KVM: arm64: Validate the FF-A memory access descriptor placement
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 KVM: arm64: Validate the FF-A memory access descriptor placement
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Field name | Offset
-- 0
[ Header (ffa_mem_region) |__ ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]
Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c +6 -0
@@ -508,6 +508,12 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 func_id, buf = hyp_buffers.tx;memcpy (buf, host_buffers.tx, fraglen); +if (FFA_MEM_REGION_HAS_EP_MEM_OFFSET (hyp_ffa_version) && + buf->ep_mem_offset !=sizeof (struct ffa_mem_region )) { + ret =FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ep_mem_access = (void *)buf +ffa_mem_desc_offset (buf,0 , hyp_ffa_version); offset = ep_mem_access->composite_off;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.rc1.555.g9c883467ad-goog
Marc Zyngier
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
What am I missing?
M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Quoted 7 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Hello Marc,
Quoted 17 lines
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
Quoted 8 lines
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
What am I missing?
While the spec allows the gap to be variable (since version 1.1), the arm ff-a driver places it at a fixed position in:ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c#L671
and makes use of the same assumption in: ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored in ep_mem_offset and not adding it up with sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).
Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the ffa_mem_desc_offset() to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset than sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.
Quoted 5 lines
M.Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Thanks,
Sebastian
Sudeep Holla
maintainerQuoted 35 lines · Sebastian Ene
Quoted 7 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Hello Marc,
Quoted 24 lines
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
What am I missing?
While the spec allows the gap to be variable (since version 1.1), the arm ff-a driver places it at a fixed position in:
ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c#L671
That's just the current choice in the driver and can be changed in the future.
Quoted 2 lines
and makes use of the same assumption in:
ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448
Again this is just in the transmit path of the message the driver is constructing and hence it is a simple choice rather than wrong assumption.
Quoted 4 lines
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored in
ep_mem_offsetand not adding it up withsizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).
Sorry what am I missing as the driver is building these descriptors to send it across to SPMC, we are populating the field and it will be 0 before it is initialised
Quoted 3 lines
Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
Can you share the diff you have in mind to understand your concern better or are you referring to this patch itself.
Quoted 5 lines
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
ffa_mem_desc_offset()to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset thansizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.
Calling the host as compromised if it chooses a different offset seems bit of extreme here. I am no sure if I am missing to understand something here.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Sudeep
Quoted 36 lines · Sudeep Holla
Quoted 35 lines · Sebastian Ene
Quoted 7 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Hello Marc,
Quoted 24 lines
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
What am I missing?
While the spec allows the gap to be variable (since version 1.1), the arm ff-a driver places it at a fixed position in:
ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c#L671
Hello Sudeep,
Quoted 8 lines
That's just the current choice in the driver and can be changed in the future.
Quoted 2 lines
and makes use of the same assumption in:
ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448Again this is just in the transmit path of the message the driver is constructing and hence it is a simple choice rather than wrong assumption.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored in
ep_mem_offsetand not adding it up withsizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).Sorry what am I missing as the driver is building these descriptors to send it across to SPMC, we are populating the field and it will be 0 before it is initialised
Right, what I meant is having something like this since this function is not limited to the driver scope and using it from other components would imply relying on the
assumption: 'ep_mem_offset == sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)'. We will also have to validate that the ep_mem_offset doesn't point outside of the mailbox designated buffer.
---
include/linux/arm_ffa.h +1 -1
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ ffa_mem_desc_offset(struct ffa_mem_region *buf, int count, u32 ffa_version)if (!FFA_MEM_REGION_HAS_EP_MEM_OFFSET (ffa_version)) offset += offsetof(struct ffa_mem_region , ep_mem_offset);else - offset +=sizeof (struct ffa_mem_region ); + offset += buf->ep_mem_offset;return offset; }
---
And then move ffa_mem_region_additional_setup to be called earlier before ffa_mem_desc_offset:
(so that it can setup the value for ep_mem_offset)
---
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +2 -2
@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, mem_region->flags = args->flags; mem_region->sender_id = drv_info->vm_id; mem_region->attributes =ffa_memory_attributes_get (func_id); + +ffa_mem_region_additional_setup (drv_info->version, mem_region); composite_offset =ffa_mem_desc_offset (buffer, args->nattrs, drv_info->version);
@@ -708,7 +710,6 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, } mem_region->handle =0 ; mem_region->ep_count = args->nattrs; -ffa_mem_region_additional_setup (drv_info->version, mem_region); ---
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
Can you share the diff you have in mind to understand your concern better or are you referring to this patch itself.
