmware extended_desc in rsi_prepare_skb()

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

The firmware-controlled extended_desc value is subtracted from pkt_len without bounds checking. When extended_desc exceeds pkt_len, the u32 subtraction wraps, causing either a failed allocation (DoS) or an out-of-bounds heap read via the subsequent memcpy from buffer + payload_offset. Both SDIO and USB paths are affected.

Add a bounds check to reject packets where extended_desc exceeds pkt_len.

Fixes dad0d04fa7ba ("rsi: data and management rx path")

---
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch to produce valid index hashes (v2 had post-processed index lines).

Changes in v2:
- No code changes from v1.

 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c +5 -0
index 662e42d1e5e8d..2ff7068bad7a7 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *rsi_prepare_skb(struct rsi_common *common,
 		pkt_len = RSI_RCV_BUFFER_LEN * 4;
 	}
 
+	if (extended_desc > pkt_len) {
+		rsi_dbg(ERR_ZONE, "%s: extended_desc %u > pkt_len %u\n",
+			__func__, extended_desc, pkt_len);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	pkt_len -= extended_desc;
 	skb = dev_alloc_skb(pkt_len + FRAME_DESC_SZ);
 	if (skb == NULL)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
#2 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/5 wifi: rsi: fix OOB read from firmware-claimed length exceeding actual frame size

In reply to Tristan Madani

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

The firmware-controlled length field (12-bit, up to 4095) from the RX descriptor is used as the memcpy size in rsi_prepare_skb(). No check ensures this claimed length fits within the actual received data. A malicious or malfunctioning firmware can cause out-of-bounds reads past the RX buffer, leaking kernel heap contents into skbs delivered to mac80211.

Add a bounds check in rsi_read_pkt() to reject frames where offset + length exceeds actual_length.

Fixes dad0d04fa7ba ("rsi: data and management rx path")

---
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch to produce valid index hashes (v2 had post-processed index lines).

Changes in v2:
- No code changes from v1.

 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c +6 -0
index 2ff7068bad7a7..9901bd53cc844 100644
@@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ int rsi_read_pkt(struct rsi_common *common, u8 *rx_pkt, s32 rcv_pkt_len)
 		queueno = rsi_get_queueno(frame_desc, offset);
 		length = rsi_get_length(frame_desc, offset);
 
+		if (offset + length > actual_length) {
+			rsi_dbg(ERR_ZONE,
+				"%s: frame overflows: offset %u + len %u > actual %u\n",
+				__func__, offset, length, actual_length);
+			goto fail;
+		}
 		/* Extended descriptor is valid for WLAN queues only */
 		if (queueno == RSI_WIFI_DATA_Q || queueno == RSI_WIFI_MGMT_Q)
 			extended_desc = rsi_get_extended_desc(frame_desc,
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
#3 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/5 wifi: rsi: fix OOB read from firmware pad_bytes in management RX path

In reply to Tristan Madani

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

The firmware-controlled pad_bytes value (u8, from descriptor byte 4) is used to shift the skb_put_data() source pointer forward in rsi_mgmt_pkt_to_core(). While the existing msg_len -= pad_bytes check catches the case where pad_bytes >= msg_len, it does not prevent a large pad_bytes from shifting the read window into heap memory beyond the actual packet data. The resulting kernel heap contents are delivered to mac80211 as a management frame.

Add validation that pad_bytes does not exceed half of msg_len. Alignment padding in 802.11 management frames is typically 0-3 bytes, so any value exceeding msg_len / 2 indicates a corrupted descriptor.

Fixes dad0d04fa7ba ("rsi: Add RS9113 wireless driver")

---
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch to produce valid index hashes (v2 had post-processed index lines).

Changes in v2:
- No code changes from v1.

 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_mgmt.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_mgmt.c +6 -0
index 7f2c1608f2ce3..ebbc2a43ddfa6 100644
@@ -490,6 +490,12 @@ static int rsi_mgmt_pkt_to_core(struct rsi_common *common,
 	u8 pad_bytes = msg[4];
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
+	if (pad_bytes > msg_len / 2) {
+		rsi_dbg(MGMT_RX_ZONE,
+			"%s: pad_bytes %u too large for msg_len %d\n",
+			__func__, pad_bytes, msg_len);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (!adapter->sc_nvifs)
 		return -ENOLINK;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
#4 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/5 wifi: rsi: fix OOB read from firmware offset field in SDIO RX path

In reply to Tristan Madani

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

The firmware-controlled offset field in rsi_read_pkt() is validated only when rcv_pkt_len is zero (USB path). For the SDIO path, rcv_pkt_len is always positive, so the check is skipped entirely. A crafted offset can cause out-of-bounds reads past the 8192-byte pktbuffer when computing queue number, length, extended descriptor, and data pointers.

Add a transport-independent bounds check to reject offset values that exceed the frame's actual_length.

Fixes dad0d04fa7ba ("rsi: data and management rx path")

---
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch.

Changes in v2:
- New patch in v2, not present in v1.

 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_main.c +6 -0
index eb950e862ecf1..bc03066a240c1 100644
@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@ int rsi_read_pkt(struct rsi_common *common, u8 *rx_pkt, s32 rcv_pkt_len)
 		if (!rcv_pkt_len && offset >
 			RSI_MAX_RX_USB_PKT_SIZE - FRAME_DESC_SZ)
 			goto fail;
+		if (offset > actual_length) {
+			rsi_dbg(ERR_ZONE,
+				"%s: offset %u exceeds length %u\n",
+				__func__, offset, actual_length);
+			goto fail;
+		}
 
 		queueno = rsi_get_queueno(frame_desc, offset);
 		length = rsi_get_length(frame_desc, offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3