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ipv6: Cap TLV scan in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim

PATCH Applied Daniel Borkmann 4 participants 4 messages Apr 21 – Apr 23

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 ipv6: Cap TLV scan in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim

Commit 47d3d7ac656a ("ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options") added net.ipv6.max_{hbh,dst}_opts_{cnt,len} and applied them in ip6_parse_tlv(), the generic TLV walker invoked from ipv6_destopt_rcv() and ipv6_parse_hopopts().

ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() does not go through ip6_parse_tlv(); it has its own hand-rolled TLV scanner inside its NEXTHDR_DEST branch which looks for IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT. That inner loop is bounded only by optlen, which can be up to 2048 bytes. Stuffing the Destination Options header with 2046 Pad1 (type=0) entries advances the scanner a single byte at a time, yielding ~2000 TLV iterations per extension header.

Reusing max_dst_opts_cnt to bound the TLV iterations, matching the semantics from 47d3d7ac656a, would require duplicating ip6_parse_tlv() to also validate Pad1/PadN payload. It would also mandate enforcing max_dst_opts_len, since otherwise an attacker shifts the axis to few options with a giant PadN and recovers the original DoS. Allowing up to 8 options before the tunnel encapsulation limit TLV is liberal enough; in practice encap limit is the first TLV. Thus, go with a hard-coded limit IP6_TUNNEL_MAX_DEST_TLVS (8).

---
v2->v3:
- Hard code limit of 8 instead of max_dst_opts_cnt (Ido)
v1->v2:
- Use abs() given max_dst_opts_cnt's negative meaning (Justin)
- Remove unlikely (Justin)

 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +6 -0
index 907c6a2af331..4546a60942ab 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK("ip6tnl");
 MODULE_ALIAS_NETDEV("ip6tnl0");
 
+#define IP6_TUNNEL_MAX_DEST_TLVS    8
+
 #define IP6_TUNNEL_HASH_SIZE_SHIFT  5
 #define IP6_TUNNEL_HASH_SIZE (1 << IP6_TUNNEL_HASH_SIZE_SHIFT)
 
@@ -430,11 +432,15 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw)
 				break;
 		}
 		if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) {
+			int tlv_cnt = 0;
 			u16 i = 2;
 
 			while (1) {
 				struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *tel;
 
+				if (unlikely(tlv_cnt++ >= IP6_TUNNEL_MAX_DEST_TLVS))
+					break;
+
 				/* No more room for encapsulation limit */
 				if (i + sizeof(*tel) > optlen)
 					break;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
maintainer Reviewed-by on v3 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Daniel Borkmann

Commit 47d3d7ac656a ("ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options") added net.ipv6.max_{hbh,dst}_opts_{cnt,len} and applied them in ip6_parse_tlv(), the generic TLV walker invoked from ipv6_destopt_rcv() and ipv6_parse_hopopts().

ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() does not go through ip6_parse_tlv(); it has its own hand-rolled TLV scanner inside its NEXTHDR_DEST branch which looks for IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT. That inner loop is bounded only by optlen, which can be up to 2048 bytes. Stuffing the Destination Options header with 2046 Pad1 (type=0) entries advances the scanner a single byte at a time, yielding ~2000 TLV iterations per extension header.

Reusing max_dst_opts_cnt to bound the TLV iterations, matching the semantics from 47d3d7ac656a, would require duplicating ip6_parse_tlv() to also validate Pad1/PadN payload. It would also mandate enforcing max_dst_opts_len, since otherwise an attacker shifts the axis to few options with a giant PadN and recovers the original DoS. Allowing up to 8 options before the tunnel encapsulation limit TLV is liberal enough; in practice encap limit is the first TLV. Thus, go with a hard-coded limit IP6_TUNNEL_MAX_DEST_TLVS (8).

Quoted 1 line

Given that you are targeting net and that the issue was always present, I would use:

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by on v3 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 23 lines · Daniel Borkmann

Commit 47d3d7ac656a ("ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options") added net.ipv6.max_{hbh,dst}_opts_{cnt,len} and applied them in ip6_parse_tlv(), the generic TLV walker invoked from ipv6_destopt_rcv() and ipv6_parse_hopopts().

ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() does not go through ip6_parse_tlv(); it has its own hand-rolled TLV scanner inside its NEXTHDR_DEST branch which looks for IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT. That inner loop is bounded only by optlen, which can be up to 2048 bytes. Stuffing the Destination Options header with 2046 Pad1 (type=0) entries advances the scanner a single byte at a time, yielding ~2000 TLV iterations per extension header.

Reusing max_dst_opts_cnt to bound the TLV iterations, matching the semantics from 47d3d7ac656a, would require duplicating ip6_parse_tlv() to also validate Pad1/PadN payload. It would also mandate enforcing max_dst_opts_len, since otherwise an attacker shifts the axis to few options with a giant PadN and recovers the original DoS. Allowing up to 8 options before the tunnel encapsulation limit TLV is liberal enough; in practice encap limit is the first TLV. Thus, go with a hard-coded limit IP6_TUNNEL_MAX_DEST_TLVS (8).

Quoted 1 line

Thanks, Daniel.

Cheers,
Justin

#3 lore raw
In reply to Daniel Borkmann
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Quoted 13 lines · On Tue, 21 Apr 2026 22:24:06 +0200 you wrote:

Commit 47d3d7ac656a ("ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options") added net.ipv6.max_{hbh,dst}_opts_{cnt,len} and applied them in ip6_parse_tlv(), the generic TLV walker invoked from ipv6_destopt_rcv() and ipv6_parse_hopopts().

ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() does not go through ip6_parse_tlv(); it has its own hand-rolled TLV scanner inside its NEXTHDR_DEST branch which looks for IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT. That inner loop is bounded only by optlen, which can be up to 2048 bytes. Stuffing the Destination Options header with 2046 Pad1 (type=0) entries advances the scanner a single byte at a time, yielding ~2000 TLV iterations per extension header.

Quoted 1 line

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [net,v3] ipv6: Cap TLV scan in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/076b8cad77aa

You are awesome, thank you!

Signature · 2 lines
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