Sure, please let me know if you think this is wrong. I might have misunderstood it.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
ffa_mem_desc_offset()to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset thansizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.Calling the host as compromised if it chooses a different offset seems bit of extreme here. I am no sure if I am missing to understand something here.
Sorry for not explaining it, in pKVM model we don't trust the host kernel so we can assume that everything that doesn't pass the hypervisor validation(in this case the ff-a memory transaction) can be a potential attack that wants to compromise EL2.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Sudeep
Thanks,
Sebastian
Sudeep Holla
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Sebastian Ene
On Wed, Apr 22, 2026 at 08:29:06PM +0100, Sudeep Holla wrote:
[...]
Quoted 15 lines
Hello Sudeep,
Quoted 13 lines
That's just the current choice in the driver and can be changed in the future.
Quoted 2 lines
and makes use of the same assumption in:
ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448Again this is just in the transmit path of the message the driver is constructing and hence it is a simple choice rather than wrong assumption.
Quoted 4 lines
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored in
ep_mem_offsetand not adding it up withsizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Sorry what am I missing as the driver is building these descriptors to send it across to SPMC, we are populating the field and it will be 0 before it is initialised
Right, what I meant is having something like this since this function is not limited to the driver scope and using it from other components would imply relying on the
assumption: 'ep_mem_offset==sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)'. We will also have to validate that theep_mem_offsetdoesn't point outside of the mailbox designated buffer.
Sure, we can extend the function itself or add addition helper to get the functionality you are looking for the validation.
Quoted 25 lines
---
include/linux/arm_ffa.h +1
-2@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ ffa_mem_desc_offset(struct ffa_mem_region *buf, int count, u32 ffa_version)if (!FFA_MEM_REGION_HAS_EP_MEM_OFFSET (ffa_version)) offset += offsetof(struct ffa_mem_region , ep_mem_offset);else - offset +=sizeof (struct ffa_mem_region ); + offset += buf->ep_mem_offset;return offset; } ---And then move
ffa_mem_region_additional_setupto be called earlier beforeffa_mem_desc_offset:
(so that it can setup the value forep_mem_offset)---
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +0
-0
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, · line 695
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +2
-0@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, mem_region->flags = args->flags; mem_region->sender_id = drv_info->vm_id; mem_region->attributes =ffa_memory_attributes_get (func_id); + +ffa_mem_region_additional_setup (drv_info->version, mem_region);
Ah this could do the trick. I need to check if all the usages are covered though.
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +0
-2composite_offset =ffa_mem_desc_offset (buffer, args->nattrs, drv_info->version);@@ -708,7 +710,6 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, } mem_region->handle =0 ; mem_region->ep_count = args->nattrs; -ffa_mem_region_additional_setup (drv_info->version, mem_region); ---Quoted 1 line
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
Can you share the diff you have in mind to understand your concern better or are you referring to this patch itself.
Sure, please let me know if you think this is wrong. I might have misunderstood it.
Nope, the patch helped to understand it quicker. Thanks for that.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
ffa_mem_desc_offset()to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset thansizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Calling the host as compromised if it chooses a different offset seems bit of extreme here. I am no sure if I am missing to understand something here.
Sorry for not explaining it, in pKVM model we don't trust the host kernel so we can assume that everything that doesn't pass the hypervisor validation(in this case the ff-a memory transaction) can be a potential attack that wants to compromise EL2.
I am aware of the principle in general, but this example with different offset can't be assumed as comprised host if the offset + size is well within the Tx buffer size boundaries. That should be the way for you to cross check for any compromise IHMO.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Sudeep
Quoted 24 lines · Sudeep Holla
Quoted 1 line · Sebastian Ene
On Wed, Apr 22, 2026 at 08:29:06PM +0100, Sudeep Holla wrote:
[...]
Quoted 19 lines
Hello Sudeep,
Quoted 16 lines
That's just the current choice in the driver and can be changed in the future.
Quoted 2 lines
and makes use of the same assumption in:
ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448Again this is just in the transmit path of the message the driver is constructing and hence it is a simple choice rather than wrong assumption.
Quoted 4 lines
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored in
ep_mem_offsetand not adding it up withsizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).Sorry what am I missing as the driver is building these descriptors to send it across to SPMC, we are populating the field and it will be 0 before it is initialised
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Right, what I meant is having something like this since this function is not limited to the driver scope and using it from other components would imply relying on the
assumption: 'ep_mem_offset==sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)'. We will also have to validate that theep_mem_offsetdoesn't point outside of the mailbox designated buffer.Sure, we can extend the function itself or add addition helper to get the functionality you are looking for the validation.
Thanks, would it be ok to BUG_ON if the offset is out of range here ? (we would probably have to pass the size of the buf as well in this function)
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 19 lines
---
include/linux/arm_ffa.h +1
-2@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ ffa_mem_desc_offset(struct ffa_mem_region *buf, int count, u32 ffa_version)if (!FFA_MEM_REGION_HAS_EP_MEM_OFFSET (ffa_version)) offset += offsetof(struct ffa_mem_region , ep_mem_offset);else - offset +=sizeof (struct ffa_mem_region ); + offset += buf->ep_mem_offset;return offset; } ---And then move
ffa_mem_region_additional_setupto be called earlier beforeffa_mem_desc_offset:
(so that it can setup the value forep_mem_offset)
Quoted 15 lines
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, · line 695
Quoted 11 lines
---
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +2
-0@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, mem_region->flags = args->flags; mem_region->sender_id = drv_info->vm_id; mem_region->attributes =ffa_memory_attributes_get (func_id); + +ffa_mem_region_additional_setup (drv_info->version, mem_region);Ah this could do the trick. I need to check if all the usages are covered though.
I looked a bit at the call paths and I think we can use it like this. Please let me know if you found it differently. I would like to re-spin another version of this patch.
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +0
-2composite_offset =ffa_mem_desc_offset (buffer, args->nattrs, drv_info->version);@@ -708,7 +710,6 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize, } mem_region->handle =0 ; mem_region->ep_count = args->nattrs; -ffa_mem_region_additional_setup (drv_info->version, mem_region); ---Quoted 1 line
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
Can you share the diff you have in mind to understand your concern better or are you referring to this patch itself.
Sure, please let me know if you think this is wrong. I might have misunderstood it.
Nope, the patch helped to understand it quicker. Thanks for that.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
ffa_mem_desc_offset()to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset thansizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Calling the host as compromised if it chooses a different offset seems bit of extreme here. I am no sure if I am missing to understand something here.
Sorry for not explaining it, in pKVM model we don't trust the host kernel so we can assume that everything that doesn't pass the hypervisor validation(in this case the ff-a memory transaction) can be a potential attack that wants to compromise EL2.
Quoted 5 lines
I am aware of the principle in general, but this example with different offset can't be assumed as comprised host if the offset + size is well within the Tx buffer size boundaries. That should be the way for you to cross check for any compromise IHMO.
I agree, it cannot be assumed as a compromised host it can be perferctly normal with another driver that places it at a different offset; that's why I suggested patching ffa_mem_desc_offset instead and doing the ep_mem_offset validation there.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Sudeep
Thanks,
Sebastian
Marc Zyngier
maintainerQuoted 36 lines · Sebastian Ene
Quoted 7 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Hello Marc,
Quoted 24 lines
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
What am I missing?
While the spec allows the gap to be variable (since version 1.1), the arm ff-a driver places it at a fixed position in:
ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c#L671
That's an implementation detail, and you shouldn't rely on this.
Quoted 8 lines
and makes use of the same assumption in:
ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored inep_mem_offsetand not adding it up withsizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
I think you should parse the buffers as the spec intends them, without assumptions or limitations.
Quoted 5 lines
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
ffa_mem_desc_offset()to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset thansizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.
Why compromised? Isn't that a perfectly valid thing to do? What I understand is that the FFA 1.1 implementation in pKVM doesn't match the expectations of the spec. If that's indeed the case, pKVM should be fixed to accept these messages correctly, or stop using FFA 1.1.
M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Quoted 53 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 36 lines · Sebastian Ene
Quoted 7 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Hello Marc,
Quoted 24 lines
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
What am I missing?
While the spec allows the gap to be variable (since version 1.1), the arm ff-a driver places it at a fixed position in:
ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c#L671That's an implementation detail, and you shouldn't rely on this.
Quoted 6 lines
and makes use of the same assumption in:
ffa_mem_desc_offset().
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448
The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset based on the value stored inep_mem_offsetand not adding it up withsizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do you think ?
I think you should parse the buffers as the spec intends them, without assumptions or limitations.
Ack.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
ffa_mem_desc_offset()to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host places an EMAD at a different offset thansizeof(struct ffa_mem_region), then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.
Quoted 6 lines
Why compromised? Isn't that a perfectly valid thing to do? What I understand is that the FFA 1.1 implementation in pKVM doesn't match the expectations of the spec. If that's indeed the case, pKVM should be fixed to accept these messages correctly, or stop using FFA 1.1.
M.
Sorry, what I meant is that a potentially malicious host could abuse this limitation of the FF-A proxy validation which is looking at a fixed offset to do the EMAD validation. Another EMAD can be placed at a different offset and it will bypass the validation of the proxy alltogether.
We have two choices: the simple one is what this patch does (enforce a fixed offset) or the second one : patch ffa_mem_desc_offset to use ep_mem_offset instead of sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region) and validate the ep_mem_offset.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Thanks,
Sebastian
Sudeep Holla
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Ene
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
As I read this, you want to remove a bad assumption...
Indeed, it matches my understanding as well. I got confused with the code change initially only to realise you want to restrict the choice of offset.
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Quoted 8 lines
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
Quoted 7 lines
And yet you decide that you want to enforce this assumption. I don't understand how you arrive to this conclusion.
Looking at the spec, it appears that the offset is *designed* to allow a gap between the header and the EMAD. Refusing to handle a it seems to be a violation of the spec.
+1
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Sudeep
I haven't tested this, but the change looks reasonable to me.
Samet
Quoted 48 lines
2026. 4. 22. 오후 1:27, Sebastian Ene <[email protected]> 작성:
Prevent the pKVM hypervisor from making assumptions that the endpoint memory access descriptor (EMAD) comes right after the FF-A memory region header and enforce a strict placement for it when validating an FF-A memory lend/share transaction.
Prior to FF-A version 1.1 the header of the memory region didn't contain an offset to the endpoint memory access descriptor. The layout of a memory transaction looks like this:
Field name | Offset
-- 0[ Header (
ffa_mem_region) |__ep_mem_offset
EMAD 1 (ffa_mem_region_attributes) |
]Reject the host from specifying a memory access descriptor offset that is different than the size of the memory region header.
Fixes 42fb33dde42b ("KVM: arm64: Use FF-A 1.1 with pKVM")Signed-off-by Sebastian Ene <[email protected]>---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c| 6 ++++++1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c +6
-1@@ -508,6 +508,12 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 func_id, buf = hyp_buffers.tx;memcpy (buf, host_buffers.tx, fraglen); +if (FFA_MEM_REGION_HAS_EP_MEM_OFFSET (hyp_ffa_version) && + buf->ep_mem_offset !=sizeof (struct ffa_mem_region )) { + ret =FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ep_mem_access = (void *)buf +ffa_mem_desc_offset (buf,0 , hyp_ffa_version); offset = ep_mem_access->composite_off; --2.54.0.rc1.555.g9c883467ad-goog